In Re: Henry L. Klein

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #025
F
ROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
T
he Opinion handed down on the 18th day of May, 2023 are as follows:
P
ER CURIAM:
2023-B-00066 IN RE: HENRY L. KLEIN
SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.
Crichton, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for the reasons assigned
by Crichton, J.

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 202
3-B-0066
I
N RE: HENRY L. KLEIN
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Henry L. Klein , an attorney
licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS
This disciplinary matter originates from respondent’s actions in connection
with a civil matter. While it is not our intent to express any opinion on this civil
proceeding, a brief discussion of the fact s is necessary in order to understand the
context of the disciplinary charges.
Essentially, respondent represented Regina Heisler in connection with a suit
brought by Girod LoanCo, LLC (“Girod”) , in which it sought to enforce certain
promissory notes executed by Mrs. Heisler both individually and in her capacity as
the executrix of her late husband’s succession.1 On March 12, 2019, Girod filed a
“Verified Petition for Foreclosure by Executory Process” against Mrs. Heisler in the
24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson. Two days later, respondent
removed the action to federal court on the alleged basis of diversity jurisdiction. On
June 5, 2019, the federal court remanded the matter to the 24 th JDC, finding the
1 The notes were originally executed in favor of First NBC Bank. Girod purchased the notes after
the bank failed.

2

undisputed evidence in the record established t hat Mrs. Heisler and Girod are both
citizens of Louisiana.
On June 21, 2019, the district court entered an “Order for Writ of Seizure and
Sale” in favor of Girod. Respondent filed an exception of lack of jurisdiction on the
ground that Girod was an “una uthorized foreign entity” and Louisiana has no
jurisdiction to hear any claims by such an entity. The court denied the exception,
and the court of appeal denied writs. Respondent also filed a motion captioned,
“Motion To Vacate Order of Executory Process, Peremptory Exception of No Right
of Action, Request for Expedited Hearing and Motion to Dismiss.” In denying this
motion, the court stated that the relief requested was duplicative of the relief
previously requested and previously denied. Again, the court of appeal denied writs.
On October 7, 2019, the district court issued sua sponte an “Order to Show
Cause Why Attorney Should Not Be Held in Contempt.” The order alleged that
respondent had sent “threatening and disrespectful correspondence” to the court’s
fax number and to the personal email address of the court’s law clerk. The order
also alleged that these communications were ex parte efforts by respondent to
influence the court to reverse its previous rulings in the Heisler litigation. The show
cause hearing was scheduled for October 29, 2019.
Before the hearing could be held, respondent filed two writ applications
directly in this court, under docket numbers 19-CD-1582 and 19-CD-1633, seeking
“protection” from the distric t court’s show cause order. We denied both
applications. Girod Loanco, LLC v. Heisler, 19-1582 (La. 10/9/19), 280 So. 3d 594;
Girod Loanco, LLC v. Heisler, 19-1633 (La. 10/16/19), 280 So. 3d 1159.
Respondent then filed a second “Notice of Removal,” sugge sting that the
show cause order created a federal question supporting the exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction by the federal court. On December 23, 2019, the federal court again
remanded the matter to the 24
th JDC, finding respondent “did not have an

3

‘objectively reasonable basis’ for seeking removal, and sought to remove only to
delay a state court show cause hearing regarding contempt.” The federal court
awarded attorney’s fees and costs in favor of Girod due to the improper removal.
Following remand, respondent resumed the filing of motions in state court.
On May 27, 2020, respondent filed a “Motion to Set a Hearing Pursuant to Precedent
Set in NASCO v. Calcasieu and Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32 (1991).” This
motion alleged that the “vulture fund” Girod had perpetrated a fraud upon the court
and requested an independent investigation to protect the integrity of the court. On
June 3, 2020, the district court denied respondent’s motion, refused to accept certain
exhibits as part of the record, and prohibited respondent from filing further motions
in the case without first seeking leave of court and obtaining permission to make
such filings.
2 In written reasons, the court found that respondent had engaged in a
pattern of filing repetitive motions, abuse of process, and refusing to follow proper
procedures.
On August 3, 2020, respondent filed a motion to recuse the district judge. In
his motion, respondent a ccused Girod’s counsel of aiding and abetting its client’s
fraud and the district judge of “turning a blind eye to the fraud.” Respondent also
stated that the relationship between the district judge and Girod’s counsel was
“nothing short of shocking” because counsel had made a campaign contribution to
the district judge, and that the district judge’s integrity had been compromised with
counsel’s participation. Throughout the pleading, re spondent accused the district
judge of partiality towards Girod’s counsel and its clients, without regard to Mrs.
Heisler. Respondent cited no evidence for these allegations. On August 10, 2020,
the district judge denied the motion to recuse.

2 Respondent admitted that after the district court issued this order, he filed another motion without
having first sought leave of court to do so. The ODC alleges that as a result of this action, the
district court filed a second motion for contempt against respondent.

4

On August 19, 2020, respondent filed a petition in Orleans Parish Civil
District Court on behalf of himself and his wife. T he Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff
was named as defendant. In the suit, r espondent represented that the foreclosure
order against Mrs. Heisler was unconstitutional and argued that the Sheriff was not
legally obligated to execute the “constitutionally infirm” order. In paragraph 43 of
the petition, respondent again alleged that Girod’s counsel had actively participated
in compromising the integrity of the district judge.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
On October 16, 2019, the clerk of this court sent correspondence to the ODC
enclosing copies of respondent’s writ applications in 19-CD-1582 and 19-CD-1633,
which involved the contempt proceedings arising from respondent’s ex parte
communications. T he correspondence was not in the nature of a complaint, but
requested that the OD C review the filings for the purpose of determining whether
any ethical violations may have occurred.
The ODC opened an investigation into the matter. During its investigation,
the ODC took the sworn statement of Girod’s counsel. Counsel testified that
respondent sent messages to the law firm’s managing partner in which he threatened
to file a legal malpractice claim against the firm. Respondent, in pleadings, also
accused the firm of aiding and abetting criminal activity on the part of its client,
demanded that the firm dismiss Girod’s claims, and pay a settlement of three million
dollars. Respondent also sent harassing messages to non-attorney employees of the
firm, including the Chief Finance Officer, the Chief Operating Officer, the Human
Resources manager, and the Information Technology staff.
In January 2021, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging
that his conduct as set forth above violated Rules 3.1 (a law yer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis

5

in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous), 3.3(a)(1) (a lawyer shall not
knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer),
3.4(c) (a lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal), 3.5(a) (a lawyer shall not seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror
or other official by means prohibited by law), 3.5(b) (a lawyer shall not communicate
ex parte with a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official during the proceeding
unless authorized to do so by law or court order), 3.5(d) (a lawyer shall not engage
in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal), 4.4(a) (in representing a client, a lawyer
shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay,
or burden a third person), 8.2(a) (a lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving disho nesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent answered the formal charges and denied any misconduct. He
asserted that his work to protect Mrs. Heisler was “above board, yet sabotaged by
the district judge and by the ruthless tactics” of Girod. Respondent also stated that
the district judge was “corrupted” by Girod and its counsel.
In light of respondent’s answer, the matter proceeded to a formal hearing on
the merits.

Formal Hearing
The hearing committee conducted a formal hearing on December 8, 2021.
Respondent did not appear at the hearing. When reached by telephone, respondent
stated that he was ill and could not attend the hearing. Respondent declined the

6

opportunity to participate in the hearing via telephone or video conference. Instead,
he requested a continuance, which was denied. The hearing then proceeded in
respondent’s absence, and the ODC called Girod’s counsel to testify.
A second day of hearing was held on March 28, 2022. Respondent appeared
at the hearing but was not represented by counsel. Respondent did not call any
witnesses to testify. His evidence consisted of information as to the civil matter in
which he represented the Heisler family, information as to his history as an attorney,
and information as to his personal history. He did not present any evidence to refute
any of the facts as presented by the ODC.

Hearing Committee Report
After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the
hearing committee found that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct
as alleged in the formal cha rges. Respondent violated Rule 3.1 by removing the
Heisler case to federal court, not once but twice, in response to a contempt motion
issued against him, with the court finding no reasonable basis for the removal, and
that the removal was filed solely to delay the contempt matter in the state court
proceeding. These actions had no basis in law or fact, nor did there exist a good
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
Respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(1 ) when he falsely accused Girod’s counsel of
aiding and abetting criminal activity on the part of Girod, without any evidence to
support such a claim. Respondent violated Rule 3.4(c) when he continued to file
additional pleadings into the record without leave of court, disregarding the district
court’s filing order. Respondent violated Rule s 3.5(a)(b)(d) when he had ex parte
communications with the district court’s law clerk. This conduct was an
inappropriate and disruptive attempt to influence the court. Respondent violated
Rule 4.4(a) when he sent multiple messages to other attorneys not associated with

7

the litigation, as well as non- attorney employees, of Girod’s counsel. These
communications had no purpose other than to embarrass and/or burden individuals
not associated with the Heisler litigation. Respondent violated Rule 8.2(a) when he
filed several public court documents accusing the district judge of compromising his
integrity, “turning a blind eye” to fraud perpetrated by Girod’s counsel, and
receiving inappropriate campaign contributions from Girod’s counsel, all without
any evidence to support such claims. Respondent violated Rules 8.4(a)(c)(d) by the
personal and defamatory attacks he made on Girod’s counsel and the district judge.
These attacks were dishonest and were prejudicial to the administration of justice.
The committee determined respondent violated duties owed to the legal
system and the legal profession. He acted knowingly and intentionally.
Respondent’s misconduct caused actual harm, in that his statements about the district
judge and Girod’s counsel were inflammatory and were not supported by any
evidence, and designed to attempt to damage the reputation of a sitting judge and of
a well-established law firm. His statements were made in public pleadings filed with
the court, and also in the course of the hearing, without any regard for the risk
associated with making the statements. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is suspension.
The committee determined the following aggravating factors are present: a
prior disciplinary record,
3 refusal to acknowledge the wrongf ul nature of the
conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1968). The
committee determined the only mitigating factor present is respondent’s full and free
disclosure to the disciplinary board.

3 Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for three months in 1987. In 1989, he was
suspended for six months. Respondent has also received three formal private reprimands (1975,
1988, and 1989) and two admonitions (1993 and 2018).

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Based on these findings, the com mittee recommended respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day.
Respondent filed an objection to the hearing committee’s report.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation
After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s
factual findings are not manifestly erroneous and adopted same. Based on these
factual findings, the board determined respondent’s conduct violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct as alleged in the formal charges.
The board agreed with the committee that respondent violated duties owed to
the legal system and the legal profession. His actions were knowing and intentional,
and caused actual harm. Based on the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, the board determined the baseline sanction is suspension. The board
agreed with the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the committee.
Considering these findings, the court’s prior jurisprudence discussing similar
misconduct, and the applicable aggravating factors, the board recommended
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day. The
board further recommended that respondent attend Ethics School and that he be
assessed with the costs and expenses of this matter.
Respondent filed an objection to the board’s recommendation. Accordingly,
the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, §
11(G)(1)(b).
4

4 Respondent filed numerous motions in this court both prior to and after the docketing of the case
for oral argument. After careful review, we find the motions are without merit and hereby deny
them.

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DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93-2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.
The charges in this case allege that in the course of representing a client in
pending litigation, respondent made unsubstantiated, disparaging remarks about the
trial judge and opposing counsel, engaged in ex parte communications with the trial
court’s law clerk, continued to fil e duplicative plead ings into the record although
ordered by the trial court to refrain from doing so without leave of court, and
removed the case to federal court solely for the purpose of delay. Respondent’s sole
defense to these charges is based on his assertion that he was acting as a zealous
advocate for his client and was seeking to address what he perceived as a significant
injustice.
While we have recognized attorneys must be vigorous advocates on behalf of
their clients, we have consistently rejected any attempts by lawyers to justify their
unethical conduct under the guise of “zealous advocacy.” In re: Zohdy, 04-2361
(La. 1/19/05), 892 So. 2d 1277, 1289 at n.15. See also In re: Young, 03-0274 (La.
6/27/03), 849 So. 2d 25, 31 (“While r espondent’s motivation may have been to
protect the interests of his client, he may not violate his professional obligations as
an officer of the court under the guise of being a zealous advocate.”).

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Respondent’s actions in the instant case clearly crossed the boundary between
zealous advocacy and professional misconduct. As the hea ring committee found,
many of respondent’s actions, such as his removal of the Heisler case to federal court
to avoid the state court contempt hearing, had no basis in fact or law and were
intended solely for purposes of delay. He filed multiple pleadings into the record
without leave of court, in clear violation of the trial court’s order. He improper ly
entered into ex parte communications with the trial court’s law clerk, which the
committee found represented an “inappropriate and disruptive attempt to influence
the court.” Finally, he has repeatedly made unfounded accusations of improper
conduct against opposing counsel and the trial court.
Significantly, respondent’s harassing conduct did not abate after the filing of
formal charges but has continued during the course of these disciplinary
proceedings. Respondent’s filings in this disciplinary matter are replete with
unsubstantiated attacks on the integrity of the ODC, the trial judge, and opposing
counsel.5 When asked during oral argument to provide proof for these assertions,
respondent merely referred to vague “inferences” which he claims to have drawn
from the facts. Such unsupported attacks clearly exceed the bounds of mere
advocacy. See In re: Milkovich, 493 So. 2d 1186, 1198 -99 (La. 1986) (finding an
attorney “far exceeded the limits of zealous advocacy” by leveling “a vicious attack
on the integrity of the prosecutor and the judge which is not in any manner suggested
by the record.”).
Respondent has also burdened this court during these disciplinary proceedings
by filing multiple motions and pleadings, the vast majority of which have no bearing

5 Many of respondent’s filings in this court arguably could be seen as violat ing Supreme Court
Rule VII, § 7, which provides, “[t]he language used in any brief or document filed in this court
must be courteous, and free from insulting criticism of any person, individually or officially, or of
any class or association of persons, or of any court of justice, or other institution.” However,
because respondent was representing himself in these disciplinary proceedings, we exercised our
discretion to permit the filings so as to not interfere with respondent’s ability to defend himself.

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on the issues presented in his disciplinary case. Instead, respondent has consistently
attempted to re -litigate the merits of the Girod matter in the context of his
disciplinary case. Such actions are clearly inappropriate and any attempt by
respondent to covertly re-litigate final judgments will not be countenanced by this
court.
Taken as a whole, respondent’s actions, both in the context of the underlying
litigation and the disciplinary proceedings, display a disturbing lack of respect for
the judicial system and his obligations as a professional. As aptly stated by Justice
Crichton, “[i]t is unfortunate that respondent does not seem to understand that being
a zealous advocate does not equate to such repugnant disrespect for the system we
are charged to honor and serve.” In re: McCool, 15-0284 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So. 3d
1058, 1090 (Crichton, J. concurring). It is beyond question that the formal charges
have been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appr opriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In imposing a
sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high
standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and
deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173 (La.
1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and the
seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
Respondent submits his actions should not be a basis for discipline as he
caused no actual harm to any client. We disagree. Even a cursory review of the
facts demonstrates he violated duties owed to the legal system and the legal
profession. His actions were knowing and intentional, and caused actual harm to the
administration of justice.

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The applicable baseline sanction is suspension. The aggravating and
mitigating factors found by the hearing committee are supported by the record.
In fashioning an appropriate sanction, we take some guidance from In re :
Abadie, 20-1276 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So. 3d 1073, 1081, cert. denied sub nom. Abadie
v. Louisiana Att’y Disciplinary Bd. , 212 L. Ed. 2d 11, 142 S. Ct. 1114 (2022) , in
which we imposed a year and a day suspension on an attorney who filed improper
pleadings, failed to follow court procedures, and attacked the integrity of the
presiding judge. In doing so, we stated:
It is clear respondent was frustrated that her client did not
obtain the relief to which she believed he was legally
entitled. It is an unfortunate fact that in many instances,
litigation leaves one of the parties and its counsel
disappointed by the outcome. However, this does not give
an attorney license to make unsupported and reckless
allegations of collusion and conspiracy on the part of the
judges who participated in the matter. Rather, lawyers are
expected to be professionals and to honor their obligations
to the legal system and to the profession. Respondent
failed to do so, and for this misconduct, she must be
sanctioned.

Based on this reasoning, and considering respondent’ s
complete lac k of remorse, we find the board’ s
recommended sanction is appropriate. Accordingly, we
will suspend respondent from the practice of law for one
year and one day.

Similarly, in this case, we are confronted with respondent’s failure to honor
his obligations to the profession and legal system, as well as his continued lack of
remorse for his actions. We find a one year and one day suspension, which will
require respondent to file a formal application for reinstatement pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule XIX, § 24, is an appropriate sanction. As in In re: Simon, 04-2947 (La.
6/29/05), 913 So. 2d 816, 826–27, “[w]e urge respondent to take this opportunity to
reflect upon his professional and ethical duties as a member of the bar of this state,
in particular the need to balance t he zealous advocacy of a client’ s cause with his
oath as an attorney to ‘maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers.’”

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DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee
and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it
is ordered that Henry L. Klein, Louisiana Bar Roll number 7440, be and he hereby
is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day. All costs
and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from
the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

1
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2023-B-00066
I
N RE: HENRY L. KLEIN
At
torney Disciplinary Proceeding
C
RICHTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons:
I agree with the majority’s finding that respondent has violated the multitude
of Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged. However, I disagree with the sanction
of one year and one day suspension, as I find it unduly lenient. Respondent has not
only continued to deny any responsibility for his misconduct, he has engaged in a
pattern of filing repetitive and unnecessary documents in this Court since the Office
of Disciplinary Counsel filed its formal charges against him on January 18, 2023. In
fact, other than his objection and brief responding to the Petition filed by Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, as of May 17, 2023, respondent has filed approximately
fourteen documents in this Court since the Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s initial
filing, many of which seek only to address the underlying litigation and have no
actual relevance to (or express remorse for) respondent’s misconduct.
1 This Court’s
rules setting forth the Code of Professionalism in the Courts provides that lawyers
will “speak and write civilly and respectfully in all communications with the court”
and “will be considerate of the time constraints and pressures on the court and court
staff inherent in their efforts to administer justice.” La. S.Ct. Rules, Part G, § 11.
2
1These documents include, but are not limited to, a “Request for Special Assignment” (seeking to
have his disciplinary matter heard on an expedited basis), a “Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings” (a pleading not relevant to disciplinary proceedings in this Court), a “Notice of
Significant Development” ( pertaining only to the underlying litigation and not respondent’s
misconduct), a “Verified Notice of Significant Filing” (also related to the underlying matter and
not the instant disciplinary process), and most recently a “Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to SCOTUS
Rulings at [sic] Axon v. FTC and SEC v. Cochran and for Further Relief” (a repetitive, albeit
largely unclear, filing urging this Court to investigate alleged collusion between the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel and Girod, a party in the underlying litigation).
2 See also, Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing
so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or

2

Respondent’s filings here have attempted to re-litigate the underlying matter which
brought rise to the original allegations against him, they have requested this Court
give special order and consideration to his disciplinary case, and they have maligned
his opposing counsel following oral argument before this Court.3 See La. S.Ct. Rule
VII, § 7 (“[t]he language used in any brief or document filed in this court must be
courteous, and free from insulting criticism of any person, individually or officially,
or of any class or association of persons, or of any court of justice, or other
institution.”) These meritless documents have served no other purpose than to harass
and detract from the important work of this Court.
In my view, respondent’s prior misconduct throughout his career, coupled
with the present violations, demonstrate that his abusive disregard for the most basic
rules of decorum outweighs any alleged “advocacy” he may claim.
4 He has caused
needless delay and disruption and has shown zero remorse for his actions.
Accordingly, I would impose a lengthier suspension than that set forth by the
majority.

reversal of existing law.”); and Rule 3.5(d) (“A lawyer shall not engage in conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal.”).

3 In a filing on March 5, 2023, entitled “Motion to Strike Hearsay and Request for Enforcement of
April 14 SCOTUS Ruling,” respondent, as he has done before, accuses the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of collusion with Girod.

4 As I have stated before and as noted by the majority, “[i]t is unfortunate that respondent does not
seem to understand that being a zealous advocate does not equate to such repugnant disrespect for
the system we are charged to honor and serve.” In re: McCool, 15-0284 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So. 3d
1058, 1090 (Crichton, J., concurring).