Dwayne Alexander v. Louisiana State Board of Private Investigator Examiners, Phyllis Glazer, James P. Englade, Lance Wallace, Annette Kovac, and Meeks and Associates, LLC

DWAYNE ALEXANDER * NO. 2023-CA-0159

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
LOUISIANA STATE BOARD *
OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR FOURTH CIRCUIT
EXAMINERS, PHYLLIS *
GLAZER, JAMES P. STATE OF LOUISIANA
ENGLADE, LANCE *******
WALLACE, ANNETTE
KOVAC, AND MEEKS AND
ASSOCIATES, LLC

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2019-00711, DIVISION “B”
Honorable Richard G. Perque, Judge Pro Tempore
******
Judge Dale N. Atkins
******
(Court composed of Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge
Rachael D. Johnson)

Dwayne Alexander
1515 South Salcedo Street
P.O. Box 791407
New Orleans, LA 70179

PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Jeff Landry, Attorney General
Davis B. Allgood, Special Assistant Attorney General
DAVIS B. ALLGOOD, ATTORNEY AT LAW
21950 Hoo Shoo Too Rd
Baton Rouge, LA 70817

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, Louisiana State Board of
Private Investigator Examiners

Jeff Landry, Attorney General
Dennis J. Phayer
BURGLASS, TANKERSLEY, GAUDIN, PHAYER
5213 Airline Drive
Metairie, LA 70001

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES, James Englade and Lance
Wallace

S. Daniel Meeks
Kristen E. Meeks
MEEKS & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
237 West Causeway Approach
Mandeville, LA 70448

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPEELEES, Phyllis E. Glazer and
Meeks & Associates, L.L.C.

Jeff Landry, Attorney General
Deborah A. Villio, Special Assistant Attorney General
Michael L. Fantaci
James C. Raff
LEBLANC FANTACI VILLIO, LLC
3421 N. Causeway Blvd., Suite 201
Metairie, LA 70002

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, Annette Kovac

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; JUDGMENT AMENDED IN
PART AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS
OCTOBER 25, 2024

DNA

SCJ

RDJ

The case underlying this appeal involves allegations of fraud and

defamation. Appellant, Dwayne Alexander (“Mr. Alexander”), seeks review

of the trial court’s November 2, 2022 judgment, which ruled on multiple

exceptions and motions filed by the parties. In pertinent part, in that

judgment, the trial court granted an exception of res judicata filed by some

of the Appellees, the Louisiana Board of Private Investigator Examiners

(“Board”) and Phyllis Glazer (“Ms. Glazer”) and Meeks & Associates, LLC

(“Meeks”).1 On appeal, res judicata has been asserted by the other

Appellees, Annette Kovac (“Ms. Kovac”), James Englade (“Mr. Englade”),

and Lance Wallace (“Mr. Wallace”) (collectively “Appellees”). For the

following reasons, we:

• Affirm the sustaining of Appellees’ Unauthorized Use of a Summary
Proceeding;

1 According to the record, in November 2015, Meeks hired Ms. Glazer.
While Ms. Glazer was employed at Meeks, Mr. Alexander filed Dwayne Alexander
v. La. State Board of Private Investigator Examiners, et al., CDC No. 2018-2072,
Div. “1-14” (“Case No. 2018-2072”), wherein he named the Board, Mr. Lance
Wallace, Mr. James P. Englade, and Mr. Del Hahn, as defendants. Ms. Glazer was
retained to represent the Board, Mr. Lance Wallace, Mr. James P. Englade, and
Mr. Del Hahn in CDC Case No. 2018- 2072.

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• Affirm the denial as moot of the exception of no cause of action filed
by Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace, Ms. Kovac, the Board, and Ms.
Glazer and Meeks;

• Affirm the denial as moot of the exception of peremption filed by Mr.
Englade and Mr. Wallace, Ms. Kovac, and Ms. Glazer and Meeks;

• Reverse the trial court’s denial of the requests for attorney fees as
found in Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s “Exceptions of Peremption,
No Cause of Action, and Unauthorized Use of a Summary Proceeding
and Request for Award of Attorney Fees;” in Ms. Kovac’s “Exception
of Peremption, Exception of No Cause of Action, Exception of
Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding, and Motion for Attorney
Fees in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of Judgments
on the Grounds of Fraud on the Court;” the Board’s “Peremptory
Exception . . . Pleading the Objections of No Cause of Action,
Prescription, and Res Judicata, Combined with Dilatory Exception
Pleading the Objection of Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding
and with Motion for Attorney’s Fees under [La. C.C.P.] art. 2004;”
and Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ “Motion to Adopt Defendants’ Responses
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of
Fraud on the Court and Request for Costs and Attorney Fees;”

• Reverse the trial court’s denial of Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ request for
costs as found in their “Motion to Adopt Defendants’ Responses to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of
Fraud on the Court and Request for Costs and Attorney Fees;”

• Award costs to Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace for their “Exceptions of
Peremption, No Cause of Action, and Unauthorized Use of a
Summary Proceeding and Request for Award of Attorney Fees;” to
Ms. Kovac for her “Exception of Peremption, Exception of No Cause
of Action, Exception of Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding,
and Motion for Attorney Fees in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud on the Court;” and
to the Board for its “Peremptory Exception . . . Pleading the
Objections of No Cause of Action, Prescription, and Res Judicata,
Combined with Dilatory Exception Pleading the Objection of
Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding and with Motion for
Attorney’s Fees under [La. C.C.P.] art. 2004;”

• Remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of the amount
of the trial court costs and attorney fees owed to Mr. Englade and Mr.
Wallace, Ms. Kovac, the Board, and Ms. Glazer and Meeks for those
respective exceptions and motion filed in response to Mr. Alexander’s
Motion for Annulment, specifically Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s
“Exceptions of Peremption, No Cause of Action, and Unauthorized
Use of a Summary Proceeding and Request for Award of Attorney

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Fees;” Ms. Kovac’s “Exception of Peremption, Exception of No
Cause of Action, Exception of Unauthorized Use of Summary
Proceeding, and Motion for Attorney Fees in Response to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud on the
Court;” the Board’s “Peremptory Exception . . . Pleading the
Objections of No Cause of Action, Prescription, and Res Judicata,
Combined with Dilatory Exception Pleading the Objection of
Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding and with Motion for
Attorney’s Fees under [La. C.C.P.] art. 2004;” and Ms. Glazer and
Meeks’ “Motion to Adopt Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud on the
Court and Request for Costs and Attorney Fees;”

• Affirm that Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment is moot pursuant
to the granting of Appellees’ Exception of Unauthorized Use of a
Summary Proceeding;

• Affirm the sustaining of the Board’s and Ms. Glazer and Meeks’
exception of res judicata and apply res judicata to Mr. Alexaner’s
claims against Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace and Ms. Kovac too;

• Affirm the dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Alexander’s Petition for
Absolute Nullity;

• Affirm the denial of Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify;

• Affirm the finding that Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s, the Board’s,
and Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ pleadings filed in response to Mr.
Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify were rendered moot by the denial
of the Motion to Disqualify;

• Reverse the trial court’s denial of Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ request for
costs and attorney fees associated with their opposition to Mr.
Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify;

• Award costs and attorney fees to Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace and
the Board for their oppositions to Mr. Alexander’s Motion to
Disqualify;

• Remand to the trial court for a determination of the costs and attorney
fee’s owed to Ms. Glazer and Meeks, Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace,
and the Board for their oppositions to Mr. Alexander’s Motion to
Disqualify;

• Reverse the denial of Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s Re-urged
Motion to Tax Costs;

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• Remand for a determination as to how much Mr. Englade and Mr.
Wallace are owed in light of our decision to grant their Re-urged
Motion to Tax Costs;

• Affirm the grant of Ms. Kovac’s Motion to Tax Costs and award of
$75.00 for same;

• Affirm the grant of the Board’s Motion to Tax Costs and award of
$525 for same;

• Grant all Appellees’ requests for frivolous appeal damages as
requested in their Answers to Mr. Alexander’s appeal;

• Amend the November 2, 2022 judgment to show Ms. Glazer and
Meeks did not have a pending motion to tax costs at the time of the
October 27, 2022 hearing;

• Remand for the opportunity for Ms. Glazer and Meeks to file the
appropriate motion to tax costs and rule to show cause per La. C.C.P.
art. 1920;

• Deny Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ request to amend the judgment to state
that they did not have a pending motion for sanctions;

• Reverse the denial of Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ Motion for Sanctions;

• Remand for the trial court to determine the amount owed to Ms.
Glazer and Meeks in conjunction with their Motion for Sanctions
under La. C.C.P .art. 863;

• Affirm the award of $500 to the Board for the Special Motion to
Strike in addition to the award of $1500 previously granted by the trial
court;

• Grant the Board’s request for an additional award under La. C.C.P.
art. 971 in the amount of $500;

• Instruct the trial court to fulfill its duty to assess and scrutinize Mr.
Alexander’s in forma pauperis status;

• Instruct the trial court to enforce the in forma pauperis code articles
and rules by requesting that the Clerk of Court for Orleans Parish
Civil District Court provides an affidavit of account for the costs and
fees Mr. Alexander owes and records this information in the mortgage
records; and

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• Instruct the Clerk of this Court to provide an affidavit of account for the
costs and fees Mr. Alexander owes for this appeal and his 2019 Appeal and
instruct our Clerk to record this information in the mortgage records.

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The protracted dispute underlying this present appeal has been before this

Court numerous times on both appeals and writ applications. In one of Mr.

Alexander’s prior appeals, docketed with this Court as 2015-CA-0537, 0708

Dwayne G. Alexander v. Louisiana State Board of Private Investigator Examiners,

et al. (“2015 Appeal”), the Court summarized the relevant factual and procedural

background up to that point as follows:

In November, 1997, Mr. Alexander obtained a license to
practice as a private investigator from the Board. Until November
2006, he held a valid private investigator license. When he was
licensed, Mr. Alexander was subject to the rules and regulations
governing the practice of private investigators, as promulgated and
enforced by the Board and set forth in La. R.S. 37:3501 et seq. (“the
P.I. Statutes”).

Soon after obtaining his license, Mr. Alexander formed his own
private investigator company, World Wide Detective Agency, Inc.
(“World Wide”); and he employed other investigators to work for
him. In 2000, Mr. Alexander began performing contract work for the
City of New Orleans (the “City”), investigating worker’s
compensation claims. In 2006, Mr. Alexander entered into a contract
with the City’s third party claims administrator, Cannon Cochran
Management Services, Inc. (“CCMSI”), to become their
Disadvantage[d] Business Enterprise (“DBE”) partner. From 2006 to
February 2009, Mr. Alexander continued to investigate worker’s
compensation claims for the City under his DBE contract with
CCMSI. In November 2006, Mr. Alexander decided not to renew his
private investigator license and allowed his license to expire. See La.
R.S. 37:3517. According to Mr. Alexander, his work for the City
under the DBE contract with CCMSI did not require him to be
licensed as a private investigator given the exemptions enumerated in
La. R.S. 37:3503(8)(b)(i), (iv), and (viii).

Before his license expired in 2006, Mr. Alexander received two
notices from the Board that complaints had been filed against him.
Both complaints—the Phenix and Caesar complaints—involved
allegations of professional misconduct against Mr. Alexander. The
Board opened investigations into the two complaints, and Mr.

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Alexander was provided the opportunity to respond to the complaints.
As of November 14, 2006, the date Mr. Alexander’s license expired,
the Board’s investigation of the complaints was not completed. On
December 6, 2006, the Board sent a letter to Mr. Alexander informing
him that the two complaints filed against him had not been resolved as
of the date that his license expired and that his license would not be
renewed until a hearing was held with the Board’s investigatory
officer. The letter further informed Mr. Alexander of the possibility
that he “may have violated state criminal law during one of those
investigations” and that the matter would be turned over to the State
Police for investigation.

On February 16, 2009, the Board received a complaint letter
and a large binder (“the Centanni Binder”) from a private investigator,
Wayne Centanni. In the letter, Mr. Centanni complained that Mr.
Alexander had been conducting private investigation work with
CCMSI for the City without holding a valid license; and Mr. Centanni
requested that the Board conduct a full investigation into Mr.
Alexander and his business dealings. The Centanni Binder contained a
background investigation of Mr. Alexander and his private
investigator company, which consisted of a large volume of personal
and professional information that Mr. Centanni had compiled from
various sources. The Centanni Binder also included records obtained
from the Board through a public records request filed by Mr. Centanni
on February 12, 2009. The Board’s records disclosed information
about Mr. Alexander’s license and his expunged criminal convictions,
all of which Mr. Centanni included in the Centanni Binder.

Mr. Centanni sent copies of the letter and the Centanni Binder
to CCMSI, the City Attorney’s Office, the Metropolitan Crime
Commission (“MCC”), Lee Zurik at WWL-TV, and several others.
Upon receiving the Centanni Binder, CCMSI contacted Mr.
Alexander and held a meeting with him. At the meeting, Mr.
Alexander [was] informed of the Centanni Binder and its contents.
Subsequently, in February 2009, Mr. Alexander’s DBE contract with
CCMSI and the City was terminated.

On February 27, 2009, the Board issued a cease and desist order
directed to Mr. Alexander, which stated as follows:

Pursuant to the authority of La. R.S. 37:3522, the
Louisiana State Board of Private Investigator Examiners
orders that Dwayne Alexander, who the Board finds to be
engaged in the practice of private investigation in the
State of Louisiana in violation of La. R.S. 37:3500 et
seq., be and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
such activity.

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Annette Kovac, the Board’s Chairman, signed the cease and
desist order. On March 4, 2009, the Board’s Executive Director, Mr.
Englade, hand-delivered the cease and desist order to Mr. Alexander.

On May 12, 2009, Mr. Alexander sent two letters to the Board
complaining that its actions—disclosing personal, confidential records
to Mr. Centanni and issuing the cease and desist order without a
hearing—resulted in the loss of his contract with CCMSI and the City.
Mr. Alexander also filed a formal complaint with the Board against
Mr. Centanni and submitted a public records request for the
documents the Board furnished to Mr. Centanni.

In July 2009, Mr. Alexander filed suit against Mr. Centanni in
Orleans Parish Civil District Court (“CDC”) alleging unfair trade
practices. Mr. Alexander also filed suit against CCMSI in [the] United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana alleging
wrongful termination. Within a year of the lawsuits being filed, both
were dismissed.

In January 2011, Mr. Alexander worked a contract job
investigating a worker’s compensation claim for the St. Charles Parish
School Board (the “School Board”). In May 2011, the MCC contacted
the St. Charles Parish School Board Superintendent (the
“Superintendent”) after receiving an anonymous tip that Mr.
Alexander was conducting private investigations in St. Charles Parish
without a valid license. The MCC informed the Superintendent that
Mr. Alexander lacked a valid license to perform private investigator
work and that, on February 27, 2009, he was issued a cease and desist
order. The MCC also provided information about Mr. Alexander’s
criminal background. Based on the information provided by the MCC,
the Superintendent contacted the St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office
and requested that an investigation be conducted into whether Mr.
Alexander had a valid private investigator license at the time he
performed work for the School Board.

In the course of his investigation, Captain Donald Smith of the
St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office contacted the Board by email and
explained the nature of his investigation. Captain Smith requested that
the Board provide documentation as to whether Mr. Alexander held a
valid private investigator license in January 2011. He also requested
that the Board provide the relevant state statutes setting forth the
penalty for conducting private investigations without a valid private
investigator license. In response to his inquiry, Captain Smith
received a phone call from Mr. Englade. Mr. Englade informed
Captain Smith that the Board had served Mr. Alexander with the cease
and desist order in March 2009 and that order was still in effect. Mr.
Englade further informed Captain Smith that if, in fact, Mr. Alexander
had conducted private investigations in St. Charles Parish in 2011, he
would be in violation of the P.I. Statutes. After that discussion, the

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Board faxed to Captain Smith a copy of the cease and desist order, the
table of contents for the P.I. Statutes (La. R.S. 37:3500-25), and the
statute providing the penalties for violating the P.I. Statutes (La. R.S.
37:3521). Based on his investigation, Captain Smith completed an
arrest warrant affidavit, charging Mr. Alexander with a violation of
La. R.S. 37:35206 by providing contract or private investigator
services to the Board without possessing a valid license. On June 23,
2011, an arrest warrant for Mr. Alexander was signed and issued by
the Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court in St. Charles Parish (“29th
JDC”).

In October 2011, Mr. Alexander discovered the outstanding
arrest warrant for him in St. Charles Parish. Upon discovering the
arrest warrant, he turned himself in to the police. At the time of his
arrest (on October 24, 2011), Mr. Alexander learned that he was being
charged with conducting private investigation without a valid private
investigator license. On the next day, October 25, 2011, the Times-
Picayune newspaper reported on Mr. Alexander’s arrest as a result of
the investigation by the St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Office into his
work for the School Board in January 2011.

On December 19, 2012, [a] 29th JDC judge ordered the State to
produce to Mr. Alexander the State’s evidence file in the criminal case
against him on the charge of violating La. R.S. 37:3520.

On January 14, 2013, Mr. Alexander filed . . . suit against the
[Board and Mr. Englade, in his individual capacity and in his official
capacity as Executive Director of the Board]. [Mr.] Alexander averred
in his petition that the Board and Mr. Englade, individually and in his
official capacity, violated his constitutional rights and defamed him by
issuing the cease and desist order in 2009. He also averred that the
Defendants violated state public records laws and Board[] regulations
by disclosing his expunged criminal records. Finally, he averred that
the Defendants’ defamatory and tortious conduct against him was
continuing and undiscoverable from 2009 until December 19, 2012,
when he received the State’s evidence in the criminal case against him
in the 29th JDC.

On March 5, 2013, the Defendants filed multiple exceptions,
including no cause of action, prescription, and improper venue.
Following a hearing on the exceptions, the trial court granted the
Defendants’ exception of no cause of action and allowed Mr.
Alexander twenty days to amend his petition to state a cause of action.
The trial court also granted the Defendants’ exception of improper
venue as to Mr. Alexander’s claims under the Public Records Act.
The trial court denied the Defendants’ exception of prescription.

On May 31, 2013, Mr. Alexander filed a first supplemental and
amended petition. In his amended petition, Mr. Alexander enumerated

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the following five causes of action: (1) slander and defamation (2006-
2013); (2) defamation and slander (2011-2013); (3) continuing
defamation and slander per se; (4) damages for violation of state law
affecting petitioner; and (5) breach of duty to investigate and
disseminate truthful information.

On July 29, 2013, the Defendants filed a second set of
exceptions, a motion for sanctions and attorney’s fees, and a motion to
strike pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 971. On September 20, 2013, these
matters were heard by the trial court. In its October 16, 2013
judgment, the trial court overruled the Defendants’ exceptions of no
cause of action and prescription and denied their motion to strike and
motion for sanctions.

On December 10, 2013, the Defendants filed an answer and a
reconventional demand. In their answer, the Defendants asserted
multiple affirmative defenses, including discretionary immunity and
quasi-judicial immunity. In their reconventional demand, the
Defendants asserted a claim of abuse of process against Mr.
Alexander.

On September 18, 2014, Mr. Alexander filed a motion for
partial summary judgment on the issue of whether he was exempt
from the P.I. Statutes, pursuant to La. R.S. 37:3503, while working
under his DBE contract with the City from 2006 to 2009 and while
working for the St. Charles Parish School Board in 2011. On October
8, 201[4], the trial court denied Mr. Alexander’s motion for partial
summary judgment.

On November 3, 2014, the Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment seeking dismissal of Mr. Alexander’s claims and a
judgment against Mr. Alexander on their reconventional claim of
abuse of process. In their summary judgment motion, the Defendants
also re-urged their exception of prescription and asserted quasi-
judicial immunity and conditional privilege as a bar to Mr.
Alexander’s claims against them. At the November 14, 2014 hearing,
the trial court overruled the exception of prescription, finding no
reason to revisit the issue, and denied the motion for summary
judgment, finding there were issues of material fact appropriate for a
jury to resolve.

In December 2014, a jury trial was held in this matter. At the
close of Mr. Alexander’s evidence and before the submission of the
case to the jury, the Defendants moved for a directed verdict and
dismissal of Mr. Alexander’s claims based on prescription. After brief
argument, the trial court found “sufficient evidence of an interruption
of prescription” and denied the Defendants’ motion for directed
verdict. On the following day, the trial court instructed the jury on the
applicable law and submitted a general verdict form with multiple jury

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interrogatories to the jury. The jury instructions and interrogatories set
forth the following four causes of action against the Defendants for
the jury to decide: (1) defamation; (2) abuse of process; (3) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (4) violation of a constitutional right
under color of law. Neither Mr. Alexander nor the Defendants raised
any objection to the jury instructions or jury interrogatories presented
to the jury.

On December 18, 2014, the jury returned its verdict. The jury
found the Defendants not liable on two of the four claims—intentional
infliction of emotional distress and violation of Mr. Alexander’s
constitutionally protected rights. The jury found the Defendants liable
to Mr. Alexander for the other two claims—defamation and abuse of
process—and awarded a total of $300,000 in damages. On January 5,
2015, the trial court entered judgment in accord with the jury’s
verdict. Both the Defendants and Mr. Alexander filed motions for new
trial. On March 10, 2015, the trial court denied both motions.

On January 30, 2015, Mr. Alexander filed a petition to annul
the jury verdict based on fraud and ill practice under La. C.C.P. art.
2004. In his petition to annul, Mr. Alexander alleged that the jury
verdict resulted from perjured testimony and fabricated evidence
presented by the Defendants at trial. In response, the Defendants filed
a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Alexander’s
allegations of misconduct should have been raised in a motion for
mistrial. On May 8, 2015, the trial court granted the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice Mr.
Alexander’s petition to annul the jury verdict.

Alexander v. La. State Bd. of Private Investigator Exam’rs, 2015-0537, 0708, pp.

2-12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/17/17), 211 So.3d 544, 549-54, writ denied, 2017-0571

(La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 855, and writ denied, 2017-0607 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d

857. In Mr. Alexander’s 2015 Appeal, this Court held that Mr. Alexander’s claims

based on pre-2011 actions and his abuse of process claims were prescribed. Id. at

p. 48, 211 So.3d at 573. This Court affirmed the remainder of the trial court’s

judgment. Id.

After this Court rendered its Opinion in Mr. Alexander’s 2015 Appeal, on

January 22, 2019, Mr. Alexander instituted a new lawsuit by filing a “Petition for

Fraud and Defamation” (“Petition for Fraud”) in Civil District Court for the Parish

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of Orleans. The trial court docketed this suit under case number 2019-0711 (“CDC

Case No. 2019-711”). Therein, Mr. Alexander named as defendants Ms. Glazer,

individually and in her capacity representing the Board; Mr. Englade, individually

and in his capacity as Executive Director of the Board; Ms. Kovac, individually

and in her capacity as a member of the Board; Mr. Wallace, individually and in his

capacity as a member of the Board; the Board; and Meeks. In his Petition for

Fraud, Mr. Alexander “alleg[ed] that the Defendants conspired to defame him by

‘circulating a false Cease and Desist Order’ and fraudulently inducing him to settle

claims in a pending lawsuit [CDC Case No. 2018-2072] tangentially related to the

factual scenario summarized above.” Alexander v. La. State Bd. of Private

Investigator Exam’rs, 2019-0778, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/1/20), 293 So.3d 1243,

1250 (footnote omitted). Mr. Alexander contended that the defendants defamed

him and violated his constitutional rights by fabricating and circulating a false

cease and desist order, thereby ruining his business and career. In particular, Mr.

Alexander contended that Ms. Glazer, Mr. Englade, and Mr. Wallace knew that the

cease and desist order was false and invalid, such that attaching it to pleadings and

referring to it in open court constituted defamation on their part. Further, Mr.

Alexander asserted that Ms. Glazer, Mr. Englade, and Mr. Wallace had

fraudulently induced him into engaging in settlement negotiations when they had

no intention or authority to settle. After the parties filed various pleadings, the trial

court rendered judgment on May 22, 2019.

Ultimately, this led to another appeal by Mr. Alexander to this Court, which

was lodged as 2019-CA-0778 Dwayne Alexander v. Louisiana State Board of

Private Investigator Examiners, Phyllis Glazer, James P. Englade, Lance Wallace,

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Annette Kovac, and Meeks and Associates (“2019 Appeal”), wherein the Court

explained the updated procedural history as follows:

Ms. Kovac filed an exception of No Cause of Action. Attorney
Glazer and Meeks filed a Motion for Sanctions and Injunctive Relief
as well as Exceptions of Prematurity, Lis Pendens, and Improper
Venue. Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace filed Exceptions of No Cause of
Action, Prematurity, and Vagueness. Likewise, [the Board] filed
Exceptions of No Cause of Action, Prematurity, and Vagueness. [The
Board] also filed a Special Motion to Strike pursuant to La. C.C.P. art.
971.

Mr. Alexander then filed a First Supplemental and Amending
Petition adding Davis Allgood, as attorney for [the Board], as a
defendant. Mr. Alexander attempted to file the First Supplemental and
Amending Petition ex parte. Most of the defendants objected.
Contending a conflict of interest prevented Attorney Glazer and
Meeks from serving as counsel, Mr. Alexander filed a Motion to
Disqualify them. Mr. Alexander filed a Motion for Insufficiency of
Service of Process of the Defendants’ Exceptions and Motion to
Strike.

Following these numerous filings, the trial court conducted a
thorough hearing and issued a judgment containing the following
rulings:

1) The peremptory exceptions filed by [the Board] and Ms.
Kovac, as well as the dilatory exceptions filed by Mr.
Englade, Mr. Wallace, Attorney Glazer, and Meeks are
sustained due to the pendency of case 2018-2072 in the
trial court;

2) All remaining exceptions are overruled as moot;

3) Motion for Sanctions filed by Attorney Glazer and
Meeks is denied without prejudice;

4) Motion to Transfer is denied;

5) Motion to Disqualify Attorney Glazer and Meeks is
denied;

6) Mr. Alexander’s Exception of Insufficiency of Service of
Process is denied;

7) [The Board]’s Special 971 Motion to Strike is granted;

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8) Mr. Alexander is ordered to pay [the Board] $1,500 for
attorney’s fees; and

9) Mr. Alexander’s claims are dismissed without prejudice.

Mr. Alexander’s notice of appeal followed.

Attorney Glazer and Meeks filed an Answer to Mr. Alexander’s
appeal seeking reversal of the trial court’s denial of sanctions pursuant
to La. C.C.P. art. 863, an injunction preventing Mr. Alexander from
filing further suits, attorney’s fees and costs, and damages for a
frivolous appeal. Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace also filed an Answer
requesting damages and costs for defending a frivolous appeal. [The
Board] filed an Answer seeking an increase in the attorney’s fees
award[ed] by the trial court pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 971 based on
defending the appeal, as well as attorney’s fees and costs for the
frivolous appeal.

Alexander, 2019-0778, pp. 9-10, 293 So.3d at 1250-51 (footnote omitted).

Discussing one of the arguments in Mr. Alexander’s brief in his 2019

Appeal, this Court explained that “Mr. Alexander frames the central issue in his

self-authored appellant brief as follows: ‘The trial court committed legal error

when it failed to consider that the under lying [sic] case . . . had decided the issue

of the cease and desist order’s falsity, permitting the instant defamation action.’”

Id. at p. 11, 293 So.3d at 1251-52. As this Court further explained, Mr. Alexander

was “essentially questioning the legality of the trial court’s granting the exception

of prematurity.” Id. at p. 11, 293 So.3d at 1252. This Court found that because

“Mr. Alexander’s claims of alleged defamation arose within the context of [CDC

Case No. 2018-2072] currently pending before the trial court” then “the judicial

proceeding giving rise to Mr. Alexander’s allegations of defamation ha[d] not yet

concluded.” Id. at p. 12, 293 So.3d at 1253. Accordingly, this Court concluded that

the trial court did not err by granting the Exception of Prematurity and dismissing

Mr. Alexander’s suit. Id.

13

Discussing another argument in Mr. Alexander’s brief in his 2019 Appeal,

this Court explained that “Mr. Alexander contends that the trial court erred by

granting [the Board]’s Special Motion to Strike pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 971

because there was no service of the motion and the statute does not apply.” Id. at p.

13, 293 So.3d at 1252-53. More particularly, “Mr. Alexander states that while there

is a signed return on the motion in the record, the signature does not match his

own. He contends that a person identified as A Dwuane signed the return.” Id. at p.

13, 293 So.3d at 1253 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then quoted

the relevant portion of La. C.C.P. art. 1313, which states:

A. Except as otherwise provided by law, every pleading
subsequent to the original petition, and every pleading which under an
express provision of law may be served as provided in this Article,
may be served either by the sheriff or by:

(1) Mailing a copy thereof to the counsel of record, or if there is
no counsel of record, to the adverse party at his last known address,
this service being complete upon mailing.

....

C. Notwithstanding Paragraph A of this Article, if a pleading or
order sets a court date, then service shall be made either by registered
or certified mail or as provided in Article 1314, or by actual delivery
by a commercial courier.

This Court held that because the record contained a signed return on service of the

Board’s Special Motion to Strike, the record was dispositive on the issue of

service, such that the trial court did not err by denying Mr. Alexander’s Motion for

Insufficiency of Service of Process as it related to the Special Motion to Strike.

Alexander, 2019-0778, p. 13, 293 So.3d at 1253. Moreover, the Court noted that

Mr. Alexander bore the burden of proving probability of success on his defamation

claim to defeat the Board’s Motion to Strike. Id. at p. 15, 293 So.3d at 1254. The

Court concluded that because the trial court dismissed Mr. Alexander’s claims

14

based on prematurity, this negated his probability of success on the Board’s

Motion to Strike, such that the trial court did not err in granting the Motion to

Strike. Id.

In Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal, this Court also concluded that the trial

court erred by denying a motion for sanctions filed by Ms. Glazer and Meeks. Id.

at p. 19, 293 So.3d at 1256. The Court remanded the issue of sanctions to the trial

court to conduct a hearing and assess sanctions if deemed appropriate. Id.

Additionally, in deciding to award frivolous appeal damages to the defendants, the

Court listed “similar and indirectly related lawsuits filed at First City Court and the

Orleans Parish Civil District Court” and quoted an order and a warning regarding

frivolous and repetitive litigation issued to Mr. Alexander by the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and the United States Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeal, respectively. Id. at pp. 21-24, 293 So.3d at 1257-59.

In sum, in this Court’s Opinion in Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal, this Court

affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Specifically, this Court affirmed

the trial court’s decision to sustain the exception of prematurity because Mr.

Alexander’s claims of defamation could not be brought until the underlying suit

concluded. The Court further affirmed the trial court’s grant of the Board’s Special

Motion to Strike because Mr. Alexander was properly served and La. C.C.P. art.

971 was designed for this type of suit. The Court determined that the Board was

entitled to an increase in sanctions under La. C.C.P. art. 971 and remanded the

matter to the trial court for that determination. Additionally, the Court found that

the trial court erred by not addressing Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ Motion for Sanctions

pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 863 and remanded this issue to the trial court for a

determination on the motion. Finally, the Court found that Mr. Alexander’s appeal

15

was frivolous and awarded damages, attorney fees, and costs consistent with the

Opinion. Mr. Alexander filed a writ application with the Louisiana Supreme Court

regarding this Court’s Opinion, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his writ

application on November 10, 2020. Alexander v. La. State Bd. of Priv. Investigator

Exam’rs, 2020-01072 (La. 11/10/20), 303 So.3d 1039.

After this Court rendered its Opinion in his 2019 Appeal and the Louisiana

Supreme Court denied his writ application, on January 28, 2021, Mr. Alexander

filed a “Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud and Fraud

on the Court” (“Motion for Annulment”) in CDC Case No. 2019-711, i.e., the

same trial court case number that led to his 2019 Appeal to this Court. In his

Motion for Annulment, Mr. Alexander contended that the trial court’s May 22,

2019 judgment should be set aside as “it was based on fraud on the [c]ourt, and

fraud and ill practice under [La.] C.C.P. art. 2002” because the defense attorneys

“present[ed] perjured[] testimony [and] false documents,” while “fabricating

evidence” and “misrepresent[ing] facts to the [c]ourt.” His arguments largely

centered on service of process in the prior proceedings, whereby Mr. Alexander

maintained “he was never served with process and proffered evidence in support of

the fact” while the defendants “appallingly misrepresented effectuation of service

of process without a scintilla of proof.”

In response to Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment, on February 8, 2021,

Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace filed “Exceptions of Peremption, No Cause of

Action, and Unauthorized Use of a Summary Proceeding and Request for Award

of Attorney Fees.” Also on February 8, 2021, Ms. Kovac filed an “Exception of

Peremption, Exception of No Cause of Action, Exception of Unauthorized Use of

Summary Proceeding, and Motion for Attorney Fees in Response to Plaintiff’s

16

Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud on the Court.” Then,

on February 11, 2021, the Board filed a “Peremptory Exception by Defendant

Board Pleading the Objections of No Cause of Action, Prescription, and Res

Judicata, Combined with Dilatory Exception Pleading the Objection of

Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding and with Motion for Attorney’s Fees

under [La. C.C.P.] art. 2004.” Also on February 11, 2021, Ms. Glazer and Meeks

filed a “Motion to Adopt Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiff’s Motion for

Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud on the Court and Request for

Costs and Attorney Fees.” In pertinent part, in arguing the exception of

unauthorized use of a summary proceeding, Appellees contended that Louisiana

courts require an action for nullity based on fraud or ill practices to be brought in

an ordinary proceeding rather than collaterally in a summary proceeding, such as

Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment. That is, they argued that it was improper

for Mr. Alexander to seek nullification of the trial court’s May 22, 2019 judgment

via the filing of a motion. Rather, he should have brought his action alleging fraud

or ill practices in a direct action in a petition for nullity in the same court that

rendered the judgment he sought to annul.

However, prior to these exceptions being set for hearing, on August 24,

2022, Mr. Alexander filed a “Petition for Absolute Nullity Final Judgments

Pursuant to[] Art. 2002, art. 1953, Art. 2001” (“Petition for Absolute Nullity”),

wherein he listed the defendants as Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace; Ms. Kovac; the

Board; Ms. Glazer and Meeks; and Davis B. Allgood (“Mr. Allgood”), individually

and in his capacity as an attorney representing the Board. Mr. Alexander repeated

the assertions from his Motion for Annulment regarding improper service of

process of the Board’s Motion to Strike. Regarding Mr. Allgood, Mr. Alexander

17

alleged that he lied in an affidavit regarding service of the Board’s Motion to

Strike on Mr. Alexander. Mr. Alexander further contended that Mr. Allgood failed

to secure proper service of the Board’s motion, such that Mr. Alexander was

“completely unaware” of it.

In response to Mr. Alexander’s Petition for Absolute Nullity, on September

12, 2022, Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace filed “Exceptions of Peremption and No

Cause of Action and Request for Award of Attorney Fees.” Then, on October 5,

2022, the Board and Mr. Allgood filed a “Motion to Strike by Defendants Board

and by Allgood, Combined with Their Peremptory Exception Pleading the

Objections of No Cause of Action, Prescription, Peremption, and Res Judicata, and

Their Motion for Attorney’s Fees.” Therein, in pertinent part, they contended that

the trial court should grant their exception of res judicata because Mr. Alexander’s

claims and arguments regarding fraud or ill practices had “all been adjudicated,

repeatedly.” The Board and Mr. Allgood argued:

When a litigant has made his nullity arguments and they have been
rejected in a final judgment, it is over – particularly where this has
occurred on appeal. . . . Even where the litigant did not argue for
nullity, if even the grounds for the alleged nullity appear in an
appellate record, the final judgment is supposed to preclude further
consideration.

They asserted that res judicata was proper under both La. C.C.P. art. 2005 and La.

R.S. 13:4231(3).

The district court set all exceptions for a hearing on October 27, 2022. At the

outset, the trial court stated that Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment was

procedurally improper and granted Appellees’ exceptions of unauthorized use of a

summary proceeding. Having so granted the exceptions of unauthorized use of a

summary proceeding, counsel for Ms. Kovac stated, “[i]f the [M]otion [for

18

Annulment] from January . . . [20]21 is gone, all [that is] left is [Mr. Alexander’s]

[P]etition [for Absolute Nullity] of August . . . [20]22.” To which the trial court

responded, “Correct. Correct. To which exceptions lie.” However, counsel for Ms.

Kovac explained that Ms. Kovac had never been served with Mr. Alexander’s

Petition for Absolute Nullity and thus had only filed exceptions to his Motion for

Annulment. Thereafter, Mr. Allgood (as counsel for the Board) argued that Mr.

Alexander already argued insufficiency of service of process at a hearing before

the trial court prior to the trial court rendering its May 22, 2019 judgment and

before this Court during his 2019 Appeal. After Mr. Allgood’s argument, counsel

for Ms. Glazer and Meeks also stated that they did not file any additional

exceptions because they were not served with Mr. Alexander’s Petition for

Absolute Nullity. Thereafter, the trial court instructed Mr. Alexander to

“specifically address to the Court the exceptions that have been filed,” explaining

that the court was “most concerned with . . . res judicata because it appears . . . that

this has all been said and done and resolved.” In response, Mr. Alexander

explained that he filed his Motion for Insufficiency of Service of Process and that

during the trial court’s May 2019 hearing the trial court judge asked Mr. Allgood if

there was service, to which Mr. Allgood replied in the affirmative. Mr. Alexander

alleged that Mr. Allgood’s response during the hearing was untrue, and that there

“was some oversight on the Fourth Circuit” during his 2019 Appeal. He

acknowledged that the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his writ application

following his 2019 Appeal. Nonetheless, Mr. Alexander argued that because of the

“holdings . . . without any service of process, the matter should be absolute null

[sic].” After Mr. Alexander presented his argument, the trial court orally sustained

the exception of res judicata, explaining:

19

I am bound by the [Louisiana] Fourth Circuit [Court of Appeal]. And
I am bound by what comes from the [Louisiana] Supreme Court.

This matter, in every respect in every which way I try to look at this,
has been resolved. It has been adjudicated. . . . And every which way I
see it, [it is] done. [It is] concluded. So I do have to grant the . . .
exception of res judicata.[ ]

After sustaining the exception of res judicata, the trial court stated, “I believe that

the rest of the exceptions are of no moment with the res judicata determination so

[I am] overruling the remaining matters.”

Thereafter, the trial court stated that it needed to address a motion to tax fees

and costs by Ms. Glazer and Meeks. The trial court explained that it had decided to

deny the motion, noting that Mr. Alexander was representing himself. Counsel for

Ms. Glazer and Meeks responded, “I am relying on the motion, Your Honor.”

Counsel for Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace stated that they had also filed a motion

to tax costs, and the trial court stated it was denying the motion. Counsel for Ms.

Kovac explained that his client had already been awarded costs by the trial court

(in the form of a $75 filing fee), and the trial court responded, “[t]o the extent that

you are requesting the tax of costs to the clerk’s office, I will grant that. I will deny

any request for attorney[’]s fees that may have been pending.” Then, counsel for

the Board explained that the Board had “a motion for the tax and the costs which

have already been awarded. And the Fourth Circuit specifically remanded the case

to this Court for an increase in the attorney[’]s fee award on the Article 971 motion

to strike for having the defendant on a frivolous appeal.” Counsel for the Board

continued, however, that “based on the rulings of this [c]ourt and the Fourth

Circuit, [I am] entitled to have costs taxed and an increase in the attorney[’]s fee

award.” The trial court responded, “To the extent that this Court is being directed

[and] specifically commanded by the Fourth Circuit to make a determination, the

20

Court will take the attorney[’]s fees and costs under advisement for an in camera

inspection and will then provide a judgment.”

After the October 27, 2022 hearing, the trial court took the matter under

advisement and issued its judgment on November 2, 2022. That judgment stated:

THE COURT, after considering the relevant pleadings filed,
arguments of counsel and Mr. Alexander, with law and evidence
being in favor therein, and for the reasons orally stated by the Court
on the record, issues the following Judgment:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that, with respect to Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of
Judgments on Grounds of Fraud and Fraud on the Court, Defendants’
Exception of Unauthorized Use of a Summary Proceeding is
SUSTAINED, Defendants’ Exceptions of Peremption and No Cause
of Action are DENIED AS MOOT, and Defendants’ Request for
Costs and Attorney Fees are DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that Petitioner’s Motion for Annulment of Judgments on
the Grounds of Fraud and Fraud on the Court is MOOT pursuant to
Defendants’ Exception of Unauthorized Use of a Summary
Proceeding.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that Defendants’ peremptory exception of Res Judicata is
SUSTAINED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED the Petition for Absolute Nullity of Final Judgment is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to the granting of
Defendants’ Exception of Res Judicata.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that Petitioner’s “Motion to Disqualify the [sic] Dennis
Phayer, Burglass & Tankersely [sic], Davis Allgood, and the Attorney
General’s Office” is DENIED, and Defendants’ responsive pleadings
are rendered MOOT. Defendants’ Request for Costs and Attorney
Fees are DENIED, all parties to bear their own costs.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that Defendants, James Englade, Lance Wallace, Phyllis
Glazer and Meeks & Associates’ respective Motions to Tax Costs are
DENIED.

21

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED, that Defendant Annette Kovac’s Motion to Tax Costs is
hereby GRANTED, and Petitioner Dwayne Alexander is hereby
ordered to pay the sum of Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) to the order
of: “LeBlanc Fantaci Villio, LLC” acting as counsel for Defendant,
Annette Kovac.

THE COURT, on remand from the Fourth Circuit, as being
directed to make a determination on the following Motions, after
considering the relevant pleadings filed, arguments of counsel and Mr.
Alexander, issues the following Judgment:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that,
pursuant to the Fourth Circuit’s finding that [the Board] is entitled to
an increase in Article 971 sanctions, the Defendant Louisiana Board
of Private Investigator Examiner’s Re-urged Motion to Tax Costs and
for Additional Attorney’s Fees, is GRANTED and Petitioner Dwayne
Alexander is hereby ordered to pay the sum of Five-Hundred Twenty-
Five Dollars ($525), representing costs in this Court, and Five
Hundred Dollars ($500), in addition to the previously awarded sum,
representing additional attorney’s fees, to the [Board].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that Defendants’ Phyllis Glazer and Meeks & Associates,
LLC’s Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Article 863 is DENIED.

Mr. Alexander’s timely appeal follows.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In his brief to this Court, Mr. Alexander asserts three assignments of error.

Specifically, he contends:

1. The trial court committed legal error when it failed to
consider that the under lying [sic] case Alexander v. La. State Board
of Private Investigator Examiners, 2015-0537 (La. App. 4 Cir.
2/17/17), 211 So.3d 544, writ denied, 221 So. 3d 855 (La. 2017) had
decided the issue of the cease-and-desist order’s falsity, permitting the
instant defamation action without delay.

2. The trial court committed legal error when it dismissed
plaintiff [sic] Petition for Absolute Nullity of Final Judgment with
Prejudice Pursuant to Defendant’s Exception of Res Judicata because
1) the record shows there was no service of the motion and rule date
setting the motion; 2) no evidence was adduced and all evidence
adduced in Alexander v. La. State Board of Private Investigator
Examiners, 2015-0537 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/17/17), 211 So.3d 544, writ
denied, 221 So. 3d 855 (La. 2017) shows that the cease and desist

22

order was a false document, and 3) the motion is meritless because
this is a private matter.

3. The trial court committed legal error when it granted
defendant’s [sic] Res Judicata exceptions when plaintiff [sic] claims
were never litigated. The record will show there is no evidence
showing the claims in the instant case that were ever litigated.

DISCUSSION

Based on our review of the record, we find that resolution of this matter

hinges on determining whether the trial court correctly sustained the exception of

unauthorized use of a summary proceeding and whether the trial court correctly

concluded that res judicata applies so as to bar Mr. Alexander’s claims. We discuss

each of these in turn.

Whether the Trial Court Properly Sustained the Exception of Unauthorized
Use of a Summary Proceeding

In its November 2, 2022 judgment, the trial court sustained the exception of

unauthorized use of a summary proceeding, which all Appellees filed. Pursuant to

sustaining this exception, the trial court held that Mr. Alexander’s Motion for

Annulment was moot. We begin by considering whether the trial court properly

sustained the exception of unauthorized use of a summary proceeding, thereby

rendering Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment moot.

Unauthorized use of a summary proceeding is an “objection[] which may be

raised through the dilatory exception” according to La. C.C.P. art. 926(A)(3). As

this Court has previously explained, “this exception is . . . designed to test whether

an action should proceed in a summary manner rather than by ordinary

proceeding.” Hatcher v. Rouse, 2016-0666, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/1/17), 211

So.3d 431, 433 (citing Cent. Cmty. Sch. Bd. v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 2008-

0036, p. 11 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/6/08), 991 So.2d 1102, 1110). Per La. C.C.P. art.

23

851, “[t]here are three different modes of procedure used in civil matters in

Louisiana trial courts: ordinary, summary, and executory.” Succession of Gendron,

2017-216, p. 9 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/17), 236 So.3d 802, 809. “Ordinary

proceedings . . . are to be used in the district courts in all cases, except as otherwise

provided by law.” La. C.C.P. art. 851. “Summary and executory proceedings are

regulated by the provisions of Book V” of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.

Id.

Located in Book V of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure are Articles

2591 - 2596, which are in Title I. Summary Proceedings. According to La. C.C.P.

art. 2591, “[s]ummary proceedings are those which are conducted with rapidity,

within the delays allowed by the court, and without citation and the observance of

all the formalities required in ordinary proceedings.” Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure Article 2591 provides a list of instances in which summary proceedings

may be used:

(1) An incidental question arising in the course of judicial
proceedings, including the award of and the determination of
reasonableness of attorney fees.

(2) An application for a new trial.

(3) An issue which may be raised properly by an exception,
contradictory motion, or rule to show cause.

(4) An action against the surety on a judicial bond after
judgment has been obtained against the principal, or against both
principal and surety when a summary proceeding against the principal
is permitted.

(5) The homologation of a judicial partition, of a tableau of
distribution or account filed by a legal representative, or of a report
submitted by an auditor, accountant, or other expert appointed by the
court; and an opposition to any of the foregoing, to the appointment of
a legal representative, or to a petition for authority filed by a legal
representative.

24

(6) A habeas corpus, mandamus, or quo warranto proceeding.

(7) The determination of the rank of mortgages, liens, and
privileges on property sold judicially, and of the order of distribution
of the proceeds thereof.

(8) The original granting of, subsequent change in, or
termination of custody, visitation, and support for a child; support for
a spouse; injunctive relief; support between ascendants and
descendants; use and occupancy of the family home or use of
community movables or immovables; or use of personal property.

(9) An action to compel an accounting at termination of
parental authority; and an action to seek court approval to alienate,
encumber, or lease the property of a minor, to incur an obligation of a
minor, or to compromise the claim of a minor.

(10) An action to annul a probated testament under Article
2931.

(11) An action to enforce the right to a written accounting
provided for in R.S. 9:2776.

(12) An action for dissolution or specific performance of a
compromise entered pursuant to Article 1916(B) or by consent
judgment.

(13) All other matters in which the law permits summary
proceedings to be used.

As the above list demonstrates, “[a]nnulment of judgment is not a proceeding

which may be disposed of summarily under the provisions of law.” Veillon v.

Veillon, 517 So.2d 936, 941 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).

Thus, in discussing La. C.C.P. arts. 2591 - 2596, this Court has held that an

action for nullity of judgment is not a summary proceeding. Baton Rouge Bank &

Trust Co. v. Subco, Inc., 306 So.2d 312, 315 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (first citing

Columbia Radio & Supply Co. v. Jordan, 215 So.2d 553 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968);

and then citing Garnett v. Ancar, 203 So.2d 812 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967)). Rather,

an action for nullity must comply with the rules governing ordinary proceedings,

including citation and service. Id. Accordingly, if a plaintiff attempts to institute an

25

action to annul a judgment by a summary proceeding, the trial court is correct to

sustain an exception of improper use of summary process filed by the defendant(s).

Veillon, 517 So.2d at 941.

In this matter, Mr. Alexander initially sought to establish that the trial

court’s May 22, 2019 judgment was a nullity in his Motion for Annulment. In

response, Appellees filed their exceptions of unauthorized use of a summary

proceeding. Because Mr. Alexander attempted to institute his action to annul via a

summary proceeding with his Motion for Annulment, the trial court was correct in

sustaining Appellees’ exceptions of improper use of a summary proceeding in light

of the foregoing law. Accordingly, we affirm that part of the trial court’s

November 2, 2022 judgment that sustained Appellees’ exceptions of unauthorized

use of a summary proceeding, and we affirm the part of the judgment denying their

exceptions of peremption and no cause of action as moot in light of the sustaining

of the unauthorized use exception. Similarly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that

Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment was rendered moot by the sustaining of

Appellees’ exceptions of unauthorized use of summary proceeding. Having so

held, we arrive at the same point that the trial court did: without Mr. Alexander’s

Motion for Annulment, all that remains is his Petition for Nullity and whether res

judicata bars it from moving forward.

Res Judicata

Standard of Review

We begin our discussion about the applicability of res judicata with a

consideration of the appropriate standard of review. When an appellate court

reviews a trial court’s “grant[] or denial of an exception [of] res judicata, the

appellate court must determine whether the trial court’s decision is legally correct

26

or incorrect.” Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., Agr. & Mech. Coll. v. Dixie

Brewing Co., 2013-0250, 0251, 0252, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/4/13), 131 So.3d

130, 132 (citing Myers v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of La., 2009-1517, p. 5 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 5/19/10), 43 So.3d 207, 210). In other words, because “[t]he res

judicata effect of a prior judgment” constitutes “a question of law,” the appellate

court reviews the matter de novo. LaBarre v. Occidental Chem. Co., 2023-0139, p.

8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/28/23), 376 So.3d 896, 901 (citing Pierrotti v. Johnson, 2011-

1317 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/19/12), 91 So.3d 1056, 1063). Accordingly, we review

this issue de novo.

Time for Raising

Before outlining the principles applicable to res judicata, we next consider

when a party must raise this exception. Res judicata is one of “[t]he objections that

may be raised through the peremptory exception.” La. C.C.P. art. 927(3). It can be

pled for the first time before an appellate court but sustained only if proof of the

ground of the exception appears in the record on appeal. Bethel v. Simon, 2022-

198, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/22/22), 344 So.3d 226, 229 (citing La. C.C.P. art.

2163). An appellate court can even “notice[] and suppl[y]” the objection of res

judicata “on its own motion.” Bailey v. Clark, 2020-0257, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir.

5/12/21), 326 So.3d 900, 903 (first citing La. C.C.P. art. 927(B); and then citing

Johnson v. Univ. Med. Ctr. in Lafayette, 2013-0040 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 347,

349).

As stated previously, the Board filed an exception of res judicata with the

trial court, which the trial court sustained in its November 2, 2022 judgment. On

appeal, the Board again argues in its brief that res judicata applies so as to bar Mr.

Alexander’s claims. Before the trial court, Ms. Glazer and Meeks filed a “Motion

27

to Adopt Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of Judgments

on the Grounds of Fraud on the Court and Request for Costs and Attorney Fees,”

thereby adopting the Board’s res judicata exception. In their brief to this Court,

Ms. Glazer and Meeks argue that Mr. Alexander’s Petition for nullity is barred by

res judicata. The other Appellees did not assert res judicata before the trial court.

However, in their Appellee Brief, Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace argue that a

“foregoing analysis applies equally to, and serves to negate, [Mr.] Alexander’s

third Assignment of Error – that res judicata under La. R.S. 13:4231 does not

apply.” Additionally, they dedicate a paragraph of their brief to adopting the

arguments of their co-Appellees, and all co-Appellees argue for res judicata. In her

brief, Ms. Kovac asserts that Mr. Alexander’s Petition for Nullity is barred by res

judicata, such that the trial court properly dismissed it. In her brief, Ms. Kovac also

states: “to the extent that the exception of res judicata considered by the [trial]

[c]ourt is deemed limited to” the Board, Ms. “Kovac hereby pleads the peremptory

exception of res judicata, avers that the grounds for the exception are well

supported by the record on appeal, and respectfully requests that this Court dismiss

[Mr.] Alexander’s” Petition for Nullity. Thus, all Appellees make the argument for

res judicata in their appellate briefs to this Court and—for those that did not raise

the exception at the trial court—they were legally capable of raising it for the first

time on appeal. Next, we turn to the principles applicable to res judicata.

Principles Applicable to Res Judicata

“Res judicata is a concept by which [a party] may defeat an action by

declaring the claim extinguished because it already has been litigated.” Walton v.

Burns, 47,388, 47,428, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/13), 151 So.3d 616, 621 (citing

La. R.S. 13:4231). As this Court has explained, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata

28

precludes re-litigation of all causes of action arising out of the same transaction or

occurrence that were the subject matter of a prior litigation between the same

parties.” Sam v. La. State Racing Comm’n, 2023-0170, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir.

10/24/23), 376 So.3d 953, 956 (quoting Kimball v. Kamenitz, 2021-0101, pp. 20-

21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/21), 331 So. 3d 474, 488). This is because “[t]he civilian

concept of res judicata is based upon a presumption of correctness.” Johnson v.

Orleans Par. Sch. Bd., 2014-0277, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/26/17), 219 So.3d 452,

462 (quoting Burguieres v. Pollingue, 2002-1385, p. 7 (La. 2/25/03), 843 So. 2d

1049, 1053). Moreover, “[i]nherent in the concept of res judicata is the principle

that a party had the opportunity to raise the claim in the first adjudication.”

Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 1995-0654, p. 16 (La.

1/16/96), 666 So.2d 624, 634. “The doctrine of res judicata is not discretionary”

but rather “mandates that final judgments be given effect.” LaBarre, 2023-0139, p.

7, 376 So.3d at 902 (citing State ex rel. Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P., 2020-0429 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 9/20/21), 341 So.3d 1, 8, writ denied, 2022-00882 (La. 4/4/23), 358

So.3d 854).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4231 establishes the legal doctrine of res

judicata in our state. It provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final
judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or
other direct review, to the following extent:

(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are
extinguished and merged in the judgment.

(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are

29

extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those
causes of action.

(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant
is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to
any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was
essential to that judgment.

La. R.S. 13:4231. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that “the chief inquiry”

for determining whether res judicata applies “is whether the second action asserts a

cause of action which arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the

subject matter of the first action.” Burguieres v. Pollingue, 2002-1385, p. 7 (La.

2/25/03), 843 So. 2d 1049, 1053. However, that is not the only inquiry as a party

must prove five elements for a subsequent action to be barred by res judicata:

(1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are
the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit
existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and (5) the
cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the
transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first
litigation.

Sam, 2023-0170, p. 5, 376 So.3d at 957 (quoting Myers, 2009-1517, p. 6, 43 So. 3d

207, 211).

The matter sub judice concerns whether res judicata applies in a nullity

action. Regarding the annulment of judgments, La. C.C.P. art. 2005 provides that

“[a] judgment affirmed, reversed, amended, or otherwise rendered by an appellate

court may be annulled only when the ground for nullity did not appear in the

record of appeal or was not considered by the appellate court.” In discussing La.

C.C.P. art. 2005, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has explained that

“[t]he law is clear that either of the conditions in La. [C.C.]P. art. 2005 may

prohibit maintenance of a nullity action.” Dumas v. Bd. of Ethics, 2019-0289, p. 6

(La. App. 1 Cir. 11/15/19), 290 So.3d 1143, 1147 (citing Radcliffe 10 L.L.C. v. Zip

30

Tube Sys. of La., Inc., 2009-0417, 0418, p. 7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/29/09), 30 So.3d

825, 829, That is, “both conditions provided in La. [C.C.]P. art. 2005 need not be

present” for res judicata to apply in a nullity action. Id. Because La. C.C.P. art.

2005 is more specifically directed toward the situation in this matter (i.e., an

assertion of res judicata in a nullity action) than La. R.S. 13:4231, we consider its

applicability. See Burge v. State, 2010-2229, p. 5 (La. 2/11/11), 54 So.3d 1110,

1113 (stating that “[t]he general rule of statutory construction is that a specific

statute controls over a broader, more general statute”).

Based on our review of the record, including the actions of the trial court and

this Court’s 2019 Appeal, we agree with the trial court and Appellees that res

judicata bars Mr. Alexander’s Petition for Nullity. The alleged nullity of the trial

court’s May 10, 2019 judgment and all of Mr. Alexander’s arguments in support of

his allegations were “actually litigated and determined” in the trial court and in this

Court. In particular, Mr. Alexander’s contention that the May 22, 2019 trial court

judgment should be deemed a nullity is that one of the motions ruled upon in that

judgment was obtained by fraud and ill practices, namely the Board’s Motion to

Strike. Not only did the record in Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal contain the

Board’s Affidavit of Service regarding its Motion to Strike, as well as Mr.

Alexander’s Motion for Insufficiency of Service of Process, this Court’s Opinion

demonstrates that the Court considered Mr. Alexander’s arguments on this issue.

Specifically, the Court held:

The record contains a signed return on service of [the Board]’s
Special Motion to Strike. We find the record dispositive on the issue
of service. Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Mr.
Alexander’s Motion for Insufficiency of Service of Process as it
relates to the Special Motion to Strike.

31

We further note that Mr. Alexander’s first assignment of error in the present

appeal is identical to his assignment of error in his 2019 Appeal. That is, Mr.

Alexander questioned in his 2019 Appeal as he does in his present appeal the

legality of the trial court’s grant of the exception of prematurity. In the Opinion

rendered in Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court

correctly sustained the exception of prematurity because Mr. Alexander’s claims of

defamation could not be brought until the underlying suit is concluded. As with his

allegations of insufficiency of service of process, this Court already considered Mr.

Alexander’s arguments on this point in his 2019 Appeal and will not reconsider it.

In sum, we affirm the trial court’s November 2, 2022 judgment insofar as it

granted the Board’s and Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ exception of res judicata. Because

all Appellees raised this exception on appeal, we conclude that Mr. Alexander’s

claims against all Appellees are barred by res judicata. In light of this conclusion,

we also affirm the trial court’s decision to dismiss Mr. Alexander’s Petition for

Absolute Nullity with prejudice.

Having now affirmed the trial court’s decision to sustain the exceptions of

unauthorized use of summary proceeding and res judicata, we next look at the

remaining parts of the trial court’s November 2, 2022 judgment, as well as the

answers filed by Appellees in response to Mr. Alexander’s appeal, to resolve those

matters.

Other Matters Addressed by the November 2, 2022 Judgment

Denial of Costs and Fees for Exceptions of Unauthorized Use of a Summary
Proceeding, No Cause of Action, and Peremption

As previously summarized, in response to Mr. Alexander’s Motion for

Annulment, all Appellees filed an exception of unauthorized use of a summary

32

proceeding.2 The trial court sustained Defendants’ exceptions of unauthorized use

of a summary proceeding, and we have affirmed that decision. With their

exception of unauthorized use of a summary proceeding, Mr. Englade, Mr.

Wallace, and Ms. Kovac also asserted the exceptions of no cause of action and

peremption, while the Board asserted the exception of no cause of action but did

not file an exception of peremption. Ms. Glazer and Meeks moved to adopt their

co-defendants’ responses to Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment, thereby

adopting all of the foregoing exceptions. All Appellees requested attorney fees in

conjunction with their exceptions. In addition, Ms. Glazer and Meeks requested

costs in their motion to adopt their co-defendants’ responses. In the November 2,

2022 judgment, after sustaining Appellees’ exceptions of unauthorized use of a

summary proceeding and denying their exceptions of peremption and no cause of

action as moot, the trial court denied Appellees’ requests for costs and attorney

fees.

In his Motion for Annulment, Mr. Alexander contended that the trial court’s

May 22, 2019 judgment should be set aside as “it was based on fraud on the

[c]ourt, and fraud and ill practice.” Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2004

is titled “Annulment for vices of substance; peremption of action.” It provides:

A. A final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be
annulled.

B. An action to annul a judgment on these grounds must be
brought within one year of the discovery by the plaintiff in the nullity
action of the fraud or ill practices.

2 Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace filed their exception of unauthorized use of a

summary proceeding on February 8, 2021, as did Ms. Kovac. Then, on February
11, 2021, the Board filed its exception of unauthorized use of a summary
proceeding. That same day, Ms. Glazer and Meeks filed a motion to adopt the
other Defendants’ responses to Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment.

33

C. The court may award reasonable attorney fees incurred by
the prevailing party in an action to annul a judgment on these
grounds.

La. C.C.P. art. 2004 (emphasis added). Though La. C.C.P. art. 2004(C) did not

mandate that the trial court had to award attorney fees to Appellees as the

prevailing party in an action to annul on the basis of fraud or ill practices (i.e., the

Article uses the permissive word “may” rather than “shall”), this Court has decided

to reverse the trial court’s decision not to award attorney fees to Appellees’ in

association with their successful defense of Mr. Alexander’s Motion for

Annulment via their exception of unauthorized use of a summary proceeding. In so

ruling, we note that the protracted nature of this matter is due, in large part, to Mr.

Alexander’s repetitive and frivolous filings. See La. C.C.P. art. 2164 (providing

that “[t]he appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and

proper upon the record on appeal”).

Similarly, we have decided to reverse the trial court’s denial of Ms. Glazer

and Meeks’ request for costs associated with their motion to adopt their co-

defendants’ responses to Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment; and, although

Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace, Ms. Kovac, and the Board did not request costs in

their exceptions, we have nonetheless decided to award to them the costs

associated with the filing of their exceptions in response to Mr. Alexander’s

Motion for Annulment. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1920 provides:

Unless the judgment provides otherwise, costs shall be paid by the
party cast, and may be taxed by a rule to show cause.

Except as otherwise provided by law, the court may render judgment
for costs, or any part thereof, against any party, as it may consider
equitable.

34

Thus, the trial court could have assessed costs against Mr. Alexander pursuant to

La. C.C.P. art. 1920, though the trial court was not required to do so. The ability of

trial courts to assess costs against the party cast in judgment is true even when, as

here, the party cast in judgment is indigent and had been proceeding in forma

pauperis. Herigodt v. Town of Golden Meadow, 2020-0752, pp. 16-17 (La. App. 1

Cir. 2/22/21), 321 So.3d 1004, 1016-17 (first citing La. C.C.P. art. 5188; and then

citing Smith v. Smith, 543 So. 2d 608, 608 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989)). In interpreting

La. C.C.P. art. 1920, this Court has explained that “[a] trial court has great

discretion in awarding costs . . . and can only be reversed on appeal upon a

showing of an abuse of that discretion.” Certain St. Bernard Par. Gov. Comp.

Disks v. St. Bernard Par. Gov., 2013-1054, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/18/13), 130

So.3d 56, 58 (alteration in original) (quoting Hendrix v. Maison Orleans I, L.L.C.,

2011-1349, p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/26/12), 101 So.3d 1013, 1023). However, that

“discretion is not boundless.” Id. at p. 3, 130 So.3d at 58-59. See also La. C.C.P.

art. 2164; Brown v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 1997-599, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 3 Cir.

12/3/97), 704 So.2d 1234, 1237-38 (finding that “equitable considerations of

justice and fundamental fairness to the party who has been damaged by the

wrongdoing of an opposing [party] is of prime concern” and that “the trial and

appellate courts of this state are too busy to have their time wasted having to rehear

matters”). Mr. Alexander was the party cast in judgment, and Appellees were

successful in pleading their exception of unauthorized use of a summary

proceeding. Again, given that the protracted nature of this matter is due, in large

part, to Mr. Alexander’s repetitive and frivolous filings to which Appellants have

had to respond, we find that an award of costs to Appellees for the filing of their

35

exceptions in response to Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment is just, legal, and

proper based on the appellate record. La. C.C.P. art. 2164.

In sum, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the requests for attorney fees as

found in Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s “Exceptions of Peremption, No Cause of

Action, and Unauthorized Use of a Summary Proceeding and Request for Award

of Attorney Fees;” in Ms. Kovac’s “Exception of Peremption, Exception of No

Cause of Action, Exception of Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding, and

Motion for Attorney Fees in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of

Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud on the Court;” the Board’s “Peremptory

Exception . . . Pleading the Objections of No Cause of Action, Prescription, and

Res Judicata, Combined with Dilatory Exception Pleading the Objection of

Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding and with Motion for Attorney’s Fees

under [La. C.C.P.] art. 2004;” and Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ “Motion to Adopt

Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the

Grounds of Fraud on the Court and Request for Costs and Attorney Fees.” We

reverse the trial court’s denial of Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ request for costs as found

in their “Motion to Adopt Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiff’s Motion for

Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud on the Court and Request for

Costs and Attorney Fees.” Finally, we award costs to Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace

for their “Exceptions of Peremption, No Cause of Action, and Unauthorized Use of

a Summary Proceeding and Request for Award of Attorney Fees;” to Ms. Kovac

for her “Exception of Peremption, Exception of No Cause of Action, Exception of

Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding, and Motion for Attorney Fees in

Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of

Fraud on the Court;” and to the Board for its “Peremptory Exception . . . Pleading

36

the Objections of No Cause of Action, Prescription, and Res Judicata, Combined

with Dilatory Exception Pleading the Objection of Unauthorized Use of Summary

Proceeding and with Motion for Attorney’s Fees under [La. C.C.P.] art. 2004.” We

remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of the amount of the trial

court costs and attorney fees owed to Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace, Ms. Kovac,

the Board, and Ms. Glazer and Meeks for those respective exceptions and motion

filed in response to Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment.

Denial of Motion to Disqualify and Denial of Associated Costs and Attorney
Fees

On October 4, 2022, Mr. Alexander filed a “Memorandum in Support of

Motion to Disqualify the [sic] Dennis Phayer, Burglass & Tankersely, Davis

Allgood, and the Attorney General’s Office” (“Motion to Disqualify”). In

response, on October 17, 2022, Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace filed an opposition

to Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify. In arguing that the trial court should

deny Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify, Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace

contended that “[g]iven the history of [Mr.] Alexander’s prior litigation and the

substance of the allegations asserted by him in multiple pleadings over the past

several years, it is clear that his instant [M]otion to [D]isqualify is more accurately

characterized as an opposition to and attempt to delay adjudication of both the

several concurrently pending defense motions to tax costs against him as well as

the several defense exceptions to his nullity motion and petition set for hearing on

October 27, 2022.” On October 18, 2022, the Board likewise filed an opposition to

Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify. Therein, the Board argued that Mr.

Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify was frivolous and had been brought in bad faith,

and the Board asserted that it constituted “yet another among many reasons that

37

existing sanctions should be enforced, and that additional and more effective

sanctions should be imposed[] on Mr. Alexander.” The following day, October 19,

2022, Ms. Glazer and Meeks also filed an opposition to Mr. Alexander’s Motion to

Disqualify. In pertinent part, in their opposition, Ms. Glazer and Meeks asserted

that Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify was “another example of Mr. Alexander

misusing our judicial system to harass the Defendants” and was frivolous. They

requested that the trial court “award[] the Defendants court costs and attorney fees

they incurred for defending [Mr. Alexander]’s Motion to Disqualify.” Ms. Kovac

did not file any pleadings in response to Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify.

In its November 2, 2022 judgment, the trial court denied Mr. Alexander’s

Motion to Disqualify and ruled that the responsive pleadings filed by Mr. Englade

and Mr. Wallace, the Board, and Ms. Glazer and Meeks were rendered moot by

that denial. We affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Mr. Alexander’s Motion to

Disqualify; and we affirm the trial court’s finding that the responsive oppositions

were rendered moot by that denial. However, in the November 2, 2022 judgment,

after denying Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify, the trial court stated:

“Defendants’ Requests for Costs and Attorney Fees are DENIED, all parties to

bear their own costs.” Based on our review of the record, only Ms. Glazer and

Meeks requested costs and attorney fees in their opposition. Because we agree with

the arguments in Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ opposition and acknowledge that they had

to expend costs and resources to oppose Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify, we

hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their request for costs and

attorney fees, and we reverse the trial court’s denial of their request for costs and

attorney fees. See La. C.C.P. art. 1920; La. C.C.P. art. 2164; Brown, 1997-599, pp.

5-6, 704 So.2d at 1237-38; Herigodt, 2020-0752, pp. 16-17, 321 So.3d at 1016-17;

38

and Certain St. Bernard Par. Gov. Comp. Disks v. St. Bernard Par. Gov., 2013-

1054, p. 3, 130 So.3d at 58. Further, though they did not request them, for the same

reasons, we award costs and attorney fees to Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace and the

Board for their oppositions to Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify because, as an

appellate court, we are to “render any judgment which is just legal and proper upon

the record on appeal.” Id. We remand this matter to the trial court for a

determination of the amount of the trial court costs and attorney fees owed to Mr.

Englade and Mr. Wallace, the Board, and Ms. Glazer and Meeks for their

respective oppositions to Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify.

Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s, Ms. Kovac’s, and the Board’s Motion to Tax
Costs

Additionally, before the trial court at the October 27, 2022 hearing were

three motions to tax costs. The November 2, 2022 judgment denied a Re-urged

Motion to Tax Costs filed by Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace. Additionally, in the

judgment, the trial court granted a Motion to Tax Costs filed by Ms. Kovac and

ordered Mr. Alexander to pay $75.00 to Ms. Kovac’s counsel. The trial court also

granted a Re-urged Motion to Tax Costs filed by the Board and ordered Mr.

Alexander to pay $525, “representing costs in [the trial] [c]ourt.” As previously

excerpted, La. C.C.P. art. 1920 states that “costs shall be paid by the party cast, and

may be taxed by a rule to show cause.” We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant

Ms. Kovac’s Motion to Tax Costs and award to her the sum of $75.00. We also

affirm the trial court’s decision to grant the Board’s Motion to Tax Costs and

award to it the sum of $525. However, we find that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s Re-urged Motion to Tax

Costs. As previously stated, our review of this record and this litigation history

39

reveals that the protracted nature of this dispute is due mostly to Mr. Alexander’s

repetitive and unfounded pleadings. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial

of Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s Re-Urged Motion to Tax Costs, and we remand

this matter to the trial court to determine how much Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace

are owed in light of our decision to grant their Re-urged Motion to Tax Costs. See

La. C.C.P. art. 2164 (providing that “[t]he appellate court shall render any

judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal. The court may

. . . tax the costs of the lower . . . court . . . as in its judgment may be considered

equitable.”)

Answers to Appeal

Frivolous Appeal

All Appellees filed Answers to Mr. Alexander’s appeal. Therein, they

contend that Mr. Alexander’s appeal is frivolous so as to entitle them to recover

frivolous appeal damages, including attorney fees and costs, for having to litigate

the appeal. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2133(A) states, in pertinent

part, that:

An appellee shall not be obliged to answer the appeal unless he
desires to have the judgment modified, revised, or reversed in part or
unless he demands damages against the appellant. In such cases, he
must file an answer to the appeal, stating the relief demanded, not
later than fifteen days after the return day or the lodging of the record
whichever is later.

Further, La. C.C.P. art. 2164 provides:

The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and
proper upon the record on appeal. The court may award damages,
including attorney fees, for frivolous appeal or application for writs,
and may tax the costs of the lower or appellate court, or any part
thereof, against any party to the suit, as in its judgment may be
considered equitable.

40

As this Court has previously explained, “[a]ppeals are always favored and,

unless the appeal is unquestionably frivolous, damages will not be granted.”

Alexander, 2019-0778, p. 20, 293 So.3d at 1256 (quoting Tillmon v. Thrasher

Waterproofing, 2000-0395, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/28/01), 786 So. 2d 131, 137).

This is because frivolous appeal damages may result in a “chilling effect . . . on the

appellate process.” Id. Nonetheless, “if [an appeal] does not present a substantial

legal question, if the sole purpose of the appeal is delay, or if the appealing counsel

does not seriously believe the view of the law that he advocates” then this

constitutes a frivolous appeal. Id. To this end, “[d]amages for a frivolous appeal

will be awarded if the appellant is attempting to delay the action, if the appellant

does not believe what he is advocating, or if the appeal presents no substantial

legal question.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hunter v.

Maximum Grp. Behavioral Servs., Inc., 2010-0930, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/16/11),

61 So. 3d 735, 739). It is only proper to award frivolous appeal damages if “the

proposition advocated is so ridiculous or so opposed to rational thinking that it is

evident beyond any doubt that it is being deliberately professed for ulterior

purposes.” Id. (quoting Bottle Poetry, LLC v. Doyle Rest. Grp. Co., 2013-0406, p.

9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/15/14), 133 So. 3d 60, 67).

We find that Appellees are entitled to an award of frivolous appeal damages.

As this Court explained in Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal, though he filed his brief

pro se, Mr. Alexander is “not representative of the average pro se litigant.”

Alexander, 2019-0778, pp. 20-21, 293 So.3d at 1257. We find that Mr. Alexander’s

appeal does not present a substantial legal question. Rather, it presents questions

that have already been answered multiple times, and that the sole purpose of the

appeal is likely Mr. Alexander’s attempt to delay and avoid having to pay the costs

41

and fees previously assessed. Just as this Court did in Mr. Alexander’s 2019

Appeal, we again outline Mr. Alexander’s similar and indirectly related lawsuits

filed at First City Court and the Orleans Parish Civil District Court, which include,

but are not limited to:

1. Alexander v. Wayne R. Centanni and Centanni Investigative
Agency, CDC No. 09-07153, Div. “F-07” (Unfair and Deceptive
Trade Practices);

2. Alexander v. Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. D/B/A
CCMSI, Jerry Armatis, Thomas Brechtel, and Carl Ayestas, CDC No.
09-07154, Div. “D-16” (Retaliatory Discharge, Wrongful
Termination, Overtime Wages and Back Pay, Unjust Enrichment, and
Whistleblower Protection);

3. Alexander v. Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc., CDC
No. 12 05255, Div. “L-06” (Discrimination);

4. Alexander v. Angella Myers, CDC No. 12-5254, Div. “G-11”
(Tortious Interference relative to CDC No. 12-05255);

5. Alexander v. LSBPIE and its Executive Director, James P. Englade,
in his official capacity and individually, Dennis J. Phayer, Nancy
Marshall, Elliot M. Lonker, Lance Guest, Frilot, L.L.C., Elizabeth
Doubleday, Deutsche Kerrigan, L.L.P., and Burglass & Tankersley,
L.L.C., CDC No. 13-00362, Div. “F-07” (Defamation and Abuse of
Process);

6. Alexander v. Carl Ayestas, CDC No. 13-09535, Div. “A-16”
(Defamation);

7. Alexander v. Angella Myers, CDC No. 13-10624, Div. “M-13”
(Tortious Interference regarding CDC No. 13-09535);

8. Alexander v. Jerry Armatis, Myers Law Group, L.L.P., Angella H.
Myers, and Mark C. Carver, First City Court for the Parish of
Orleans, No. 13-53519 (Invasion of Privacy);

9. Alexander v. Lance S. Guest in his official and individual capacity,
and Office of Risk Management, CDC No. 14-03062, Div. “N-08”
(Defamation);

10. Alexander v. The City of New Orleans, Travelers Ins. Co., Brian
Thomas, Angela Myers, Myers Law Group, Lawrence W. Gerguson &
Associates, Lawrence Ferguson, Mark C. Carver, Cannon Cochran

42

Management Services, Inc., Carlos O. Ayestas, Jr., Jerry Armatis,
CDC No. 14-04123, Div. “B-05” (Breach of Contract);

11. Alexander v. Wayne R. Centanni, individually and d/b/a, Centanni
Investigative Agencies, David Parnell, Jr., Lance Wallace, and James
Englade, CDC No. 15-00209, Div. “N-08” (Petition to Annul
Judgment for Fraud and Ill Practices regarding CDC No. 09-07153);

12. Alexander v. The Times-Picayune, L.L.C. and David Hammer,
CDC No. 15 *1258 11890, Div. “M-13” (Libel, Slander, and
Defamation);

13. Alexander v. Blue Williams, L.L.P., LSBPIE, Dennis J. Phayer,
David Parnell, Jr., Nancy J. Marshall, James P. Englade, Elizabeth
Doubleday, Deutsch Kerrigan, L.L.P., Burglass & Tankersly, L.L.C.,
and Thomas G. Buck, CDC No. 17-02215, Div. “I-14” (Defamation);

14. Alexander v. Blue Williams, L.L.P., Dennis J. Phayer, David
Parnell, Nancy J. Marshall, and La. State Board of Private
Investigator Examiners, CDC No. 17-05452, Div. “I-14”
(Defamation);

15. Alexander v. LSBPIE, Sher Garner Cahill Richter Klein &
Hilbert, L.L.C., Annette Kovac, Brandon W. Keay, James M. Garner,
Debra Fishchman, James P. Englade, CDC No. 17-05546, Div. “I-
14” (Defamation);

16. Alexander v. Office of Risk Management and Julian S. Thompson,
in his official capacity as The Director of Risk Management, CDC No.
17-10372, Div. “J-15” (Mandamus);

17. Alexander v. LSBPIE, Lane Wallace, Brett Tweedel, Michael A.
Thomas, The State of Louisiana through the Board of Private
Investigator Examiners, Sher Garner Cahill Richter Klein McCallister
Klien & Hilbert, L.L.C., Dennis Phayer, David Parnell, Lance
Wallace, James P. Englade, Del Hahn, Nancy Marshall, Sonia Mallet
in her capacity as the Director of Litigation for the Office of the
Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, Ryan Luminais, Ronald
Luminae, Elliot Lonker, Leblanc Fantaci Villio, L.L.C., Jeff Landry, in
his capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana,
Annette Kovac, Delbert Hahn, Phyllis E. Glazer, James Garner,
Frilot, L.L.C., Debra Fischman, Michael L. Fantaci, Elizabeth
Doubleday, and Deutsch Kerrigan, L.L.P., CDC C/A No. 18-02072,
Div. “I-14” (Defamation);

18. Alexander v. Gertraud G. Malmgren, James Young, Peter
Weilbacher, USAA Casualty Ins. Co., State Farm Ins. Co., Lobman,
Carnahan, Batt, Angelle, & Nader, Stacy Estrada, and David Batt,
CDC No. 2018-09910, Div. “G-11” (Libel and Slander, Fraud and

43

Fraud on the Court, Conspiracy, Tortious Interference with Contract,
Intentional and Fraudulent Misrepresentations, Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, and Mental Anguish);

19. Alexander v. Jeffrey M. Landry, Stephen J. Oats, Warren Orlando,
Oat & Marino, Millard Mule, Louisiana Citizens for Job Creators,
Inc., Harvey Gulf International Marine, L.L.C., Shane J. Guidry, and
David Allen, CDC No. 2018-10372, Div. “L-06” (Breach of
Contract);

20. Alexander v. LSBPIE, Phyllis Glazer, James P. Englade, Lance
Wallace, Annette Kovac, and Meeks & Associates, CDC No. 2019-
0711, Div. “I-14” (Defamation); and

21. Alexander v. LSBPIE and James P. Englade in his Official
Capacity, and James P. Englade Individual Capacity, CDC No. 2019-
10301, Div. “L-06” (Petition to Make Judgment Executory relative to
CDC No. 2013-0362).

Moreover, over the years, Mr. Alexander has filed numerous writ

applications and appeals with this Court. In fact, this Court handed down an

Opinion in another appeal by Mr. Alexander on July 31, 2024, Alexander v. Blue

Williams, L.L.P., 2023-0216 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/24), ___ So.3d ___, 2024 WL

3593508. And on this Court’s November 7, 2024 docket is yet another appeal by

Mr. Alexander. That will mark three appeals by Mr. Alexander that are heard by

this Court in the calendar year 2024 alone. We also note that the above list does not

even include Mr. Alexander’s numerous filings in the Federal Court system.

Because of his innumerable federal filings, the United States District Court of the

Eastern District of Louisiana issued the following order:

In addition to the positions stated above, certain defendants also seek
additional relief from the Court relative to related further litigation
instituted by Plaintiff relating in some way to the investigation
services previously provided by him, and/or Worldwide Detective
Agency, Inc., to the City of New Orleans and/or CCMSI. See, e.g.,
Rec. Doc. 20–1, pp. 24–25. Having carefully considered the parties’
submissions, as well as the records in the pertinent proceedings
previously pending in this Court, IT IS ORDERED that:

44

(1) Dwayne Alexander and Worldwide Detective Agency, Inc. shall
not hereafter file, in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, any additional complaint, motion, or other
pleading that arises from or is premised upon: (a) Alexander’s and/or
Worldwide’s private investigative services provided to the City of
New Orleans and/or CCMSI, (b) private investigation licensing, (c)
and/or any litigation regarding same, without first seeking leave of
Court to do so, and certifying, in writing, that the proposed
submission is not frivolous, presented for an improper purpose,
repetitive or duplicative, has evidentiary support, and does not contain
any inappropriate, irrelevant, malicious, harassing and/or insulting
comments. Failure to comply with this order may result in filings
being stricken from the record and/or the imposition of significant
financial and/or other sanctions, including payment of excess costs,
expenses, and any attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and/or
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

(2) Dwayne Alexander or anyone acting on his behalf, or on behalf of
Worldwide Detective Agency, Inc., must give written notice to any
court or agency (including parish, city, state and federal courts or
agencies) of all prior and pending litigation filed by Dwayne
Alexander or Worldwide Detective Agency, Inc. (or anyone acting on
his/its behalf) by appending to the petition or complaint a written
summary of all past and pending proceedings that directly or
indirectly relate to private investigation services, private investigation
licensing, or Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc., its
employees or its attorneys. Failure to comply with this order may
result in filings being stricken from the record and/or the imposition
of significant financial and/or other sanctions, including payment of
excess costs, expenses, and any attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. §
1927 and/or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

Alexander v. City of New Orleans, No. CIV. A. 12-1524, 2015 WL 160435, at *3-4

(E.D. La. 1/12/15). Subsequently, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

stated the following:

Alexander is WARNED, however, that future frivolous, repetitive, or
otherwise abusive filings will result in the imposition of progressively
severe sanctions, which may include monetary penalties and
restrictions on his ability to file pleadings and other documents in this
court and in any court subject to this court’s jurisdiction. Alexander
should review any pending appeals and actions and move to dismiss
any that are frivolous. His failure to do so will result in the imposition
of sanctions. This warning supplements and does not displace the
sanctions orders of the district court.

45

Alexander v. Cannon Cochran Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 638 Fed. Appx. 410 (5th Cir.

2016).

In light of Mr. Alexander’s history in the court systems and in light of his

repetitive arguments raised in the matter sub judice, we find that Mr. Alexander’s

appeal is frivolous because there is no substantial legal question presented. Even as

a pro se appellant, Mr. Alexander could not and should not believe the position he

has taken after being informed by the trial court in the May 22, 2019 judgment that

his defamation claims cannot be addressed until the underlying matter is resolved

and by then being subsequently informed by the trial court at the October 22, 2022

hearing and in the November 2, 2022 judgment that this Court has already

considered and ruled on Mr. Alexander’s arguments in his 2019 Appeal.

Additionally, at the October 22, 2022 hearing, the trial court also told Mr.

Alexander that it was “bound by what comes from the [Louisiana] Supreme Court”

and that “[t]he [Louisiana] Supreme Court has spoken.” To assert the same

arguments from his 2019 Appeal in this present appeal after having been so

informed constitutes a frivolous appeal. Therefore, we award the following, to be

paid by Mr. Alexander, based on his frivolous appeal:

Ms. Glazer and Meeks: $2,000 for attorney fees
$1,000 for damages

Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace: $2,000 for attorney fees
$1,000 for damages

Board: $2,000 for attorney fees
$1,000 for damages

Ms. Kovac: $2,000 for attorney fees
$1,000 for damages.

As this Court ruled in Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal, he must also pay all costs for

all Appellees associated with this appeal. Alexander, 2019-0778, p. 25, 293 So.3d

46

at 1260 (citing Hester v. Hester, 1998-0854, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/13/98), 715

So. 2d 40, 43). Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2164, we further tax the costs of this

appeal and instruct the Clerk of this Court to determine the amount Mr. Alexander

owes in light of this ruling. See La. C.C.P. art. 2164 (providing that “[t]he appellate

court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on

appeal. The court . . . may tax the costs of the . . . appellate court”). Though the

award of “frivolous appeal damages is sparsely utilized because of the chilling

effect it may have on litigation,” we again conclude as this Court did in Mr.

Alexander’s 2019 Appeal that “a chilling effect is necessary for Mr. Alexander

given his repetitious court filings and the unique background of the present

matter.” Alexander, 2019-0778, p. 25, 293 So.3d at 1260.

Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ Answer – Request for Amendment of Judgment

In their Answer, Ms. Glazer and Meeks also seek modification of the trial

court’s judgment. They contend that while the trial court stated in the judgment

that it was denying a motion to tax cost and a motion for sanctions filed by Ms.

Glazer and Meeks, they had neither a pending motion to tax costs nor a motion for

sanctions before the trial court at the time of the hearing and subsequent judgment.

Accordingly, they ask this Court to amend, modify, or revise the trial court’s

November 2, 2022 judgment to properly reflect the fact that a motion to tax costs

and a motion for sanctions were not before the trial Court on October 25, 2022.

Nonetheless, Ms. Glazer and Meeks assert that they have legitimate claims against

Mr. Alexander for costs, as well as the right to a contradictory hearing on

sanctions, so they ask this Court to remand the issue of damages and sanctions

back to the trial court to allow them to file the appropriate motion to recover the

damages, attorney fees, and costs this Court awarded them in the 2019 Appeal and

47

to file and set for contradictory hearing, a motion for sanctions pursuant to La.

C.C.P. art. 863.

After reviewing the record, we agree with Ms. Glazer and Meeks that they

did not have a pending motion to tax costs before the trial court at the time of the

hearing and judgment. Accordingly, we amend that part of the judgment which

currently reads:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that Defendants, James Englade, Lance Wallace, Phyllis
Glazer and Meeks & Associates’ respective Motions to Tax Costs are
DENIED.

To now read:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that Defendants’, James Englade and Lance Wallace’s,
Motion to Tax Costs is DENIED.

That is, we remove the trial court’s denial of Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ motion to tax

costs from the November 2, 2022 judgment because no such motion was before the

trial court on the date of the October 27, 2022 hearing. As amended, we affirm that

part of the judgment. Nonetheless we agree with Ms. Glazer and Meeks that, like

their co-Appellees’, they are entitled to having their costs taxed. Thus, we remand

this matter to the trial court for Ms. Glazer and Meeks to file the appropriate

motion and rule to show cause per La. C.C.P. art. 1920.

However, we disagree with Ms. Glazer and Meeks that they did not have a

pending motion for sanctions. This Court’s Opinion rendered in Mr. Alexander’s

2019 Appeal reveals that in its November 2, 2022 judgment, the trial court was

following an Order from this Court to address Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ Motion for

Sanctions. That is, in the Opinion rendered in Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal, this

Court found that the trial court erred by not addressing Ms. Glazer and Meeks’

48

Motion for Sanctions pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 863, so this Court remanded this

issue to the trial court for a determination on their motion. In fact, in Mr.

Alexander’s 2019 Appeal, Ms. Glazer and Meeks filed an Answer to Mr.

Alexander’s appeal asserting that the trial court erred by denying their Motion for

Sanctions pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 863. Thus, that part of the November 2, 2022

judgment referencing Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ Motion for Sanctions was the trial

court ruling on their motion as ordered by this Court. In fact, prior to denying Ms.

Glazer and Meeks’ Motion for Sanctions, the November 2, 2022 judgment stated:

“THE COURT, on remand from the [Louisiana] Fourth Circuit [Court of Appeal],

as being directed to make a determination on the following Motions, after

considering the relevant pleadings filed, arguments of counsel and Mr. Alexander,

issues the following Judgment:”. As such, we disagree with Ms. Glazer and Meeks

that the November 2, 2022 judgment needs to be amended to remove any reference

to a motion for sanctions filed by them.

However, we disagree with the trial court’s decision to deny Ms. Glazer and

Meeks’ Motion for Sanctions. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 863

provides, in pertinent part:

B. Pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit
or certificate, except as otherwise provided by law, but the signature
of an attorney or party shall constitute a certification by him that he
has read the pleading, and that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, he certifies all
of the following:

(1) The pleading is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation.

(2) Each claim, defense, or other legal assertion in the pleading
is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

49

(3) Each allegation or other factual assertion in the pleading has
evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified allegation or
factual assertion, is likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(4) Each denial in the pleading of a factual assertion is
warranted by the evidence or, for a specifically identified denial, is
reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

....

D. If, upon motion of any party or upon its own motion, the
court determines that a certification has been made in violation of the
provisions of this Article, the court shall impose upon the person who
made the certification or the represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of
the pleading, including reasonable attorney fees.

As this Court explained in the Opinion rendered in Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal,

La. C.C.P. art. 863 “imposes a duty of reasonable inquiry on a party—including a

pro se litigant—signing pleadings.” Alexander, 2019-0778, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir.

4/1/20) 293 So.3d 1243, 1256 (quoting Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc., 2011-0318, p.

8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/7/11), 73 So. 3d 407, 414). In discussing La. C.C.P. art. 863,

this Court has also explained the rationale behind the article, as well as factors to

consider in determining an appropriate sanction:

Louisiana law requires all parties to conduct an objectively reasonable
inquiry into the factual basis of their allegations prior to signing and
filing pleadings with the court. See La. C.C.P. art. 863(B); See also
John W. Fisk Co., Div. of Fisk Corp. v. Michel, [19]97-2105, p. 3 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 3/25/98), 709 So.2d 1061, 1063. Violation of this
requirement, “shall” result in sanctions. See La. C.C.P. art. 863(D).
“Subjective good faith will not satisfy the duty of reasonable inquiry.”
Loyola v. A Touch of Class Transp. Serv., Inc., [19]90-1694 (La. App.
4 Cir. 1991), 580 So.2d 506, 510. The goal to be served by the
imposition of sanctions is the “correction of litigation abuse.” Keaty v.
Raspanti, [20]03-1080, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/4/04), 866 So.2d 1045,
1050 (citing Joyner v. Wear, 27,631, p. 14 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/6/95),
665 So.2d 634, 642).

The trial court “has considerable discretion imposing the type
and severity of sanctions.” John W. Fisk Co., Div. of Fisk Corp.,

50

[19]97-2105, p. 2, 709 So.2d at 1063. Generally, four factors are
considered in determining the appropriate sanctions award: (1) the
conduct that is being punished or sought to be deterred, (2) the
expenses or costs caused by the violation of article 863, (3) whether
the expenses or costs were reasonable as opposed to self-imposed, and
(4) whether the sanction is the least severe adequate to serve its
purpose. Keaty, [20]03-1080, p. 5, 866 So.2d at 1050 (citing Butler v.
Reeder, [19]98-484, p. 14 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/29/98), 728 So.2d 888,
895).

Pierce v. Buck Kriehs Co., 2022-0848, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/23), 371 So.3d

534, 537-38. On appeal, “[a] trial court’s judgment regarding sanctions under La.

C.C.P. art. 863 is reviewed under a manifest error/clearly wrong standard.” Id. at p.

4, 371 So.3d at 537 (citing Mathis v. Mathis, 2006-1589, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir.

7/25/07), 964 So.2d 426, 428). Thus, an appellate court will not disturb a trial

court’s judgment regarding sanctions under La. C.C.P. art. 863 “unless the record

furnishes no evidence to support the court’s finding, or if the finding is clearly

wrong.” Id.

For the reasons listed in the “Frivolous Appeal” section of this Opinion, we

find La. C.C.P. art. 863 applicable to this situation, and we conclude that the trial

court’s decision to deny Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ Motion for Sanctions was clearly

wrong. The record and Mr. Alexander’s entire litigation history contain no

evidence to support the trial court’s finding that sanctions were not appropriate at

this juncture. That is, Mr. Alexander’s arguments in the matter sub judice evidence

that he failed to “conduct an objectively reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of

[his] allegations prior to signing and filing [his] pleadings with the court[s].”

Pierce, 2022-0848, p. 4, 371 So.3d at 537. He has already asserted these same

arguments twice before the trial court, twice before this Court, and once before the

Louisiana Supreme Court. Even after being told by the trial court at the October

27, 2022 hearing that these issues had already been decided by this Court and the

51

Louisiana Supreme Court, Mr. Alexander nonetheless filed this present appeal. The

sanctions provided by La. C.C.P. art. 863 are designed to “correct[] . . . litigation

abuse,” and Mr. Alexander’s repetitive and unfounded filings in the history of this

dispute are a clear example to this Court of litigation abuse. Pierce, 2022-0848, p.

5, 371 So.3d at 537.

We note that La. C.C.P. art. 863(E) states that “[a] sanction authorized in

Paragraph D shall be imposed only after a hearing at which any party or his

counsel may present any evidence or argument relevant to the issue of imposition

of the sanction” (emphasis added). Remand for a contradictory hearing is

unnecessary here because, although none of them presented evidence or argument,

Ms. Glazer and Meeks and Mr. Alexander all had an opportunity to present

evidence and argument at the October 27, 2022 hearing regarding the issue of

sanctions. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 863(E) does not mandate that

the hearing had to actually include evidence or argument. Rather, use of the

permissive “may” merely indicates that the parties had to have the opportunity to

present evidence or argument. Ms. Glazer and Meeks and Mr. Alexander had that

opportunity. In particular, during the hearing, Mr. Allgood reminded the trial court

that the Board had a pending motion for sanctions, and subsequently the trial court

judge explained his thoughts on the issue of sanctions:

I do not believe at this time, Mr. Alexander’s actions are sanctionable.
I think he has filed what he believes to be appropriate and truthful. [It
is] just -- the [Louisiana] Fourth Circuit [Court of Appeal] has spoken.
The [Louisiana] Supreme Court has spoken. The [t]rial [court is] now
bound by those. But I do not believe that him seeking redress up until
here is a sanctionable offense.

Moreover, the record reveals that the trial court directed the parties on October 20,

2022, to provide a summary of the relevant facts and procedural posture of the case

52

in advance of contradictory hearing set for October 27, 2022. As previously

explained, the issue of Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ Motion for Sanctions was remanded

to the trial court in this Court’s Opinion rendered in Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal,

and the trial court still had not ruled on it prior to the October 27, 2022 hearing;

therefore, the parties should have known that this issue remained unresolved in

advance of the October 27, 2022 hearing. Thus, we remand solely for the trial court

to determine the amount to which Ms. Glazer and Meeks are owed in terms of La.

C.C.P. 863 sanctions.

In sum, we only amend the trial court’s November 2, 2022 judgment to

properly reflect the fact that Ms. Glazer and Meeks did not have a motion to tax

costs before the trial Court on the date of the hearing, October 25, 2022. As

amended, we affirm that part of the trial court’s November 2, 2022 judgment.

Regarding Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ Motion for Sanctions, we reverse the trial

court’s decision to deny their motion and remand this matter to the trial court to

determine the amount to which Ms. Glazer and Meeks are entitled under La.

C.C.P. art. 863.

The Board’s Request for an Increase in Attorney Fees under La. C.C.P. art. 971

In its Answer, the Board seeks an increase in its award of attorney fees under

La. C.C.P. art. 971. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 971 is titled

“Special motion to strike.” It provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free
speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established a
probability of success on the claim.

53

B. In any action subject to Paragraph A of this Article, a
prevailing party on a special motion to strike shall be awarded
reasonable attorney fees and costs.

....

(1) “Act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in
connection with a public issue” includes but is not limited to:

(a) Any written or oral statement or writing made before a
legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law.

(b) Any written or oral statement or writing made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official body authorized by
law.

In the Opinion rendered in Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal, this Court held

that the trial court had not erred by granting the Board’s Special Motion to Strike

(as previously explained). In so ruling, this Court also granted the Board’s request

for an increase in sanctions under La. C.C.P. art. 971(B), explaining that “[a]s the

prevailing party on appeal, [the Board] is entitled to an increase in attorney’s fees

and costs.” Alexander, 2019-0778, p. 15, 293 So.3d at 1254. In the November 2,

2022 judgment, the trial court ruled:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that,
pursuant to the [Louisiana] Fourth Circuit[] [Court of Appeal’s]
finding that [the Board] is entitled to an increase in Article 971
sanctions, . . . [Mr.] Alexander is hereby ordered to pay the sum of . . .
Five Hundred Dollars ($500), in addition to the previously awarded
sum, representing additional attorney’s fees to the [Board].

The “previously awarded sum” referenced above was from the trial court’s prior

judgment, which stated:

7) [The Board]’s Special 971 Motion to Strike is granted;

8) Mr. Alexander is ordered to pay [the Board] $1,500 for attorney’s
fees;

54

We affirm the trial court’s award of $500 to the Board in relation to the Special

Motion to Strike in addition to the previously awarded $1500. In its Answer to this

appeal, the Board asserts that “[r]esponding to this appeal requires the expenditure

of additional amounts for attorney’s fees for which the Board is entitled to an

increased award under La. [C.C.P.] art. 971.” We agree with the Board and order

Mr. Alexander to pay an additional $500 to the Board under La. C.C.P. art. 971.

In sum, we affirm the trial court’s award of $500 to the Board for the Special

Motion to Strike in addition to the award of $1500 previously granted by the trial

court. We grant the Board’s request for an additional award under La. C.C.P. art.

971 in the amount of $500. In total, that is $2500 owed to the Board by Mr.

Alexander pertaining to the Board’s Special Motion to Strike.

In Forma Pauperis Status

Duty of Continuous Scrutiny

We observe that part of the reason Mr. Alexander has been able to continue

filing his numerous lawsuits, appeals, and writ applications is because he has in

forma pauperis status. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 5183 provides:

A. A person who wishes to exercise the privilege granted in this
Chapter shall apply to the court for permission to do so in his first
pleading, or in an ex parte written motion if requested later, to which
the applicant shall annex the following:

(1) The applicant’s affidavit that the applicant is unable to pay
the costs of court in advance, or as they accrue, or to furnish security
therefor, because of the applicant’s poverty and lack of means,
accompanied by any supporting documentation.

(2) The affidavit of a third person other than the applicant’s
attorney that he knows the applicant, knows the applicant’s financial
condition, and believes that the applicant is unable to pay the costs of
court in advance, or as they accrue, or to furnish security therefor.

....

55

B. (1) Upon the filing of the completed application and
supporting affidavits, the court shall render an order that does one of
the following:

(a) Grants the application and allows the applicant to litigate or
to continue the litigation without paying the costs in advance.

(b) Denies the application with written reasons for such denial.

(c) Sets the matter for a contradictory hearing.

(2) The submission by the applicant of supporting
documentation that the applicant is receiving public assistance
benefits or that the applicant’s income is less than or equal to one
hundred twenty-five percent of the federal poverty level shall create a
rebuttable presumption that the applicant is entitled to the privilege
granted in this Chapter. If the court finds that the presumption has
been rebutted, it shall provide written reasons for its finding.

(3) The court may reconsider its original order granting the
application on its own motion at any time in a contradictory hearing.

In interpreting La. C.C.P. art. 5183, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of

Appeal has held that “[n]otwithstanding the liberal construction of codal provisions

authorizing indigents to sue in forma pauperis, trial courts have the authority, as

well as the duty, of continuous scrutiny to prevent abuse of this privilege.” McCoy

v. State ex rel. Jones, 39,323, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/17/05), 901 So.2d 1109,

1112 (second emphasis added). Thus, “[a] court may subject the indigent litigant to

continuous scrutiny to prevent abuse of the privilege.” Id. (citing Smith v. Smith,

543 So.2d 608 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989)). The trial court’s authority and duty of

scrutinizing a litigant’s in forma pauperis status “is subject only to the requirement

of due process, namely that an evidentiary hearing is required when rescission . . .

depends upon contested factual issues.” Id. (citing T & S Feed Co., Inc. v. Meaux,

339 So.2d 421 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976)). This notion of the trial court’s duty to

monitor a litigant’s in forma pauperis status is reinforced by La. C.C.P. art. 5182,

which is titled “Restrictions on privilege,” and provides:

56

The privilege granted by this Chapter shall be restricted to litigants
who are clearly entitled to it, with due regard to the nature of the
proceeding, the court costs which otherwise would have to be paid,
and the ability of the litigant to pay them or to furnish security
therefor, so that the fomentation of litigation by an indiscriminate
resort thereto may be discouraged, without depriving a litigant of its
benefits if he is entitled thereto.

(Emphasis added.) Our concern is that, heretofore, Mr. Alexander has

demonstrated such a “fomentation of litigation by an indiscriminate resort thereto”

as evidenced by our above list of Mr. Alexander’s related lawsuits. In light of the

foregoing, we remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to exercise its

duty by holding a contradictory hearing on the issue of Mr. Alexander’s in forma

pauperis status to ensure that Mr. Alexander does not continue to abuse this

privilege in the future.

Enforcement

We also note that Mr. Alexander’s in forma pauperis status allowed him to

proceed without paying costs up to this point, but it did not relieve him of his

obligation to eventually pay costs if he lost this suit, which he did. Louisiana Code

of Civil Procedure Article 5188 states that “if judgment is rendered against a party

who has been permitted to litigate without the payment of costs, he shall be

condemned to pay the costs incurred by him, in accordance with the provisions of

Article 5186, and those recoverable by the adverse party.” As referenced therein,

La. C.C.P. art. 5186 provides:

An account shall be kept of all costs incurred by a party who has been
permitted to litigate without the payment of costs, by the public
officers to whom these costs would be payable. . . . If judgment is
rendered against the indigent plaintiff and he is condemned to pay
court costs, an affidavit of the account by an officer to whom costs are
due, recorded in the mortgage records, shall have the effect of a
judgment for the payment due.

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Additionally, the trial court’s “Appendix 8.0. (Rule 8.0) In Forma Pauperis

Affidavit” explains: “Although you may be granted the privilege of proceeding

without prepayment of costs, SHOULD JUDGMENT BE RENDERED

AGAINST YOU, YOUR STATUS AS A PAUPER DOES NOT RELIEVE

YOU OF THE OBLIGATION TO PAY THESE COSTS.”

Now, judgment has been rendered against Mr. Alexander multiple times

(i.e., the May 2019 and November 2022 trial court judgments, as well as this

Court’s judgment from Mr. Alexander’s 2019 Appeal and this judgment from his

present appeal); but the record before this Court does not evidence that the

procedure provided in La. C.C.P. arts. 5186 and 5188 and the trial court’s

“Appendix 8.0. (Rule 8.0) In Forma Pauperis Affidavit” has been enacted yet by

the trial court. Accordingly, we remand this matter with instructions to the trial

court to request that the Clerk of Court for Orleans Parish Civil District Court

provide an affidavit of account for the costs and fees due and to record this in the

mortgage records.

Similarly, we direct the Clerk of this Court to provide an affidavit of account

for the costs and fees due in conjunction with this appeal and with Mr. Alexander’s

2019 Appeal, and we direct our Clerk to record same in the mortgage records.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we:

• Affirm the sustaining of Appellees’ Unauthorized Use of a Summary
Proceeding;

• Affirm the denial as moot of the exception of no cause of action filed
by Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace, Ms. Kovac, the Board, and Ms.
Glazer and Meeks;

• Affirm the denial as moot of the exception of peremption filed by Mr.
Englade and Mr. Wallace, Ms. Kovac, and Ms. Glazer and Meeks;

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• Reverse the trial court’s denial of the requests for attorney fees as
found in Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s “Exceptions of Peremption,
No Cause of Action, and Unauthorized Use of a Summary Proceeding
and Request for Award of Attorney Fees;” in Ms. Kovac’s “Exception
of Peremption, Exception of No Cause of Action, Exception of
Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding, and Motion for Attorney
Fees in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of Judgments
on the Grounds of Fraud on the Court;” the Board’s “Peremptory
Exception . . . Pleading the Objections of No Cause of Action,
Prescription, and Res Judicata, Combined with Dilatory Exception
Pleading the Objection of Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding
and with Motion for Attorney’s Fees under [La. C.C.P.] art. 2004;”
and Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ “Motion to Adopt Defendants’ Responses
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of
Fraud on the Court and Request for Costs and Attorney Fees;”

• Reverse the trial court’s denial of Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ request for
costs as found in their “Motion to Adopt Defendants’ Responses to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of
Fraud on the Court and Request for Costs and Attorney Fees;”

• Award costs to Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace for their “Exceptions of
Peremption, No Cause of Action, and Unauthorized Use of a
Summary Proceeding and Request for Award of Attorney Fees;” to
Ms. Kovac for her “Exception of Peremption, Exception of No Cause
of Action, Exception of Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding,
and Motion for Attorney Fees in Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud on the Court;” and
to the Board for its “Peremptory Exception . . . Pleading the
Objections of No Cause of Action, Prescription, and Res Judicata,
Combined with Dilatory Exception Pleading the Objection of
Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding and with Motion for
Attorney’s Fees under [La. C.C.P.] art. 2004”;

• Remand this matter to the trial court for a determination of the amount
of the trial court costs and attorney fees owed to Mr. Englade and Mr.
Wallace, Ms. Kovac, the Board, and Ms. Glazer and Meeks for those
respective exceptions and motion filed in response to Mr. Alexander’s
Motion for Annulment, specifically Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s
“Exceptions of Peremption, No Cause of Action, and Unauthorized
Use of a Summary Proceeding and Request for Award of Attorney
Fees;” Ms. Kovac’s “Exception of Peremption, Exception of No
Cause of Action, Exception of Unauthorized Use of Summary
Proceeding, and Motion for Attorney Fees in Response to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud on the
Court;” the Board’s “Peremptory Exception . . . Pleading the
Objections of No Cause of Action, Prescription, and Res Judicata,

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Combined with Dilatory Exception Pleading the Objection of
Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceeding and with Motion for
Attorney’s Fees under [La. C.C.P.] art. 2004;” and Ms. Glazer and
Meeks’ “Motion to Adopt Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiff’s
Motion for Annulment of Judgments on the Grounds of Fraud on the
Court and Request for Costs and Attorney Fees”;

• Affirm that Mr. Alexander’s Motion for Annulment is moot pursuant
to the granting of Appellees’ Exception of Unauthorized Use of a
Summary Proceeding;

• Affirm the sustaining of the Board’s and Ms. Glazer and Meeks’
exception of res judicata and apply res judicata to Mr. Alexander’s
claims against Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace and Ms. Kovac too;

• Affirm the dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Alexander’s Petition for
Absolute Nullity;

• Affirm the denial of Mr. Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify;

• Affirm the finding that Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s, the Board’s,
Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ pleadings filed in response to Mr. Alexander’s
Motion to Disqualify were rendered moot by the denial of the Motion
to Disqualify;

• Reversal the trial court’s denial of Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ request for
costs and attorney fees associated with their opposition to Mr.
Alexander’s Motion to Disqualify;

• Award costs and attorney fees to Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace and
the Board for their oppositions to Mr. Alexander’s Motion to
Disqualify.

• Remand to the trial court for a determination of the costs and attorney
fees owed to Ms. Glazer and Meeks, Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace,
and the Board for their oppositions to Mr. Alexander’s Motion to
Disqualify;

• Reverse the denial of Mr. Englade and Mr. Wallace’s Motion to Tax
Costs;

• Remand for a determination as to how much Mr. Englade and Mr.
Wallace are owed in light of our decision to grant their Re-Urged
Motion to Tax Costs;

• Affirm the grant of Ms. Kovac’s Motion to Tax Costs and award of
$75.00 for same;

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• Affirm the grant of the Board’s Motion to Tax Costs and award of
$525 for same;

• Grant all Appellees’ requests for frivolous appeals damages;

• Assess all costs of this appeal against Mr. Alexander and instruct the
Clerk of this Court to determine same;

• Tax the costs of this appeal and instruct the Clerk of this Court to
determine the amount Mr. Alexander owes in light of this ruling;

• Amend the November 2, 2022 judgment to show that Ms. Glazer and
Meeks’ did not have a pending motion to tax costs at the time of the
October 27, 2022 hearing;

• Remand for the opportunity for Ms. Glazer and Meeks to file the
appropriate motion to tax costs and rule to show cause per La. C.C.P.
art. 1920;

• Deny Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ request to amend the judgment to state
that they did not have a pending motion for sanctions;

• Reverse the denial of Ms. Glazer and Meeks’ Motion for Sanctions;

• Remand for the trial court to determine the amount owed to Ms.
Glazer and Meeks in conjunction with their Motion for Sanctions
under La. C.C.P .art. 863;

• Affirm the award of $500 to the Board for the Special Motion to
Strike in addition to the award of $1500 previously granted by the trial
court;

• Grant the Board’s request for an additional award under La. C.C.P.
art. 971 in the amount of $500;

• Instruct the trial court to fulfill its duty to assess and scrutinize Mr.
Alexander’s in forma pauperis status;

• Instruct the trial court to enforce the in forma pauperis code articles
and rules by requesting that the Clerk of Court for Orleans Parish
Civil District Court provides an affidavit of account for the costs and
fees Mr. Alexander owes and records this information in the mortgage
records; and

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• Instruct the Clerk of this Court to provide an affidavit of account for
the costs and fees Mr. Alexander owes for this appeal and his 2019
Appeal and instruct our Clerk to record this information in the
mortgage records.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; JUDGMENT AMENDED IN
PART AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS

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