In Re: Judge Guy E. Bradberry

Supreme Court of Louisiana
February 24, 2023
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: JUDGE GUY E. BRADBERRY
No. 2022-O-01828
_ _ _ _
_ _
IN R
E: Judiciary Commission of Louisiana - Applicant Other; Judge Guy E.
Bradberry - Applicant Other; Joint Petition for Consent Discipline;
_ _ _ _ _ _
February 24, 2023
Joint petition for consent discipline accepted. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
JDH
JTG
WJC
PDG
02/24/2023 "See News Release 011 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2022-O-1828
IN RE: JUDGE GUY E. BRADBERRY
JUDICIARY COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA
PER CURIAM
This matter arises from a joint petition for consent discipline filed by the
Judiciary Commission of Louisiana (“Commission”) and respondent, Judge Guy E.
Bradberry.
UNDERLYING FACTS
Respondent has been a judicial officer since 1991. He assumed office as a
district judge of the 14th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Calcasieu on
January 1, 2003 and held this position at the time of the charges in this case.1 After
the institution of formal proceedings, the Commission and respondent filed a joint
petition for discipline by consent, including a joint memorandum and joint
stipulation of facts, pursuant to the requirements of Supreme Court Rule XXIII, §
30. In the petition, the parties stipulate to respondent’s misconduct in two matters.
Notice of Hearing Case No. 363 – The Chesson Matter
On April 20, 2015, respondent signed an order citing Christian Chesson, an
attorney, to appear before him on April 27, 2015 for an Article 863 Sanctions
Hearing for conduct which allegedly took place in open court on January 12, 2015.
Mr. Chesson was not present in court on April 27, 2015 when the matter was called,
1 Respondent was elected to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit on November 8, 2022 and assumed
office on January 1, 2023. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 23, the disciplinary complaint
at issue in this proceeding became a matter of public record in October 2022 and was reported by
the local media prior to the November election.
February 24, 2023
02/24/23

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and attempts to locate him were unsuccessful. Respondent then issued a bench
warrant for Mr. Chesson’s arrest.
Later the same morning, Mr. Chesson was picked up pursuant to the bench
warrant and walked through respondent’s courtroom to holding for processing.
Respondent failed to allow Mr. Chesson an opportunity to be heard by way of
defense or mitigation prior to his incarceration.
The next day, April 28, 2015, a hearing was held to address the issue of
sanctions for Mr. Chesson’s conduct on January 12, 2015. However, respondent
took up an issue of alleged direct contempt, addressing conduct respondent observed
in his courtroom on February 23, 2015, rather than the matter of sanctions pursuant
to Article 863 for the January 12, 2015 conduct. During the hearing, respondent
denied Mr. Chesson’s attorney an opportunity to speak on behalf of Mr. Chesson,
despite the attorney’s request to do so, until after respondent had ruled and sentenced
Mr. Chesson for contempt. In finding Mr. Chesson in contempt, respondent
referenced and appeared to rely upon two “statements” from witnesses to Mr.
Chesson’s conduct on February 23, 2015. These witness statements were not entered
into evidence in the contempt proceedings, and Mr. Chesson was not apprised of the
statements prior to the April 28, 2015 hearing. Moreover, the witnesses were not
identified at or prior to the hearing, and they did not testify at the hearing. Finally,
the sentence respondent imp osed upon Mr. Chesson for contempt was
impermissible.
Mr. Chesson appealed respondent’s contempt ruling and sentence. On June
17, 2015, prior to a ruling on the appeal, respondent filed a per curiam with the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal in which he defe nded his contempt finding and advocated
for the sentence imposed. He included in the per curiam unsworn witness statements
from two employees of the Calcasieu Parish District Attorney’s Office, which were
not entered into evidence in the proceedings on April 28, 2015 and which were only

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made part of the record after the close of the proceedings. The Third Circuit did not
request that respondent submit the per curiam or any other information following
the filing of the appeal by Mr. Chesson.
Following it s consideration of the appeal, the Third Circuit reversed
respondent’s ruling of direct contempt and vacated the contempt sentence. The court
of appeal found, among other things, that consideration of the two witness statements
“would be a flagrant violation of Mr. Chesson’s right to due process,” the notice for
the April 28, 2015 hearing did not “comport[] with due process,” and the contempt
sentence was “unlawful.”
Respondent also mishandled recusal procedures in other cases. On April 30,
2008, despite the absence of any grounds to recuse, respondent recused himself from
the matter of Chesson v. Chesson, Case No. 2003-2782, based on a representation to
respondent that the parties were willing to settle their differences if he recused
himself. Between March 3, 2016 and April 17, 2016, respondent recused himself
from ten cases on his docket in which Mr. Chesson was counsel of record, despite
the absence of any motion to recuse or other grounds for recusal. Between May 6,
2016 and May 9, 2016, respondent vacated the previous orders of recusal in all but
two of these cases, without any authority or jurisdiction to do so. In one case,
respondent recused himself a second time on September 26, 2016 after the matter
was re-allotted back to him from another di vision, and despite the absence of any
motion to recuse or other grounds for recusal. In some of these matters, respondent’s
actions caused needless delay to the parties and families involved.
On February 12, 2019, respondent entered into a Deferred Recom mendation
of Discipline Agreement (“DRDA”) regarding the complaints filed in the Chesson
matter. The DRDA required respondent to fulfill certain specified conditions,
including obtaining additional education on the subject of recusal and to comply
with the law and canons governing recusal. The DRDA further provided that if its

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term expired without a violation of these conditions by respondent, the Commission
would dispense with making any recommendation of discipline to this court
regarding the complaints filed in the Chesson matter. However, if respondent
violated any of the conditions of the DRDA, or if “any further meritorious
complaints [were] lodged against him during the term” of the DRDA, respondent
would be in default of the DRDA. The DRDA specif ied that “[t]he consent
discipline agreed to by Judge Bradberry in the event of a default under this
Agreement shall consist of a public censure by the Louisiana Supreme Court.” The
complaint in the Stine matter, infra, was filed during the term of the DR DA, and
respondent acknowledges that his conduct in the Stine matter constitutes a default
under the terms and conditions of the DRDA.
Accordingly, pursuant to the DRDA, respondent waives any right to object to
and accepts the imposition of a public censure for his violation in the Chesson matter
of Canons 1 (a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary),
2A (a judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the in tegrity and impartiality of the
judiciary), 2B (a judge shall not initiate the communication of information in any
court or disciplinary proceeding, but may provide such information for the record in
response to a formal request by a court or disciplinary agency official), 3A(1) (a
judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it), and
3A(7) (a judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly)
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent also acknowledges that he engaged in
willful misconduct relating to his official duty and persistent and public conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute, in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C).

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Notice of Hearing Case No. 385 – The Stine Matter
Respondent was contacted by telephone by Troy Stine, a litigant in a pending
custody case assigned to respondent’s court. Mr. Stine was crying and at a loss over
concerns for his son, whom respondent understood wa s facing an emergency
concerning his physical and/or mental health. 2 At the time of the telephone call,
respondent had not held any hearings in the Stine case, and he was unaware the case
was pending before him (although he made no effort at the time to determine whether
Mr. Stine had a case pending before him).
Shortly after the call, respondent walked to Mr. Stine’s office from the
courthouse and met with Mr. Stine. He discussed Mr. Stine’s concerns for his sons,
including issues with his eldest son, and issues related to his then fourteen-year-old
son. During the meeting, respondent recognized Mr. Stine as someone who is a
member of a church group to which he belongs. After Mr. Stine advised respondent
that he had a case pending at the 14th JDC, respondent ended the meeting.
Upon returning to his office after the meeting, respondent discovered that Mr.
Stine’s case was assigned to his division of court. Respondent determined that he
would recuse himself from the case because he had received ex parte information
from a litigant concerning a child in a family matter before him, and because it is his
practice to recuse from cases involving litigants who are members of the same
church groups to which he belongs. Nevertheless, respondent did not recuse at that
time. Several weeks later, on March 8, 2021, respondent texted Mr. Stine contact
information for the director of the Office of Juvenile Justice and encouraged him to
set up a meeting regarding his seventeen-year-old son. Respondent also encouraged
Mr. Stine to seek counseling for his fourteen-year-old son.

2 Respondent was familiar with the Stine family as part of the Lake Charles community.

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On March 9, 2021, a hearing was scheduled on a motion to compel in the Stine
case. Respondent privately advised counsel for the parties that he had engaged in a
discussion with Mr. Stine about concerns for one of his children and further advised
that he had provided Mr. Stine with information about a juvenile program.
Thereafter, respondent presided in court in the Stine case, wherein a stipulation was
entered on the record by the attorneys for the parties concerning the motion to
compel. Respondent instructed Evelyn Oubre, counsel for Mr. Stine, to circulate
and submit a judgment to the court for signature. Respondent did not recuse himself
on the date of the hearing on the motion to compel, or in the days following the entry
of the stipulation.
On March 18, 2021, Ms. Oubre hand delivered a letter requesting that
respondent recuse himself from the Stine case, in part because of her contention that
she had learned from Mr. Stine that the circumstances of the discussion between him
and respondent differed from what respondent had shared with counsel on March 9,
2021. After receiving Ms. Oubre’s correspondence, respondent finally recused
himself from the Stine case. He did not sign the stipulated judgment concerning the
motion to compel, never presided over a contested contradictory hearing in the Stine
case, and never rendered a judgment involving a contested issue after presiding over
a contradictory hearing in the Stine case.
Respondent acknowledges that his conduct in the Stine matter constitutes a
violation of Canons 1, 2 (a judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities), 2A, 2B (a judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial
office to advance the private interest of the judge or others), 3A(4) (a judge shall
perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice), 3A(6) (except as permitted by law,
a judge shall not permit private or ex parte interviews, arguments, or
communications designed to influence his or her judicial action in any case), and 3C
(a judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s

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impartiality might reasonably be questioned and shall disqualify himself or herself
in a proceeding in which disqualification is required by law) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Respondent also acknowledges that he engaged in wil lful misconduct
relating to his official duty and willful and persistent failure to perform his duty, in
violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C).

PETITION FOR CONSENT DISCIPLINE
The parties have filed a joint petition for consent discipline in this court. For
his misconduct as set forth above, the parties propose that respondent be publicly
censured and ordered to pay $1,548.00 in costs incurred by the Commission.
The parties stipulate that in mitigation, respondent has good character and
reputation.3 In addition, he has been fully cooperative throughout the duration of
these proceedings. He is remorseful and has accepted responsibility for the negative
light his conduct brought upon the judiciary, and he has committed to refrain from
such conduct in the future. In aggravation, however, the ethical violations in both
the Chesson and Stine matters were serious. Moreover, respondent is an experienced
judicial officer and had already been disciplined for judicial misconduct at the time
he committed the violations in the Stine matter.4
Based on the foregoing, and considering the applicable jurisprudence, the
parties urge the court to accept the joint petition for consent discipline.

3 Respondent is active in his church, in the community, and in numerous professional associations,
including the Louisiana District Judges Association, which he formerly served as President.
Respondent has received many awards and commendations throughout the years for his work and
volunteer service.
4 In addition to the DRDA in the Chesson matter, respondent has been cautioned previously for
failing to timely decide an application for post-conviction relief and for failing to comply with an
order of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal directing that the application be decided by a specified
date. Respondent was previously admonished for impermissibly vacating his order referring a
pending motion for recusal to another j udge for hearing and for making misrepresentations or
misstatements in his per curiam opinion vacating the order.

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DISCUSSION
This court is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in judicial disciplinary
proceedings by La. Const. art. V, § 25(C). Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 30 sets
forth a formal procedure for the discipline of judges by consent.
Here, the parties have stipulated to respondent’s misconduct in two matters.
In the Chesson matter, respondent acknowledges that he mishandled a contempt
proceeding, filed an unsolicited per curiam in the appellate court regarding the
contempt finding and sentence, and mishandled recusal procedures in other cases.
In the Stine matter, respondent acknowledges that he engaged in improper ex parte
communications with a litigant and failed to expeditiously recuse himself from the
matter. For the stipulated misconduct, the parties propose that respondent be
publicly censured and ordered to pay $1,548.00 in costs.
There is no question that respondent’s conduct constituted a serious violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Furthermore, as a n experienced judicial officer
serving since 1991, respondent should have known better. Nevertheless, by
consenting to public discipline, respondent has acknowledged responsibility for his
conduct and the negative light it cast upon the judiciary. Respon dent has also
committed to refrain from violating the ethical rules in the future.
Under these circumstances, we will accept the petition for consent discipline.
We will publicly censure respondent for his violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct in th e Chesson and Stine matters . We will also order respondent to pay
$1,548.00 in costs. In accordance with Supreme Court Rule XXIII, § 30(e), we
further order the joint pleadings filed in this matter shall become public upon the
release of this opinion.

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DECREE
It is ordered that the Joint Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that
Judge Guy E. Bradberry be publicly censured for his violation in the Chesson matter
of Canons 1, 2A , 2B, 3A(1), and 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and La.
Const. art. V, § 25(C), and for his violation in the Stine matter of Canons 1, 2, 2A,
2B, 3A(4), 3A(6), and 3(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and La. Const. art. V, §
25(C). Judge Bradberry shall also pay $1,548.00 in costs incurred by the
Commission.