State Of Louisiana v. J Amaal Edwards

Supreme Court of Louisiana
November 01, 2022
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
J
AMAAL EDWARDS
No. 2022-KK-00983
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: State of Louisiana - Applicant Plaintiff; Applying For Writ Of Certiorari,
Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Number(s) 13- 4134, Court of
Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Number(s) 22-K-41;
_ _ _ _ _ _
November 01, 2022
Writ application denied. See per curiam.
Hughes, J., would grant.
SJC
JLW
JTG
WJC
JBM
PDG
11/01/2022 "See News Release 047 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2022-KK-00983
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
JAMAAL EDWARDS
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Parish of Jefferson
PER CURIAM
Writ denied. Respondent, Jamaal Edwards, shot and killed his fiancée, Tracy
Nguyen, on August 10, 2013. He was incoherent when arrested and did not appear
to understand his actions. Police hypothesized that respondent was under the
influence of some synthetic drug, but the substance was never identified by chemical
testing. It is believed that respondent used a substance or substances that induced his
temporary psychotic state.1 After a bench trial, respondent was found not guilty by
reason of insanity on July 20, 2016. The trial court committed respondent to inpatient
treatment at the Forensic Division of the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System
(ELMHS).
Psychiatric notes during this inpatient hospitalization document multiple
violent attacks by respondent on other patients and hospital staff as well as sexually
aggressive behavior toward female staff. 2 In addition, the notes reflect numerous
instances in which he destroyed property, openly masturbated in front of others ,
threatened staff and their families , was caught with contrab and substances (the
1 About three months earlier, respondent voluntarily sought treatment for psychotic symptoms. It
was also hypothesized at that time that the psychotic s ymptoms were induced chemically but this
was never confirmed.
2 During his prior hospitalization, respondent also engaged in unprovoked attacks on other patients.
While jailed and awaiting trial, respondent similarly got into fights with other prisoners and refused
to follow rules.
11/01/22

2

smuggling and distribution of which he appeared to have orchestrated) , was
disruptive, and refused to comply with treatment or rules. He is described in the
notes as arrogant, manipulative, and, with the possible exception of the murder of
his fiancée, free from any remorse for his actions.
During his hospitalization, r espondent was diagnosed with antisocial
personality disorder, multiple substance use disorder in forced remission in a
controlled environment (i.e. involuntary inpatient hospitalization), and a prior
episode of substance induced psychotic disorder now resolved (i.e. the psychotic
episode during which he shot and killed his fiancée).
Respondent’s potential for future violence is clear and apparent. His antisocial
personality disorder in conjunction with his persistent substance abuse is a recipe for
almost certain disaster. However, his diagnosis, according to expert testimony
presented here, does not constitute a treatable mental illness that would justify his
continued involuntary inpatient hospitalization under existing law . That law was
enacted to implement the directives of the United States Supreme Court in Foucha
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992).
In Foucha v. Louisiana, the United States Supreme Court held that Louisiana
could not continue to confine insanity acquitee, Terry Foucha, in a mental hospital,
since he could no long er be considered mentally ill. Like in the present case, an
expert testified that “ Foucha probably suffered from a drug induced psychosis but
that he had recovered from that temporary condition; that he evidenced no signs of
psychosis or neurosis and was in ‘good shape’ mentally; that he had, however, an
antisocial personality, a condition that is not a mental disease and that is untreatable.”
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75, 112 S.Ct. at 1782. Therefore, Foucha could no longer be
considered legally insane or mentally ill. As such, the Supreme Court found that any
further confinement of him would be subjected to the constitutional procedures for
involuntary civil commitment proceedings set forth in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.

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418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) . The Supreme Court in Addington had
held “that to commit an individual to a mental institution in a civil proceeding, the
State is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the two statutory preconditions to commitment: that the person sought to
be committed is mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization for his own welfare
and protection of others.” Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75, 112 S.Ct. at 1783.
On May 31, 2022, respondent was ordered released from involuntary inpatient
hospital care into the community pursuant to the recommendation of a psychiatric
expert, who testi fied, in essence, that there is nothing else that can be done . The
Foucha decision, as implemented statutorily, requires respondent to be released .
However, his release clearly presents a risk to public safety, which the trial court ,
pursuant to the directives of the court of appeal, State v. Edwards, 22-41 (La. App.
5 Cir. 5/25/22) (unpub’d), available at 2022 WL 1657305 , has tried to mitigate by
imposing several strictures on respondent , including house arrest, electronic
monitoring, and weekly drug screening.3 The State all but concedes that this is all
that can be done to protect the public at present under existing law and Foucha,4
which decision the State acknowledges this court lacks the authority to overrule.

3 Shortly after his release, respondent had already violated those strictures by sending an electronic
message to a female staff member at ELMHS. While the contents of the message viewed alone
might appear nonthreatening, when viewed in the context of respondent’s history of violence and
sexually assaultive behavior toward female staff it certainly would have caused alarm in the
recipient. In response, the trial court increased the intensity of respondent’s home incarceration
and ordered him to spend 15 days in parish jail.

4 The public might also be better protected if respondent faced criminal consequences for the
violent acts he committed while in the hospital, one of which resulted in a broken jaw and
permanent hearing loss for the victim. In Foucha, the United States Supreme Court envisioned
such a possibility:

Furthermore, if Foucha committed criminal acts while at Feliciana, such as assault,
the State does not explain why its interest would not be vindicated by the ordinary
criminal processes involving charge and conviction, the use of enhanced sentences
for recidivists, and other permissible ways of dealing with patterns of criminal
conduct. These are the nor mal means of dealing with persistent criminal conduct.
Had they been employed against Foucha when he assaulted other inmates, there is
little doubt that if then sane he could have been convicted and incarcerated in the
usual way.

4

The Legislature amended La.C.Cr.P. art. 657 to comply with the United
States Supreme Court’s directives in Foucha. Previously, that provision required a
contradictory hearing to determine “whether the committed person can be
discharged, or can be released on probation, without danger to others or to himself.”
1992 La. Acts, No. 398. To comply with the Foucha decision, the article was
amended to require a contradictory hearing “ to determine whether the committed
person is no longer mentally ill as defined by R.S. 28:2(14) a nd can be discharged,
or can be released on probation, without danger to others or to himself as defined by
R.S. 28:2(3) and (4).” 1993 La. Acts, No. 700.5 Thus, as amended and at present, the
State is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence “ that the committed
person is currently both mentally ill and dangerous. ” The State concedes that it
cannot make that showing here because antisocial personality disorder is not deemed
a mental illness as defined by La.R.S. 28:2 and current diagnostic standards.6 Thus,

Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82, 112 S.Ct. at 1786–87.

5 At present, La.C.Cr.P. art. 657 provides:

After considering the report or reports filed pursuant to Articles 655 and 656, the
court may either continue the commitment or hold a contradictory hearing to
determine whether the committed person no longer has a mental illness as defined
by R.S. 28:2 and can be discharged, or can be released on probation, without danger
to others or to himself as defined by R.S. 28:2. At the hearing the burden shall be
upon the state to seek continuance of the confinement by proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the committed person current ly has a mental illness and
is dangerous. After the hearing, and upon filing written findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the court may order the committed person discharged, released
on probation subject to specified conditions for a fixed or an indeterminate period,
or recommitted to the state mental institution. A copy of the judgment and order
containing the written findings of fact and conclusions of law shall be forwarded to
the administrator of the forensic facility. Notice to the counsel for the committed
person and the district attorney of the contradictory hearing shall be given at least
thirty days prior to the hearing.

6 La. R.S. 28:2(24) defines a “person who has mental illness” as:

any person with a psychiatric disorder which has substantial adverse effects on his
ability to function and who requires care and treatment. It does not refer to a person
with, solely, an intellectual disability; or who suffers solely from epilepsy or a
substance-related or addictive disorder.

The psychiatric expert here testified that respondent does not have a psychiatric disorder that can
be treated:

5

respondent must be conditionally discharged despite the State’s clear and convincing
evidence of his dangerousness because, under the law as amended to comply with
Foucha, respondent must be both dangerous and mentally ill. See State v. Roberts,
620 So.2d 824 (La. 1993) (per curiam) (“An insanity acquittee confined by the state
is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous, i.e.,
he may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer.”).
Judge Molaison, concurring in the court of appeal, is critical of the Foucha
decision, and proposes that a legislative solution is needed to address the troubling
situation presented here. Judge Wicker, also concurring in the court of appeal, offers
a potenti al legislative roadmap. Judge Wicker reviewed legislation from several
jurisdictions that had narrowly tailored enactments, within the parameters set by the
United States Supreme Court in Foucha, designed to allow a limited form of
continued confinement un der certain circumstances when there is a substantial
likelihood a person, if released, will commit criminal acts jeopardizing public safety,
or will present a reasonably foreseeable danger to self or the community . We join
Judges Wicker and Molaison in urging the Legislature to examine the concerning
situation presented here and carefully craft a legislative solution to better protect the
public.
Respondent was found not guilty by reason of insanity of murder. A finding
of not guilty by reason of insanity is a determination that he undoubtedly committed
the charged criminal act but he cannot be punished for it because he was legally
insane at the time of his actions. See State v. Branch , 99-1484, p. 1 (La. 3/17/ 00),

. . . He does not meet criteria as set forth by the DSM for a psychiatric illness. He
has linear thought process. He does not suffer from delusional beliefs, an d
therefore, he doesn’t meet criteria for a psychiatric illness at this time.

I have diagnosed him with antisocial personality disorder, but there is no treatment
for that. It is simply a way of describing the way [respondent] interacts with the
world around him, and basically, the way that he reacts to situations or how he
obtains his goals; and therefore, it is not a treatable mental illness.

Transcript of hearing dated December 16, 2021, at pp. 6–7.

6

759 So.2d 31, 32 (per curiam) (“A Louisiana jury considering an accused’s dual plea
of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity must nevertheless first determine
whether the state has proved the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt before it may proceed to a determination of whether he was
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the offense and
therefore exempt from criminal responsibility for his acts.”); see also Jones v. United
States, 463 U.S. 354, 363, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 3049, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) (“A verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed
an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of
mental i llness.”). Respondent has a well-documented history of violence while
involuntarily confined. A psychiatric expert opined that he presents a risk for future
violence. The State has shown by clear and convincing evidence that he is dangerous.
Releasing him into the community under these circumstances endangers public
safety. Despite all of this, we are constrained under United States Supreme Court
precedent and existing statutory enactments in response thereto to deny the State’s
writ application, which we r eluctantly do with trepidation. We issue reasons in
conjunction with th is writ denial to urge the United States Supreme Court to
reexamine this area of law and the Louisiana Legislature to act.