Washington Dos Santos v. Usaa Casualty Insurance Company, Government Employees Insurance Company and Carrie Ann Rainey

WASHINGTON DOS SANTOS * NO. 2023-C-0559

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
USAA CASUALTY *
INSURANCE COMPANY, FOURTH CIRCUIT
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES *
INSURANCE COMPANY AND STATE OF LOUISIANA
CARRIE ANN RAINEY *******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2022-07550, DIVISION “F-14”
Honorable Jennifer M Medley,
******
Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase
******
(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge
Dale N. Atkins)

ATKINS, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT.

Kevin O’Bryon
O’Bryon & Schnabel, PLC
935 Gravier Street, Suite 900
New Orleans, LA 70112

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR

Wade Webster
Chaffe McCall, L.L.P.
2300 Energy Centre
1100 Poydras Street
New Orleans, LA 70163

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED
SEPTEMBER 18, 2023

TGC
RML
Relator, Government Employees Insurance Company (hereinafter

“GEICO”), seeks review of the trial court’s July 12, 2023 judgment denying its

motion for partial summary judgment. After consideration of the record before this

Court, and the applicable law, we grant the writ and reverse the judgment of the

trial court denying GEICO’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

On August 19, 2022, Respondent, Washington Dos Santos, filed a petition

for damages asserting damages as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Respondent

named GEICO as a defendant in its capacity as the uninsured/underinsured

motorist insurer of the vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident. In his

petition for damages, Respondent asserted that GEICO violated Louisiana’s

penalty statutes. Specifically, La. R.S. 22:1892 and La. R.S. 22:1973, which

requires that an insurer be fair in its handling of claims and tender payment when

satisfactory proof of loss is established. Respondent supplemented his petition for

damages alleging that GEICO acknowledged receipt of the proof of claim but

failed to tender payment.

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On April 23, 2023, GEICO filed a motion for partial summary judgment

asserting that Respondent’s claim under his insurance policy contract dictates that

all claims are subject to North Carolina law and therefore, Louisiana’s penalty

statutes are inapplicable. GEICO also maintained that a claim asserted against a

foreign uninsured/underinsured motorist policy is subject to the law of the state of

issuance. GEICO averred that the policy was issued to Respondent at a North

Carolina address; Respondent has a North Carolina driver’s license; and the

vehicle is registered in North Carolina. GEICO attached Respondent’s insurance

policy; portions of Respondent’s deposition transcript; and the police report from

the motor vehicle accident at issue to its motion for partial summary judgment.

Respondent opposed the motion arguing that Louisiana’s public policy

favors penalties against insurance companies that refuse to pay their insured.

Respondent asserted that at the time of the accident he had recently become a

Louisiana resident, the accident occurred in Louisiana and the adverse driver is a

Louisiana resident. Thus, according to Respondent, Louisiana law is applies.

By judgment dated July 12, 2023, the trial court denied GEICO’s motion for

partial summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion based on its

determination that Respondent was a Louisiana resident at the time of the accident.

This application for supervisory review followed.

Discussion

The sole issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in denying

GEICO’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Appellate courts review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for

summary judgment de novo. This Court has previously set forth the applicable

standard of review as follows:

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Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to
determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. This standard of
review requires the appellate court to look at the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, to determine if they show that no
genuine issue as to a material fact exists, and that the mover is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material when its existence or
nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under
the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially
insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or
determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as
to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons
could reach only one conclusion, no need for trial on that issue exists
and summary judgment is appropriate. To affirm a summary
judgment, we must find reasonable minds would inevitably conclude
that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of the applicable law
on the facts before the court.

Chatelain v. Fluor Daniel Const. Co., 2014-1312, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/10/15),

179 So.3d 791, 793 (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has articulated the

following burden-shifting guidelines when considering a motion for summary

judgment:

[T]he burden of producing evidence at the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment on the mover (normally the defendant), who can
ordinarily meet that burden by submitting affidavits or by pointing out
the lack of factual support for an essential element in the opponent's
case. At that point, the party who bears the burden of persuasion at
trial (usually the plaintiff) must come forth with evidence (affidavits
or discovery responses) which demonstrates he or she will be able to
meet the burden at trial.

Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078, p. 4 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37,

39. Thus, if an adverse party fails to set forth specific facts demonstrating a

genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is rendered against the adverse

party.

GEICO maintains the trial court erred in denying its motion for partial

summary judgment because the insurance policy specifically mandates

Respondent’s claim is subject to North Carolina law and thus, Louisiana’s penalty

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statutes are inapplicable. GEICO also asserts that North Carolina law applies

because at the time of the accident the policy was issued in North Carolina;

Respondent has a North Carolina driver’s license; and the vehicle is registered in

North Carolina. Thus, according to GEICO, there is no genuine issue of material

fact as to which state law applies to Respondent’s claim.

Respondent’s policy provides, in pertinent part:

This policy is issued in accordance with the laws of North Carolina
and covers property or risks principally located in North Carolina.
Any and all claims or disputes in any way related to this policy shall
be governed by the laws of North Carolina.

“Whether an insurance policy provides for, or precludes, coverage as a matter of

law is an issue that can be resolved within the framework of a motion for summary

judgment.” Wagner v. Tammany Holding Co., L.L.C., 2013-0374, p. 7 (La.App. 4

Cir. 10/9/13), 135 So.3d 77, 82 (quoting Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Lexington

Ins. Co., 2012-1686, p. 9 (La.App 4 Cir. 6/5/13), 118 So.3d 1203, 1212)). “An

insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed

employing the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Louisiana

Civil Code.” Burmaster v. Plaquemines Par. Gov't, 2010-1543, p. 4 (La.App. 4

Cir. 3/30/11), 64 So.3d 312, 316 (citation omitted). The extent of coverage is

determined by the parties’ intent as reflected by the words in the policy. Louisiana

Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 1993-0911 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d

759, 763 (citations omitted). In order to resolve ambiguous language within an

insurance policy, the policy must be construed as a whole. Id. “[I]f the policy

wording at issue is clear and unambiguously expresses the parties’ intent, the

insurance contract must be enforced as written. Id., 1993-0911, 630 So.2d at 764

(citing La. C.C. art. 2046).

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Our de novo review finds that Respondent’s insurance policy mandates

application of North Carolina law. The language in the policy is clear and

unambiguous thus, it must be enforced as written. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n,

1993-0911, 630 So.2d at 764. Respondent does not dispute that the insurance

policy provides that North Carolina law is applicable to any claims. Rather, he

maintains that Louisiana’s public policy interest outweighs implementation of

North Carolina law because North Carolina has no real interest in the outcome of

this matter. We find this argument unpersuasive. “When the words of an insurance

contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further

interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent and courts must enforce

the contract as written.” Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, Inc., 2007-0054, p. 8

(La. 5/22/07), 956 So.2d 583, 589. The language contained in GEICO’s policy

with Respondent are clear, North Carolina law applies to any disputes or claims.

Conclusion

Accordingly, we find GEICO has satisfied its burden of establishing that the

language of the contract of insurance is clear and unambiguous and that North

Carolina law applies. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s July 12, 2023

judgment denying GEICO’s motion for partial summary judgment.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED

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