In Re: Jonathan B. Andry

Supreme Court of Louisiana
November 15, 2023
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: JONATHAN B. ANDRY
No. 2023-B-00374
_ _ _ _
_ _
IN
RE: Office of Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Notice of Discipline in
Another Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule XIX, Section 21 and Motion to Initiate
Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings;
_ _ _ _ _ _
November 15, 2023
Reciprocal discipline imposed. See per curiam.
JBM
JLW
JDH
SJC
JTG
WJC
PDG
11/15/2023 "See News Release 049 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 20
23-B-0374
I
N RE: JONATHAN B. ANDRY
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
P
ursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
(“ODC”) has filed a petition seeking the imposition of reciprocal discipline against
respondent, Jonathan B. Andry , an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana,
based upon discipline i mposed by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
U
NDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the months following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico, hundreds of individual and class actions were filed in state and federal
courts on behalf of the thousands of victims. Many of those claims were
consolidated in the Eastern District of Louisiana Deepwater Horizon multi -district
litigation (“MDL”). In 2012, BP reached a settlement wi th the MDL plaintiffs,
which established the Court-Supervised Settlement Program (“CSSP”) to evaluate
and award the payment of economic damages to individuals and businesses affected
by the oil spill. Respondent was among the attorneys who represented claimants in
the CSSP.
In 2013, respondent was accused of funneling $40,000 to a CSSP staff
attorney through improper referral payments. T he MDL district court a ppointed
Louis Freeh as special master to investigate the alleged misconduct. Respondent
made f alse statements during this investigation. The special master’s report
11/15/23

2

recommended that respondent be prevented fr om representing CSSP claimants.
United States District Judge Carl Barbier, the district court judge overseeing both
the MDL and CSSP, ordered respondent to show cause why he should not adopt the
recommendation. Following an evidentiary hearing and an opportunity to respond
in writing, Judge Barbier determined that respondent violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct and disqualified him from participating further in the CSSP or
collecting fees.
Respondent then appealed to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that the district court misapplied the Rules of Professional Conduct and that
its sanctions were excessive. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the district
court “did not abuse its discretion in finding that [respondent] violated the Louisiana
Rules of Professional Conduct or in fashioning an appropriate sanction. ” In re
Deepwater Horizon, 824 F.3d 571, 586 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
At Judge Barbier’s direction, the special master filed a disciplinary complaint
against respondent with the en banc court of the Eastern District of Louisiana .
Following a hearing, the en banc court found that respondent clearly violated duties
owed to the legal system, the court, and the profession through his violation of Rules
1.5(e) (division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm), 8.4(a)
(violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) , and 8.4(d) (engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. The en banc court suspended respondent from practic ing law in the
Eastern District of Louisiana for one year (three concurrent one -year suspensions)
for violating Rules 1.5(e), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d) ; f or respondent’s violation of R ule
8.4(c), the court ordered a public reprimand.
Respondent again appealed to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, arguing that the en banc court misapplied the Rules of Professional

3

Conduct and abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sanction.1 The court of
appeals agreed with respondent that the en banc court erred in finding he violated
Rules 1.5(e) and 8.4(a); however, the court of appeals found respondent’s conduct
did violate Rule 8.4(d):
Rule 8.4(d), more than Rule 1.5(e), gets to the hea rt of
Andry’s misconduct. The core of the wrongdoing was not
the way fees were split between attorneys, but the fact that
money was sent to an attorney involved in the claims
administration process by an a ttorney representing
claimants. Thus, the en banc court did not err in findin g
that Andry violated Rule 8.4(d).

In re Andry, 59 F.4th 203 (5th Cir. 2023) (on rehearing).
With regard to sanction, the court of appeals reversed the en banc court’s order
suspending respondent from the practice of law for one year each for violations of
Rules 1.5(e) and 8.4(a). The court of appeals remanded the matter to the en banc
court for further proceedings, stating that “[o]n remand, the court is f ree to impose
on Andry whatever sanction it sees fit for the 8.4( d) violation, including but not
limited to its previous one-year suspension.”
On remand, the en banc court suspended respondent for one year for his
violation of Rule 8.4(d). The effective date of the suspension was April 20, 2022.
After receiving notice of the federal court order of discipline, the ODC filed a
motion to initiate reciprocal discipline proceedings in Louisiana, pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21.
2 Copies of the orders issued by the en banc court
were attached to the petition, as well as the opinions of the Fifth Circuit. On March
14, 2023, we rendered an order giving respondent and the ODC thirty days to

1 Respondent did not challenge the en banc court’s application of Rule 8.4(c), nor the public
reprimand imposed for that violation.
2 Previously, Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(A) was predicated upon the imposition of discipline
“by another state disciplinary authority.” Effective May 15, 2019, the rule was amended to include
discipline imposed “by another state or federal disciplinary authority...” [Emphasis added.]

4

demonstrate why the imposition of identical discipline would be unwarranted. Both
parties timely filed a response to the order.
In his initial response, respondent argued that the imposition of reciprocal
discipline was premature because he was appealing the Fifth Circ uit’s decision in
his case to the United States Supreme Court. We then held the matter to await the
decision of the United States Supreme Court. On October 2, 2023, the United States
Supreme Court denied respondent’s petition for writ of certiorari. Accordingly, the
matter is now ripe for the imposition of reciprocal discipline.

DISCUSSION
The standard for imposition of discipline on a reciprocal basis is set forth in
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 21(D). That rule provides:
Discipline to be Imposed. Upon the expiration of thirty
days from service of the notice pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph B, this court shall impose the identical
discipline … unless disciplinary counsel or the lawyer
demonstrates, or this court finds that it clearly appears
upon the face of the record from which the discipline is
predicated, that:

(1) The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity
to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due
process; or
(2) Based on the record created by the jurisdiction that
imposed the discipline, there was such infirmity of
proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the
clear conviction that the court could not, consistent
with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that
subject; or
(3) The imposition of the same discipline by the court
would result in grave injustice or be offensive to the
public policy of the jurisdiction; or
(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially
different discipline in this state; …

If this court determines that any of those elements exists,
this court shall enter such other order as it deems
appropriate. The burden is on the party seeking different
discipline in this jurisdiction to demonstrate that the
imposition of the same discipline is not appropriate.

5

In determining the appropriate measure of reciprocal discipline, we are not
required to impose the same sanction as that imposed by the jurisdiction in which
the misconduct occurred. Nevertheless, only under extraordinary circumstances
should there be a significant variance from the sanction imposed by the other
jurisdiction. In re: Aulston, 05-1546 (La. 1/13/06), 918 So. 2d 461. See also In re
Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 968- 69 (D.C. 2003) (“there is merit in according
deference, for its own sake, to the actions of other jurisdictions with respect to the
attorneys over whom we share supervisory authority”).
In the instant case, the imposition of reciprocal discipline against respondent
based upon the federal court’s judgment (a one-year suspension, which has become
final upon the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court ) is clearly
appropriate. Respondent has presented no evidence that imposition of this sanction
in Louisiana would result in a grave injustice for purpose s of Supreme Court Rule
XIX, § 21, and there is no suggestion of such upon the face of the record before us.
Moreover, there is little doubt that respondent’s conduct would warrant discipline in
Louisiana, given that it involves improper referral payments to another attorney.
Under these circumstances, we find it is appropriate to defer to the federal court
judgment imposing discipline upon respondent.
Accordingly, we will impose reciprocal discipline in the form of a one-year
suspension from the practice of law. Nothing in our order should be read as
precluding the reinstatement of respondent in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana if permitted under the rules of that court.

DECREE
Considering the Petition to Initiate Reciprocal Discipline Proceedings filed by
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and the record filed herein, it is ordered that

6

respondent, Jonathan B. Andry, Louisiana Bar Roll number 20081, be and he hereby
is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.