Jaymi Katherine Dennies v. Alex Robles

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2022 CA 1342

JAYMI KATHERINE DENNIES

f y17' VERSUS

ALEX ROBLES

DATE of juDGmENT: AUG 0 8 2023

ON APPEAL FROM THE CITY COURT OF HAMMOND
PARISH OF TANGIFAHOA, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NUMBER 2022EO1835

HONORABLE C. BRITAIN SLEDGE, III JUDGE

Jaymi Katherine Dennies Plaintiff A
- ppellee
Hammond, Louisiana In Proper Person

Alex Robles Defendant -Appellant
Hammond, Louisiana In Proper Person

BEFORE: THERIOT, CHUTZ, AND HESTER, JJ.

Disposition: AFFIRMED.

Chutz, J.

Defendant -appellant, Alex Robles, appeals a judgment of eviction rendered

against him by the City Court of Hammond in favor of plaintiffappellee, Jaymi K.

Dennies. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For a period of time, Ms. Dennies and Mr. Robles resided together at a house

on Sontheimer Road owned by Ms. Denies. On October 11, 2022, Ms. Dennies

posted written notice for Mr. Robles to vacate the premises on the grounds of

stalking and invasion of privacy. Ms. Dennies subsequently gave Mr. Robles a

second written notice to vacate. On October 19, 2022, Ms. Dennies filed a motion

and rule for possession in the City Court of Hammond after Mr. Robles failed to

vacate the premises.

In answer, Mr. Robles asserted Ms. Denies could not establish stalking and

invasion of privacy as grounds for eviction because they were a longtime romantic

couple, and Ms. Dennies had given him permission to look through her cell phone.

Mr. Robles further alleged he had a partial ownership interest in the house because

he made some mortgage payments on the house, including the one due for October

2022, and he had also performed substantial repairs on the house. Mr. Robles

claimed Ms. Dennies' attempt to evict him was retaliation for him confronting her

about an affair he alleged she had with another man and was " part of a [ pattern of]

behavior of Domestic Abuse that she has demonstrated over the years."

A hearing was held on Ms. Dennies' rule for possession on October 25, 2022.

Ms. Dennies testified she purchased the house on Sontheimer Road in October 2020,

and Mr. Robles moved into the house as her roommate shortly thereafter. She

indicated they had a verbal agreement that he would pay her $ 500.00 in rent per

month. According to Ms. Dennies, she bought the house with money she inherited

from her grandparents. She denied there was ever any discussion with Mr. Robles

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about the two of them buying the house jointly. Ms. Dennies further denied Mr.

Robles' contention that he was her boyfriend. She testified Mr. Robles invaded her

privacy by going through her mail, her cell phone, and her watch, making her feel

uneasy and unsafe in her own home. She testified Mr. Robles had recently opened

her cell phone in the middle of the night while she was sleeping and texted several

photographs and a video from her cell phone to his cell phone.

Mr. Robles testified at the hearing that he is still involved in a romantic

relationship with Ms. Dennies, while at the same time alleging she was involved in

a plot to kill him. He also reiterated his claim that Ms. Dennies gave him permission

to look through her cell phone in July 2019. At another point in his testimony,

however, he denied ever looking through her cell phone but admitted " looking

through her watch." Mr. Robles additionally claimed that after posting the October

11 notice to vacate, Ms. Dennies later agreed he could remain in the house until the

end of the year.

As support for this claim, Mr. Robles requested the trial court allow him to

play an audio recording from his cell phone of an October 12, 2022 conversation

during which Ms. Dennies allegedly made this statement. While the trial court

permitted him to play the recording in court, Mr. Robles did not introduce the

recording into evidence, and it is not included in the appellate record. After the

recording was played, Ms. Denies denied she told Mr. Robles he could remain in

the house until the end of the year. She explained the recorded conversation occurred

on October 12, and she later gave Mr. Robles another written notice to vacate by the

end of the week.

After hearing the testimony of both parties, the trial court observed they had

a complicated personal relationship." The trial court further concluded the parties

had a " month to month ... verbal lease" and a " verbal agreement of what the living

arrangements would be and the compensation [ Mr. Robles] would provide, whether

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it be payments to the mortgage, cleaning up around the house, fixing stuff —

whatever." Finding Ms. Dennies had given Mr. Robles a second notice to vacate

after she allegedly told him he could remain in the house through the end ofthe year,

the trial court held Mr. Robles must vacate the premises by the end of the month.

On October 25, 2022, the trial court signed a judgment of eviction in favor of Ms.

Denies ordering Mr. Robles to vacate the premises no later than the end of the

month. Mr. Robles now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Eviction is a proper remedy for an owner of immovable property who wishes

to evict a lessee` after his right of occupancy has ceased. La. C.C.P. art. 4701; Polk

v. Buckhalter, 18- 0053 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9124118), 258 So. 3d 816, 818- 19. A

summary action for eviction involves the single issue of whether the owner is

entitled to possession of the premises. Citizens Bank & Frust Company v Carr,

583 So -2d 864, 866 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 588 So. 2d 109 ( La. 1991). The

summary eviction procedure is not appropriate to try disputed title to property but is

designed for situations where the possessor has no semblance of claim to title or

possession. Polk, 258 So. 3d at 819; see also La. Code Civ. P. art. 4705.

Although Mr. Robles admits in brief that Ms. Dennies retains title to the house

on Sontheimer Road, he alleged both in the trial court and in this court that he has a

partial ownership interest in the house. His claim is based on his contention that he

In brief, Mr. Robles argues that in order to evict him, Ms. Dennies was required to prove he was
an " occupant" of the house as defined in La. C.C. P. art. 4704, and the purpose of the occupancy
had ceased. In pertinent part, La. C. C.P. art. 4704 defines an " occupant" as including " any person
occupying immovable property by permission or accommodation of the owner." Mr. Robles
maintains a rule to evict a tenant may be subject to an exception of no cause of cause if the
defendant is an occupant of the premises, and he raised the exception of no cause of action as an
affirmative defense in his answer. These arguments lack merit. The owner of immovable property
has a right/cause of action to evict either a lessee or an occupant of his property when the lessee
or occupant' s right of occupancy has ceased and proper written notice to vacate has been given.
See La. C. C.P. arts. 4701, 4702, and 4731.In this case, the trial court concluded there was a
verbal lease between Ms. Dennies and Mr. Robles, making him a lessee. Given the trial court
apparent acceptance of Ms. Dennies' testimony, we cannot say the trial court' s conclusion that a
verbal lease existed was manifestly erroneous.
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made some mortgage payments on the house and also performed substantial repairs

on it. City courts lack jurisdiction over eviction proceedings where title to

immovable property is in dispute. La. C.C.P. art. 4847( A)( 1); Bon Amis

Investments, LLC v. Lapeyrouse, 15- 1459 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 515116), 195 So. 3d 514,

517; see also La. C.C. P. art. 4705. Nevertheless, a lessee cannot defeat the owner' s

right to a summaxy action for eviction merely by asserting an ownership interest in

immovable property when the record is devoid of any evidence indicating the

existence of a colorable dispute concerning title to the property or even a semblance

of title in the lessee. See Citizens Bank & Trust Company, 583 So.2d at 866; see

also Bon Amis Investments, LLC, 195 So.3d at 517.

The record herein is devoid of any evidence supporting Mr. Robles'

ownership claim. He does not claim that he and Ms. Dennies had an agreement for

him to purchase any interest in the house. Moreover, neither the act of making

mortgage payments or performing repairs on a house are sufficient to convey an

ownership interest in a house. In Louisiana, a transfer of immovable property must

be in the form of an authentic act or act under private signature, or meet the

requirements for an oral transfer. La. C.C. art. 1839; Harp v. Succession ofBryan,

19- 0062 (La. App. 1 st Cir. 913120), 313 So.3d 284, 293.

In this case, Mr. Robles presented no written document purporting to transfer

partial ownership of the house to him in accordance with La. C.C. art. 1839. Nor

has Mr. Robles established the possibility of an oral transfer of the house. In order

for an oral transfer ofimmovable property to be valid between the parties, there must

be delivery of the property and an acknowledgement by the transferor, under oath,

of the transfer. La. C. C. art. 1839. During Ms. Dennies' testimony, far from

acknowledging an oral transfer of a partial ownership interest in the house to Mr.

Robles, she denied ever discussing purchasing the house jointly. Given the lack of

any supporting evidence, Mr. Robles failed to establish the existence of a colorable

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dispute concerning ownership of or any semblance of an ownership interest in the

house. An eviction proceeding does not become a title dispute over which a city

court lacks jurisdiction merely because the defendant asserts, without any supporting

evidence, an ownership interest in the property. See Tartan Transport &

Construction., Ltd. Y. McDonald, 436 So.2d 1270, 1271 ( La. App. lst Cir.), writ

denied, 442 So.2d 446 ( La. 1983); Moody Investment Corporation v. Occupants of

901 E. 70th S4, 43, 395 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/ 13/ 08), 990 So.2d 119, 123.

In his pro se brief, Mr. Robles appears to argue the trial court also lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to hear Ms. Dennies' rule for possession because he had

filed a petition for a protective order against Ms. Dennies in the 21st JDC and it had

not been heard at the time Ms. Dennies' rule for possession was heard.' Essentially,

he argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the rule for possession because

his request for a protective order should take precedence over all other matters,

including Ms. Dennies' rule for possession. This argument lacks merit.

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the legal power and authority of a court

to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the

object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La.

C.C.P. art. 2. Bon Amis Investments, Ina, 195 So.3d at 517. Louisiana Code of

Civil Procedure article 4844(C) specifically grants the City Court of Hammond

jurisdiction over suits for possession of leased premises in cases where the lease is

by the month and the monthly rent does not exceed $5, 000. See also La. C. C.P. art.

4843( F). Thus, Ms. Dennies' rule for possession fell within the jurisdiction of the

trial court because the lease between the parties was by the month and the rent was

500 per month. The fact that Mr. Robles may have filed a petition for a protective

2 In brief, Mr. Robles alleges the 21st JDC issued an ex parte temporary restraining order on
October 21, 2022, and scheduled a hearing for November 11, 2022, on his request for a protective
order based on Ms. Dennies allegedly conspiring to murder him. He further indicated the 21st
JDC denied his request for sole possession of the house on the grounds that Ms. Dennies owned
the house and Mr. Robles had a separate address.

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order against Ms. Denies in the 21 st JDC did not divest the trial court of its subject

matter jurisdiction over Ms. Dennies' rule for possession.

Finally, Mr. Robles alleges the trial court committed manifest error in
granting Ms. Dennies' rule for possession in view of: the audio recording he played
in court wherein Ms. Dennies agreed he could remain in the house until the end of

the year; the perjury she committed when she denied making such an agreement; and

Ms. Denies' failure to prove stalking and invasion of privacy as grounds for

evicting him.

It is well-settled that an appellate court may not set aside a trial court' s finding

of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless they are clearly wrong. If the factual

findings are reasonable and supported by the record, the trial court' s determinations

must be given much discretion, especially regarding the credibility of witness

testimony. Resell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). Only the factfinder can

be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the

listener' s understanding and belief in what is said. Id. Where there is conflicting

testimony, the trial court' s reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable

inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate

court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Thus, when

there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfmder' s choice between

them cannot be manifestly erroneous. Id.

Initially, we note that while much of Mr. Robles' argument is based on the

audio recording he played in court in which Ms. Dennies allegedly agreed to allow

him to remain in the house until the end of the year, he failed to introduce either the

recording or a transcript thereof into the record. Appellate courts are courts ofrecord

and may not review evidence that is not in the appellate record. La. C.C.P. art. 2164;

Denoux v Vessel Management Services, Ina, 07- 2143 ( La. 5121108), 983 So.2d

84, 88. Moreover, even if Ms. Dennies did agree Mr. Robles could remain in the

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house until the end of the year during the conversation recorded on October 12,

thereby negating the October 11 notice to vacate, the trial court accepted her

testimony that she gave Mr. Dennies a second notice to vacate after the October 12

conversation occurred.

Mr. Robles strenuously argues the trial court erred in accepting Ms. Dennies'

testimony because she perjured herself regarding the October 12 conversation. It is

impossible for this court to determine the accuracy of this claim since the record

does not establish the content of this conversation. We note, however, that the trial

court, which heard both the audio recording and Ms. Dennies' testimony, did not

make a finding that her testimony was inconsistent with the audio recording. To the

contrary, in ruling in her favor, it is apparent the trial court accepted Ms. Dennies'

testimony. Considering the record before us and the great deference accorded to a

trial court' s credibility evaluations, we cannot say the trial court manifestly erred in

accepting Ms. Dennies' testimony.

In view of its credibility evaluations, we find no manifest error in the trial

court' s factual findings that the parties had a verbal month-to-month lease, and Ms.

Dennies gave Mr. Robles written notice to vacate the premises more than five days

before the end of the month based on invasions of her privacy. Given Ms. Dennies'

testimony regarding the agreement between the parties and the written notices to

vacate she gave Mr. Robles, the record supports the trial court' s findings.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting Ms. Dennies'

rule for possession and ordering Mr. Robles to vacate the premises is affirmed. All

costs of this appeal are assessed to Mr. Robles.

AFFIRMED.

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