State Of Louisiana v. Darryl Braggs, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2022 KA 1008

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DARRYL BRAGGS, JR.

Judgment Rendered: MAR 0 5 2023

On Appeal from the Eighteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of West Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Docket No. 211014
Honorable Tonya S. Lurry, Judge Presiding

Mary Constance Hanes Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant
New Orleans, Louisiana Darryl Braggs, Jr.

Antonio " Tony" Clayton Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Plaquemine, Louisiana
Terri Russo Lacy
Assistant District Attorney
Port Allen, Louisiana

BEFORE: McCLENDON, HOLDRIDGE, AND GREENE, 33.

rl kdf• d B. tbhG,YS

McCLENDON, J.

The defendant, Darryl Braggs, Jr., was charged by amended grand jury indictment

with one count of second degree murder while engaged in the perpetration of an assault by

drive- by shooting ( count I), a violation of LSA- R. S. 14: 30. 1( A)( 1) or ( A)( 2), and one count

of aggravated criminal damage to property (count III), a violation of LSA- R.S. 14: 55. 1, 2 He

moved to suppress the use of his statements, but the motion was denied. Following a

jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged on both counts by unanimous

verdicts. On the charge of second degree murder, he was sentenced to life imprisonment

at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On the

charge of aggravated criminal damage to property, he was sentenced to a concurrent term

of twelve years at hard labor and was fined $ 10, 000. The defendant now appeals

challenging the denial of his motion to suppress and a ruling of the trial court allowing

the State to use evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts committed by the defendant.

For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On November 22, 2020, at approximately 9: 30 p. m., a home in Gonzales was

struck by twenty-four or more bullets. At the time of the shooting, the home owner,

Glenda Barker, as well as her grandson and her grandson' s girlfriend, were at home.

Barker's grandson was outside smoking a cigarette on the patio when the shooting started

and was able to see a black four -door car in the road. Additionally, a neighbor heard the

gunshots and saw a blue or black vehicle leave the scene after the shooting. No shots

were fired from Barker' s home.

The body of the victim, Jaleel Leonard, was recovered from Barker's driveway. He

was wearing vinyl gloves and had a Glock 43 . 9 mm handgun on his person. The police

recovered twenty- seven shell casings fired from an AR -15 rifle and five shell casings fired

from a . 9 mm weapon in the area of the driveway.

1 Count II charged Kameron Webb as a principal to second degree murder.

z Prior to trial, the defendant failed to object to lack of rearraignment, if any, or to the denial of an
opportunity to enter a plea to the amended indictment. Accordingly, he is considered to have pled not
guilty on all counts. See LSA- C. Cr. P. art. 555.

2

Dr. Christopher Tape testified concerning the autopsy of Leonard. He stated

Leonard died from blood loss from a " penetrating distant gunshot wound" to his right

back, and that the letters " YNW" were tattooed on his arm. Subsequent investigation

revealed the letters were the initials of a gang called " Young and Wreckless."

Leonard' s grandmother advised the police that the defendant was the last person

with whom she saw Leonard. She also advised the police that the defendant had picked

up Leonard in a vehicle consistent in description with the vehicle seen at the crime scene.

Additionally, cell phone records placed the cell phones of the defendant and Leonard in

the area of the crime approximately three minutes before the incident was reported.

In two recorded interviews, the defendant placed himself at the crime scene with

Leonard. Following the first interview, the defendant called Dequan Johnson and

essentially instructed him to destroy a cellphone which belonged to the grandmother of

a YNW gang member. During the second interview, the defendant stated that Leonard

exited the vehicle and " just start[ ed] shooting." The defendant confessed that he fired

twice and that he "[ thought he] hit [ Leonard]." Shortly thereafter, the defendant was

asked directly whether one of the rounds he fired " hit [ Leonard,]" and the defendant

responded, "[ h] ad to be." The defendant was also asked whether he saw anyone in the

home " shooting back." He stated that he remembered seeing two flashes, but " it could

have been anything."

MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS

In assignment of error number 1, the defendant contends the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion to suppress his December 8, 2010 and December 10, 2020

statements. He argues his statement that he fired two shots and might have hit Leonard

was induced by promises made to him by detectives on December 8, 2020.

Before a confession can be introduced into evidence, it must be affirmatively shown

that it was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation,

menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. LSA- R. S. 15: 451. Confessions obtained by

any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the exertion of any improper influence,
Nevertheless, the
are involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of constitutional law.

voluntariness of a confession is determined by the totality of the circumstances, with the

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ultimate focus on whether the statement was the product of an essentially free and

unconstrained choice or the result of an overborne will. State v. Hills, 2022- 0549 ( La. App.

1 Cir. 11/ 4/ 22), 2022 WL 16707743, * 4. It must also be established that an accused who

makes a confession during custodial interrogation was first advised of his Miranda rights.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 ( 1966). A confession

of guilt induced by a government promise of immunity is " coerced" and may not be used

against the accused. State v. Turner, 2016- 1841 ( La. 12/ 5/ 18), 263 So. 3d 337, 399, cert.

enied, U. S. _,__, 140 S. Ct. 555, 205 L. Ed. 2d 355 ( 2019).

Since the general admissibility of a confession is a question for the trial court, its

conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony are accorded great weight and

will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. However, a trial

court's legal findings are subject to a de nava standard of review. The trial court must

consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a confession is admissible.

The direct testimony of the interviewing police officer can be sufficient to prove a

defendant's statement was freely and voluntarily given. Hills, 2022 WL 16707743 at * 4.

The burden of proof is generally on the defendant to prove the grounds recited in a

motion to suppress evidence. See LSA- C. Cr.P. art. 703( D). However, this is not the case

with the motion is to suppress a confession. Rather, with respect to a motion to suppress

a confession, the burden of proof is with the State to prove the confession' s admissibility.

See LSA-C. Cr. P. art. 703( D). The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

confession was made freely and voluntarily. Therefore, if the defendant alleges police

misconduct in eliciting a confession, the State must specifically rebut those allegations.

Hills, 2022 WL 16707743 at * 4.

In his December 8, 2020 recorded interview, the defendant conceded he drove

Leonard and two other men to the crime scene, but denied knowing they would fire guns

there and denied knowing who shot Leonard. In his December 10, 2020 recorded interview,

the defendant stated he " shot two times" and one of the rounds had to have hit Leonard.

The State gave notice it would request a pretrial determination of the admissibility

of inculpatory statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officers in his recorded

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interviews. Thereafter, the defendant moved to suppress the confessions/ admissions,

alleging they were involuntary because they were induced by promises.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State introduced into evidence

Miranda rights forms and transcripts of the defendant's statements. The defense made

no challenge to the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights prior to making the

statements.

West Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff`s Department Detective Christopher Bouquet

testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. He conducted the initial questioning of

the defendant on December 8, 2020. West Baton Rouge Parish Sheriffs Department

Detectives Chris Conaway and Kevin Cyrus also participated in the interview.

The following colloquy occurred during the December 8, 2020 interview:

Bouquet: I know it' s an accident. Of course it was an accident. This is
your boy.

Conway: Months. We're talking months here.

Bouquet: If that much. Matter of fact, I'm — honestly,
I'm not going to
lie. Youll probably do a few months, they're going [ to] give you time served,
put you on probation for a few years. I don't see a home arrest in it. I don' t
see that. My thing is this. Okay? Amongst everything else, I know it's an
accident. I' m telling you it's an accident.

When it goes down to trial, I' m going to be the one to say, yeah, it' s
an accident. I' m the one that's going [ to] do that. You need to tell me,
explain to me how it was an accident.

Detective Bouquet stated he was not promising the defendant anything, but rather

explaining to him the possibilities of what could happen based on the detective's belief that

Leonard was shot accidentally. Detective Bouquet testified, " I was explaining to him how I

felt about the situation. I wasn't making any promises at all." The State asked Detective

Bouquet if he ever told the defendant he was going to go home. Detective Bouquet

answered negatively. The State asked Detective Bouquet if he felt he had the authority to

speak such language." Detective Bouquet again answered negatively and explained:

Bouquet: Because I don' t handle trial matters. I don' t handle sentencing,
or I don't handle any form of that. I'm simply there to identify stuff, make
arrests, and bring it all to the district attorney's office.

State: So you weren't promising him nothing in exchange for
something that you wanted him to tell you?

Bouquet: Correct.

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The defendant did not tell Detective Bouquet anything following the colloquy.

According to Detective Bouquet, the fact that Detective Cyrus was African- American

helped the defendant better relate to him. Indeed, while being questioned by Detective

Cyrus on December 8, 2020, the defendant repeatedly stated he felt more comfortable with

him. Detective Cyrus told the defendant, " I' m telling you, we have a warrant for your arrest.

You [ are] going [ to] get booked here today. The question is how long you stay here. You

going — You [ are] going [ to] get booked. You want me to lie to you?" The defendant

answered negatively.

The State pointed out that Detective Cyrus directly told the defendant he would be

booked after the interview. Further, in response to questioning by the State, Detective

Bouquet indicated the defendant's inculpatory statement came after Detective Cyrus'

statement. Thereafter, after asking Detective Cyrus if he could smoke another cigarette,

the defendant stated, " I just, I want to talk to you though." Detective Cyrus replied, "[ t] hat's

fine bro. You know, I mean, these guys are the ones working the case." Detective Cyrus

advised the defendant that he and his vehicle were seen by a witness because he stopped

under a light. Detective Cyrus also told the defendant that cell phone records placed

Leonard' s phone in the defendant's vehicle following the incident and provided the location

of the defendant's vehicle after he fled from the scene.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress the December 8, 2020 and December

10, 2020 statements. The court held the statements were given knowingly, freely, and

voluntarily and after advice of the Miranda warnings. The court found the defendant's

inculpatory statements were elicited from the evidence presented to him by Detective Cyrus

rather than from any statements made by Detectives Bouquet and Conway. The court

noted the defendant's rapport with Detective Cyrus and the incriminating evidence with

which he confronted the defendant. The court did not believe Detective Bouquet lied to the

defendant when he told him he believed it was an accident that the defendant killed

Leonard.

We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. The trial court's conclusions

on the credibility and weight of the testimony are supported by the evidence of the rapport

Detective Cyrus developed with the defendant and the incriminating evidence Detective

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Cyrus presented to him prior to the confession. The State proved beyond a reasonable

doubt that the confession was made freely and voluntarily and specifically rebutted the

allegations of police misconduct in eliciting the confession. See Hills, 2022 WL 16707743

at * 4. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the confession was the product of the

essentially free and unconstrained choice of the defendant rather than his overborne will.

See Hills, 2022 WL 16707743 at * 6 (" a confession is not rendered inadmissible because

officers ` exhort or adjure' an accused to tell the truth, provided the exhortation is not

accompanied by an inducement in the nature of a threat or which implies a promise of

reward.").

This assignment of error is without merit.

OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE

In assignment of error number 2, the defendant contends the trial court abused its

discretion in allowing the State to introduce LSA- C. E. art. 404( B) evidence to show that he

was a member of a gang and as such would have knowledge of certain facts, including that

a crime was going to be committed, when he drove Leonard and two other men to the

crime scene. He argues that, although " he would have had an idea what the gang members

were doing[,]" he merely socialized with members of YNW, including Leonard, and enjoyed

the gang's non -criminal activities.

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant is generally

inadmissible because of the substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant. It is well

settled that courts may not admit evidence of other crimes to show the defendant as a man

of bad character who has acted in conformity with his bad character. However, evidence

of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or

accident, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or

transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding. State v. Calloway, 2018- 1396

La. App. 1 Or. 4/ 12/ 19), 276 So. 3d 133, 147, writ denied, 2019- 00869 ( La. 1/ 20/ 21), 308

So. 3d 1164, citing LSA-C. E. art. 404( B)( 1). Even when the other crimes evidence is offered

for a purpose allowed under Article 404( B)( 1), the evidence is not admissible unless it tends

to prove a material fact at issue or to rebut a defendant's defense. The State bears the

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burden of proving that the defendant committed the other crimes, wrongs, or acts. State

v. Calloway, 276 So. 3d at 147.

Other crimes evidence is admissible under the integral act exception ( formerly known

as resgestae) when the evidence relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the

act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding. Thus, evidence of other

crimes forms part of the res gestae when said crimes are related and intertwined with the

charged offense to such an extent that the State could not have accurately presented its

case without reference to the other crime. The res gestae doctrine in Louisiana is broad

and includes not only spontaneous utterances and declarations made before or after the

commission of the crime, but also testimony of witnesses and police officers pertaining to

what they heard or observed before, during, or after the commission of the crime, if a

continuous chain of events is evident under the circumstances. Integral act evidence in

Louisiana incorporates a rule of narrative completeness without which the State's case would

lose its narrative momentum and cohesiveness. State v. Calloway, 276 So. 3d at 147.

Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable

than it would be without the evidence. LSA- C. E. art. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible

except as otherwise provided by positive law. Evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible. LSA-C. E. art. 402. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. LSA- C. E. art.

403. A trial court's determination regarding the relevancy and admissibility of evidence will

not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Calloway, 276 So. 3d at

147- 48.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15: 1404( A) defines a " criminal street gang" as " any

ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or

informal, which has as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the

criminal acts enumerated in [ LSA- R. S. 15: 1404( B)( 1)-( 13)] or which has a common name

or common identifying sign or symbol, whose members individually or collectively engage

in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity." Louisiana Revised Statutes

15: 1404( B) defines " pattern of criminal gang activity" as " the commission or attempted

commission of two or more of the following offenses, provided that the offenses occurred

within a three-year period, and the offenses are committed on separate occasions or by two

or more persons[.]" Louisiana Revised Statutes 15: 1404( B) includes among its enumerated

offenses: first or second degree murder; illegal use of weapons or dangerous

instrumentalities; assault by drive- by shooting; and aggravated criminal damage to

property. LSA- R. S. 15: 1404( B)( 3), ( B)( 5), ( B)( 9) & ( B)( 11).

Prior to trial, the State gave notice of its intent to use evidence at trial of other crimes,

wrongs, and acts committed by the defendant. The State set forth that it intended to prove

the defendant was a member of the criminal street gang YNW and weapons used in the

instant offense corresponded to weapons used or possessed by known YNW gang members.

Following a hearing, the trial court found the evidence admissible and granted the notice of

intent. Thereafter, this Court reversed the ruling. State v. Braggs, 2022- 0074 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 1/ 25/ 22), 2022 WL 215161 ( Wolfe, J., dissenting). Subsequently, the Louisiana

Supreme Court reversed this Court and reinstated the ruling of the trial court. State v.

Braggs, 2022- 00185 ( La. 1/ 26/ 22), 332 So. 3d 666.

Louisiana State Police Trooper Alexander Nezgodinsky testified at the 404( 6)( 1)

hearing. The defense stipulated he was an expert in criminal gang activity and to the

existence of a gang called " YNW." Trooper Nezgodinsky first learned about YNW in 2018

while working with criminal intelligence. YNW broke off from the " Never Broke Again" gang

and operated on the west side of the Mississippi River in Point Coupee and West Baton

Rouge Parishes. Trooper Nezgodinsky was particularly concerned with YNW due to its

extreme violence and the fact that many of its members were in their late teens.

Trooper Nezgodinsky provided a Louisiana State Police form based upon FBI criteria

to local agencies to document groups of individuals as street gangs or as organized crime.

He identified street gang/ organized crime forms prepared for Darryl Braggs, Jr., the

defendant, Tyzontae Davis, Kameron Webb, Dequan Johnson, and Leonard, the victim.

Following months of investigation, Trooper Nezgodinsky learned that Johnson was the
leader of YNW, Davis was the gun supplier of YNW and had a reputation for being one of

the more violent members, and Leonard was known to commit burglaries, particularly car

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burglaries. Additionally, Trooper Nezgodinsky testified that Xavier Joseph, known as " Big

Billy," was reputed to supply narcotics to YNW.

Trooper Nezgodinsky identified a photograph depicting the defendant standing next

to Johnson and Leonard. The men were wearing the same clothes they wore in a music

video. Webb also appeared with the men in the video. In another video, the defendant

appeared with 3ohnson, Leonard, Webb, and Davis.

According to Trooper Nezgodinsky, through community input, he concluded that the

defendant was associated with YNW. Trooper Nezgodinsky noted multiple videos

established a connection between the defendant and YNW, with the defendant in the videos

and carrying a gun. Trooper Nezgodinsky stated that between making the " shoots of the

videos," the defendant, Johnson, and Leonard posted on Facebook. Trooper Nezgodinsky

testified:

So it's just [the] totality of [the defendant's] behavior, if I may, on video and
off video, through the law enforcement that documented his activities, not
necessarily criminally, but he's always associated or in [ the] presence of other
members of the gang that were arrested. The community confirmed not
specifically I was asking about [ the defendant], but they confirmed that he's
associated, where he hangs out, the houses, the vehicles they drive and the
people he' s constantly associated with.3

The State introduced into evidence a jail log identifying the defendant's PIN number

and a recording of a telephone call he made from jail. In the jail call, the defendant tells

Johnson, another member of YNW, "[ w] hoever got 3950, man, get rid of that phone. That's

how they got me." Trooper Nezgodinsky explained the significance of the call as follows:

T]hat's the first call [ the defendant] makes after doing an interview, and he
calls the leader of the group and he tells him to destroy the evidence that got
the defendant] arrested. [ The defendant] didn't call his mama. He didn't
call his significant other. He calls [ Johnson]. I think, based on my training
and being a cop for 18 years, that's significant.

3 Additionally, Trooper Nezgodinsky testified a Louisiana court had determined that Jaquan Battley was a
member of YNW. Battley had no prior criminal record, but was subsequently convicted of second degree
murder. According to Trooper Nezgodinsky, " Free JJ" was a video, documentary, and song based on the
killing of " Sir James" by Battley. The defendant appeared in " Free JJ." Trooper Nezgodinsky stated, in
addition to community input and the defendant's involvement in gang videos, he determined the defendant
was involved with YNW on the basis of the defendant's knowledge, specifically "[ the defendant] knows the
gang, how they operate, the crimes they commit. He' s involved in it."

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According to Trooper Nezgodinsky, the defendant was part of YNW. He noted, "[ the

defendant] was the driver when they pulled up at the house. He took his mama' s car. He

had knowledge." Trooper Nezgodinsky testified:

The defendant] basically says that he was there, and he accidentally shot his
buddy. To me, he has the knowledge because this gang does not operate
without knowledge or knowing. He knew why he was there. He knew what
Leonard] specializes in. He knew who are the people involved in the vehicle,
the other two back passengers, but based on his gang lifestyle and love for
the gang, he's not going to be a rat or a snitch. They don't snitch on each
other. They don't go and do stuff out of the blue. This was organized,
planned activity that went sideways. He didn' t mean to shoot and kill
anybody. He didn' t mean to kill, let's say [ Leonard]. They reacted and they
started shooting, and that's what happened. But he had knowledge, how
they operate. He' s part of this lifestyle.

Trooper Nezgodinsky also cited the ballistics evidence as relevant to the defendant's

knowledge and association with YNW. Trooper Nezgodinsky noted four individuals were

present in the vehicle when the incident occurred. The defendant was the driver and fired

five rounds from a . 9 mm handgun. The shell casings collected on the scene and the bullet

that killed Leonard matched the . 9 mm found in the custody of Davis, a member of YNW.

Additionally, two AR -15 style rifles were used in the incident. The rifle that matched 17 shell

casings at the crime scene was recovered in the possession of Webb. The other rifle, a . 223

caliber, was used to commit a homicide in New Roads in 2021. Johnson and Davis were

both indicted in connection with that homicide.

In a post -hearing memorandum, the State the argued that Article 404( 6) evidence

showed: the defendant's affiliation with YNW; his knowledge of the criminal activity

committed in the instant case; his preparation and plan to commit the murder, or at the

very least, the drive- by shooting in the instant case; and his motive as an affiliate of YNW.

Additionally, the State argued the defendant's jailhouse call to the leader of YNW, Dequan

Johnson, a/ k/ a " Quarterbaby," made immediately following the defendant's December 8,

2020 interview, informing Johnson the defendant had been caught with evidence of cell

location and advising Johnson to get rid of the cellphone was further evidence of the

defendant's membership in, and affiliation with, YNW.

There was no clear abuse of discretion in the ruling on the admissibility of the

evidence concerning the defendant's association with YNW. To the extent, if any, that

being a member of a gang was other crimes evidence or evidence of bad acts, such

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evidence was properly allowed at trial. See State v. Lawson, 2018-0382 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

11/ 8/ 18), 2018 WL 5876815, * 8, writ denied, 2018- 2048 ( La. 5/ 20/ 19), 271 So. 3d 1272.

The State' s theory was that the defendant committed second- degree murder under LSA-

R. S. 14: 30. 1( A)( 1), by killing Leonard with the specific intent to kill or to inflict great

bodily harm, or, in the alternative, that the defendant was a principal to second degree

murder by assault by drive- by shooting under LSA- R. S. 14: 30. 1( A)( 2). As used in LSA-

R. S. 14: 30. 1( A)( 2), the term " drive- by shooting" means the discharge of a firearm from

a motor vehicle on a public street or highway with the intent either to kill, cause harm to,

or frighten another person. LSA- R. S 14: 37. 1( C). Although the defendant conceded he

drove himself and three people to the crime scene, and his passengers fired shots on a

nearby house, the defendant claimed he was surprised when the shooting began.

Evidence of the defendant's association with Leonard and other known gang members

by appearing in photographs and videos with them, by carrying weapons around them,

by posting messages in social media with them, and by advising them to destroy evidence

was not impermissible other crimes evidence to show bad character or a criminal

disposition; rather, it had independent relevance to the issues of preparation, plan, and

knowledge. An expert on gang activity testified that gangs " don't go and do stuff out of

the blue" and that the assault was " organized, planned activity." Accordingly, the prejudicial

effect of the challenged evidence, if any, was outweighed by its probative value. See State

v. Lawson, 2018 WL 5876815 at * 8 (" the State used the FabBoys associations to show

motive of why Hart was killed. The evidence of the FabBoys group and its affiliations was,

therefore, relevant and properly admissible under [ LSA-C. E.] art. 404( B)."}.

Moreover, even if the other crimes evidence was inadmissible, the admission of such

evidence was harmless error. See LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 921. The erroneous admission of other

crimes evidence is a trial error subject to harmless -error analysis on appeal. State v. Swan,

2018- 0320 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 17/ 18), 2018 WL 6599023, * 13, writ denied, 2019- 0151 ( La.

5/ 20/ 19), 271 So. 3d 1270. The test for determining whether an error is harmless is whether

the verdict actually rendered in this case " was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan

v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275, 279, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182 ( 1993). The

defendant confessed to shooting Leonard during the perpetration of an assault by drive- by

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shooting. Even under the defendant's theory that when he shot Leonard from the car he

had no intent to shoot him, he fired from the car with the intent to kill, cause harm to, or

frighten another person. Accordingly, error, if any, in allowing the other crimes evidence

to be presented to the jury was harmless. LSA- C. Cr. P. art. 921, Sullivan, 508 U. S. at 279,

113 S.Ct. at 2081; Swan, 2018 WL 6599023 at * 13.

This assignment of error is without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the

convictions and sentences are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

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