In Re: Judge Charlene Charlet Day, The Family Court In And For East Baton Rouge Parish, State Of Louisiana

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FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #046
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
T
he Opinions handed down on the 21st day of October, 2022 are as follows:
BY Crain, J.:
2022-O-00886 IN RE: JUDGE CHARLENE CHARLET DAY, THE FAMILY COURT
IN AND FOR EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH, STATE OF
LOUISIANA
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE OPINION.
Hughes, J., dissents in part and assigns reasons.

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SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2022-O-00886

IN RE: JUDGE CHARLENE CHARLET DAY
THE FAMILY COURT IN AND FOR
EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH
STATE OF LOUISIANA

Judiciary Commission of Louisiana

CRAIN, J.

This matter is before the court on the recommendation of the Judi ciary
Commission of Louisiana that Judge Charlene Charlet Day be suspended from office
for 180 days. The Commission found that Judge Day abused her contempt power in
violation of Canons 1, 2, 2A, and 3A(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
committed willful misconduct in violation of Article V, Section 25(C) of the
Louisiana Constitution. We agree.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Herbert and Tina Anny filed a petition for grandparent visitation rights, which
was allotted to Judge Day. The pertinent facts are: Jonathan Johnson was married
to Tiesha Gransbery Johnson, the Annys’ daughter. One child, J.J., was born of the
marriage. Tiesha died in April 2016. Johnson re-married to Whitney Crockett-
Johnson. With a military deployment approaching for Johnson and strained relations
with Crockett-Johnson, the Annys sought grandparent visitation rights to ensure a
continuing relationship with their grandson. Crockett -Johnson was not a party to
this visitation action.
Johnson and the Annys reached an agreement on visitation. That agreement
was reduced to writing and signed by Johnson, the Annys, their attorneys, and Judge
Day. Crockett-Johnson was neither named in the agreement, nor did she sign it. The
agreement was then reduced to j udgment, which was signed by the attorneys and

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Judge Day. Crockett-Johnson was neither named in the judgment, nor did she sign
it. Before his deployment, Johnson executed a power of attorney and a provisional
custody by mandate1 in favor of Crockett-Johnson.
After Johnson ’s deployment, problems quickly arose as Crockett-Johnson
denied the Annys visitation for various reasons. This lead to the Annys fil ing a
contempt rule against Johnson, the signatory to the visitation judgment. Judge Day
ordered Johnson to appear for a contempt hearing on July 23, 2019. On July 16, the
Annys filed a second rule for contempt against Johnson. Again, Judge Day ordered
Johnson to appear on July 23 to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
Significantly, Johnson was on deployment , and t he visitation documents did not
name Crockett-Johnson.
Complicating matters, on June 19 Johnson fired his attorney, Aidan Reynolds.
Reynolds’ paralegal signed a return receipt on July 10, confirming the termination.
Because Reynolds did not immediately withdraw as attorney of record, his secretary
was served with the two contempt rules requiring Johnson’s attendance at the July
23 hearing. One service return indicated Reynolds’ secretary “says that they were
dropped by client and no longer represent him.” The second service return indicated
personal service on Reynolds’ secretary.
Reynolds contacted the Annys’ attorney and asked that the July 23 hearing be
continued to August 13 so Johnson could retain new counsel. The Annys’ attorney
agreed. However, no new subpoenas were issued and no one representing Johnson’s

1 “A person having parental authority over a child may delegate the provisional custody of that
child by written mandate to any natural person.” La. R.S. 9:951. “The mandate of provisional
custody shall be effective for the term stipulated, but the stat ed term shall not exceed one year
from the date of execution.” La. R.S. 9:952. “A mandate of provisional custody of a child may
provide for the health, education, and welfare of the child, including the following: (1) Consenting
to and authorizing such med ical care, treatment, or surgery as may be necessary for the health,
safety, and welfare of the child. (2) Enrolling the child in such schools or educational institutions
as may be necessary for his proper education. (3) Disciplining the child in such reasonable manner
as may be necessary for his proper rearing, supervision, and training. (4) Doing and performing all
other such acts as may be necessary for the shelter, support, and general welfare of the child.” La.
R.S. 9:953.

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interests appeared for the August 13 hearing. Judge Day called Reynolds and asked
why neither he nor Johnson were present for the hearing. Reynolds told Judge Day
he was fired, he was ill, and he could not come to court. The Annys’ attorney asked
to proceed. Reynolds asked for a continuance. Judge Day agreed to continue the
August 13 hearing, but, according to Reynolds, told him she require d Johnson (on
deployment), Crockett-Johnson (not a party), or their attorney to appear before 4:00
p.m. on August 14 and sign a receipt for notice o f a new hearing. In a sworn
statement to the Judiciary Commission, Judge Day testified:
So Mr. Reynolds was saying that he was ill and I didn’t want to have to
make him come to court, but I did say [Crockett-Johnson] has an option.
She can come up here now and she can sign notice, or she can come
before 4:00 p.m. I didn’t care as long as she came and signed the notice,
but I did say that she had to appear before 4:00 p.m., and I think I gave
her until 4:00 p.m. the very next day.

Reynolds attempted to notify both Johnson and Crockett -Johnson of Judge
Day’s order through email and voicemail. His email to Crockett-Johnson was sent
to an incorrect email address. Johnson received Reynolds’ email and acknowledged
speaking to a new attorney , but did not recall any conversations with Crockett -
Johnson. Crockett-Johnson denied knowledge of Reynolds’ messages.
Attorney Edmond Jordan contact ed Reynolds the next day regarding
substituting as counsel for Johnson. At this point, Reynolds believed the issue of the
hearing notice was resolved. But, no one appeared to sign a receipt for the notice.
On Augus t 19, Judge Day issued a n arrest warrant for Crockett-Johnson for her
“failure to appear as ordered by Judge Day to sign notice before the end of business
on 8-13-19.”2
At 1:08 p.m. on August 30, Crockett-Johnson was arrested at the school where
she worked and J.J. was a student. Deputies placed five -year-old J.J. in physica l

2 Judge Day ordered someone to sign a receipt for notice by the end of August 14, but the arrest
warrant instead stated the date as August 13.

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custody of Mrs. Anny, after determining she was included in the visitation judgment.
Crockett-Johnson was transported to the East Baton Rouge Parish jail,
photographed, fingerprinted, booked into custody, and held in a jail cell until 3:25
p.m. Upon being released, she immediately retrieved J.J. from Mrs. Anny. That
same day, a motion was filed to substitute Edmond Jordan for Aidan Reynolds as
counsel for Johnson.
Crockett-Johnson filed a judiciary commission complaint against Judge Day.
Following inv estigation and a hearing , the Commission filed its findings and
recommendation with this court. The Commission found the issuance of an arrest
warrant for Crockett-Johnson for her “failure to appear as ordered by Judge Day to
sign notice” was improper. Judge Day issued the arrest warrant even though
Crockett-Johnson was not a party in the proceeding, had not filed pleadings
requesting relief, and was not served with a subpoena or summons to appear for the
August 13 hearing. Crockett-Johnson was neither in court nor on the phone w ith
Judge Day when she was ordered to appear and sign for the hearing notice, and was
not served a subpoena or summons to appear in court to sign for such notice. The
Commission found no legal support for issuing an arrest warrant under the se
circumstances. The Commission concluded Judge Day abused her contempt power,
thus constituting judicial misconduct in violation of Canons 1, 2, 2A, and 3A(1) of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and Article V, Section 25(C) of the Louisiana
Constitution.
Judge Day disagrees with the Commission’s conclusion and seeks relief from
this court. She contends the parties’ attorneys agreed that Crockett-Johnson would
appear to sign a receipt for the hearing notice and that an arrest warrant would issue
if she failed to do so . Judge Day knew Johnson was on military deployment, but
believed Crockett-Johnson was substituting for him while he was gone. Judge Day
argues she acted in good faith and would not have accepted the attorneys’ agreement

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that Crockett-Johnson would accept the notice of hearing if she thought it legally
improper. Judge Day believed Crockett-Johnson’s failure to appear and sign was
“direct” contempt because she failed to appear at a particular time after being ordered
to do so. Judge Day argues if there was a legal error in issuing the arrest warrant, it
does not constitute judicial misconduct.
DISCUSSION

Contempt may be either direct or constructive. La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 221.
“Direct” contempt is “[o]ne committed in the immediate view and presence of the
court and of which it has personal knowledge, or a contumacious failure to comply
with a subpoena or summons, proof of service of which appears of record. ” La.
Code Civ. Proc. art. 222. Crockett-Johnson’s failure to appear did not occur in the
immediate view or presence of t he court. Rather, according to Judge Day, the
“direct” contempt was her alleged “contumacious failure to comply with a subpoena
or summons, proof of service of which appears of record.” But, Crockett-Johnson
was not a party to the proceeding and was never subpoenaed. A review of the record
would have confirmed th ese critical fact s. T he record confirms that Crockett-
Johnson was never under legal compulsion to appear on either July 23, August 13,
or before 4:00 p.m. on August 14.
Judge Day relied upon her verbal order issued during the telephone conference
on August 13 . That order is not a summons or subpoena for purposes of “direct”
contempt. See La. Code Civ. Proc. art 252 (“The clerk of court shall issue all
citations, writs, mandates, summons, subpoe nas, and other process of the court in
the name of the State of Louisiana. He shall indicate thereon the court from which
they issue, sign them in his official capacity, and affix the seal of the court thereto.
If service by the sheriff is required, the clerk shall deliver or mail them to the sheriff
who is to make the service.”). Judge Day’s order was not in writing, was not issued

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by the clerk , and did not comply with the legal requirements for a subpoena or
summons.
To secure jurisdiction over a non-party, such as Crockett-Johnson, Judge Day
could have issued a subpoena requiring her to appear in court. See La. Code Civ.
Proc. art. 1351 (“The clerk or judge of the court wherein the action is pending, at the
request of a party, shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses at hearings
or trials. A subpoena shall issue under the seal of the court. It shall state the name
of the court, the title of the action, and shall command the attendance of the witness
at a time and place specified, until discharged .”). Instead, having never legally
compelled her to appear, Judge Day issued an arrest warrant because Crockett-
Johnson failed to appear.
Judge Day’s verbal order was issued to someone Judge Day knew had been
discharged and during a status conference in a matter that Crockett -Johnson was
never a party to. The attorney receiving that verbal order then conveyed Judge Day’s
directive to an incorrect email address . This series of errors emphasizes the
importance of a judge carefully and deliberately using proper procedure to secure
an individual’s presence in court. Judge Day had no legal authority to hold Crockett-
Johnson in “direct” contempt.
“Constructive” contempt is “[w]illful disobedience of any lawful judgment,
order, mandate, writ, or process of the court[.]” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 224. Judge
Day contends the provisional custody by mandate in favor of Crockett -Johnson
allowed her to compel Crockett-Johnson’s appearance. Even if that were correct, a
matter to which we do not opine, Judge Day was still required to follow a lawful
procedure to determine “constructive” contempt. A person charged with
“constructive” contempt is entitled to forty-eight hour notice and a hearing. See La.
Code Civ. Proc. art. 225. Judge Day provided no notice of her contempt ruling and
no opportunity to be heard. Instead, she issued a warrant for Crockett-Johnson’s

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immediate arrest. A judge cannot, without prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard, order arrest for “constructive” contempt.
In summary, Crockett-Johnson could not be punished for “direct” contempt
because she was not legally compelled to appear and sign for the notice. Judge Day’s
verbal order did not satisfy the legal requirements for process. If Crockett-Johnson’s
actions were “constructive” contempt, then Judge Day failed to follow that
procedure. The arrest warrant issued for Crockett -Johnson was without legal
authority.
Judge Day argues Crockett-Johnson’s involvement as J.J.’s stepmother and
Johnson’s wife mitigates any legal error s. She believed Crockett -Johnson was
substituted for her husband while he was deployed . Thus, she believed service of
process on Johnson was service of process on Crockett-Johnson. Even if her beliefs
and assumpti ons were correct and Crockett-Johnson was an agent or proxy for
Johnson, the facts still do not support her immediate arrest. Considering all
evidence, including Judge Day’s proffered evidence motion, we find n o law
authorized Judge Day to order the immediate arrest of Crockett-Johnson for failing
to comply with a verbal directive issued in her absence.
Judge Day also argues the attorneys agreed if Crockett-Johnson did not appear
to sign for the notice, then an arrest warrant would issue. She argu es Reynolds
waived issuance of a formal subpoena and accepted notice for Johnson and his
proxy, Crockett-Johnson, to get the continuance. A judge must know the law and
follow it faithfully, regardless of whether an attorney consents or fails to object. An
attorney’s consent or failure to object does not cloak a judge with authority she does
not otherwise possess.
Judge Day’s failure to properly exercise her contempt power deprived
Crockett-Johnson of her liberty and violated her fundamental due proces s rights.
Her error is judicial misconduct. See In re Quirk, 97-1143 (La. 12/12/97), 705 So.2d

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172, 178 (“ A single instance of serious, egregious legal error, particularly one
involving the denial to individuals of their basic or fundamental rights, may amount
to judicial misconduct.”).
An aggravating fact that we cannot ignore is that less than ten months before
the current violation, Judge Day was admonished by the Commission for similar
misconduct in two other cases. Those admonishments were for holding two separate
litigants in “direct” contempt and ordering them jailed without first affording them
due process and an opportunity to speak , all contrary to Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 223. According to the record, Judge Day imposed a jail sentence
for contempt that was not authorized by law and exhibit ed an intemperate judicial
demeanor towards the individuals. So, this is the third time it has been proved that
Judge Day abused her contempt power. Unfortunately, this reflects a “pattern or
practice of legal error.” Id. at 178 (“[A] pattern of repeated legal error (although not
necessarily the same error) over a period of time can constitute judicial misconduct,
regardless of whether the errors were made in bad faith or were egregious in
nature.”).
“The contempt power wielded by judges is an awesome re sponsibility and,
when exercising such power, judges must diligently and in good faith comply with
the strictures of the law governing its execution. The failure to do so … constitutes
an abuse of the contempt power.” In re Jefferson, 99-1313 (La. 1/19/00), 753 So.
2d 181, 185. Judge Day violated Canon 1 by failing to observe a high standard of
conduct, which damaged the integrity and independence of the judiciary. She
violated Canons 2 and 2A by failing to respect and comply with the law , thereby
eroding public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. She
violated Canon 3A(1) by failing to follow the law and maintain professional
competence in it.

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Judge Day’s actions also constitute willful misconduct in violation of Article
V, Section 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution. She did not issue the arrest warrant
for Crockett-Johnson until six days after the August 13 conference. Thus, nearly a
week passed during which time Judge Day had ample opportunity to reflect, consider
the basis for contempt, and ensure proper legal authority for an arrest warrant. She
should have known her actions were not permitted by law.
Having found these violations, we must consider an appropriate discipline.
We are guided by the following factors : (a) whether the misconduct is a n isolated
instance or evidences a pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, extent , and frequency of
occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in or out
of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judg e's official
capacity or in her private life; (e) whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized
that the acts occurred; (f) whether the judge has evidenced a n effort to change or
modify her conduct; (g) the length of service on the bench; (h) whether there have
been prior complaints about this judge; (i) the effect the misconduct has upon the
integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and (j) the extent to which the judge
exploited her position to satisfy her personal desires. In re: Chaisson, 549 So.2d 259,
266 (La. 1989).
(a) Whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a pattern of conduct
and (b) the nature, extent, and frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct

Judge Day received a prior admonishment for fail ing to follow proper
contempt procedures. She was put on not ice of the necessity of scrupulously
following the law before depriving a person of his liberty. This violation occurred
less than ten months after that admonishment. This factor weighs in favor of serious
discipline.
(c) Whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom and (d) whether the
misconduct occurred in the judge’s official capacity or in her private life

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Judge Day’s actions were not in open court, but the arrest warrant was issued
in her official judicial capacity. This factor weighs in favor of serious discipline.
(e) Whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred and
(f) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify her conduct

Judge Day cooperated with this investigation. However, she has not
acknowledged that her actions violated judicial ethics and the Louisiana
Constitution. The Commission was impressed that Judge Day d oes not appear to
recognize and understand her errors. This factor weighs in favor of serious
discipline.
(g) The length of service on the bench

Judge Day was admitted to practice law in 1994. She was first elected family
court judge in East Baton Rouge Parish in 2011. Her current term ends December
31, 2026. She will attain age 70 during this term, making her current term her last.
When this matter arose in 2019, Judge Day had been a judge for eight years and an
attorney for twenty-five years. She should have been familiar with, and sensitive to,
due process rights and her ethical and constitutional obligations. This factor weighs
in favor of serious discipline.
(h) Whether there have been prior complaints about this judge

Judge Day was previously admonished for abusing her contempt authority in
two separate cases. These admonishments expressly warned Judge Day there are no
exceptions to the procedural requirements for holding a person in contempt. Despite
these warnings, her contempt powers were again used and deprived someone of their
liberty without following proper procedure. The prior discipline should have
prompted extreme caution before d epriving someone else of their liberty for
contempt. This factor weighs in favor of serious discipline.
(i) The effect the misconduct has upon the integrity of and respect for the judiciary

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Judge Day’s conduct harmed the integrity of and respect for the judiciary.
When a judge abuses the immense power to deprive a person of their liberty, it has
a profound effect on public confidence in the judiciary. This factor weighs in favor
of serious discipline.
(j) The extent to which the judge exploited her position to satisfy her personal desires

There is no evidence that Judge Day used her positio n to satisfy personal
desires. This factor mitigates against serious discipline.
The factors in favor of serious discipline far outweigh any mitigating factors.
We agree with the Commission’s recommended discipline. Judge Day’s actions
were contrary to clear and determined law regarding contempt and resulted in the
wrongful arrest of an individual in deprivation of her fundamental due process rights.
This error occurred less than ten months after Judge Day was admonished by the
Commission for similar conduct in two other cases. Similar, but di stinguishable,
violations of the contempt power ha ve resulted in harsher discipline. See In re
Jefferson, 753 So.2d at 194 (removing Judge Jefferson from office for the abuse of
his contempt power, as well as for engaging in abusive behavior towards the city
prosecutor, dismissing forty -one criminal cases without legal grounds, failing to
cooperate with a supernumerary judge, and the unauthorized practice of law); In re
Free, 16-0434 (La. 6/29/16), 199 So. 3d 571, 605 (suspending Judge Free for one
year without pay for his failure to follow proper contempt procedures with respect
to two defendants, for his improper comments about a pending case to the district
attorney and victims’ families outside the presence of the defendants and defense
counsel, and for improper language and failing to maintain decorum in his
courtroom).
Contempt power is significant. The abuse of th at power causes substantial
harm to the public’s confidence in the judiciary. Considering Judge Day’s prior
admonishment, the Commission’s concern that she fails to fully comprehend her

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error, her experience on the bench, and the fact that an individual was actually
detained and jailed as a result of this misconduct, we believe a 180-day suspension
from judicial office without pay is warranted.
DECREE
Judge Charlene Charlet Day violated Canons 1, 2, 2A, and 3A(1) of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and committed willful misconduct in violation of Article V,
Section 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution. It is ordered that Judge Day be and she
is suspended from judicial office for 180 days without pay. Judge Day is further
ordered to pay the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana $6,260.00 for costs.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2022-O-00886

IN RE: JUDGE CHARLENE CHARLET DAY
THE FAMILY COURT IN AND FOR
EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH
STATE OF LOUISIANA

Judiciary Commission of Louisiana

Hughes, J., dissents in part.
Respectfully, I would impose a lesser penalty. If a party who has been served
fails to appear for trial, trial may proceed without that party. It is not the
responsibility of the trial judge to round up the participants. The Code of Civil
Procedure applies in Family Court.