State of Louisiana in the Interest of J.V.I. and G.V.I. .

STATE OF LOUISIANA IN * NO. 2023-CA-0557
THE INTEREST OF J.V.I. AND
G.V.I. *
COURT OF APPEAL
*
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
ST. BERNARD 34TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NO. 26-006-J, DIVISION “B”
Honorable Jeanne Nunez Juneau, Judge
******
Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase
******
(Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge
Tiffany Gautier Chase)

Annette Fuller Roach
ROACH & ROACH, APLC
2740 Rue de Jardin, Suite 400
Lake Charles, LA 70605

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

Katherine Dowling
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES
1450 Poydras Street, Suite 1600
New Orleans, LA 70112

Mary M. McMillan
SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA LEGAL SERVICES
1340 Poydras Street, Suite 600
New Orleans, LA 70112

Sarah Stone
PRO BONO PROJECT
935 Gravier Street, Suite 1340
New Orleans, LA 70112

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES

AFFIRMED
NOVEMBER 13, 2023

TGC
RLB
PAB This is an appeal of the trial court’s June 22, 2023 judgment terminating the

parental rights of D.Y.V.R., the mother of G.V.I. and J.V.I. (hereinafter

collectively “the children”) and certifying the children eligible for adoption.1 After

consideration of the record before this Court and applicable law, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

D.Y.V.R. is the mother of G.V.I. and J.V.I.2 On January 8, 2021, the

Department of Family and Child Services (hereinafter “DCFS”) filed an affidavit

in support of an Instanter Order on behalf of the children. The affidavit states that

the children were in need of care based upon the following allegations: the

children’s father, H.I.R., inappropriately touched his thirteen year old relative;

H.I.R. was arrested and charged with the molestation of a juvenile; the children’s

family members were told of the abuse and did not believe the thirteen year old

relative; the children’s older brother inappropriately touched them; and the

1 We have used the initials of the parties to protect and maintain the privacy of the children

involved in this proceeding. See Rule 5-1 and Rule 5-2, Uniform Rules, Louisiana Courts of
Appeal.
2 G.V.I. and J.V.I. are seven (7) and six (6) years old, respectively, and are the children of

D.Y.V.R. and H.I.R.

1

whereabouts of the children’s mother, D.Y.V.R., were unknown.3 On that same

day, the trial court placed the children into the temporary custody of DCFS.

Following multiple continued custody hearings, it was determined that

D.Y.V.R. was living in the Dominican Republic. After several failed attempts to

return the children to the Dominican Republic and into the care of family members

and friends, the State of Louisiana (hereinafter “the State”) filed a petition

declaring the children in need of care on January 26, 2021. D.Y.V.R. answered the

petition denying all allegations. The trial court placed the children into the

temporary custody of DCFS on March 23, 2021.

The State later amended its petition alleging the children were in need of

care based on: (1) H.I.R’s incarceration and prosecution for the first degree rape of

his thirteen year old relative; (2) the children’s older brother being incarcerated and

prosecuted for the first degree rape of G.V.I. and J.V.I.; (3) D.Y.V.R. being

investigated for having possible knowledge of the children being sexually abused

by their brother and father; and (4) the St. Bernard Sheriff’s Department’s

possession of an audio recording where D.Y.V.R. states that she does not believe

her children were sexually abused.

On July 21, 2021, the trial court held a hearing and adjudicated the children

in need of care. The trial court also ordered the children to remain in DCFS’

custody under the terms and conditions of the case plan set forth in the DCFS

report. The case plan indicated that the children were enrolled in school and in

overall good health. The initial placement of the children was with a foster family,

but the goal of the initial case plan was for reunification of the children with their

3 Throughout the record, the children’s father is referred to as both H.R.I. and H.I.R. However,

the judgment terminating the parental rights of the children’s mother and father states the father’s
name as H.I.R. Thus, this opinion will address the father as H.I.R.

2

mother. To accomplish that goal, D.Y.V.R. was required to: (1) attend all

scheduled family visits, court hearings, and agency meetings; (2) obtain and

maintain suitable housing for the children; (3) pay $25.00 per child in monthly

contributions to support her children in foster care; (4) maintain a legitimate

income to support her children; (5) complete a psychological evaluation and follow

all recommendations; and (6) inform DCFS of her whereabouts. The DCFS case

plan also included a visitation contract which provided for phone visits, between

D.Y.V.R. and the children, every Monday for one hour.

A permanency hearing occurred on March 9, 2022 at which D.Y.V.R. and

H.I.R were present.4 The State moved to modify the case plan from reunification of

the children with D.Y.V.R. to termination of her parental rights which would

certify the children eligible for adoption. G.V.I. and J.V.I. joined the State’s

motion while D.Y.V.R. and H.I.R. objected to the modification. After hearing the

testimony of the DCFS case worker and the children’s foster mom, the trial court

found that D.Y.V.R. was in minimal compliance with the case plan and approved

the modification of the case plan. However, the trial court noted that D.Y.V.R.

could continue to work towards the original case plan for reunification for a six

month period.

On February 8, 2023, DCFS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights

of D.Y.V.R. and H.I.R. The petition alleges that D.Y.V.R. failed to provide

significant contributions and maintain significant contact with her children for six

months. The petition asserts that D.Y.V.R.’s parental rights should be terminated

4 The permanency hearing was originally set to occur on February 23, 2022. Due to a conflict,

the parties and trial court agreed to reset the matter to March 9, 2022.

3

as she failed to comply with the reunification case plan. D.Y.V.R. timely answered

the petition with a general denial of all allegations.

The termination hearing was held over two dates: May 17, 2023 and May

24, 2023. At the hearings, the trial court heard testimony from Brandis White

(hereinafter “Ms. White”), the DCFS case worker for the family; Maria Casati

(hereinafter “Ms. Casati”), an expert witness in social work with the Tulane

Parenting Education Program (hereinafter “T-PEP”); D.Y.V.R.; Michael Pichon

(hereinafter “Mr. Pichon”), a CASA volunteer appointed to the case in March

2021; and the children’s foster parents.

After reviewing the evidence and testimony in its entirety, on June 22, 2023,

the trial court rendered judgment terminating the parental rights of D.Y.V.R. and

H.I.R.5 In its judgment, the trial court also declared the children eligible for

adoption. This appeal by D.Y.V.R. followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court’s finding on the termination of parental

rights under a manifest error standard. State in the Interest of A.S., 2017-0028, p. 4

(La.App. 4 Cir. 5/10/17), 220 So.3d 179, 183. This Court reviews “both prongs of

the trial court's determination—whether the statutory grounds for termination have

been established and whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of

the child—under the manifest error standard.” State in the Interest of E.R., 2022-

0754, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/7/23), 357 So.3d 892, 895, writ denied, 2023-00346

(La. 4/12/23), 359 So.3d 24.

5 The trial court’s June 22, 2023 judgment terminated the parental rights of
D.Y.V.R and H.I.R.
However, only D.Y.V.R. appeals the trial court’s June 22, 2023 judgment. Thus, this appeal
involves only D.Y.V.R.’s challenge of the trial court’s termination of her parental rights and
certification of the children as eligible for adoption.

4

TIMELINESS OF APPEAL

Prior to addressing the merits of D.Y.V.R.’s appeal, we must consider

whether this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. J.V.I. maintains that this Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The judgment terminating D.Y.V.R.’s parental

rights was signed on June 22, 2023. J.V.I.’s brief before this Court indicates that

the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Department “served” the judgment to counsel for

D.Y.V.R. on June 23, 2023, which J.V.I. maintains started the clock to timely file a

notice of appeal. Thus, J.V.I. asserts that D.Y.V.R.’s filing of notice of appeal on

July 21, 2023, is untimely pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 332.

La. Ch.C. art. 332 provides, in pertinent part that, “appeals shall be taken

within fifteen days from mailing of the notice of judgment.” “The starting point for

interpreting a statue is the language of the statute itself.” State in the Interest of

A.S., 2017-0028, p. 5, 220 So.3d at 183 (citation omitted). “We have stated time

and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means

and means in a statute what it says....” State v. Williams, 2010-1514, p. 6 (La.

3/15/11), 60 So.3d 1189, 1192 (citations omitted). “When a law is clear and

unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be

applied as written.” Id. (quoting Cat’s Meow v. City of New Orleans, 1998-0601, p.

15 (La. 10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198).

We further recognize the fundamental principle that an appeal should not be

dismissed unless the reason for doing so is free from doubt. See Fraternal Order of

Police v. City of New Orleans, 2002-1801, p. 2 (La. 11/8/02), 831 So.2d 897, 899

(citation omitted). Appeals are favored and “in the absence of the clerk’s certificate

showing the date of the mailing of the judgment and to whom it was mailed, doubt

should be resolved in favor of the right to appeal.” State v. Fin Cas. & Sur., 2017-

5

1014, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/7/18), 318 So.3d 713, 717 (quoting Garco, Inc. v.

Rob’s Cleaning & Powerwash, Inc., 2008-1249, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/22/09), 12

So.3d 386, 388) (citation omitted); See State in the Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, p.

13 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/26/23), ___So.3d___, 2023 WL 6226289, *7.

The record before this Court did not initially contain a notice of signing of

judgment. However, the record was supplemented with a notice of signing of

judgment indicating that a judgment was mailed on October 13, 2023. The trial

court failed to initially attach a notice of signing of judgment to the June 22, 2023

judgment. Our Supreme Court has determined that an appeal shall not be dismissed

for a mere technicality. See Fraternal Order of Police, 2002-1801, p. 3, 831 So.2d

at 899 (citation omitted). The St. Bernard Sheriff’s Department’s “service” on June

23, 2023 is insufficient to start the time delays for the filing of a notice of appeal

pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 332. See State in the Interest of A.S., 2017-0028, p. 6,

220 So.3d at 183 (finding that the St. Bernard Sheriff’s Office and its custom of

walking a judgment to counsel is insufficient to start the time of delay for the filing

of notice of appeal). Thus, we find the notice of appeal timely and will consider the

merits of D.Y.V.R.’s appeal.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, D.Y.V.R. asserts the following three assignments of error: (1) the

trial court erroneously terminated her parental rights as she had completed her case

plan; (2) DCFS failed to show by, clear and convincing evidence, that the

termination of D.Y.V.R.’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children; and

(3) DCFS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite D.Y.V.R. with the children.

We find that D.Y.V.R.’s first and second assignments of error pertain to the

6

sufficiency of evidence presented at trial. For ease of discussion, we will address

the sufficiency of evidence first.

Sufficiency of Evidence

D.Y.V.R. maintains that DCFS failed to prove, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the termination of her parental rights were in the best interest of the

children. She asserts that she properly completed her case plan. In cases involving

the involuntary termination of parental rights, the two interests are (1) the rights of

the parents and (2) the rights of the child. Our Supreme Court has emphasized the

importance of these interests:

The parents have a natural, fundamental liberty interest to the
continuing companionship, care, custody and management of their
children warranting great deference and vigilant protection under the
law, Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct.
2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981), and due process requires that a
fundamentally fair procedure be followed when the state seeks to
terminate the parent-child legal relationship, State in Interest of
Delcuze, 407 So.2d 707 (La.1981). However, the child has a profound
interest, often at odds with those of his parents, in terminating parental
rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable,
long-term, and continuous relationships found in a home with proper
parental care. In balancing these interests, the courts of this state have
consistently found the interest of the child to be paramount over that
of the parent.

The State’s parens patriae power allows intervention in the parent-
child relationship only under serious circumstances, such as where the
State seeks the permanent severance of that relationship in an
involuntary termination proceeding. The fundamental purpose of
involuntary termination proceedings is to provide the greatest possible
protection to a child whose parents are unwilling or unable to provide
adequate care for his physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
adequate rearing by providing an expeditious judicial process for the
termination of all parental rights and responsibilities and to achieve
permanency and stability for the child. The focus of an involuntary
termination proceeding is not whether the parent should be deprived
of custody, but whether it would be in the best interest of the child for
all legal relations with the parents to be terminated.

7

State ex rel. J.A., 1999-2905, pp. 7-9 (La. 1/12/00), 752 So.2d 806, 810-11

(internal citations omitted).

The termination of the legal relationship between a child and its natural

parent “is one of the most drastic actions the state can take against its citizens.”

State in the Interest of A.L.D., 2018-1271, p. 4 (La. 1/30/19), 263 So.3d 860, 863.

“[T]he primary concern of the courts and the State remains to secure the best

interest for the child, including termination of parental rights if justifiable grounds

exist and are proven.” State ex rel. J.A., 1999-2905, p. 9, 752 So.2d at 811.

Title X of Louisiana’s Children Code governs the involuntary termination of

parental rights and the certification of children for adoption. The purpose in

instituting the involuntary termination of parental rights is to provide protection to

a child whose parent is unwilling or unable to provide adequate care for the child’s

welfare and needs and to achieve stability and permanence for the child. See La.

Ch.C. art. 1001; State ex rel J.A., 1999-2905, p. 8, 752 So.2d at 811. DCFS may

pursue the termination of parental rights pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 1004, which

provides in pertinent part:

The department may petition for the termination of parental rights of
the parent of the child when any of the following apply:

The child has been placed in the custody of the state and
termination is authorized by Article 1015(6).
The child is in foster care because the parent is incarcerated and
termination is authorized by Article 1015(7).

La. Ch.C. art. 1004(D)(4-5). The petition must allege at least one of the statutory

grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights provided in La. Ch.C. art.

1015. State in the Interest of E.R., 2022-0754, p. 5, 357 So.3d at 896. The process

for terminating a parent’s rights is a two-pronged inquiry which requires (1) DCFS

establish each element of at least one statutory ground for termination by clear and

8

convincing evidence; and (2) if the trial court finds grounds for termination have

been established, the trial court must then determine the best interests of the child.

See La. Ch.C. art. 1035; State in the Interest of E.R., 2022-0754, p. 6, 357 So.3d at

896. The best interest of the child consideration shall include the children’s

attachment to their current caretakers. See La. Ch.C. art. 1037(B).6 With these

principles in mind, we turn to the trial court’s determination of the two-prong

inquiry required to terminate parental rights.

DCFS filed its petition to terminate D.Y.V.R.’s parental rights pursuant to

La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5) and (6) which provides the grounds for the termination of

parental rights. The article provide in pertinent part;

(5) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody
of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under
circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid
parental responsibility by any of the following:

(b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to
provide significant contributions to the child's care and support
for any period of six consecutive months.

(c)As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to
maintain significant contact with the child by visiting him or
communicating with him for any period of six consecutive
months.

(6) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed
since a child was removed from the parent's custody pursuant to a
court order; there has been no substantial parental compliance with a
case plan for services which has been previously filed by the
department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return
of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable
expectation of significant improvement in the parent's condition or

6 If the trial court finds that the statutory ground(s) for parental termination have been proven by

clear and convincing evidence and that the termination is in the best interest of the child, the trial
court “shall order for the termination of parental rights against whom the allegations are proven.”
See La. Ch.C. Art. 1037(B). The trial court must also enter written findings on both issues. See
La. Ch.C. art 1037.

9

conduct in the near future, considering the child’s age and his need for
a safe, stable, and permanent home.

La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5)(b-c) and (6).7 DCFS sought to terminate D.Y.V.R.’s

parental rights based upon her non-compliance with the case plan. Specifically,

DCFS alleged that D.Y.V.R. lacked improvement in addressing the children’s

sexual abuse and D.Y.V.R. failed to show a substantial change in complying with

the case plan. At the time of DCFS’ filing of the petition for termination of

parental rights, the children had been in DCFS’ custody, with a certified foster

family, for twenty-six months.

The trial court heard from several witnesses at the termination hearings. Ms.

White, the DCFS case worker, testified that D.Y.V.R. began providing limited

parental child support in August 2022, but failed to provide other basic necessities

for the children. According to Ms. White’s testimony, D.Y.V.R. also failed to

provide evidence of sufficient income and testified that D.Y.V.R. sent photos of

her home in Tennessee, but DCFS had no way to verify if D.Y.V.R. actually

resided in the home. Ms. White concluded that D.Y.V.R. failed to prove she had

sufficient living conditions, did not comply with the reunification case plan set

forth by DCFS, and had not seen the children in person for over six months.

Ms. Casati, an expert in social work, testified to various matters including

D.Y.V.R.’s failure to complete the case plan, D.Y.V.R’s inability to address the

children’s sexual abuse, and the children’s struggles with sexual abuse. According

to Ms. Casati, D.Y.V.R. failed to complete the parenting education program

through T-PEP and stated that she referred D.Y.V.R. to individual psychotherapy

7 La. Ch.C. art. 1015 was recently revised in Louisiana’s 2023 Legislative Session and went into

effect on June 9, 2023. However, the trial in this matter occurred in May 2023, thus the trial
court properly applied the version of La. Ch.C. art. 1015 enacted by Acts 2018, No. 202, § 6
effective on August 1, 2018.

10

due to her increased symptoms of anxiety and depression, which D.Y.V.R.

declined.8 Ms. Casati testified that D.Y.V.R. had informed her that H.I.R. was

abusive and jealous, and that his behavior led to D.Y.V.R. moving out of his home

in the Dominican Republic. Ms. Casati believed that D.Y.V.R failed to exercise

good judgment in allowing her children to the travel alone to the United States

with H.I.R. After working with D.Y.V.R. for two years, Ms. Casati concluded that

D.Y.V.R. failed to make substantial progress in understanding or acknowledging

the children’s experiences with sexual abuse and found that placing the children

back into the care of D.Y.V.R. would place them in imminent harm.

Ms. Casati testified that the children attended therapy for post-traumatic

stress disorders (hereinafter “PTSD”) as they both endured serious abuse while

living with H.I.R. The children recounted multiple forms of sexual abuse by

family members while living with H.I.R. She informed the trial court that the

children experienced nightmares, avoidance, and increased irritability as a result of

their PTSD.

The trial court also heard testimony from Mr. Pichon, the CASA volunteer.

Mr. Pichon testified that the children called their foster parents “mom” and “dad.”

He has observed a positive and stable bond between the children and their foster

parents. Mr. Pichon stated that he believed the foster parents have the capacity to

provide a safe and stable environment for the children; thus recommending the

children be deemed eligible for adoption. Further, the foster parents have ensured

that the children have undergone therapy which has improved their PTSD

symptoms.

8 According to Ms. Casati, D.Y.V.R. failed to take to individual therapy session seriously and

only went to one appointment.

11

D.Y.V.R. testified that she works in the Dominican Republic and owns her

own business. She comes to the United States for court hearings but rarely stays in

Tennessee as she has another young child in the Dominican Republic. When asked

about her mental health and psychological treatment, she testified that she attended

one telehealth visit in January 2023. D.Y.V.R. maintains she had no intention of

permanently abandoning her children and believed that she completed the case

plan to the best of her ability.

A review of the record indicates that D.Y.V.R. failed to comply with the

case plan. Ms. White’s testimony was that D.Y.V.R. had not seen her children, in

person, for over a six month period and that D.Y.V.R. failed to provide evidence of

sufficient income and housing. D.Y.V.R’s continued refusal to seek treatment to

address her symptoms of depression and anxiety are also indicators of her failure to

comply with DCFS’ case plan. Expert testimony reveals that D.Y.V.R. has shown

instances of impaired judgment; is unable to determine the difference between

safety and danger; has failed to show significant improvement in her ability to

make better decisions; and is incapable of exercising her parental responsibilities

without exposing the children to serious harm. See La. Ch.C. art. 1036(D)(1)

(providing that based upon an expert opinion, established upon a pattern of

behavior, it can be determined that a parent lacks the reasonable expectation of

significant improvement in developing parental responsibilities to protect a child

from substantial risk of serious harm).

The cumulative testimony of the witnesses is that D.Y.V.R. has failed to

demonstrate a sufficient change in her behavior which would justify reunification

with the children. See State in the Interest of C.M., 2021-0353, p. 10 (La.App. 4

Cir. 8/4/21), 325 So.3d 1148, 1155 (holding that in order to prevent the termination

12

of parental rights, a parent must demonstrate a substantial change or modification

of behavior that resulted in the State’s removal of the child from the parent’s

home). We therefore find that the elements of the statutory grounds for termination

of parental rights under La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5) and (6) were proven by clear and

convincing evidence. Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s

conclusion that DCFS established the statutory grounds for the termination of

D.Y.V.R.’s parental rights.

Best Interest of The Children

The trial court found that the termination of D.Y.V.R.’s parental rights were

in the best interest of the children. “After a statutory termination ground is

satisfied, the court must also find that termination is in in the best interest of the

child.” State in the Interest of D.B., 2016-0694, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/8/16), 206

So.3d 1021, 1027 (citations omitted). The purpose of involuntary termination

proceedings “is to provide the greatest possible protection to a child… .” State ex

rel H.A.S., 2010-1529, p. 12 (La. 11/30/10), 52 So.3d 852, 859. The primary

concern for the State and courts is to secure the best interest of the child by

achieving permanency and stability for the child. See Id., 2010-1529, p. 12, 52

So.3d at 860.

The record supports the finding that the termination of D.Y.V.R.’s parental

rights is in the best interest of G.V.I. and J.V.I. Mr. Pichon, Ms. Casati, and the

foster parents testified that the children’s health is thriving both mentally and

physically since being in custody of their certified foster family. The children’s

foster parents also testified that they understood the children’s struggles with

PTSD and stated their intentions to adopt the children.

13

The testimony and evidence presented to the trial court revealed that the

children have endured multiple traumatic experiences. These include: experiencing

domestic abuse between D.Y.V.R. and H.I.R; being separated from their mother

for a two year period while living in the United States; living in a home where their

father sexually abused their relative; and being sexually abused by their brother.

Mr. Pichon stated that the children have a deep affection for their foster parents

and call them “mom” and “dad.” Ms. White, Ms. Casati, and Mr. Pichon agreed

that the children have made substantial progress with their foster parents and are in

desperate need of stability.

A review of the testimony indicates that the children have experienced

permanency and stability in the foster parents’ home and removal would not be in

the children’s best interest. See State in the Interest of D.B., 2016-0694, p. 11, 206

So.3d at 1028. In light of the fact that D.Y.V.R. has not come to terms with her

children’s experiences with sexual abuse and that the children’s foster parents have

created a home in which they thrive, we find that the trial court’s conclusion to

terminate D.Y.V.R.’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the trial court’s ruling.

Reunification

D.Y.V.R. also asserts that DCFS failed to make diligent efforts to reunite her

with the children. DCFS must provide “reasonable efforts” to reunite families after

separation. See State ex rel J.M., 2002-2089, p. 15 (La. 1/28/03), 837 So.2d 1247,

1256. Reasonable efforts are defined by the particular facts and circumstances of

each case. La. Ch.C. art. 603(26) DCFS must exercise ordinary diligence and care

to reunite a family with the child’s health, care, and safety being a paramount

concern. Id.

14

On two separate occasions, the children were placed into the custody of

family members and friends with orders to return them to the Dominican Republic.

Both placements resulted in the children being returned to DCFS’ custody and

ultimately being adjudicated in need of care. At one point, the children were placed

with their paternal aunt, who was later arrested in conjunction with H.I.R’s arrest,

which resulted in the children’s return to DCFS’ custody. The children were placed

in DCFS custody following the arrest of their father, H.I.R, and have remained

with the same foster family for over two years.

After determining that D.Y.V.R. lives in the Dominican Republic, DCFS

referred D.Y.V.R. to parenting classes and therapy sessions to address her mental

health concerns.9 D.Y.V.R. failed to take advantage of these services. DCFS also

provided D.Y.V.R. with opportunities for her to visit with the children. Many of

the visits would end early due to “non-engagement” between D.Y.V.R. and her

children. After multiple hearings and child in need of care proceedings, the trial

court determined that D.Y.V.R. failed to make reasonable efforts to comply with

her case plan. The record is replete with evidence and testimony indicating that

DCFS attempted to reunite D.Y.V.R. with her children. For the foregoing reasons,

we find DCFS’ efforts reasonable and find that this assignment of error lacks

merit.

CONCLUSION

G.V.I. and J.V.I. have been in the State’s custody for over two years and

have endured multiple hardships as a result of D.Y.V.R.’s and H.I.R.’s parental

conduct. The children have been placed with various family members that resulted

9 For example, Ms. Casati worked with D.Y.V.R. for a two year period to assist her with her

mental health and accepting the results of the children’s experiences with sexual abuse.

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in instability and were ultimately returned into DCFS’ custody. The testimony

establishes that the children have found stability and permanence with their foster

parents. We therefore find the trial court did not err in terminating D.Y.V.R.’s

parental rights and certifying the children eligible for adoption. The totality of the

testimony and evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that termination of

D.Y.V.R.’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s June 22, 2023

judgment.

AFFIRMED

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