Patricia Claverie v. Iam Tucker, Integrated Logistical Support, Inc. and the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans

PATRICIA CLAVERIE * NO. 2023-CA-0331

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
IAM TUCKER, INTEGRATED *
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, INC. FOURTH CIRCUIT
AND THE SEWERAGE AND *
WATER BOARD OF NEW STATE OF LOUISIANA
ORLEANS *******

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2021-08443, DIVISION “F-14”
Honorable Jennifer M Medley, Judge
******
Judge Paula A. Brown
******
(Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge
Tiffany Gautier Chase)

Brett J. Prendergast
4603 South Carrollton Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Michelle D. Craig
TRANSCENDENT LAW GROUP
3726 Canal Street, Suite A
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

REVERSED AND REMANDED
NOVMEBR 27, 2023

PAB
RLB
TGC

This case arises out of a pre-employment dispute. Appellant, Patricia

Claverie (“Ms. Claverie”), seeks review of the district court’s February 8, 2023

judgment, which sustained the exception of no cause of action (the “exception”)

filed by Appellee, Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans (the “SWBNO”),

and found that Ms. Claverie failed to state a cause of action for detrimental

reliance. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court’s judgment and

remand this matter for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 18, 2021, Ms. Claverie filed a petition for damages (the

“petition”), against Iam Tucker (“Ms. Tucker”), Integrated Logistical Support, Inc.

(“ILSI”), which is owned by Ms. Tucker, and the SWBNO, asserting defamation

claims against Ms. Tucker and ILSI and detrimental reliance claims against the

SWBNO.1 Ms. Claverie alleged that on July 27, 2020, she applied for an Engineer

Intern II position with the SWBNO, interviewed with the SWBNO on September

17, 2020, and shortly thereafter, received an employment offer with a start date of

1 This appeal is limited to the exception of no cause of action filed by the SWBNO. However, for

context, we will briefly discuss the factual allegations asserted against all defendants, as they are
intertwined.

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November 1, 2020. Prior to receiving this offer, Ms. Claverie was an employee of

ILSI. Ms. Claverie avers that on October 13, 2020, after receiving her employment

offer from SWBNO, she submitted a formal letter of resignation to ILSI advising

Ms. Tucker that she had accepted a job offer with another employer and that her

last day would be October 30, 2020.

Ms. Claverie contends that on October 19, 2020, Ms. Tucker falsely accused

her of stealing ILSI’s physical files and deleting electronically stored files from

ILSI’s computer server, and terminated her employment with ILSI. On that same

day, Ms. Tucker filed a formal report with the New Orleans Police Department (the

“NOPD”), alleging that Ms. Claverie stole ILSI’s work product and intellectual

property, which led to a warrant being issued for Ms. Claverie’s arrest on

November 6, 2020. After learning of the existence of a warrant for her arrest, in

January 2021 Ms. Claverie turned herself into the NOPD. On April 19, 2021, the

Orleans Parish District Attorney (the “DA”) refused the theft charges.

Ms. Claverie maintains that along with filing a report with the NOPD, Ms.

Tucker filed a complaint with the SWBNO to report Ms. Claverie’s alleged theft of

ILSI’s property, which caused the SWBNO’s security department to open an

investigation into the allegations. Ms. Claverie claims that the SWBNO’s

investigation was “rife with errors,” and following the investigation the SWBNO

failed to make good on its representation of future employment, which she

detrimentally relied upon by resigning her previous job with ILSI. She further

claims that she lost wages because of her reliance on the SWBNO’s promise of

employment.

The SWBNO filed an answer on February 22, 2022, which included a no

cause of action defense. On May 13, 2022, the SWBNO filed a memorandum in

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support of its exception, asserting that Ms. Claverie had failed to allege facts

sufficient to support her claim for detrimental reliance. Ms. Claverie opposed the

exception, and the matter came for hearing on January 27, 2023. Following oral

argument of counsel, the district court granted the SWBNO’s exception. A partial

final judgment was signed on February 8, 2023, sustaining the exception and

ordering the dismissal of Ms. Claverie’s claims against the SWBNO. This timely

appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

In her appeal to this Court, Ms. Claverie asserts the following two

assignments of error: (1) the district court erred in finding that her petition failed to

state a cause of action for detrimental reliance against the SWBNO; and (2) the

district court erred in determining that her failure to obtain permanent civil service

status with the SWBNO precluded her cause of action for detrimental reliance.

Before turning to the merits of her assigned errors, we will first review the relevant

law and standard of review applicable to these issues.

“An exception is a means of defense, other than a denial or avoidance of the

demand, used by the defendant, whether in the principal or an incidental action, to

retard, dismiss, or defeat the demand brought against him.” La. C.C.P. art. 921.

“An exception of no cause of action is a peremptory exception.” La. C.C.P. art.

927(A). “The function of the peremptory exception is to have the plaintiff's action

declared legally nonexistent, or barred by effect of law, and hence this exception

tends to dismiss or defeat the action.” La. C.C.P. art. 923. “On the trial of the

peremptory exception pleaded at or prior to the trial of the case, evidence may be

introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the

grounds thereof do not appear from the petition.” La. C.C.P. art. 931. However,

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“[n]o evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the

objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” La. C.C.P. art. 931.

“An exception of no cause of action tests ‘the legal sufficiency of the

petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in

the pleading.’” Green v. Garcia-Victor, 17-0695, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/16/18),

248 So.3d 449, 453 (quoting Moreno v. Entergy Corp., 10-2281, p. 3 (La. 2/18/11),

62 So.3d 704, 706). “In deciding an exception of no cause of action a court can

consider only the petition, any amendments to the petition, and any documents

attached to the petition.” 2400 Canal, LLC v. Bd. Of Sup’rs of Louisiana State

Univ. Agr. & Mech. Coll., 12-0220, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/7/12), 105 So.3d 819,

825 (citing B-G & G Investors VI, L.L.C. v. Thibaut HG Corp., 08-0093, pp. 4-5

(La. App. 4 Cir. 5/21/08), 985 So.2d 837, 841). “A court cannot consider assertions

of fact referred to by the various counsel in their briefs that are not pled in the

petition.” Id. (citing State ex rel. Guste v. Audubon Park Commission, 320 So.2d

291 (La. App. 4th Cir.1975)). “The grant of the exception of no cause of action is

proper when, assuming all well pleaded factual allegations of the petition and any

annexed documents are true, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he seeks as a

matter of law; any doubt must be resolved in the plaintiffs’ favor.’” Id. (citing

Kuebler v. Martin, 578 So.2d 113 (La.1991)). “Louisiana has chosen a system of

fact pleading.” 831 Bartholomew Investments-A, L.L.C. v. Margulis, 08-0559, p. 9

(La. App. 4 Cir. 9/2/09), 20 So.3d 532, 538 (first citing La. C.C.P. art. 854 cmt.

(a); and then citing Montalvo v. Sondes, 93-2813, p. 6 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 127,

131). “Therefore, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to plead the theory of his case in

the petition.” Id. at pp. 9-10, 20 So.3d at 538 (citing Kizer v. Lilly, 471 So.2d 716,

719 (La.1985)). “However, the mere conclusions of the plaintiff unsupported by

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facts does [sic] not set forth a cause of action.” Id. at p. 10, 20 So.3d at 538 (citing

Montalvo at p. 6, 637 So.2d at 131) (alteration in the original).

“Appellate courts review rulings on exceptions of no cause of action using

the de novo standard of review because exceptions of no cause of action present

legal questions.” Henderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 21-0654, pp. 4-5

(La. App. 4 Cir. 12/17/21), 335 So.3d 349, 353 (citing Tickle v. Ballay, 18-0408, p.

4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So.3d 435, 438). “The burden of demonstrating

that the petition states no cause of action is upon the mover.” 831 Bartholomew

Investments-A, L.L.C., 08-0559, p. 10, 20 So.3d at 538 (citing City of New Orleans

v. Board of Com’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 93-0690, p. 28 (La. 7/5/94), 640 So.2d

237, 253).

The doctrine of detrimental reliance, codified at La. C.C. art. 1967, provides:

A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have
known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to
his detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying.
Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages
suffered as a result of the promisee’s reliance on the promise.
Reliance on a gratuitous promise made without required formalities is
not reasonable.

“The doctrine of detrimental reliance is ‘designed to prevent injustice by

barring a party from taking a position contrary to his prior acts, admissions,

representations, or silence.’” Suire v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459,

p. 31 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 59 (quoting Babkow v. Morris Bart, P.L.C.,

1998-0256 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 423, 427). The Louisiana

Supreme Court has previously set forth the elements a party must prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, in order to establish a detrimental reliance claim:

“(1) a representation by conduct or word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change

in position to one’s detriment because of reliance.” Id. (citing Lakeland Anesthesia,

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Inc. v. United Healthcare of La., Inc., 03-1662, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/17/04), 871

So.2d 380, 393). As to the third element—a change in position to one’s detriment

because of reliance—“to establish reliance to [her] detriment, [the plaintiff] need

only show that [she] suffered damages not adequately compensated by the

defendant.” Id. at p. 32, 907 So.2d at 59. “Thus, the focus of analysis of a

detrimental reliance claim is not whether the parties intended to perform, but,

instead, whether a representation was made in such a manner that the promisor

should have expected the promisee to rely upon it, and whether the promisee so

relies to his detriment.” Id. at pp. 31-32, 907 So.2d 37, 59 (citing Morris v.

People’s Bank & Trust Co. of Natchitoches, 580 So.2d 1029, 1036 (La. App. 3d

Cir. 1991)).

With these precepts in mind, we now turn to the merits of Ms. Claverie’s

assigned errors.

Detrimental Reliance

Ms. Claverie argues that the allegations contained in her petition allege facts

to satisfy each element of detrimental reliance set forth in Suire. First, Ms. Claverie

contends that the representation by conduct or word element is satisfied by facts

alleged in Paragraph 3 of her petition, which states:

3.
On July 27, 2020, Ms. Claverie applied via the New Orleans
Civil Service Commission’s website for an open Engineer Intern II
position with the Board. Steven Giang and Mubashir Maqbool with
the Board’s Network Engineering Department interviewed Ms.
Claverie on September 17, 2020. On October 6, 2020, Ms. Claverie
received an offer letter from Ms. Terri Sippio with the Board. Ms.
Claverie accepted this offer. Ms. Claverie was to start her employment
with the Board on November 1, 2020.

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Next, Ms. Claverie urges that she alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the second

required element of detrimental reliance—justifiable reliance—in Paragraph 5 of

her petition, which provides:

5.
Relying on the job offer made by the Board and to insure a
smooth transition of her job duties at ILSI, on October 13, 2020, Ms.
Claverie advised Tucker of her intention to start new employment and
that her last day would be October 30, 2020. Although Ms. Claverie
did not advise Tucker that her new employer was the Sewerage and
Water Board, Tucker was aware of this fact and tried to convince Ms.
Claverie not to go to work for the Board. Ms. Claverie explained to
Tucker that she believed that the new job was best for her because of
the benefits offered. Ms. Claverie submitted a formal letter of
resignation that same day. Ms. Claverie would not have resigned from
ILSI but for the representation of the Board’s employees that she
would have a job with the Board.

Finally, Ms. Claverie contends that sufficient facts are alleged in Paragraphs 9 and

11 of her petition to satisfy the third element for a claim for detrimental reliance—

that she prove that she had a detrimental change in position because of her alleged

reliance. Paragraphs 9 and 11 of her petition states, as follows:

9.
Ultimately, the Board failed to make good on its promise of a
job for Mr. Claverie and never hired her for the position for which she
had resigned her previous job with ILSI. On information and belief,
this failure was the result of the false claims made by Tucker. For
whatever reason, the result was that Ms. Claverie was without full
time employment for a number of months.

* * *

11.
The Board is also liable for damages under the theory of
detrimental reliance since Ms. Claverie resigned from her job as a
result of the representations of a future job made by Board employees.

Ms. Claverie posits that these factual allegations state a valid cause of action for

detrimental reliance.

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In opposition, the SWBNO does not dispute that it offered Ms. Claverie

employment and that she accepted that employment. Rather, the SWBNO argues

that Ms. Claverie did not justifiably rely on any promise made by the SWBNO

because she failed to complete any of the prerequisites in furtherance of attaining

her position. To support this argument, the SWBNO cites to the Rules of the Civil

Service Commission, City of New Orleans (the “Civil Service Rules”). However,

because the Civil Service Rules were not attached to Ms. Claverie’s petition, they

cannot be considered by this Court on an exception of no cause of action. See

Green, 17-0695, p. 5, 248 So.3d at 453 (noting that for exceptions of no cause of

action, appellate courts can only review “the petition, any amendments to the

petition, and any documents attached to the petition” (quoting 2400 Canal, LLC,

12-0220, p. 7, 105 So.3d at 825)).

The SWBNO next argues, as it did in the district court, that this Court

should follow the precedent set out in May v. Harris Mgmt. Corp., wherein the

appellate court held “that it is unreasonable as a matter of law to rely on an offer of

at-will employment, just as it is patently unreasonable to rely on the permanency of

at-will employment once it begins.” May v. Harris Mgmt. Corp., 04-2657, p. 13

(La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/05), 928 So.2d 140, 148. In May, the plaintiff filed suit,

alleging detrimental reliance against her prospective employer after they withdrew

their employment offer despite her completing several employment documents.

The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove all of the

elements for detrimental reliance because her prospective employer would not

have been responsible for any of the plaintiff’s damages under the at-will-

employment doctrine. However, we find that the SWBNO’s reliance on May is

misplaced. May was decided on a motion for summary judgment, which requires

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proof. In the case sub judice, the only issue before this Court is whether Ms.

Claverie has stated a valid cause of action for detrimental reliance.

Our review of the petition reveals Ms. Claverie alleged that she was offered

and accepted employment with the SWBNO; in reliance on the SWBNO’s promise

of employment, she submitted a formal letter of resignation to ILSI; and she was

left unemployed for several months after the SWBNO failed to make good on their

promise. Accepting Ms. Claverie’s petition as truthful, we find that she has alleged

sufficient facts to satisfy each element to support her cause of action for

detrimental reliance.2

Permanent Civil Service Status

In her second assignment of error, Ms. Claverie contends the district court

erred in determining that her failure to obtain permanent civil service status with

the SWBNO precluded her cause of action for detrimental reliance. Having

determined that Ms. Claverie stated a cause of action against the SWBNO for

detrimental reliance, we will pretermit discussion of this assigned error.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we find that Ms. Claverie sufficiently alleged

facts to support her claim of detrimental reliance against the SWBNO; we reverse

the district court’s judgment, which sustained the SWBNO’s exception of no cause

of action; and we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

2 See Bains v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Greater New Orleans, 06-1423, pp. 9-10 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 10/3/07), 969 So.2d 646, 652, wherein this Court, rejecting the decision set forth in
May, held that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action for detrimental reliance against
her prospective employer for which there is a remedy under the law.

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