State Of Louisiana v. Corey Major, Et Al.

Supreme Court of Louisiana
March 09, 2022
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
COREY MAJOR, ET AL.
No. 2022-KD-00387
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IN RE: S
tate of Louisiana - Applicant Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory Writ,
Parish of Orleans Criminal, Criminal District Court Number(s) 541- 690, Court of
Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Number(s) 2022-K-0139;
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March 09, 2022
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
JDH
JLW
SJC
JTG
WJC
JBM
PDG
03/09/2022 "See News Release 011 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2022-KD-00387
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
COREY MAJOR ET AL.
On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans
PER CURIAM:
Code of Criminal Procedure article 704, governing severance, provides:
Jointly indicted defendants shall be tried jointly unless:
(1) The state elects to try them separately; or
(2) The court, on motion of the defendant, and after contradictory
hearing with the district attorney, is satisfied that justice requires a
severance.
Here, the trial court found that justice requires severance of one jointly indicted
defendant of three so that his counsel of choice, who by the trial date had been
suspended from the practice of law, could represent him . Therefore, the trial court
granted defendant’s motion to sever and then continued his trial until counsel should
become eligible to resume the representation , while ordering the trial of the
remaining defendants to proceed. The trial court erred.
Article 704 is based upon the general principle that the State decides when,
how, and whom to prosecute. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 704 cmt. (a); see also State v.
Phillips, 164 La. 597, 603 –04, 114 So. 171, 173 (1927). Thus, “[j]ointly indicted
defendants shall be tried jointly, unless the State elects to try them separately, or the
court, on motion of the defendant, and after contradictory hearing with the district
attorney, is satisfied that justice requires a severance. ” State v. Tennant, 352 So.2d
629, 634 (L a. 1977). This “justice” standard provided in Part (2) of the article
envisions that the trial court will only grant a severance on motion of a defendant
03/09/2022

when joint trial will result in prejudice to the defendant. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 704 cmt.
(d). Here, the trial court appeared to find prejudice in the denial of defendant’s right
to counsel of choice and in the potential denial of his co-defendant’s right to a speedy
trial if the trials of the jointly indicted defendants were not severed.
An element of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is “the right
of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent
him.” United States v. Gonzalez -Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2561,
165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006), citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692,
100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). The right is not unlimited. A defendant may not “insist on
representation by a person who is not a member of the bar, or demand that a court
honor his waiver of conflict-free representation.” Id. at 152. Although a denial of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is a structural error not susceptible to
analysis for its prejudicial effect on the outcome of trial, there can be no violation of
the right if the defendant’s “counsel” of choice is n ot licensed to practice law. See
id. at 152. In the present case, defense counsel was suspended from the practice of
law in December 2021. He is not eligible to practice at this time. For purposes of a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel analysis, he cannot be “counsel” of choice.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently held that this right cannot be
manipulated to obstruct the orderly procedure of the courts and cannot be used to
interfere with the fair administration of justice. See, e.g., State v. Bridgewater, 2000-
1529, p. 20 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, 896. Thus, “[d]efendant must exercise his
right to counsel of his choice at a reasonable time, in a reasonable manner and at an
appropriate state of the proceedings.” State v. Seiss, 428 So.2d 444, 447 (La. 1983).
Defendant’s motion to sever his trial from that of his co -defendants, and then
continue his trial until his preferred counsel of choice is reinstated to the practice of
law, was made on the week before trial and long after counsel was sus pended. It
came too late and without explanation for the delay. Furthermore, present defense

counsel expressed his readiness for trial (but for defendant’s preference for the
suspended attorney) at the motion hearing. Therefore, the trial court erred and abused
its discretion in finding justice required severing the trials and granting defendant’s
motion to continue.
We note that a co -defendant has indicated his desire for a speedy trial. The
State contends that the speedy trial motion is deficient in form and, regardless, it
lacks merit because of court closures during COVID . That issue is not before us at
this time. However, the trial court should be mindful of the request when resetting
the trial of these three jointly indicted defend ants. We nevertheless recognize that
joinder when a crime involves more than one actor “expedites the administration of
justice, reduces the congestion of the trial dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens
the burden upon citizens who must sacrifice both time and money to serve on juries,
and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses who would otherwise to be called
upon to testify only once.” State v. Bradford, 367 So.2d 745, 747 (La. 1978). The
trial court here erred in its applic ation of La.C.Cr.P. ar t. 701(2) to elevate a late
expressed preference for continued representation by a suspended attorney over
those concerns.
For the reasons above, we reverse the rulings of the trial court, which granted
defendant’s motion to sever and to continue the trial, and remand for an expeditious
trial of these three jointly indicted defendants. The stay of the proceedings
previously issued is hereby lifted.
REVERSED AND REMANDED