Scott Wesley Eastman, Et Ux. v. State Farm Mutual

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #022
FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
The Opinions handed down on the 10th day of May, 2024 are as follows:
BY McCallum, J.:
2023-C-01107 SCOTT WESLEY EASTMAN, ET UX. VS. STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. (Parish of Calcasieu)
REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT VACATED; VERDICT OF
THE JURY REINSTATED. SEE OPINION.
Hughes, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2023-C-01107
SCOTT WESLEY EASTMAN, ET UX.
VS.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET
AL.
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Calcasieu
McCALLUM, J.
While judges are learned in the law, the wisdom of a single expert is often less
than the collective wisdom of a diverse and independent group of individuals.1 Trial
by jury is understood as relying, at least in part, on this “wisdom of the crowd.” This
point, and others, underlies the great deference our Civil law system affords to jury
decisions. However, our system also recognizes that juries are not infallible and
accordingly provides corrective procedures where appropriate.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the court of appeal
properly affirmed the trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (“JNOV”) as to liability and damages. Our jurisprudence has established
a rigorous standard for granting a JNOV. Bombardier v. Clasen, 2021-0590, p. 6
(La. App. 4 Cir. 10/05/22), 350 So. 3d 1007, 1013. Finding that a reasonable factual
basis supported the jury’s verdict in this case , we conclude that standard was not
met. The trial court erred in granting the motion for JNOV, and the court of appeal
erred in affirming that judgment. We therefore reverse the court of appeal, vacate
the trial court’s judgment granting the motion for JNOV, and reinstate the jury’s
verdict.
1 Francis Galton. 1907. Vox Populi . Nature 75: 450-451. The “wisdom of the crowd” was
famously demonstrated by Galton at an English county fair. Sir Francis contrived a competition
to guess the weight of a dressed ox. The median of 787 guesses, by laypeople, proved to be
astonishingly accurate, less than one percent off of the true weight.

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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 19, 2015, Roger Burns (“Burns”), Scott Eastman (“Eastman”),
and Jillian Peterson (“Peterson”) were involved in a three -car consecutive rear-end
collision heading eastbound in the far right-hand lane of Interstate 10 where
Interstate 10 exits to merge onto Interstate 210 East in Calcasieu Parish. It is
undisputed Peterson was driving the tail ing, final vehicle of the three cars when,
during a period of congested, heavy traffic, she rear-ended the car in front her, driven
by Eastman, who then impacted the car in front of him driven by Burns. 2 Eastman
was taken to the hospital complaining of neck, head, and back pain and was
thereafter treated by numerous medical providers, one of which was Dr. Shane Rider
(“Dr. Rider”), a chiropractor.
Eastman and his wife, Mrs. Darnell Eastman (sometimes referred to
collectively as “the Eastmans”) filed suit for damages naming Peterson and her
insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm” )
(sometimes referred to collectively as “defendants”), as defendants. The Eastmans
alleged Peterson was solely liable for the accident because she negligently rear -
ended Eastman’s vehicle. Eastman sought damages for past, present, and future
medical expenses, loss of enjoyment of life, pain and suffering, and mental anguish,
along with future disability, and future loss of earnings and earning capacity . Mrs.
Eastman sought damages for loss of consortium.
Peterson and State Farm denied the Eastmans’ allegations, contending
Eastman was comparatively at fault for the accident because he impacted Burns’
vehicle prior to being rear-ended by Peterson. Defendants alleged Eastman’s first
impact with Burns ’ car created a sudden emergency or hazard for Peterson ,

2 Eastman testified that at the time of the three-car collision, traffic was heavy, slow, and congested
to the point that he called his wife from his vehicle and informed her he would be late arriving
home. He testified traffic was a “stop and go type situation.” Peterson echoed Eastman’s
description, testifying traffic was “bottling up” prior to the accident.

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impairing her ability to avoid a collision with Eastman’s vehicle. Defendants also
disputed the severity of Eastman’s injuries caused by the accident and argued that a
majority of his alleged injuries and damages were due to a pre-existing condition.
A jury trial commenced on July 28, 2021. At trial , the parties presented
conflicting testimony as to liability. Eastman testified that when Burns’ vehicle
abruptly braked in front of him , he was able to react quickly enough to stop his
vehicle without hitting Burns’ car. He further indicated that through his rearview
mirror he saw Peterson’s vehicle rapidly approaching without slowing. He testified
that he took hold of the steering wheel, braced for impact, and was then hit from
behind by Peterson, propelling his vehicle into Burns’ car. Eastman was adamant
he had stopped prior to hitting Burns’ vehicle and that the collision by Peterson was
the sole cause of his collision with Burns.
Burns’ testimony contradicted Eastman’s account of the accident. Burns
testified that when he came to an abrupt stop in the heavy traffic, he “felt a hit in the
back” of his vehicle. He further stated that he “looked in [his] rearview and just as
I looked in the rearview there was another hit as if the car behind me had hit me,
then the car behind him was hit, and then he hit me again.” When asked a follow-
up question as to whether the first impact was from Eastman alone, Burns reiterated
his observation that “when I felt the hit, and I looked up in the rearview, I could see
him right up under me. Then … you know, a snap of your finger, it was another
hit.”
Peterson claimed that Eastman’s sudden stop and impact with Burns’ vehicle
created a hazard for her. She contended that had Eastman performed a more
controlled, proper stop, she would have had more time to react appropriately to the
developing traffic congestion in front of her. She testified that to avoid the slowing
traffic, she looked to her left to try and maneuver her vehicle into the faster moving
left-hand lane; however, traffic prevented her from safely switching lanes. She then

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stated that she looked in her rearview mirror to check her blind spot, and upon
returning her sight forward, she was suddenly one car length away from Eastman’s
car. She indicated that she “just slammed [on her brakes] and hoped for the best that
[her vehicle] would stop in time.” She admitted that she had some fault in the
accident but reaffirmed her belief that she may have avoided the accident with the
vehicle in front had it provided more warning, through use of brake lights, or more
time to react by a more appropriate, controlled stop in front of her. To that point,
she testified that Eastman came to a “sudden” stop in front of her and further stated:
There were no brake lights before whenever I took a glance to my left
and if there would have been a sign of slowing down, everyone hitting
their brakes, I would not have chosen to try to switch lanes at that time,
and it was enough distance to where if I were going to see those lights
and slow down I think that if he came to a sudden stop, regardless,
hitting Mr. Burns or not, I think that if he would’ve been paying
attention as well he would’ve been able to stop sooner and gradually
press the brakes instead of that abrupt stop.

Concerning damages, Eastman presented testimony and evidence as to
treatment with Dr. Rider, Dr. Clark Gunderson (“Dr. Gunderson”), a local
orthopedic doctor, Dr. Howard Cotler (“Dr. Cotler”), an orthopedic surgeon, Dr.
Craig Morton (“Dr. Morton”), a specialist in medicine and rehabilitation, Dr. Brian
Kelly (“Dr. Kelly”), a neurosurgeon, Dr. Rex Marco, a complex spinal surgery
specialist, Dr. Joseph Crookshank (“Dr. Crookshank”), an interventional pain
management specialist, and Dr. Jeffery Kozak (“Dr. Kozak”), a spine surgeon.3 The
evidence showed that Eastman had been previously treated by Dr. Rider for neck
pain. This treatment ended over a year prior to the car accident. After the November
19, 2015, accident with Burns and Peterson, Eastman sought treatment with Dr s.
Rider and Gunderson. Eastman ended his treatment on July 27, 2016. Dr. Rider’s
notes indicated Eastman had reached maximum medical improvement reporting a

3 This list is not exhaustive of all evidence and testimony introduced and accepted into the record.

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pain level rating of 1 out of 10. Defendants argued that such progress indicated that
Eastman required no further treatment for injuries caused by the accident.
The evidence showed that Eastman returned to Dr. Rider for treatment on
September 13, 2016, but the records from that appointment listed the onset of his
complained-of neck pain and symptoms as early as 2009. Defendants asserted this
treatment was ultimately determined to be related to a pre-existing condition, Diffuse
Idiopathic Skeletal Hyperostosis (“DISH”), with which Eastman was later diagnosed
by Dr. Marco .4 However, Eastman provided opinions from subsequent treating
physicians, and experts at trial indicating that, although Eastman’s DISH symptoms
were not caused by the November 19, 2015, accident, the accident aggravate d the
condition. Eastman testified that the first time he was told about DISH was in 2019,
while being treated by Dr. Marco. Eastman presented the opinion of Dr.
Crookshanks who concurred with the diagnosis of DISH but found some of
Eastman’s pain was not related to DISH. Dr. Crookshanks believed Eastman’s
mechanical axial pain came from the lower non-DISH cervical levels.
Although Dr. Rider’s notes indicated Eastman reached maximum medical
improvement, Eastman felt he did not receive full relief, and therefore sought
treatment with Dr. Cotler. Dr. Cotler recommended Eastman undergo surgery, but
Eastman was unable to have surgery because he was on blood thinners stemming
from a heart attack he suffered in 2016. With surgery not a possibility, Eastman
sought treatment with Dr. Morton who performed several cervical injections, trigger
point and facet injections, and ordered ph ysical therapy which lasted throughout
2018. Dr. Morton also referred Eastman to Dr. Kelly for further evaluation. Dr.
Kelly, too, recommended surgery, however, surgery was cancelled because Eastman

4 The medical testimony described DISH as most commonly appearing in men over the age of 50
with diabetes. Both of those risk factors applied to Eastman. Other possible risks included genetics
and environmental factors. DISH was shown to produce ossification, via calcium deposits,
primarily in the bones and soft tissue structures of the spinal column, reducing the mobility of the
affected areas, and primarily causing stiffness and pain.

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had an anatomical problem that prevented him from being intubated during surgery.
With surgery again not possible, Dr. Kelly referred Eastman to Dr. Crookshanks,
who performed a medical branch block procedure on Eastman in September of 2019.
Eastman then saw Dr. Kozak in November of 2019. Unlike Eastman’s prior
treating physicians, Dr. Kozak did not recommend surgery, but instead, counseled
Eastman on activity modification, home exercises, and the correct use of body
mechanics. Thereafter, Eastman returned to Dr. Crookshanks who performed
additional procedures. Eastman asserted that he will be a lifetime patient of Dr.
Crookshanks, necessitating future medical expenses.
Defendants pointed to Dr. Rider’s treatments as proof that Eastman reached
maximum medical improvement shortly after being treated by Dr. Rider and that
most, if not all, of the subsequent treatment sought by Eastman related to pre -
existing conditions that Dr. Rider noted as early as 2009. They pointed out that Dr.
Rider’s medical record s reflect Eastman had as many as twenty -four chiropractic
visits with Dr. Rider from May 29, 2014, to August 24, 2014 , all preceding the
accident. The defendants alleged Eastman’s pre -accident treatment with Dr. Rider
dealt with the same symptoms and conditions for which Eastman sought treatment
post-accident. The defendants also introduced evidence of CT scans performed on
Eastman after the accident reflecting chronic findings of DISH were already present,
with ossification of the posterior longitudinal ligament.
Additionally, the defendants argued that Eastman’s credibility was
questionable. They cited Eastman’s deposition where he alleged he had never seen
a chiropractor prior to the accident although it was clear he had numerous visits with
Dr. Rider over a year prior to the accident. The defendants further attempted to place
Eastman’s credibility in question by showing Eastman was not completely candid
with his subsequent treating physicians. The defendants presented Dr. Morton’s
notes from Eastman’s first visit, for example, where Eastman denied having any

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neck pain prior to the accident even though the records from Dr. Rider , as early as
2014, showed otherwise.
After the close of trial, the jury returned a verdict finding both Peterson and
Eastman comparatively liable for the accident, assigning fifty-percent fault to each.
The jury further found that Eastman had been injured in the accident and awarded
$19,732.14 in past and present medical expenses, $16,000.00 in past and present loss
of enjoyment of life, $50,000.00 in past and present pain and suffering, and
$5,000.00 in past and present mental anguish. The jury did not award damages for
past and pre sent disability, or for future medical expenses, future loss of earnings
and earning capacity, future loss of enjoyment of life, future pain and suffering,
future mental anguish, or future disability. The jury further awarded Mrs. Eastman
$20,000.00 for loss of consortium.
Eastman then filed a motion for JNOV, or in the alternative, a motion for new
trial. He argued the jury erred as the evidence strongly and overwhelmingly favored
a finding of sole liability on the part of Peterson . The motion further sought
increased damages, including future damages.
After a hearing on Eastman’s motion, the trial judge granted the JNOV on the
basis that “the findings by the jury were clearly erroneous and factually and legally
unsupported in several of their determinations. ” The trial court found Peterson
solely liable for the accident , increased the past medical expenses award to
$138,419.06, awarded future medical expenses in the amount of $625,875.00,
awarded future loss of enjoyment of life, future pain and suffering, and future mental
anguish in the amount of $150,000.00, and awarded future loss of earnings capacity
in the amount of $130,000.00 . The trial court maintained all other awards by the
jury and signed a judgment in accordance with its JNOV ruling. In total, the trial
court increased the award from $110,732.14 to $1,115,294.06.

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Defendants appealed and t he court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s
judgment. We granted certiorari to review the lower courts’ judgments. Eastman v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2023-01107 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So. 3d 435.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
This Court recently expounded on the important role of juries. We noted that
“[c]onfidence in juries, and their ability to handle and decide difficult, factual
questions, is reflected in the legislature’s recent amendment[s]” to the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure. CD v. SC, 2022-00961, p. 4, n.5 (La. 06/01/23), 366 So.
3d 1245, 1249. “When there is a jury, the jury is the trier of fact.” Scott v. Hospital
Service Dist. No. 1 of St. Charles Parish, 496 So. 2d 270, 273 (La. 1986). “We hold
juries in high regard and accord them great deference in their decisions.” CD, 2022-
00961, p. 5, n.5, 366 So. 3d at 1249. This deference recognizes that the right to a
jury is statutorily protected. See La. C.C.P. art. 1731 A; See also La. C.C.P. art.
1736.5 Thus, overturning a jury’s verdict that is reasonably supported by the record
is, in essence, the denial of the parties’ right to be heard and judged by the jury.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1811 provides the rules which
govern a JNOV. Although Article 1811 does not prescribe the specific standard for
a trial court to follow in deciding whether to grant or deny a JNOV, this Court has
provided direction:
[A] JNOV is warranted when the facts and inferences point so strongly
and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the trial court believes
that reasonable persons could not arrive at a contrary verdict. The
motion should be granted only when the evidence points so strongly in

5 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1731 A provides:

Except as limited by Article 1732, the right of trial by jury is recognized.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1736 provides:

The trial of all issues for which a jury trial has been requested shall be by jury,
unless the parties stipulate that the jury trial shall be as to certain issues only or
unless the right to trial by jury as to certain issues does not exist; however, excep t
as otherwise provided under the provisions of Article 1562, there shall be but one
trial.

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favor of the moving party that reasonable persons could not reach
different conclusions, not merely when there is a preponderance of
evidence for the mover. The motion should be denied if there is
evidence opposed to the motion which is of such quality and weight
that reasonable and fair -minded persons in the exercise of impartial
judgment might reach different conclusions.

Joseph v. Broussard Rice Mill, Inc., 2000-00628, pp. 4-5 (La. 10/30/00), 772 So. 2d
94, 99 (citing Scott, 496 So. 2d at 273-74).
The courts of appeal have likewise uniformly discussed the standard for
granting a JNOV. “A motion for JNOV raises the question of whether the jury
verdict is supported by any legitimate or substantial evidence. … [T]he trial court
does not have the discretion to weigh evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses,
or to substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” Hogue v. Sussmane-Stubbs, 34,340,
p. 2 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/28/01), 780 So. 2d 1203, 1205.6 A “[t]rial court’s authority
to grant a JNOV under [La. C.C.P. art. 1811] is limited by the jurisprudence to those
cases where the jury’s verdict is absolutely unsupported by any competent
evidence.” Bombardier, 2021-0590, p. 6, 350 So. 3d at 1013 (Further finding that
“[u]nder this standard, ‘[n]either the trial court, nor this court can substitute its
evaluation of the evidence for that of the jury unless the jury ’s conclusions totally
offend reasonable inferences from the evidence.’”). “When contemplating a JNOV,
… [t]he trial court is not authorized to interfere with the verdict simply because it
believes another result would be correct.” Gutierrez v. Louisiana Dep’t of Transp.
& Dev., 2011-1774, p. 13 (La. App. 1 Cir. 03/23/12), 92 So. 3d 380, 387-88. A trial
court deciding a JNOV “ is constrained from making credibility evaluations of
witnesses, and all reasonable factual questions and reasonable inferences are
construed in favor of the non-moving party.” Pike v. Calcasieu Par. Sch. Bd., 2018-

6 See also, Stamps v. Dunham, 2007-0095, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 09/19/07), 968 So. 2d 739,
744-45; McBride v. H. Brown Mach. Shop, 1998-1271, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 03/31/99), 732 So. 2d
650, 652; Kistner v. King, 1998-641, p. 3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98) , 726 So. 2d 68; Engolia v.
Allain, 625 So. 2d 723, 728 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993).

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996, p. 9 (La. App. 3 Cir. 05/15/19), 272 So. 3d 943, 951, writ denied, 2019-01196
(La. 10/15/19), 280 So. 3d 611.
In reviewing a JNOV, the appellate court must first determine if the
trial judge erred in granting the JNOV. This is done by using the
aforementioned criteria just as the trial judge does in deciding whether
to grant the motion or not, i.e. do the facts an d inferences point so
strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that
reasonable persons could not arrive at a contrary verdict? If the answer
to that question is in the affirmative, then the trial judge was correct in
granting the motion. If, however, reasonable persons in the exercise of
impartial judgment might reach a different conclusion, then it was error
to grant the motion and the jury verdict should be reinstated.

Joseph, 2000-00628 p. 5, 772 So. 2d at 99 (citing Anderson v. New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc., 583 So.2d 829, 832 (La. 1991)).
The party against whom a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is made must be given the benefit of every legitimate and
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence by the jury.
However, the court is not bound by inferences which are
unreasonable.... There is no bright line which enables the court to
distinguish between the reasonable, legitimate inference and the
unreasonable, illegitimate inference. There is no precise rule to follow.
The court can only test the reasonableness of th e inferences drawn by
the jury from the evidence in terms of probability. An inference is
legitimate only where the evidence offered makes the existence of the
fact to be inferred more probable than not. Any lesser test would allow
the jury to rest a verdict on speculation or conjecture.

Joseph, 2000-00628 p. 5, 772 So. 2d at 101 (citing Rougeau v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 432 So. 2d 1162, 1167 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1983)).
Liability
Louisiana Revised Statute 32:81 A provides that “[t] he driver of a motor
vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent,
having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition
of the highway. ” “ Louisiana courts have uniform ily (sic) held that a following
motorist in a rear-end collision is presumed to have breached the standard of conduct
prescribed in La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 32:81 and hence is presumed negligent. ” Mart v.
Hill, 505 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (La. 1987).

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The presumption of fault, however, may be rebutted. “A following motorist
may rebut the presumption of negligence that arises when a rear-end collision occurs
by proving that he had his vehicle under control, closely observed the preceding
vehicle, and followed at a safe distance under the circumstances; the following
motorist may also avoid liability by proving that the driver of the lead vehicle
negligently created a hazard that he could not reasonably avoid.” Hooper v. Lopez,
2021-1442, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 06/22/22), 344 So. 3d 656, 662, as clarified on
reh’g (Sept. 1, 2022), writ denied , 2022 -01421 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So. 3d 501,
reconsideration not considered, 2022-01421 (La. 02/07/23), 354 So. 3d 663. “[T]he
presumption [may be rebutted] by establishing the unpredictable driving of the
preceding motorist created a sudden emergency that the following motorist could
not have reasonably anticipated.” Bloxham v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co., 52,177, p.
6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 06/27/18), 251 So. 3d 601, 605.
The presumption of negligence does not preclude the consideration of
comparative fault. “[N] otwithstanding the presumption of negligence, a favored
motorist can still be assessed with comparative fault if his or her substandard conduct
contributed to the cause of the accident. ” Leblanc v. Bouzon, 2014-1041, p. 4 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 03/04/15), 159 So. 3d 1144, 1147 (citing Graffia v. Louisiana Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 2008-1480, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 02/13/09), 6 So.
3d 270, 274). “[O]nce the presumption of negligence attaches to the defendant, the
ordinary rules of comparative negligence apply and, thus, a plaintiff’s damage award
may be reduced by the degree that he was comparatively at fault. ” Matherne v.
Lorraine, 2003-2369, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 09/17/04), 888 So. 2d 244, 246.
With the foregoing principles in mind, we review ed the record to determine
whether the trial court erred in finding that the jury verdict was absolutely factually
unsupported; that is, whether the evidence pointed so strongly and overwhelmingly

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in favor of the Eastmans that reasonable jurors could not reach different conclusions.
We find the trial court erred in granting Eastman’s JNOV.
Conflicting, credible testimony was given as to whether Eastman collided
with the vehicle ahead of him prior to being impacted from behind by Peterson.
Peterson testified Eastman’s vehicle stopped suddenly, and that she did not observe
any timely warning from the brake lights as to a sudden stop. She stated that had
Eastman applied his brakes, giving a brake light warning attendant to a more
controlled stop, then she would not have averted her attention to check her blind spot
or check the left-hand lane. She indicated that Eastman’s negligence in not coming
to a controlled stop decreased her ability to maintain what she felt was an initial,
appropriate following distance. More importantly, Burns testified that Eastman first
collided with him prior to being rear -ended by Peterson. Faced with plausible,
competing versions of the accident in question, the jury could have reasonably
concluded Eastman did, in fact, impact Burns prior to being impacted from behind
by Peterson, and that his negligence in colli ding with Burns created a hazard
contributing to Peterson’s inability to avoid the accident.
The court of appeal, in affirming the trial court’s judgment, and the Eastmans
cited to Mandible v. Jan Raley & Allstate Ins. Co. , 2013 -461 (La. App. 5 Cir.
12/12/13), 131 So. 3d 247, a case factually similar to the instant matter. Mandible
involved a four-car, consecutive rear-end collision with conflicting testimony as to
whether the third vehicle first hit the second vehicle before being impacted by the
fourth vehicle causing a second collision. The court of appeal stated “[t]he
[Mandible court] noted that whether the plaintiff hit the car in front of her prior to
being rear -ended did not rebut defendant’s presumption of fault.” However,
Mandible does not suggest that a following driver cannot meet his burden of
overcoming the presumption of fault by showing the preceding driver also

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negligently caused a hazard by rear -ending the driver ahead. Instead, Mandible
confirms the deference owed to the trier of fact when there is conflicting testimony:
While conflicting testimony existed as to whether plaintiff first struck
Ms. Abunser prior to defendant striking plaintiff, the trial court
apparently accepted plaintiff ’s version, which we do not find
unreasonable upon review of the record. … we find the trial court was
not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in finding defendant was
100% at fault for the collision with plaintiff and in awarding damages
against defendants.

Id., 2013-461, p. 6, 131 So. 3d at 250.
We further note Mandible involved a bench trial , rather than a motion for
JNOV, where the trial court judge’s factual findings were reviewed under a manifest
error standard of review. In considering whether to grant a JNOV following a jury
trial, a trial court must first find that “ the evidence points so strongly and
overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that reasonable men could not reach
different conclusions, not merely when there is a preponderance of evidence for the
mover.” Scott, 496 So. 2d at 273-74.
There was considerable, but conflicting testimony that required much
weighing of evidence. This alone means that triers of fact could have reached a
different, but still reasonable conclusion. The lower courts improperly reweighed
the evidence, made credibility determinations as to the witness testimony, and
ultimately substituted their judgment for that of the jury. Finding the evidence did
not so strongly and overwhelmingly favor the Eastmans that reasonable jurors could
not reach different conclusions, we find the trial court erred in granting the JNOV as
to liability.7

7 The Eastmans also argued that Peterson admitted she could have reasonabl y avoided the
accident. The y therefore contend Peterson may not exculpate herself from the presumption of
negligence because she cannot prove “that the driver of the lead vehicle negligently created a
hazard which the following vehicle could not reasonably avoid ,” citing LeBlanc v. St. Landry
Police Jury, 1994-501, p. 7 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/07/94), 647 So. 2d 614, 617. However, Peterson
made no such admission. The testimony Eastman cites actually concerned Peterson’s opinion that
had Eastman had a more controlled stop, rather than a sudden stop, and had he given more warning
to following vehicles by use of his brake lights, she would have been able to avoid a collision .
Eastman’s assertion also belies Peterson’s testimony that she considered moving her vehicle to the
right, toward the shoulder, but that a guardrail prevented the evasive action.

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Damages
We now turn to the trial court’s grant of Eastman’s JNOV as to damages.
The trial court made an observation that the jury’s award of damages reflected a
finding that Eastman’s treatment attributable to the accident ended as early as July
27, 2016. The trial court reasoned:
[The] [f]inding by the jury of past and present medical expenses in the
amounts awarded is totally unfounded and would seem to correlate with
expenses up to the “release” by Dr. Rider. …

The plethora of physicians who testified, including defendant’s own
physician, concur that at least a portion of Eastman’s continuing neck
issues, are related to this accident. … A jury cannot reasonably
disregard all this unrefuted evidence without any counter testimony[.]

As to future medicals, the trial court found:
As with this Court’s ruling regarding the error of the jury as to past and
present medical expenses, the determination by the jury that there
would be no award for the future medical expenses is profoundly
inappropriate and in total disregard of undisputed testimony regarding
same. … There was no testimony or evidence presented by defendants
upon which any jury could have relied on countervailing, contradicting
or conflicting with Dr. Crookshank’s testimony as to medical need for
future care by Eastman.

Finally, as to general damages, the trial court ruled:
… unlike the previous issues addressed by this Court defendant did
present evidence that addressed these issues.

While it is determined that Eastman has continuing medical issues as
related to both this accident and preexisting issues, evidence was
present[ed] to the jury showing his continued active outdoor lifestyle.
Video was presented of several activities by Ea stman that one could
believe reflect an otherwise normal return to activities based on the
medical treatment to accommodate and provide a relative normal life.
Eastman acknowledged that he continues his active lifestyle after the
accident though in pain. This court agrees that the awards for past and
present loss of enjoyment of life, past and present pain and suffering,
and past and present mental anguish are inordinately miniscule when
compared to or aligned with the adjusted medical evidence.

… [T]he awards by the jury as they relate to past and present damage,
totaling $71,000.00, are left as rendered. However, future loss of
enjoyment of life, future pain and suffering and future mental anguish
are herein set at $150,000.00.

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Like the issue of liability, conflicting evidence was introduced at trial as to
the severity and causes of Eastman’s injuries. In light of this, we find the trial court
erred in granting Eastman’s JNOV. The jury could have reasonably concluded that
Eastman reached maximum medical improvement from accident-related injuries, as
Dr. Rider’s records reflect, shortly after the accident, and that all, or a significant
portion, of his injuries thereafter were attributable to a pre -existing condition.
Again, Dr. Rider’s medical records indicate that as early as June 27, 2016, Eastman
reached maximum medical improvement, reporting a pain level of 1 out of 10. Dr.
Rider’s notes further showed Eastman returned for treatment on September 13, 2016,
but that treatment was for a pre -existing condition that was observed as early as
2009. Dr. Rider’s medical notes and records were the only evidence showing direct
knowledge by a physician of Eastman’s pre -accident condition. Although records
and testimony relating to subsequent physician visits provided a basis for finding
that some of Eastman’s complaints of pain were caused or aggravated by the
accident, they also included opinions that the condition pre-existed the accident. Dr.
Kelly and Dr. Stephen Esses, the defendant’s expert, noted Eastman would have had
restricted range of motion prior to the accident because of his DISH condition. The
jury further heard evidence that DISH progressively worsens over time, regardless
of any alleged aggravating accidents.
The evidence before the jury also provided a basis for concluding that
Eastman suffered from a pre-existing condition, which worsened over time. It was
thus reasonable for the jury to further conclude that a significant portion of
Eastman’s post -accident treatment was likely attributable to that condition.
Undoubtedly, the evidence adduced at trial conflicted as to what medical treatment
and medical expenses were associated with the injuries caused by the accident, the
determination of which is clearly within the province of the jury. The record, thus,
does not substantiate a finding that the evidence was so strongly and overwhelmingly

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in favor of Eastman that a JNOV was warranted . Only by first reweighing the
evidence and making credibility decisions as to which medical records and providers
were more reliable could the trial court have reached its decision to grant the JNOV.
However, as discussed supra, such considerations are improper when considering
whether to grant a motion for JNOV.
At the least, Dr. Rider’s medical findings provided a basis for the jury to have
reasonably concluded Eastman’s medical treatment for accident-related injuries was
complete as of July 27, 2016, and, therefore, the claims for future medical expenses
and future damages w ere unfounded. The jury could also have reasonably found
that a pre-existing condition, DISH, was the cause of a significant percentage or all
of Eastman’s complaints for which he later sought medical treatment. In light of the
conflicting evidence and accounts of Eastman’s medical treatment, we find the trial
court erred in ruling the evidence was so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of
Eastman that reasonable jurors could not reach different conclusions.
CONCLUSION
We find the trial court erred in granting Eastman’s JNOV, as did the court of
appeal in affirming the trial court’s judgment. We reverse the court of appeal, vacate
the judgment of the trial court, and reinstate the jury’s verdict.
REVERSED; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT VACATED; VERDICT OF THE
JURY REINSTATED.

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2023-C-01107
SCOTT WESLEY EASTMAN, ET UX.
VS.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET
AL.
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Calcasieu
HUGHES, J., dissenting.
The jury in this case rendered a stupendously bad verdict. The Defendant, a
seventeen-year-old cheerleader on the way to a party, rear-ended the Plaintiff on the
Interstate as they were traveling in the right -hand lane , totaling both cars . The
Plaintiff was taken to the hospital in an ambulance. The Defendant testified that she
was attempting to get into the left-hand lane because she realized the traffic ahead
of her was “bottling” up, but was unable to do so. After checking her “blind spot”
to see if she could get over, she returned her attention to the Plaintiff in front of her
to discover she was only one car length away from plaintiff’s car. Defendant
testified at that point she just slammed on her brakes and “hoped for the best.”
It has been argued that the possibility the Plaintiff made minimal contact with
the car ahead of him before he was plowed into by the Defendant created a “sudden
emergency” and the jury was able to consider t his “conflicting evidence” or
“competing version” of the accident; thus there was a “reasonable basis” for the
jury’s verdict.
This argument ignores the law, and common sense.
Every driver knows that if you rear -end someone, you’re liable. The law
provides a presumption to that effect, and the burden of proof is on the following

2

motorist to overcome it. This may be done by showing the driver ahead created a
sudden emergency. But no driver in the history of Louisiana has been tagged with
a sudden emergency when they stayed in their own lane and stopped because the
traffic ahead of them was stopped.
Rather, sudden emergencies have been found in cases where the rear -ended
driver was stopped on a bridge at night without proper lighting; or stopped partially
in the road way without appropriate warning lights or signals; or stopped, not due to
traffic conditions , but rather because the driver saw someone he knew in the
oncoming lane and wanted to turn around; or passed several cars but then had to pull
back into his lane without adequate space; or was travelling at dusk in the fast lane
at a very slow spe ed with no lights; or had stalled out partially in the roadway at
night without lights.
The key fact in the instant case is that the lead driver in front of the Plaintiff
was stopped. He testified, “So, I stopped abruptly and I mean very close to the car
in front of me… .” The argument by Defendant that Plaintiff should have executed
“a more controlled, proper stop” is ridiculous: if Plaintiff had stopped slower and
sooner, short of the vehicle ahead of him, Defendant would have had less than one
car length to come to a stop. Plaintiff could not go through the stopped car in front
of him and continue down the road in a “controlled” manner, he had to stop.
Maximum space for the Defendant to stop would have been with Plaintiff touching
the stopped car ahead of him. Defendant’s argument is thus inimical to her cause,
not favorable, as recognized by the Court of Appeal and previously by the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
In Billiot v. Noble Drilling Corp ., 236 La. 793, 797 -98, 109 So.2d 96, 98
(1959), the supreme court found that, in this three car accident, the second car rear-
ended the first car but no damages were sustained, until a few seconds later when
the third car rear-ended the second car and caused person and property damages to

3

both; this court held any negligence of the second driver “caused no damage and
affected only the [first] automobile and its passengers and not the [third] car
driven…, to whom plaintiff owed not duty ‘except to use the road in the usual way
in keeping wit h the laws of the road, and until he has been made aware of the
presence of such rear car by signal or otherwise… In other words, [the second
driver]’s negligence, if any, in following the [first] car too closely, has no casual
connection with the collisio n [caused by the third car] and does not absolve the
operator of the [third] car from liability for failing to perform his duty owed to [the
second car] in violating the rule that ‘the driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow
another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard to
the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and condition of the highway.’”
(emphasis added).
“Competing versions” of the accident is thus a false analysis; Defendant is
competing only with herself. T he “version” espoused by the Defendant makes her
more liable, not less, and in any event , as recognized by Billiot, there is no casual
connection that would relieve Defendant from liability. Defendant admitted she was
traveling on the Interstate, knew the traffic ahead was “bottling” up, diverted her
attention in order to check her “blind spot” in an attempt to change lanes, and when
she looked up was one car length away from a serious accident that totaled two cars
and sent the Plaintiff to the hospital in an ambulance. Defendant was clearly in a
rush and not paying attention.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the ruling of the trial court and the
Opinion of the Court of Appeal.