State of Louisiana v. Niesha Willis

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2022-K-0452

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
NIESHA WILLIS *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 553-136, SECTION “C”
Honorable Benedict J. Willard, Judge
******
Judge Dale N. Atkins
******
(Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge
Dale N. Atkins)

Annie Flanagan
Orleans Public Defenders
2601 Tulane Ave., Suite 700
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, NIESHA WILLIS

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED
SEPTEMBER 1ST, 2022

DNA
DLD
TGC
This is a criminal case involving a charge of aggravated battery. Relator,

Niesha Willis (hereinafter “Ms. Willis”), seeks review of the district court’s May

31, 2022 judgement, which denied her Motion to Suppress her statement and the

evidence seized from her person (hereinafter “Motion to Suppress”). For the

following reasons, we grant the writ and reverse the judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 13, 2022, the State of Louisiana (hereinafter “the State”) charged

Ms. Willis with aggravated battery in violation of La. R.S. 14:341 and alleged that

“[Ms. Willis], on or about March 18, 2021, did commit a battery . . . with a

dangerous weapon, to wit: a knife.” Ms. Willis appeared for arraignment and

entered a plea of not guilty on March 14, 2022. Subsequently, on April 5, 2022,

Ms. Willis filed a Motion to Suppress, wherein she sought “[a]n order suppressing

any and all statements [and] evidence . . . in this case obtained in violation of the

federal and state constitutions, or the statutes of this state . . . .”

1 Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:34 defines aggravated battery as “a battery

committed with a dangerous weapon.”

1

May 31, 2022 Hearing on Motion to Suppress

On May 31, 2022, the district court held a hearing on Ms. Willis’ Motion to

Suppress. The State called Sergeant Randy Walton (hereinafter “Sergeant

Walton”), who testified that he was employed by the New Orleans Police

Department (hereinafter “NOPD”) in the Fifth District Property Crimes Division

on March 18, 2021. Sergeant Walton stated that on that date, he “heard a broadcast

for aggravated battery by cutting right where [he] was” and “[s]imultaneously . . .

was flagged down by a group of females who pointed in the direction of a stabbing

suspect.” He testified that afterward he “rounded the corner and saw that suspect

and detained her.” Regarding why he detained Ms. Willis as soon as he saw her,

Sergeant Walton testified that the only reason was that she had been pointed out by

the group of women. Sergeant Walton stated that he “[b]riefly” spoke to the

suspect, whom he identified at the hearing as Ms. Willis, when he first came into

contact with her and noted that he thought she “had a pipe” but that she “complied

with everything [and] dropped the pipe.” In particular, Sergeant Walton explained

that he told Ms. Willis that “[s]ome females pointed [her] out as a stabbing

suspect” because he “always make[s] it a point to explain why [he is] stopping”

someone. However, Sergeant Walton testified that he did not speak to Ms. Willis

about her version of what happened.

Sergeant Walton testified that thereafter he “requested units” and that

uniformed officers arrived at his request.2 He explained that, upon the arrival of the

unit, a “[p]latoon officer came and took over the investigation” as the primary

investigating officer. Sergeant Walton identified that officer as Officer Jordan

2 Sergeant Walton testified that he was not in uniform at the time.

2

Adderley (hereinafter “Officer Adderley”)3 and explained that upon Officer

Adderley’s arrival, Sergeant Walton “gave him the same gist . . . about what

occurred and how [he] came into contact with [the suspect].” Additionally,

Sergeant Walton testified that Officer Adderley was the one who wrote the

incident report concerning this matter. However, Officer Adderley did not testify at

the May 31, 2022 hearing.

Sergeant Walton’s testimony is unclear as to whether he or Officer Adderley

placed Ms. Willis in handcuffs.4 Regardless, Sergeant Walton answered

affirmatively when asked if Officer Adderley was still investigating the incident at

the time Ms. Willis was arrested and whether Officer Adderley told Ms. Willis that

he was investigating the matter when she was placed in handcuffs. Regarding what

ensued after Ms. Willis was placed in handcuffs, the following colloquy occurred:

Q. And at the point that Ms. Willis was put in handcuffs, Officer
Adderley patted Ms. Willis down?

A. He could have. I [cannot] speak for him.

Q. Officer Adderley reached inside her pocket?

A. Again, I [cannot] speak for any action he did.

Q. Well [O]fficer Adderley took a piece of evidence off of Ms.
Willis.[5]

....

3The transcript of the May 31, 2022 hearing does not provide Officer
Adderley’s first name; but it appears elsewhere in the record.
4 Sergeant Walton answered, “I believe so. Yes.” when counsel for Ms.
Willis asked Sergeant Walton, “[s]o Officer Adderley was the person who actually
put Ms. Willis in handcuffs, correct? Or was that you?”
5 In her writ application to this Court, which is discussed more fully
throughout the Opinion, Ms. Willis explains that “[a]t some point. Officer
Adderley conducted a search of Ms. Willis and seized the blade of a knife from
inside of her pocket.”

3

[A.] [I am] unaware if he did or [did not].

....

Q. Ms. Willis said that the incident actually begun [sic] at a nearby
convenience store; is that correct?

A. Did she say that to me? I [do not] remember.

Q. You [do not] remember that?

A. No.

Q. Officer Adderley actually went to that convenience store, are
you aware?

A. No.

Q. [You are] not aware that anyone got any surveillance footage
from that convenience store?

A. No, [I am] not.

Additionally, Sergeant Walton stated that, at the time Ms. Willis was placed

in handcuffs, Officer Adderley had only spoken to him and Ms. Willis. Sergeant

Walton further testified that, at the time Ms. Willis was placed in handcuffs,

neither he nor Officer Adderley had spoken to the women who had pointed Ms.

Willis out as a suspect. When asked about his and Officer Adderley’s

conversations with any witnesses to the incident, Sergeant Walton testified as

follows:

Q. And you [did not] speak with any other witnesses?

A. The group of females, I think I passed by the location where
they were when I was leaving.

....

Q. Did you or Officer Adderley speak to any witnesses [other than
the group of women]?

4

A. I [cannot] speak for him. I did not.

....

Q. So you [do not] know what the [group of women] said at all
about the incident?

A. Other than them giving me a brief description of Ms. Willis and
flagging me down and pointing, that was pretty much the extent of my
interaction with them.

Q. And [you are] unaware of Officer Adderley’s interaction with
them?

A. Yes, because I left the scene afterwards.

Sergeant Walton was also unaware or could not recall that Ms. Willis claimed that

she had problems with these women in the past; acted in self-defense; that the

women attacked her; and that the women had thrown the pipe at her.

Counsel for Ms. Willis asked Sergeant Walton if he “perform[ed]

[Miranda6] on Ms. Willis” when he spoke with her, and Sergeant Walton

responded, “[n]o.” Additionally, counsel for Ms. Willis inquired if Sergeant

6In Miranda v. Arizona, which is discussed more fully throughout this
Opinion, the United States Supreme Court held:

[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence
and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The
defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver
is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966) (footnote omitted).

5

Walton knew who provided Ms. Willis with her Miranda rights, and he again

answered, “[n]o.” Counsel for Ms. Willis then asked Sergeant Walton whether he

knew if Ms. Willis received her Miranda rights, and Sergeant Walton responded,

“I [cannot] recall.”

After Sergeant Walton’s testimony, counsel for Relator argued that the State

failed to prove that any statements made by Ms. Willis and the evidence seized

from her person were constitutionally obtained. At the close of the hearing, the

district court orally denied Ms. Willis’ Motion to Suppress. On June 22, 2022,

Relator filed a notice of intent, which the district court granted.

Subsequently, on July 5, 2022, Ms. Willis timely filed her writ application

with this Court. Therein, Ms. Willis (hereinafter “Relator”) explains that “[a]t

some point, Officer Adderley conducted a search . . . and seized the blade of a

knife from inside of her pocket. [She] was interrogated by NOPD Officer Jordan

Adderley, and made a statement.” Relator asserts that the district court erred by

denying her Motion to Suppress. Specifically, Relator contends that the district

court erred in denying her Motion to Suppress regarding any purported confession

or statement she made because the State failed to produce evidence she received

her Miranda warnings. Further, she asserts that the district court erred in denying

her Motion to Suppress regarding any evidence seized from her person because the

State did not produce evidence that Officer Adderley had justification to search

her. Prior to considering the merits, we turn to the standard of review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As this Court has explained, a district court has “great discretion when ruling

on a motion to suppress[,]” and the district court’s ruling “will not be disturbed

absent an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Polkey, 2020-0482, p. 3 (La. App. 4

6

Cir. 11/25/20), 310 So.3d 605, 608 (quoting State v. Jones, 2012-0438, pp. 6-7 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 3/13/13), 119 So.3d 9, 15). “A [district] court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress . . . is entitled to great weight, because the [district] court has the

opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh the credibility of their testimony.”

State ex rel. J.S., 2008-1401, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/18/09), 6 So.3d 904, 908

(citing State v. Howard, 2000-2405, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/01), 787 So.2d 404,

407; State v. Johnson, 1998-2544, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/99), 748 So.2d 527,

530).

However, a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.

Polkey, 2020-0482, p. 4, 310 So.3d at 608 (quoting Jones, 2012-0438, p. 7, 119

So.3d at 15). Accordingly, an “appellate court reviews the underlying facts [under]

an abuse of discretion standard, but reviews conclusions to be drawn from those

facts de novo.” Id. If the facts are not in dispute, then an appellate court “must

consider whether the trial court came to the proper legal determination under the

undisputed facts.” Id. See also State v. Parker, 48,339, p. 11 (La. App. 2 Cir.

10/9/13), 124 So.3d 516, 522 (citing State v. Hemphill, 41,526, p. 10 (La. App. 2

Cir.11/17/06), 942 So.2d 1263, 1271; State v. Marshall, 46,457, p. 6 (La. App. 2

Cir.8/10/11), 70 So.3d 1106, 1111).

DISCUSSION

Motion to Suppress - Statement

As noted previously, Relator contends that the district court erred in denying

her Motion to Suppress regarding the statement she made to Officer Adderley. In

her writ application she asserts that “the State failed to meet its burden to prove

that [her] statement was constitutionally obtained” per La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D)

because “[n]o evidence was introduced by the State to demonstrate that [Relator]

7

was given Miranda warnings of any kind or that she knowingly and voluntarily

waived those rights.” Relator argues, therefore, that the district court’s judgment

must be reversed and that her statement must be suppressed.

Pertaining to motions to suppress statements, La. C.Cr.P. art. 703 provides,

in pertinent part:

B. A defendant may move on any constitutional ground to
suppress a confession or statement of any nature made by the
defendant.

....

D. On the trial of a motion to suppress filed under the
provisions of this Article, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
prove the ground of his motion, except that the state shall have the
burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or
statement by the defendant . . . .

Additionally, La. R.S. 15:451 states that “[b]efore what purports to be a confession

can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and

voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces,

threats, inducements or promises.” Thus, at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress,

the State bore the burden of proving the admissibility of Relator’s statement. We

turn to the law regarding statements made by those who are accused to determine

whether the State satisfied its burden.

Regarding the free and voluntary nature of confessions and statements, both

the Louisiana and United States Constitutions provide “procedural safeguards

effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda, 348 U.S. at

444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution

establishes that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself . . . .” In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held “that the

Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and

8

serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed

in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” 384 U.S.

at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624. Further, in Miranda, the United States Supreme Court

held that “[p]rior to any questioning, [a person who has been taken into custody or

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way] must be

warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be

used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,

either retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Concerning the

“[r]ights of the [a]ccused,” La. Const. art. I, § 13 (1974) states that “[w]hen any

person has been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or

commission of any offense, he [or she] shall be advised fully of the reason for his

[or her] arrest or detention, his [or her] right to remain silent, his [or her] right

against self[-]incrimination, his [or her] right to the assistance of counsel and, if

indigent, his [or her] right to court appointed counsel.” See also La. C.Cr.P. art.

218.1.

In interpreting these laws, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal has

explained:

Before an inculpatory statement made during a custodial
interrogation may be introduced into evidence, the State must prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was first advised of his
Miranda rights, that he voluntarily and intelligently waived them, and
that the statement was made freely and voluntarily and not under the
influence of fear, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or
promises.

State v. Chester, 2019-0363, pp. 30-31 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/3/21), 314 So.3d 914,

944 (citing State v. Loeb, 2009-0341 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/23/10), 34 So.3d 917, 924-

25). See also State v. Williams, 2007-0700, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/13/08), 977

9

So.2d 1101, 1109 (quoting State v. Butler, 2004-0880, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir.

1/27/05), 894 So.2d 415, 418).

This Court has defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by

law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” State v. Marzett, p. 11

(La. App. 4 Cir. 6/9/10), 40 So.3d 1204, 1211 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,

86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694). “A suspect is ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes

. . . when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the

situation to constitute a restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated

with formal arrest.” State v. Barabin, 2013-0334, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/11/13),

124 So.3d 1121, 1124 (quoting State v. Watson, 1999-1448, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir.

8/23/00), 774 So.2d 232, 242). “Custodial interrogation includes situations which

fall short of an actual arrest but where the accused is questioned by the police in a

setting which indicated that [the accused] has been deprived of his freedom of

action in a significant way.” State v. Alford, 29,343, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/9/97),

694 So.2d 1162, 1166 (citing State v. Menne, 380 So.2d 14, 16-17 (La. 1980)).

The determination as to “whether a person has been taken into custody, detained or

deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way is determined by an

objective test on a case by case basis.” Id. (citing Menne, 380 So.2d at 17). The test

includes consideration as to “whether there was probable cause to arrest prior to

questioning, whether the statements and actions of the police indicate an intent to

hold or restrain the accused, whether the accused reasonably believed he was

restrained[,] and the extent to which the investigation had focused on the accused.”

Id. (citing State v. Thompson, 399 So.2d 1161, 1165 (La. 1981); State v. Womack,

592 So.2d 872, 877 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991)).

10

In the matter sub judice, Relator made her statement sometime after she was

detained by Sergeant Walton. Though the record is unclear as to whether Relator

made the statement after she was placed in handcuffs,7 we find that a reasonable

person in Relator’s position would have understood the situation to constitute a

restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest, such

that the situation rose to the level of a custodial interrogation. See Barabin, 2013-

0334, p. 5, 124 So.3d at 1124 (quoting Watson, 1999-1448, p. 19, 774 So.2d at

242). Sergeant Walton’s testimony indicates that the NOPD officers focused their

investigation on Relator and intended to hold her based on the group of women

pointing her out as a stabbing suspect. See Alford, 29,343, p. 6, 694 So.2d at 1166

(citing Thompson, 399 So.2d at 1165; Womack, 592 So.2d at 877). In particular,

Sergeant Walton testified that he told Relator that “[s]ome females pointed [her]

out as a stabbing suspect” to explain to her why he had stopped her; and, thereafter,

Officer Adderley questioned Relator after Sergeant Walton notified him why he

had stopped Relator. Sergeant Walton testified that he did not give Relator her

Miranda rights and that he did not know if Relator ever received her Miranda

rights. The State produced no evidence that Relator received her rights in

compliance with Miranda. Because the State failed to prove that Relator received

her Miranda rights prior to her making the statement, we conclude that the district

court erred by denying Relator’s Motion to Suppress regarding the statement.

7 Sergeant Walton did not testify as to when Relator made the subject
statement; and in her writ application Relator notes “[a]t some point. Officer
Adderley conducted a search of Ms. Willis and seized the blade of a knife from
inside of her pocket. Ms. Willis was interrogated by NOPD Officer [] Adderley,
and made a statement.”

11

Motion to Suppress - Evidence

In her writ application, Relator also asserts that the district court erred in

denying her Motion to Suppress relating to the evidence seized from her person. In

particular, Relator contends that “Officer Adderley did not have probable cause for

[an] arrest and search” and that “Officer Adderley did not have a ‘particularized

and objective basis’ to suspect that [she] was armed and dangerous.” Regarding

motions to suppress evidence, La. C.Cr.P. art. 703 provides, in pertinent part:

A. A defendant adversely affected may move to suppress any
evidence from use at the trial on the merits on the ground that it was
unconstitutionally obtained.

....

D. On the trial of a motion to suppress filed under the
provisions of this Article, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
prove the ground of his motion, except that the state shall have the
burden of proving the admissibility of . . . any evidence seized without
a warrant.

The record demonstrates that Officer Adderley seized evidence from Relator

without a warrant. Therefore, we turn our consideration to whether the State met its

burden of proving the admissibility of the evidence.

Both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions protect people from

unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, which is titled “Searches and Seizures; Warrants[,]” provides that

people have the right “to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable

searches and seizures” and that this right “shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.” Similarly, La. Const. art. 1, § 5, states:

12

Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or
invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful
purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a
search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have
standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.

This Court has explained that, based on these provisions, “a warrantless search and

seizure is presumed to be unreasonable.” State v. Lockett, 2012-1561, p. 9 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 7/24/13), 120 So.3d 886, 891 (citing State v. Bridges, 2011-1666, p. 5

(La. App. 4 Cir. 11/28/12), 104 So.3d 657, 661-62). The State must demonstrate

that a warrantless search falls within limited exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Id. One such exception is a search that is incident to a lawful arrest, which is based

on probable cause, and another exception is during an investigatory stop. State v.

Surtain, 2009-1835, p. 7 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1037, 1043.

In the matter sub judice, the transcript of the May 31, 2022 hearing does not

contain any information pertaining to the actual, physical search of Relator and the

recovery of the subject evidence. Instead, Sergeant Walton testified that he could

not speak to the actions taken by Officer Adderley in obtaining the evidence:

Q. And at the point that Ms. Willis was put in handcuffs, Officer
Adderley patted Ms. Willis down?

A. He could have. I [cannot] speak for him.

Q. Officer Adderley reached inside her pocket?

A. Again, I [cannot] speak for any action he did.

Q. Well [O]fficer Adderley took a piece of evidence off of Ms.
Willis.

A. [I am] unaware if he did or [did not].

13

Given the lack of information, the State failed meet its burden of proving that this

warrantless search fell within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and

the trial court did not possess a sufficient basis upon which to deny the Motion to

Suppress regarding the evidence. Thus, the district court erred in denying Relator’s

Motion to Suppress regarding the seized evidence.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the writ and reverse the district court’s

May 31, 2022 judgment, which denied Relator’s Motion to Suppress her statement

and the evidence seized from her person.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED

14