John A. Adema, Rodi W. Adema, Patrick M. Adema, Beth Adema Cury, Patricia Talley Featherstone, Lauren Talley Mills v. Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C., High Point Gas Transmission, LLC, and High Point Gas Gathering, L.L.C.
John A. Adema, Rodi W. Adema, Patrick M. Adema, Beth Adema Cury, Patricia Talley Featherstone, Lauren Talley Mills v. Southern Natural Gas Company, L.L.C., High Point Gas Transmission, LLC, and High Point Gas Gathering, L.L.C., No. 2023-C-0052 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. May 1, 2023).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- 331 So. 3d 1072 not in our corpus
- City of New Orleans v. Board of Com'rs 640 So. 2d 237
- 314 So. 3d 1128 not in our corpus
- Scott v. Zaheri 157 So. 3d 779
- Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc. 616 So. 2d 1234
- First Nat. Bank v. Lloyd's Underwriters 629 So. 2d 507
Opinion text
CORRECTED COPY
JOHN A. ADEMA, RODI W. * NO. 2023-C-0052
ADEMA, PATRICK M.
ADEMA, BETH ADEMA *
CURY, PATRICIA TALLEY COURT OF APPEAL
FEATHERSTONE, LAUREN *
TALLEY MILLS, ET AL. FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
VERSUS STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******
SOUTHERN NATURAL GAS
COMPANY, L.L.C., HIGH
POINT GAS TRANSMISSION,
LLC, AND HIGH POINT GAS
GATHERING, L.L.C.
ON SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE
25TH JDC, PARISH OF PLAQUEMINES
NO. 66-691, DIVISION “B”
Honorable Michael D. Clement,
******
Judge Karen K. Herman
******
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge
Karen K. Herman)
Gladstone N. Jones, III
Bernard E. Boudreaux, Jr.
Michael P. Arata
Kevin E. Huddell
John T. Arnold
Rosa A. Acheson
JONES SWANSON HUDDELL & DASCHBACH, LLC
601 Poydras St., Suite 2655
New Orleans, LA 70130
S. Jacob Braud
BALLAY, BRAUD & COLON, PLC
8114 Highway 23, Suite 101
Belle Chasse, Louisiana 70037
James R. Swanson
H.S. Bartlett III
Lance C. McCardle
E. Blair Schilling
FISHMAN HAYGOOD, L.L.P.
201 St. Charles Ave., Suite 4600
New Orleans, LA 70170
CORRECTED COPY
J. Michael Veron
Turner D. Brumby
VERON, BICE, PALMER & WILSON, L.L.C.
721 Kirby Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/RELATORS
Cheryl M. Kornick
Kelly B. Becker
Laura S. Brown
Cristian M. Soler
LISKOW & LEWIS
701 Poydras Street, Suite 5000
New Orleans, LA 70139
Jamie D. Rhymes
LISKOW & LEWIS
822 Harding Street
Lafayette, LA 70503
Richard D. McConnell, Jr.
KEAN MILLER, LLP
400 Convention Street, Suite 700
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
Michael R. Phillips
Claire E. Juneau
Rachel M. Scarafia
Jeffrey J. Gelpi
KEAN MILLER, LLP
909 Poydras Street, Suite 3600
New Orleans, LA 701112
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
WRIT GRANTED, JUDGMENT
REVERSED AND REMANDED
MAY 1, 2023
KKH
JCL
PAB
This is an action by several owners of wetlands property in Plaquemines
Parish asserting claims for breach of contract, tort, and violations of the Louisiana
Unfair Trade Practices against three pipeline companies, Southern Natural Gas
Company, L.L.C., High Point Gas Gathering, L.L.C., and High Point Gas
Transmission, L.L.C. (hereinafter “pipeline companies”). Applicants-Plaintiffs
now seek review of the trial court’s December 22, 2022 judgment sustaining in
part an exception of no cause of action. For the following reasons, we find that the
trial court erred in partially granting the defendants’ exception of no cause of
action. We therefore reverse the December 22, 2022 judgment and remand the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter arises out of a dispute between members of two families who are
owners of coastal wetland property in Plaquemines Parish, and three companies to
which Plaintiffs’ predecessors-in-interest had given rights of way permitting the
companies to use the properties to install, maintain and dredge canals, and to
maintain pipelines on those properties for the transportation of gas, oil or other
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substances, and commodities. Those rights of way (“ROWs”) had been granted
beginning in 1952 with the final agreement taking place in 1970. Plaintiffs alleged
in their Petition and First Amended Petition that the ROWs expressly limited the
width of the canals, and that the failure to properly maintain the canals within those
widths caused the erosion of the canal banks and the loss of Plaintiffs’ land.
In response to the claims made by the Plaintiffs, the defendants filed
exceptions contending that no matter whether asserted under contract or tort law,
or pursuant to the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (LUTPA), Plaintiffs had
no cause of action “to seek redress for the alleged failure of Defendants to prevent
natural forces from affecting Plaintiffs’ property or for the damage caused by
natural forces.” Further, defendants maintained that “even if Plaintiffs had a legal
basis to seek redress for Defendants’ alleged failure to prevent natural forces from
affecting Plaintiffs’ properly, any such claim prescribed decades ago.”
In a judgment dated December 22, 2022, the trial court overruled the
exception of prescription. As to the exception of no cause of action, the trial court
overruled it “as to the tort claims based on the affirmative actions of defendants,
breach of contract, and violations of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act;”
sustained the exception “as to the tort claims based on the defendants’ failure to
prevent damage from natural forces;” and granted thirty (30) days to amend their
petition to plead a cause of action. From this ruling, Plaintiffs seek relief.
Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews an exception of no cause of action de novo. See
Succession of Horrell, 2021-0168, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/21), 331 So.3d 1072,
1079. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling sustaining an exception of no cause of
action, the court of appeal should review the case de novo because the exception
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raises a question of law and the “lower court’s decision is based only on the
sufficiency of the petition.” City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans
Levee Dist., 1993-0690, p. 28 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d 237, 253.
Partial exceptions of no cause of action are discouraged, as the Fourth
Circuit recently pointed out in Parker v. Paladin Contractors, LLC, 2020-0492
(La. App. 4 Cir. 3/3/21), 314 So.3d 1128:
As this court has observed, the jurisprudence of this state “has
long disfavored the granting of partial exceptions of no cause of
action.” Scott v. Zaheri, 14-0726, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/3/14), 157
So.3d 779, 782-83 (citing Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v.
Subaru S., Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1239 (La. 1993)). The reason for this
disfavor is that granting a partial exception of no cause of action
fosters multiple appeals, “which forces an appellate court to consider
the merits of the action in a piecemeal fashion.” Zaheri, 14-0726, p.
17, 157 So.3d at 789.
Id. at p. 7, 314 So.3d at 1134. The Fourth Circuit went on to discuss the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s guidance in considering partial exceptions of no
cause of action:
Given this disfavor, the Louisiana Supreme Court in the Subaru
case formulated a framework designed to result in “only one appeal in
most cases.” Subaru, 616 So.2d at 1242; see also First Nat. Bank of
Jefferson Par. v. Lloyd’s Underwriters, 629 So.2d 507, 512 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1993) (observing that the Subaru framework “derives from
the Court’s concern for the uneconomical use of judicial time”). Id. at
p. 7, 314 So.3d at 1134.
Summarized, the Subaru framework is as follows:
[A] trial court, in considering an exception of no cause of action
in multi-claim litigation in which the court might rule in favor of the
exceptor on less than all claims or on the rights of less than all parties,
must first determine whether (1) the petition asserts several
demands or theories of recovery based on a single cause of action
arising out of one transaction or occurrence, or (2) the petition is
based on several separate and distinct causes of action arising out of
separate and distinct transactions or occurrences. If the former, the
court should overrule the exception of no cause of action when the
petition states a cause of action as to any demand or theory of
3
recovery. If the latter, the court should maintain the exception in part
...
616 So.2d at 1242. Explaining the difference between these two
categories, the Supreme Court in the Subaru case observed:
There is only one cause of action (although several demands
or theories of recovery may be asserted thereon) when the
operative facts of one transaction or occurrence give rise to the
plaintiff’s right to assert the action against the defendant.
However, there are separate and distinct causes of action when the
operative facts of separate and distinct transactions or occurrences
give rise to the plaintiff’s right to assert various actions against the
defendants.
616 So.2d at 1238-39.
Id. at p. 8, 314 So.3d at 1134-35 (Emphasis supplied).
In the instant case, a fair reading of the Petition and First Amended Petition
yields the conclusion that the allegations contained therein land squarely in the first
Subaru category in that they allege a single set of operative facts: that Plaintiffs are
entitled to relief because of the Defendants’ improper maintenance of the canals at
their allowed widths whether under contract law, tort law or LUTPA.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court erred in partially
granting the defendants’ exception of no cause of action. Accordingly, we reverse
the December 22, 2022 judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
WRIT GRANTED, JUDGMENT
REVERSED AND REMANDED
4