In Re: J Antonio Florence

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #054

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 8th day of December, 2023 are as follows:

PER CURIAM:

2023-B-00592 IN RE: J ANTONIO FLORENCE

SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

NO. 2023-B-0592

IN RE: J. ANTONIO FLORENCE

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of

Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, J. Antonio Florence, an attorney

licensed to practice law in Louisiana. 1

UNDERLYING FACTS

In January 2021, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. 2 The

formal charges alleged the following:

The Kennon Matter

On April 23, 2014, Beverly Kennon hired respondent to represent her son,

Keddrick Kennon, in a criminal matter in Webster Parish. Respondent agreed to

handle the matter for a $5,000 fixed fee, but he and Ms. Kennon did not execute a

written fee agreement. Ms. Kennon paid respondent a total of $4,100. Respondent

applied $2,100 of this amount to outstanding fees owed for a 2013 representation of

Mr. Kennon.

1
Respondent is also licensed to practice law in New Jersey.
2
Initially, the ODC filed six counts of formal charges, but the hearing committee and the
disciplinary board found no misconduct in one of the counts. The ODC accepted these findings
without objection. Accordingly, this opinion does not address the misconduct in that particular
count.

Respondent did not want to publicly enroll as Mr. Kennon’s counsel of record

because he did not have a good relationship with the district attorney. Therefore, he

paid attorney Ernest Gilliam $2,000 to enroll as counsel of record during the plea

negotiation stage of the case. Respondent assured Mr. Kennon and Mr. Gilliam that

he would, nevertheless, appear and represent Mr. Kennon if the case proceeded to a

trial. Mr. Gilliam filed and handled all pre-trial motions and court appearances in

the case.

At an April 15, 2015 status conference, the judge scheduled the case for an

April 27, 2015 trial. Mr. Kennon was present with only Mr. Gilliam and complained

to the judge that he had hired respondent to represent him at trial. Mr. Gilliam

confirmed this and advised that he expected respondent to appear at the trial to

represent Mr. Kennon.

Following the status conference, Ms. Kennon sent respondent a text message

asking if he intended to represent her son at the April 27, 2015 trial. In response,

respondent claimed he did not represent Mr. Kennon and would not be representing

him at the trial. In a follow-up text message, Ms. Kennon reminded respondent that

she had already paid him to represent her son at his trial.

Respondent did not appear at Mr. Kennon’s April 27, 2015 trial. However,

Mr. Gilliam was present to represent Mr. Kennon. Over Mr. Kennon’s objection,

the judge proceeded with the trial, which resulted in a guilty verdict and a thirty-five

year sentence for Mr. Kennon.

Thereafter, Mr. Kennon filed a disciplinary complaint against respondent,

seeking a refund of the fees his mother paid. During the ODC’s investigation, Mr.

Gilliam informed the ODC that respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit, in

which he would falsely state that respondent never agreed to represent Mr. Kennon.

Mr. Gilliam refused to sign such an affidavit.

2

Respondent acknowledged accepting the $4,100 fee from Ms. Kennon but

refused to refund any portion thereof. He also refused to refer the matter to the

Louisiana State Bar Association (“LSBA”) fee dispute resolution program, claiming

he had earned the fee. Furthermore, respondent insisted that he never agreed to

represent Mr. Kennon but simply referred the case to Mr. Gilliam.

Based on these alleged facts, the ODC charged respondent with violating

Rules 1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a

client), 1.5(f)(5) (failure to refund an unearned fee), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of

Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Davis Matter

In 2016, Burney Davis was charged with a felony in Caddo Parish. Mr. Davis

hired attorney Jacqueline Scott to represent him and paid her agreed-upon $8,500

fixed fee. Later, Ms. Scott was required to withdraw from the representation and

asked respondent if he would take over. Both Mr. Davis and respondent agreed that

respondent would represent Mr. Davis for the same $8,500 fixed fee. Ms. Scott

refunded the $8,500 to Mr. Davis, who in turn used it to pay respondent.

Respondent enrolled as Mr. Davis’ counsel of record on November 9, 2016.

On December 8, 2016, Mr. Davis fired respondent because he could not get

respondent to communicate with him. Mr. Davis then hired attorney Peter Flowers

to represent him. Respondent did not refund the $8,500 fee.

Later, Mr. Davis filed a claim with the LSBA fee dispute resolution program.

Respondent did not respond to the LSBA’s letter requesting that he participate in the

program and made no other efforts to resolve the fee dispute.

3

Based on these alleged facts, the ODC charged respondent with violating Rule

1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Harris Matter

On August 16, 2016, Orya Harris hired respondent to represent her brother,

Rodriqus Harris, in a criminal matter in Caddo Parish. Respondent quoted a $5,000

fixed fee to handle the representation, but no written fee agreement was executed.

Ms. Harris made an initial $1,500 payment, and respondent provided her with a

written invoice/receipt for the payment. Over the next several months, Ms. Harris

made various payments totaling $3,100.

During 2017, respondent failed to appear at several pre-trial hearings on Mr.

Harris’ behalf. Consequently, Mr. Harris fired respondent and later filed a

disciplinary complaint against him. In his complaint, Mr. Harris demanded that

respondent withdraw from the representation and refund the fee. Respondent

withdrew from the representation prior to the August 9, 2017 trial, and Mr. Harris

was provided court-appointed counsel. However, respondent failed to refund the fee

or otherwise attempt to resolve the fee dispute.

During his July 26, 2018 sworn statement to the ODC, respondent claimed the

fixed fee was $10,000. In support of this contention, respondent provided the ODC

with copies of two separate invoices, both dated January 12, 2017 and reflecting a

$10,000 fixed fee, which he purportedly sent to Ms. Harris. The ODC showed

respondent the November 1, 2016 invoice that indicated the fixed fee was $5,000,

and he acknowledged it was genuine. However, he could provide no credible

explanation for the difference in the two sets of invoices. Ms. Harris informed the

ODC that she had never seen the two January 12, 2017 invoices and reiterated that

the fixed fee was $5,000.

4

Based on these alleged facts, the ODC charged respondent with violating

Rules 1.5(f)(5), 8.1(a) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of

material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct.

The James Matter

On February 3, 2017, Cordero James hired respondent to represent him in a

criminal matter in Caddo Parish. Pursuant to a written fee agreement, respondent

charged a $6,000 fixed fee. Mr. James’ family paid respondent $2,000 towards the

fee.

Simultaneously, respondent agreed to represent Mr. James’ co-defendant in

the case. However, the co-defendant’s statement to the police incriminated Mr.

James, and the judge advised respondent in open court that he could not represent

them both. Later, during a hearing on April 6, 2017, the judge removed respondent

from both representations due to the conflict of interest. Respondent filed a motion

to withdraw, which the judge granted, and Mr. James had to retain new counsel.

Nevertheless, respondent did not address the issue of the unearned fee.

Based on these alleged facts, the ODC charged respondent with violating Rule

1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Contempt of Court Matter

During a September 12, 2017 hearing in a criminal case pending in Caddo

Parish, Judge Erin Garrett repeatedly admonished respondent for making abusive

and insulting comments in open court directed at the court and the assistant district

attorney and for repeatedly interrupting them. During a recess in the case, Judge

Garrett instructed respondent to remain outside the courtroom. Nevertheless,

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respondent left the courthouse, and court personnel were unable to locate him at his

office.

The following day, Judge Garrett conducted a hearing in which she charged

respondent with direct contempt for (1) “contumacious” refusal to comply with her

order to remain and (2) deliberately making insulting, openly contemptuous, and

derogatory remarks that challenged her authority and dignity. Respondent was

found guilty of direct contempt and fined $100.

Based on these alleged facts, the ODC charged respondent with violating Rule

8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

As stated above, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent in January

2021. Through counsel, respondent filed an answer to the formal charges, wherein

he denied engaging in any misconduct. Accordingly, the matter proceeded to a

formal hearing on the merits.

Formal Hearing

The hearing committee conducted the formal hearing on June 14 and 15, 2021.

Both respondent and the ODC introduced documentary evidence and called

witnesses to testify before the committee. Respondent also testified on his own

behalf and on cross-examination by the ODC.

Hearing Committee Report

After consideration, the hearing committee provided an analysis of the

evidence and testimony presented for each count of alleged misconduct. Based upon

this analysis, the committee made factual findings and determinations of rule

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violations. The committee’s analysis, findings, and determinations in each count are

as follows:

The Kennon Matter

Ms. Kennon testified that respondent had successfully represented her son

previously. Therefore, she contacted him about the 2014 criminal matter.

Respondent said he would take the new case for a $5,000 fee, with a $2,000 deposit,

if she paid the balance due from the previous representation. In support, the ODC

submitted evidence in the form of two checks representing the balance owed for the

previous representation and the $2,000 deposit for the new representation. Ms.

Kennon further testified that respondent never appeared in court on her son’s behalf.

Mr. Gilliam informed her that respondent had sent him to represent her son on

preliminary matters because the district attorney did not like respondent. In support,

the ODC submitted text messages between Ms. Kennon and respondent. The

committee found Ms. Kennon’s testimony credible.

Mr. Gilliam testified that respondent associated him to handle Mr. Kennon’s

pre-trial matters, and respondent would be present if the case went to trial. This

testimony is supported by the transcript of an April 15, 2015 status conference in

Mr. Kennon’s case as well as by a motion to continue the trial filed on April 27,

2015. Mr. Gilliam also explained why he did not sign the affidavit respondent

drafted. 3 Finally, he stated that, as Mr. Kennon’s trial was approaching, he and

respondent had a falling out regarding another matter and were not speaking on a

daily basis.

Mr. Kennon testified that he believed he had hired respondent to represent

him and had one or two telephone calls with respondent wherein respondent agreed

3
Mr. Gilliam indicated that he did not want to sign the affidavit because he had no knowledge of
some of the information stated therein. He also did not want to sign the affidavit because he
thought his live testimony would be more appropriate.

7

to represent him in court. Nevertheless, respondent never appeared in court with

Mr. Kennon. This testimony is supported by the transcript of an April 15, 2015

status conference in Mr. Kennon’s case.

Respondent acknowledged speaking with both Ms. Kennon and Mr. Kennon

but denied agreeing to represent Mr. Kennon. The committee found respondent’s

denials not credible, noting that he could not explain why he had written two receipts

for the money Ms. Kennon paid him – one for the $2,000 deposit on the $5,000 fee

that showed a balance due of $3,000 and one for the $2,100 payment for the previous

representation that showed a balance due of zero.4

Based upon the testimony and evidence, the committee found that respondent

accepted the fee and agreed to represent Mr. Kennon. Whether in response to Ms.

Kennon’s threats or to his falling out with Mr. Gilliam, respondent failed to appear

in court on Mr. Kennon’s behalf. Respondent knowingly and intentionally neglected

Mr. Kennon’s representation, leaving Mr. Gilliam to try Mr. Kennon’s case.

Although the outcome of the trial may not have been any different, Mr. Kennon was

not represented by the attorney of his choice. Furthermore, respondent refused to

refund any portion of the fee or refer the matter to the fee dispute resolution program.

Respondent attempted to get Mr. Gilliam to sign an affidavit that contained facts

contrary to the committee’s factual findings.

Based upon these facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rules

1.3 and 1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee further

determined there was not clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated the

Rules of Professional Conduct by seeking Mr. Gilliam’s signature on the affidavit.

4
Respondent testified that Mr. Gilliam had already agreed to handle Mr. Kennon’s case for $5,000.
Therefore, respondent cashed the $2,000 check and gave the cash to Mr. Gilliam. Then he wrote
a receipt showing a balance due of $3,000.

8

The Davis Matter

Mr. Davis testified that he originally hired Ms. Scott to represent him.

However, when she had to withdraw because of a conflict, she refunded the

remaining $7,650 of the $8,500, and he paid respondent $7,650. Minute entries

show respondent enrolled as counsel of record but was discharged less than a month

later, which Mr. Davis attributed to respondent’s failure to communicate. Mr. Davis

also testified that, when he fired respondent, respondent told him, “You’re not

getting your money back” and “I’m not giving you a dime back.” Mr. Davis then

tried to initiate fee dispute arbitration but was unsuccessful.

Respondent lacked credibility when he inconsistently testified that he did not

remember receiving an arbitration request from Mr. Davis but also called in response

to said arbitration request. Respondent also admitted that he had not earned the

entire fee Mr. Davis had paid him. However, he claimed that Mr. Davis asked him

to apply the remaining balance to another client, which Mr. Davis denied. The

committee determined respondent’s credibility was further damaged by his failure

to include this claim in his answer to the formal charges.

Based upon the testimony and evidence, the committee found that respondent

was hired on a fixed-fee basis. When he was discharged a month later, he took no

action to address the fee dispute even after Mr. Davis filed a claim with the LSBA

fee dispute resolution program. The committee also found that respondent acted

knowingly and intentionally. Based upon these facts, the committee determined

respondent violated Rule 1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Harris Matter

During his sworn statement, respondent produced an invoice reflecting that

the fee was $10,000. When confronted with the invoice reflecting a $5,000 fee that

Ms. Harris produced, respondent admitted that the $5,000 invoice was real. He

9

claimed that the fee agreement was $5,000 for each criminal charge and that there

were actually two invoices for $5,000. However, respondent could not explain why

the second $5,000 invoice was lost and could not explain why there would be two

$5,000 invoices and also one $10,000 invoice. Respondent further testified that he

sent Ms. Harris the $10,000 invoice along with a letter via certified mail. He claimed

to have hand-delivered same to Mr. Harris. However, respondent could provide no

proof of the certified mailing. Respondent also did not know if he took any action

regarding the fee dispute in this matter.

Ms. Harris’ testimony was very credible and supported by documentary

evidence. She testified that she hired respondent to defend her brother against

serious criminal charges. According to Ms. Harris, respondent agreed to represent

her brother for $5,000, and she paid him a $1,500 deposit. Eventually, she paid him

an additional $3,100. Respondent was reluctant to provide Ms. Harris with receipts

and only wanted cash payments. When respondent failed to appear for several

hearings, Mr. Harris fired him and filed a disciplinary complaint against him. Mr.

Harris also testified that the fee agreement was $5,000 with a payment plan. Both

of them denied the fee was $10,000 and denied ever seeing the letter and $10,000

invoice respondent claimed to have delivered to them.

Based upon the testimony and evidence, the committee found respondent was

hired to represent Mr. Harris for a $5,000 fixed fee for all criminal charges. Upon

being discharged, respondent knowingly and intentionally made no effort to return

any portion of the unearned fee or to initiate fee dispute arbitration. Furthermore,

respondent created a false $10,000 invoice and letter and presented same to the ODC

and the committee. Based upon these facts, the committee determined respondent

violated Rules 1.5(f)(5), 8.1(a), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

10

The James Matter

Mr. James testified that he and his co-defendant each hired respondent to

represent them for a $6,000 fixed fee. He further testified that $2,000 of the $6,000

was paid upfront on his behalf. Documentary evidence showed that respondent

enrolled as Mr. James’ counsel on March 13, 2017 and withdrew as his counsel on

April 6, 2017 due to a conflict of interest. In his disciplinary complaint against

respondent, Mr. James requested a refund.

Respondent admitted that he did not complete Mr. James’ case but fixated on

his assertion that he had worked between sixty to eighty hours on the case despite

filing no other pleadings or making no other court appearances on Mr. James’ behalf.

In response to Mr. James’ complaint, respondent indicated that Mr. James’ aunt or

grandmother had contacted him about a refund. However, during his testimony at

the hearing, respondent testified that Mr. James’ family never contacted him about

a refund.

Based upon the testimony and evidence, the committee found that Mr. James

hired respondent on a fixed-fee basis. Within a month of being hired, respondent

had to withdraw due to a conflict of interest. Thereafter, respondent knowingly and

intentionally did not take any action to resolve the fee dispute. Based upon these

facts, the committee determined respondent violated Rule 1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct.

The Contempt of Court Matter

Judge Garrett testified that she was uncomfortable testifying against

respondent because they now have a professional rapport after having started off

“slightly rocky.” During the September 12, 2017 hearing, Judge Garrett was irritated

with respondent for saying he had not had time to read the amended motion.

Respondent then told her that he was not going to read the motion in court but would

11

instead read it at his office where he could conduct research, which she felt was

contemptuous. Therefore, she ejected him from the courtroom. The transcript of

the hearing at issue indicates that Judge Garrett stated, “Get out. Get out before I

put you in jail. Get out. I will pass it temporarily.”5 She felt that her ejection of

respondent diffused the situation and gave respondent an opportunity to address the

issues in the motion. After reviewing the transcript of the hearing at issue, Judge

Garrett also admitted that respondent did not call the prosecutor “crazy.” However,

when she heard the word during the hearing, she felt her reaction was predictable,

and she held respondent in contempt of court the next day.

Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office Captain Sharon Piggs testified that, when Judge

Garrett asked that respondent return to the courtroom, she sent a deputy to

respondent’s office, but respondent’s office location had recently changed, and the

deputy could not find him. Captain Piggs then sent respondent a text, to which he

replied, and she told him that Judge Garrett was looking for him. Respondent

indicated that he thought the hearing was finished. However, he did return to the

courtroom only to learn that Judge Garrett had adjourned for the day.

Respondent testified that he was not referring to Judge Garrett or the

prosecutor as crazy. He also stated that he was not talking to Judge Garrett when he

declined to borrow the Code book.6

Based upon the testimony and evidence, the committee found that

respondent’s words, actions, and demeanor during the September 12, 2017 hearing

5
The transcript further reveals that respondent interrupted Judge Garrett several times. Her next
statement to respondent after saying, “I will pass it temporarily” was “Do not interrupt me.” Judge
Garrett further testified that she meant for him to wait outside the courtroom, not leave the
courthouse and return to his office. She believed he understood that he should wait outside because
she had previously told him to take a moment outside the courtroom to review the motion.
Respondent’s client, Kenrick Wilson, testified that Judge Garrett told him to sit down after she
told respondent to get out of the courtroom. Mr. Wilson indicated that he sat in the courtroom
until she recalled the case, but Judge Garrett reset the hearing for the next day because respondent
did not return.
6
Respondent specified during his testimony that he was talking to the prosecutor, who had
previously offered to let him use her Code book.

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were reckless and challenged Judge Garrett’s authority and dignity. Therefore,

Judge Garrett found respondent guilty of direct contempt and fined him. Judge

Garrett and respondent have not had any problems since. Based upon these facts,

the committee determined that respondent negligently committed a technical

violation of Rule 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Because Judge Garrett

had already satisfactorily addressed respondent’s negligent lapse, the committee

declined to consider this matter in determining an appropriate sanction.

The committee then determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients,

the legal system, and the legal profession. His conduct was negligent, knowing, and

intentional, which caused actual harm to his clients and potential harm to the public,

the legal system, and the legal profession. Citing the ABA’s Standards for Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is suspension.

In aggravation, the committee found the following: a dishonest or selfish

motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, submission of false evidence,

false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, a

refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, vulnerability of the

victims, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 2008), and

indifference to making restitution. In mitigation, the committee found the absence

of a prior disciplinary record and imposition of other penalties or sanctions (the

contempt of court matter only).

After considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar

misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be suspended from the

practice of law for two years, with all but six months deferred, followed by one year

of probation with conditions.

Both respondent and the ODC objected to the committee’s report and

recommendation.

13

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

After review, the disciplinary board determined that the hearing committee’s

factual findings are supported by the record and adopted same. Based on these facts,

the board agreed with the committee’s determination of rule violations, with one

exception. In the Kennon matter, the board found an additional violation of Rule

8.4(a) due to respondent’s violation of Rules 1.3 and 1.5(f)(5) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct.

The board then determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the

public, and the legal profession. His failure to address the multiple fee disputes was

knowing, if not intentional. His submission of a fabricated invoice and letter and

fabricated testimony with respect to the Harris matter was knowing and intentional.

Respondent caused harm to several clients by failing to address the fee

disputes or to return the unearned fees. Notably, subsequent to the formal hearing,

the fee dispute in the Davis matter was submitted to the LSBA fee dispute resolution

program, and the arbitrator determined respondent owed Mr. Davis a $4,150 refund.

Respondent also harmed Mr. Kennon by failing to perform any services on his

behalf. Finally, respondent’s fabrication of documents and testimony harmed the

integrity of the legal profession and caused potential harm to the disciplinary system.

The board agreed with the committee that the baseline sanction is suspension

based upon the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The board also

agreed with the committee’s determination of aggravating and mitigating factors.

After further considering this court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar

misconduct, a majority of the board recommended respondent be suspended from

the practice of law for two years, with all but one year deferred, followed by one

year of probation with conditions. One board member dissented and would

recommend that no portion of the two-year suspension be deferred.

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Both respondent and the ODC objected to the board’s recommendation.

Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court

Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).

DISCUSSION

Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.

Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has

been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),

18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and

recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the

manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:

Caulfield, 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.

3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.

The record of this matter supports a finding that respondent neglected a legal

matter, failed to address fee disputes in four matters, made false statements and

provided false evidence to the ODC during an investigation, and was found in

contempt of court for challenging a judge’s authority during a hearing. The board’s

determinations regarding rule violations based upon these facts is supported by the

record.

The committee and the board both determined there was not clear and

convincing evidence that respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by

seeking Mr. Gilliam’s signature on the affidavit relating to the representation of Mr.

Kennon. However, we find that respondent attempted to persuade Mr. Gilliam to

sign the affidavit even though he knew it contained false statements. The committee

specifically found that respondent accepted the fee and agreed to represent Mr.

Kennon. The affidavit that respondent drafted for Mr. Gilliam’s signature

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specifically stated, “Based on my knowledge, information and belief, Mr. Florence

never agreed that he would represent Mr. Kennon in his new criminal charge,” which

is contrary to Mr. Gilliam’s remarks in open court while representing Mr. Kennon,

his statements in a motion to continue, and his testimony at the disciplinary hearing.

Respondent’s attempt to get Mr. Gilliam to sign the affidavit even though he knew

it contained this false statement is dishonest conduct in violation of Rule 8.4(c).

Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a

determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining

a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain

high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,

and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173

(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and

the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and

mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520

(La. 1984).

Respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the legal system, and the legal

profession. At times, he acted negligently, knowingly, and/or intentionally, and his

conduct caused actual and potential harm. The applicable baseline sanction is

suspension. We agree with the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the

committee and adopted by the board. In additional mitigation, we agree with

respondent that there has been a delay in the disciplinary proceedings.

Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, we find that the heartland of

respondent’s misconduct consists of his numerous failures to address fee disputes

and his submission of false statements and false evidence to the ODC. Respondent

has never addressed the fee disputes with Mr. Kennon, Mr. Harris, and Mr. James.

While he did participate in fee dispute arbitration with Mr. Davis, he did so belatedly

and has never provided evidence of the ordered refund to Mr. Davis despite claiming

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to have made said refund. With respect to his submission of false evidence and false

statements during the disciplinary proceeding, the record is clear that respondent

submitted a false invoice and made false statements to the ODC regarding the Harris

matter. In the Kennon matter, respondent attempted to submit a false affidavit to the

ODC.

Considering all of respondent’s misconduct, we will suspend him from the

practice of law for one year and one day, thereby necessitating a formal application

for reinstatement. Respondent shall make full restitution to Mr. Kennon, Mr. Harris,

and Mr. James or participate in the LSBA fee dispute resolution program and pay

any amounts awarded to Mr. Kennon, Mr. Harris, and Mr. James in decisions

rendered by the fee dispute resolution program. In addition, if he has not already

done so, respondent shall pay $4,150 to Mr. Davis, which amount was awarded to

Mr. Davis by the LSBA fee dispute resolution program.

DECREE

Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee

and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it

is ordered that J. Antonio Florence, Louisiana Bar Roll number 32037, be and he

hereby is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day.

Respondent shall make full restitution to Keddrick Kennon, Rodriqus Harris, and

Cordero James or participate in the Louisiana State Bar Association’s Fee Dispute

Resolution Program and pay any amounts awarded to Mr. Kennon, Mr. Harris, and

Mr. James in decisions rendered by the Fee Dispute Resolution Program.

Respondent shall also pay $4,150 to Burney Davis if he has not already done so. All

costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with

Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from

the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

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