State Of Louisiana v. Marlon Coleman

Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 08, 2022
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
MARLON COLEMAN
No. 2022-KK-00382
_ _ _ _
_ _
IN R
E: Marlon Coleman - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Supervisory Writ,
Parish of Orleans Criminal, Criminal District Court Number(s) 544- 714, Court of
Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Number(s) 2022-K-0002;
_ _ _ _ _ _
June 08, 2022
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., dissents.
McCallum, J., dissents.
JDH
SJC
JTG
PDG
06/08/2022 "See News Release 027 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPRE
ME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2022-KK-00382
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
MARLON COLEMAN
On Supervisory Writ to the Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans
PER CURIAM:
Writ granted. Defendant, Marlon Coleman, filed a motion to suppress the
statement he made to Corporal Correa of the Louisiana State Fire Marshal’s Office.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Corporal Correa testified as to the manner
in which Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights as follows:
So [Defendant] was advised of his rights. He was advised that he did
not have to speak with us if he didn’t wish. He was advised that he
would be issued an attorney if he couldn’t afford one. He was advised
that he could stop speaking at any time even if he had declined, I mean,
even if he had waived his rights. He was advised that he has the right
to, I’m sorry, he has the right to also—we also advised him that he
doesn’t have to speak to us at any time.
Corporal Correa testified that he recorded the interview on a digital voice recorder
and recalled using a Statement of Rights form to advise Defendant. However, the
State did not offer or introduce the voice recording, the form used to advise
Defendant, or a signed waiver of rights. Accordingly, Corporal Correa’s testimony
was the only evidence supporting the State’s contention that Defendant was properly
advised of his Miranda rights. From that testimony, it is not possible to determine
whether Defendant was correctly advised.
For a confession to be admissible, the State bears the heavy burden to show
that before he was questioned, Defendant was advised of his constitutional rights
and executed a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Brown, 16-0998, p. 50
06/08/22

2

(La. 1/28/22), — So.3d —; La. Const. art. I, §13; La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(D). Miranda
requires that,
[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently.

384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
Based on the showing by the State at the suppression hearing, there was no
evidence that Defendant was informed of his right to have counsel present before
and during questioning, nor was there evidence that he was advised of the
consequence of not remaining silent. The State did not carry its burden to show that
Defendant was properly advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda before he made
the statement.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion when it
concluded that Corporal Correa’s testimony “established enough basis that the
Miranda warnings were given,” and denied the motion to suppress the statement
made by Defendant. The appellate court erroneously found that the testimony “as to
the gist of the Miranda warnings” read to Defendant was sufficient. State v.
Coleman, 22-0002, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/15/22).
The ruling of the court of appeal is reversed and the motion to suppress his
statement is granted.
REVERSED.