Succession of Lawrence J. Randazzo .

SUCCESSION OF LAWRENCE * NO. 2023-CA-0715
J. RANDAZZO
*
COURT OF APPEAL
*
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

SUCCESSION OF JOSEPHINE NO. 2023-CA-0716
LOYACANO, WIDOW OF,
LAWRENCE J. RANDAZZO

APPEAL FROM
ST. BERNARD 34TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NO. 87-433, DIVISION “AD HOC”
Honorable Jerome J. Barbera, III
******
Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano
******
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge
Rachael D. Johnson)

Salvador J. Randazzo
Lorene A. Randazzo
321 Jade Court
Madisonville, LA 70477

APPELLANTS, IN PROPER PERSON

Jack E. Truitt
Michelle Mayne Davis
Kaylin K. Storey
Lou Anne Milliman
THE TRUITT LAW FIRM
1321 Ochsner Blvd., Ste. 200
Covington, LA 70433

Jennifer Cortes-Johnson
Nancy N. Butcher
CORTES-JOHNSON & BUTCHER, LLC
3900 N. Causeway Blvd., Suite 1200
Metairie, LA 70002

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, JOEL RANDAZZO FORJET

Petrina Randazzo Meyers
711 Kellywood Court
Covington, LA 70433

APPELLEE, IN PROPER PERSON

AFFIRMED
SEPTEMBER 6, 2024

JCL This is a succession proceeding. Appellants, Salvador J. Randazzo and

RML Lorene A. Randazzo, appeal the June 12, 2023 judgment of the district court,

RDJ which ordered certain expenses of the successions be paid from the assets of the

successions; sustained the motion to traverse the tableaus of distribution; and

denied the other claimed expenses listed in the tableaus of distribution. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal arises from a dispute over reimbursement of expenses allegedly

incurred by Salvador J. Randazzo,1 who is the former executor of his parents’

consolidated successions.2 Appellants’ other two siblings – Appellees, Joel

1 Salvador J. Randazzo is an attorney, but he and Lorene A. Randazzo both appear in proper

person. We refer to them, collectively, as “Appellants.” In quotations from the lower court’s
reasons for judgment, Salvador J. Randazzo is sometimes referred to as the “Executor.” As
discussed herein, he was removed as executor on February 6, 2023, and our Court’s record does
not show that another executor was appointed. For consistency, we refer to Salvador J. Randazzo
as “Executor” throughout the opinion.
2 In our opinion, we refer to the decedent Lawrence J. Randazzo as “Father” and the decedent

Josephine L. Randazzo as “Mother.”

1

Randazzo Forjet and Petrina Randazzo Meyers (“Siblings”) – opposed court

approval and payment of certain alleged expenses.

The district court set forth the following factual background of this matter in

its reasons for judgment,3 issued with the judgment presently on appeal:

Lawrence J. Randazzo died on March 3, 1998. His
Succession … was opened with a filing on April 9, 1999,
including a petition to probate his last will and testament,
and the appointment of Salvador J. Randazzo, his son and
heir, as Executor without bond or other security[.]

Josephine L. Randazzo, wife of Lawrence J.
Randazzo, died on April 3, 2008. Her Succession … was
opened with a filing on October 24, 2008, including a
petition to probate her last will and testament, and the
appointment of Salvador J. Randazzo, her son and heir,
as Executor without bond or other security[.]
…
The executor, Salvador J. Randazzo, is one of four
children of the decedents. The others are Lorene
Randazzo, Petrina Randazzo Meyers, and Joel Randazzo
Forjet. In 2011, over thirteen years after their father died
and over three years after their mother died, sisters
Petrina and Joel retained an attorney and filed a petition
to remove their brother as executor, claiming that he had
not filed an annual accounting for either succession
despite the many years that had passed since their parents
died[.] [A]ccountings were prepared by [the executor] in
2022 and provided to other parties, but the record does
not reflect their filing with the Clerk[.] They also
complained that he had not responded to discovery
requests from their attorney[.]

The case finally went to trial in 2014, and, while
the motion to remove him was denied, the Court
appointed his sister Petrina as co-executor, and the

3 Appellants designated the record on appeal, and only some of the pleadings discussed in this

procedural recitation appear in this Court’s record. We also recognize, as courts have long held,
that the appeal is “taken from the judgment, not the written reasons for judgment.” Greater New
Orleans Expressway Commission v. Olivier, 02-2795 p. 3 (La. 11/18/03), 860 So.2d 22, 24.
Nevertheless, the appellate court may review the reasons for judgment to the extent they provide
elucidation for the lower court’s ruling and to determine whether the judgment contains legal
error. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571, p. 78 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572; Roy Anderson Corp.
v. 225 Baronne Complex, L.L.C., 17-1005, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/11/18), 251 So.3d 493, 499.

2

executor was ordered to file annual reports for the years
after his mother’s death in 2008; he was also ordered to
answer the discovery. A motion for a new trial by the
executor was granted, setting aside the results of the
hearing.

The [district court judge, sitting ad hoc] was
appointed to preside ad hoc in this matter in July 2021.
After a conference in August 2021 between the Court,
the executor and his sisters’ (Petrina and Joel) attorney,
the executor was ordered to provide counsel with drafts
of detailed descriptive lists in both successions within 30
days; drafts were provided, but the lists were not filed
into the record until July 5, 2022.

The executor has never, by his own account in
conference and in pleadings, opened a succession bank
account in either proceeding, but instead he directed the
entities that the decedents had co-ownership interests in
to pay the heirs in equal shares when funds were
disbursed[.]

The executor engaged in litigation in 2012 and
2015 with St. Bernard Parish Government over issues
involving succession property damaged by Katrina,
which involved issues about whether the property was
being maintained properly; a second motion to remove
the executor was filed by sisters Petrina and Joel in
November 2016, prompted by new citations by St.
Bernard Parish Government over the condition of the
succession property in St. Bernard. The property has
since been demolished as testified to by the
representative of Parish Government at the trial of this
motion to traverse.

The executor filed suit in 2015 in St. Bernard
Parish on behalf of the successions against other family
members who are co-owners of alleged succession
property, alleging that they are not properly accounting
for and distributing income from the jointly owned
property; that matter is still pending, … with a motion to
recuse the presiding judge filed by the executor. The
motion to recuse was denied on January 19, 2022, after
hearing, and in the reasons for judgment, the ad hoc
judge referred to the history of that case and other
litigation (as described in the executor’s motion to
recuse) as “tortured and combative.”

(Emphasis omitted).

3

Subsequently, the 2014 motion to remove the executor, filed by Siblings, for

which a new trial was granted, proceeded to trial on February 2, 2023. All four

heirs appeared at trial. On February 6, 2023, the district court granted the motion

and ordered Salvador J. Randazzo removed as executor. No appeal was taken from

that judgment.

While the motion to remove the executor was pending, Executor retained an

attorney (now discharged), who prepared a tableau of distribution for each of the

successions. On August 31, 2022, Executor sent notice of the petition for filing the

tableau of distribution for each of the successions. On September 12, 2022,

Siblings filed a motion to traverse and objections to both tableaus of distribution.

On September 20, 2022, Executor filed in the district court both petitions for filing

the tableaus of distribution.

In the tableau for Father’s succession, Executor sought reimbursement for

alleged debts and succession expenses, in the sum of $140,708.82. In the tableau

for Mother’s succession, Executor sought reimbursement for alleged debts and

succession expenses, in the sum of $332,314.91.

The motion to traverse proceeded to hearing on April 18, 2023. Siblings

appeared for the hearing. Appellants were served with the notice of hearing, did

not appear, and were not represented by counsel at the hearing. On June 12, 2023,

the district court rendered judgment as follows:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
that the following sums, identified as legitimate expenses
of the successions named above and listed in the
Tableaus of Distribution, are hereby homologated, and

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these sums are, therefore, properly payable to the creditor
listed in the Tableaus from the assets of the successions,
except to the extent they have already been reimbursed:

Succession of [Father]:

a. funeral expenses - $9,134.37
b. appraisal fee - $2,600.00
c. Clerk of Court costs - $900.00

Succession of [Mother:]

a. funeral expenses $11,180.00
b. grass cutting & maintenance $25,228.50
c. taxes on Livaccari $7,302.38
d. taxes on [Urquhart] property $3,213.40

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that all of the other expenses, claims, and
charges listed in the Tableaus of Distribution filed in
these proceedings are denied, sustaining the Motion to
Traverse as to those items, and those items shall not be
paid or reimbursed from assets of these successions;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that all costs of these proceedings are
assessed to Salvador J. Randazzo[.]

This appeal follows.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Appellants assert that the lower court committed legal error in two respects:

first, in failing to homologate (grant court approval to pay) various expenses listed

in the tableaus of distribution; and second, in taxing all costs against Executor.

Traversal of Tableaus of Distribution

Legal Principles and Standard of Review

As a general matter, the appellate standard of review of factual findings is

whether the lower court was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Succession of

Watkins, 16-0356, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/7/16), 206 So.3d 1237, 1241. By the

5

same token, appellate review of a district court’s judgment homologating the

tableau of distribution – or refusing to grant an order doing so – is subject to the

manifest error standard, and the judgment “must be affirmed if the record as a

whole reveals that there is a reasonable factual basis for the decision.” Succession

of Mouton, 20-0007, p. 5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/17/20), 300 So.3d 430, 434 (quoting

Succession of Manheim, 98-2051, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/21/99), 734 So.2d

119, 123); In re Sporl (“Sporl I”), 03-1084, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/1/03), 859

So.2d 732, 737.

Legal error occurs when a lower court applies incorrect principles of law and

such error is prejudicial; legal error is prejudicial when it materially affects the

outcome and deprives a party of substantial rights. Mouton, 20-0007, p. 5, 300

So.3d at 434; Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541, 97-577, p. 7 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731,

735. Where legal error interdicts the fact-finding process, the manifest error

standard no longer applies, and, if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate

court should make its own independent de novo review of the record and determine

a preponderance of the evidence. Evans, 97-541, p. 7, 708 So.2d at 735.

Appellants’ primary complaint is that the district court erroneously failed to

reimburse Executor for certain claimed expenses from the succession funds.

Executor raised his claims for reimbursement by filing petitions to homologate the

tableau of distribution in each of his parents’ successions. Siblings opposed the

petitions by filing a motion to traverse the tableaus of distribution. Review of these

claims warrants the following discussion of the pertinent succession procedure.

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The tableau of distribution is a document listing estate debts that are to be

paid from available succession funds. See La. C.C.P. art. 3303. The function of the

tableau of distribution is to notify creditors and other parties interested in the

succession that the succession representative4 proposes to pay the listed estate

debts and obtain court approval to make said payments.5 Estate debts are debts of

the decedent and administration expenses. La. C.C. art. 1415. Debts of the

decedent are obligations the decedent incurred during his lifetime or those that

arise as a result of his death, such as the cost of his funeral and burial. Id.

Administration expenses are obligations incurred in the collection, preservation,

management, and distribution of the estate of the decedent, see id., which

encompass “preserving, safeguarding, and operating the property of the estate,

such as repairs, costs of maintenance and upkeep, interest attributable to a debt,

and custodial fees.” La. C.C. art. 1415, 1997 Revision Comments.

Ordinarily, a succession representative may pay an estate debt only with the

authorization of the court. La. C.C.P. art. 3301. When a succession representative

desires to pay estate debts, he shall file a petition for authority and shall include in

or annex to the petition a tableau of distribution listing those estate debts to be

paid. La. C.C.P. art. 3303(A). An opposition may be filed at any time before the

4 “ ‘Succession representative’ includes an administrator, provisional administrator,

administrator of a vacant succession, executor, and dative testamentary executor.” La. C.C.P. art.
2826(3).
5 La. C.C.P. arts. 3304 through 3306 govern the notice requirements for the petition for authority

to pay estate debts, which are not at issue in this appeal.

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tableau is homologated, and the opposition shall be tried as a summary proceeding.

La. C.C.P. art. 3307(A).

Presumption of Validity of Claims

The crux of Appellants’ argument is the presumption of validity afforded to

claims listed in a tableau of distribution. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3244:

The inclusion of the claim of a creditor of the succession
in the succession representative’s petition for authority to
pay debts or in his tableau of distribution creates a prima
facie presumption of the validity of the claim; and the
burden of proving the invalidity thereof shall be upon the
person opposing it.

According to Appellants’ argument, Executor is a creditor of the succession;

in his capacity as executor, he listed his own claims, which are presumed valid;

and Siblings failed to meet their burden to rebut those claims. Few cases illustrate

with specificity how the presumption applies, and we provide a brief recitation of

their facts here.

In Succession of Meier, 204 So.2d 793, 797 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), this

Court recognized both the Article 3244 presumption and the lower court’s

discretion to reject reimbursement of legal expenses wherein the court was “unable

to determine which items relate to services rendered” in the attorney’s capacity

representing the sole heir individually, “for which she would be obligated

personally, or which items are legitimate charges against the succession.” See also

Succession of Haydel, 606 So.2d 42, 45 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the

longstanding principle that “where the legal representation is primarily for the

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personal benefit of the executor and not the estate, such fees may not be paid from

the property of the succession”).

The Meier court noted:

there is not one word of testimony in the transcript nor
any documentary evidence offered to verify the items
listed. The trial judge rejected them, and we find no error
in his judgment on the face of the record before us.

204 So.2d at 797. This Court further explained that the Article 3244 presumption

does not prevent a lower court from rejecting claims, particularly where a

succession representative can prove disputed expenses and fails to come forward

with such proof:

In the absence of opposition [the succession
representative] is not required to verify or prove every
item in the manner required when an item is in dispute.
In this case no opposition to the administrator’s account
and tableau of distribution was filed and the only
objection, as we have pointed out above, was raised by
the court. The administrator and his attorney, however,
cannot assert that they have been denied an opportunity
to make the required proof of the contested items. They
were well aware of the court’s opposition to the items
totaling $931.68, since the court had twice previously
rejected this claim. If they had proof sufficient to
overcome the court’s objection, it should have been
submitted.

Id.

In Manheim, 98-2051, p. 9, 734 So.2d at 125, this Court found no manifest

error in the district court’s factual findings that attorney’s fees were reasonable and

the services benefited the succession. On an heir’s opposition to the homologation

of the tableau of distribution, the lower court received conflicting evidence and

testimony from the opposing heir, the executor, and the attorneys regarding the

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purpose of fees and particular actions undertaken to avoid litigation and minimize

tax liability. Id., 98-2051, pp. 8-9, 734 So.2d at 123-24. On review of the appellate

record, this Court concluded that a reasonable factual basis existed for the district

court’s determination that the heir had failed to meet her burden to rebut the

Article 3244 presumption of the attorney’s fee’s validity. Id., 98-2051, p. 8, 734

So.2d at 124.

In Succession of Dorand, 94-1627, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/26/95), 659 So.2d

523, 527, this Court increased the attorney’s fees and executor fees awarded in the

judgment homologating the tableau. The record on appeal lacked any explanation

of the lower court’s reasoning for awarding an amount lower than listed in the

tableau. Recognizing the Article 3244 presumption and the reasonableness of the

work performed, this Court found the district court abused its discretion in

reducing the fees from those amounts specified in the tableau and supported by

“itemized lists detailing the number of hours and type of work performed by them

in defending the testament from attack.” Id., 94-1627, p. 7, 659 So.2d at 526-27.

In Succession of Herrle, 517 So.2d 386, 388 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987), the

executrix sought to traverse her own tableau of distribution, which she had filed

five years earlier. The executrix sought to challenge attorney’s fees that she had

included in the tableau, and which she had paid at the time without opposition. Id.

On appeal, the reviewing court determined that the district court had properly

placed the burden of proof on the executrix, as the party opposing the attorney’s

fees, as provided in La. C.C.P. art. 3244. Id. at 390.

10

In Succession of Martin, 335 So.2d 494, 498 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976),

opponents of the tableau of distribution filed an opposition, but offered no

evidence to substantiate their opposition. They testified only that “they did not

have any particular reason for opposition other than they felt the claim was

unsupported.” Id. The lower court overruled the opposition, which the appellate

court affirmed, holding that under Article 3244, “[t]he mere filing of an opposition

to the payment of a debt included in the succession representative’s petition for

authority to pay debts does not rebut the presumption of validity nor meet the

burden of proving invalidity thereof.” Id.

Summarizing these cases, Louisiana courts view the Article 3244

presumption as rebuttable, not conclusive. Where an opponent introduced

contradicting evidence or where a lower court discerned that an executor could

have come forward with supporting proof of a disputed expense and did not do so,

the lower court’s discretion in rejecting the claim or declining to homologate the

tableau has been upheld on appeal.

Executor’s Reimbursement Claims

In the matter sub judice, Appellants complain that Executor should have

been reimbursed for the following:

• all attorney’s fees and court costs;

• Hibernia National Bank loan representing an amount Executor loaned
Mother through a limited liability company to purchase another home
after Hurricane Katrina (the “Jade Court property”);

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• “maintenance, supply and repair costs” and “multiple cleanings” for
the succession property in St. Bernard Parish, which was damaged in
Hurricane Katrina (the “Livaccari Drive property”);

• property taxes for the Jade Court property;

• various property taxes in St. Bernard Parish;

• expenses to “Delta Fence” for the Jade Court property; and

• federal and state income taxes on behalf of Mother.

Siblings argue that they properly opposed the tableau, and when Appellants

failed to appear at the hearing, Appellants failed to overcome Siblings’ objections.

According to Siblings, the district court acted correctly and within its discretion

when it sustained the objections and disallowed disputed and unsupported

expenses. Siblings further argue that Executor’s claims against the successions

were not properly documented in annual accountings or sworn detailed descriptive

lists and are now prescribed6 or barred under the “Dead Man’s Statute,” La. R.S.

13:3721.7 They contend that the claims for home repairs, renovations, property

taxes, and income taxes while the parties’ parents were living are improper claims.

They further oppose expenses related to the Livaccari Drive property, which

Executor failed to maintain, after that property was damaged in Hurricane Katrina

6 Prescription was not specifically pled in an exception below and was not addressed by the trial

court. According to the reasons for judgment, it was mentioned for the first time in Appellees’
post-trial memorandum, and the district court did not address it or rule on it. We lack authority to
address it for the first time on appeal on our own motion in the absence of an exception of
prescription. See La. C.C.P. art. 927.
7 Under La. R.S. 13:3721, “[p]arol evidence shall not be received to prove any debt or liability of

a deceased person against his succession representative, heirs, or legatees when no suit to enforce
it has been brought against the deceased prior to his death, unless within one year of the death of
the deceased” the claimant takes certain actions enumerated in the statute. “The purpose of the
‘Dead Man’s Statute’ is to protect the estate of decedents, their representatives, and heirs against
stale and unfounded claims which might have been refuted or disproved by the testimony of the
deceased were he living.” Halpern v. Jonathan Ferrara Gallery, Inc., 19-1066, p. 6 (La. App. 4
Cir. 12/30/20), 365 So.3d 568, 574 (quotation omitted).

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and was thereafter neglected, fell into further disrepair and blight, and ultimately,

was demolished by order of St. Bernard Parish Government.

Our review of the expenses disputed on appeal reveals the following. Both

tableaus list attorney’s fees and court costs, which are undated and fail to specify

what legal service was provided or what court cost was incurred. In both tableaus,

certain legal fees were demarcated as “estimated.” “It has long been recognized in

Louisiana law that an executor of a succession may obtain an attorney to aid in the

carrying out of the executor’s duties and to defend the succession against adverse

claims made against it.” Succession of Fanz, 16-0180, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir.

12/16/16), 208 So.3d 422, 434 (quotation omitted). “This Court has held that fees

for legal representation may be charged to the succession where such

representation is for the benefit of the estate rather than for the personal benefit of

the executor.” Id. This Court has characterized “a list of ‘Legal Fees’ with

undocumented monthly amounts for various years” as “uncorroborated and

unsubstantiated.” Succession of Sporl (“Sporl II”), 04-1373, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir.

4/6/05), 900 So.2d 1054, 1062. As we explained:

the reasonableness of an attorney fee award is always
subject to court scrutiny. . . . The succession
representative who seeks court approval to pay such fees
must, however, meet a threshold burden of establishing
the basis and amount of the fees, just as she would be
required to do to obtain court approval to pay other debts
or charges of the succession.

Id., 04-1373, p. 13, 900 So.2d at 1062-63 (citing Succession of McLean, 26,566,

pp. 19-20 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/95), 651 So.2d 920, 929).

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Executor’s sister, Appellee Joel Forjet, testified that Executor had not

provided her with any documentation of particular legal expenses or costs, despite

her repeated requests. The district court’s judgment homologated payment of

$900.00 in Clerk of Court costs, which – according to the reasons for judgment – is

the amount to which Siblings conceded they do not object.

As to the claimed loan to Mother, arguments in Appellants’ brief are

inconsistent with the claims listed in the tableaus. The brief references a “Hibernia

National Bank loan” of $191,465.08 while also arguing that is the loan from

Executor to Mother for the purchase of the Jade Court property. Both tableaus,

however, identify an undated “Jade Court Cashier’s Check” from Hibernia

National Bank in the amount of $191,465.08. The tableau for Mother’s estate

separately lists a “Real Estate loan” in the amount of $135,500.00 made to 321

Jade, LLC. No documentation or evidence of either alleged loan is contained

within this Court’s record. Joel Forjet testified that the Jade Court property was

paid for with insurance proceeds from the Livaccari Drive property damage claim

and that Executor contributed additional funds with the expectation that he would

live in the Jade Court property.

Regarding maintenance and repairs of the Livaccari Drive property, both

tableaus contain numerous undated entries regarding “Livaccari” containing no

description of the service provided or purpose of the expense. Joel Forjet testified

to her understanding that Mother had usufruct over the property in Father’s estate

and lived in the Livaccari Drive property along with Executor until Hurricane

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Katrina in 2005. As Siblings point out, the Livaccari Drive property was damaged

in Hurricane Katrina. Thereafter, Executor failed to repair or maintain the property

to the point where St. Bernard Parish imposed numerous building ordinance

violations against the property relative to dangerous structures and sanitation. As

testified to by Clay Dillon, Chief Compliance Inspector for the St. Bernard Parish

Government, the parish ordered the Livaccari Drive property’s demolition, which

was accomplished in March 2023 at a cost of $14,200.00. Siblings conceded to a

total of $25,228.50 in grass cutting and maintenance expenses for the succession

properties.

Executor claims he is due $1,838.50 in reimbursement for undated expenses

to “Delta Fence” for the Jade Court property. As to property taxes, Executor

claimed reimbursement of $68,127.86 in property taxes for the Jade Court

property. Joel Forjet testified that both Appellants have lived in the Jade Court

property since its purchase, and the district court recognized the need to reserve

this issue for future separate trial to determine any applicable offset relative to co-

owner status. Executor complains about an additional $1,628.57 in various

property taxes paid to Sheriff Jack A. Stephens, seemingly associated with St.

Bernard Parish properties. Joel Forjet testified that she paid the 2021 property taxes

for the Jade Court property and the 2022 taxes were unpaid. She further stated that

she redeemed the property for unpaid taxes for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017, and

Petrina Meyers reimbursed her for approximately $16,000. Joel Forjet also testified

that Petrina Meyers paid unpaid property taxes for the St. Bernard Parish

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properties. Siblings conceded to claims of property taxes in the amount of

$7,302.38 on the Livaccari Drive property and $3,213.40 on the Urquhart property.

Appellants also argue their entitlement to reimbursement of $11,842.00 in

income taxes paid. In the tableaus, Executor claims to have paid income taxes on

both parents’ behalf in 1995 and 1996 and on Mother’s behalf between 2001 and

2004. We find little guidance in Appellants’ argument concerning Succession of

Vatter, 192 La. 657, 188 So. 732 (1939), wherein a provisional accounting was

filed showing that attorneys for an executor advanced money for installments of

income tax. We see no support in the law for construing income taxes during the

decedents’ lifetimes as estate debts. Joel Forjet testified that both parents’ had

sufficient funds to satisfy such payments, not only from Social Security income,

but also through their interests in Randazzo Properties and “Toca lease payments”

they received. She also explained in her testimony her doubts, on the whole, that

outstanding loans existed between Executor and Mother, or that there was any

expectation of repayment, because Mother “never left anything outstanding with

any of us.”

We acknowledge, as a general matter, that Article 3244 imposes a

presumption of validity on claims listed in the tableau of distribution. Even so, this

Circuit has long recognized lower courts’ authority to decline payment of disputed

claims, which are within the executor’s power to substantiate, where he has failed

to come forward with supporting proof. See Meier, 204 So.2d at 797. Moreover,

this Court explicitly held that allegations contained within a tableau of distribution

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are not evidence. Sporl I, 03-1084, pp. 9-10, 859 So.2d at 737. In Sporl I, the

record on appeal contained the co-executors’ allegations of debts and the opposing

heir’s objections, but contained neither a transcript of the proceedings nor any

evidence supporting the co-executors’ claims that the disputed debts existed or

were owed by the succession. Id., 03-1084, p. 9, 859 So.2d at 737. In such a

posture, this Court found no abuse of discretion or manifest error in refusing to

homologate the tableau. Id., 03-1084, p. 10, 859 So.2d at 737-38.

Analogous circumstances are present here. Siblings opposed the tableaus of

distribution through their motion to traverse. Executor was ordered removed as

succession representative, which judgment he did not appeal. Executor did not

appear for the hearing on the motion to traverse, did not testify, and did not offer

any evidence supporting that the disputed debts existed or were owed by the

succession. Siblings appeared and testified about their objections to the claimed

debts, though evidently they conceded to some of the expenses, which were the

same expenses the district court ordered homologated.

Furthermore, Appellants opted to designate the record on appeal, as a result

of which a complete record of the proceedings below is not before this Court. La.

C.C.P. art. 2128 permits an appellant to designate the record and limit it to such

portions that he desires to constitute the record on appeal. However, “[t]he

inadequacy of the record, if any, is imputable to the appellant.” Garden Park Ests.

Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Nuss, 16-252, p. 3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/7/16), 207 So.3d 1181,

1183. “The reviewing court must presume that the trial court judgment is correct

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and supported by sufficient competent evidence when a designated record is

inadequate for a review of the matter at issue.” Id. To the extent that there is

anything missing from the record of the proceedings below that would support

Appellants’ claims on appeal, Appellants have made no efforts to correct the

deficiency or ensure that a complete record is before this Court.

The district court’s reasons for judgment make plain that it approved only

the expenses to which the other heirs did not object. It reasoned:

even when the executor does not appear to defend the
objection to some of the charges, if the party objecting
cannot prove the invalidity of the charges, even those
incurred over 20 years prior, the charges are deemed
correct. Is this the rule of law when the executor claims
he is owed over a half million dollars from the
successions but he has never filed a claim as a creditor?
How does a party defend against charges listed with a
name and an amount, but no date and no location of
property? How does a party defend against a claim for
payment of credit card debt for “miscellaneous items,” …
without even a year much less a date? The only defense
would appear to be an objection, as movers have done,
pointing out these obvious facts to the Court.
…
Any prudent administrator, including [Executor] if
he was acting as such, would challenge and oppose
charges and expenses presented in the form and
substance of much of what is included in the tableaus
before the Court. Can [Executor] merely dump his 20
plus year old check book register into a Tableau of
Distribution and expect the presumption of validity to
apply and get payment?

The irony is, there are no debts of either
succession. This is all about reimbursement of money
paid out supposedly for legitimate expenses as defined in
Article 1415.

This Court will and does take the position that the
presumption of validity mentioned in Article 3244 must
and should refer to properly filed and documented claims

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for expenses of death or administrative expenses as
defined by the law. Other than those conceded by the
movers, the items listed in the tableaus do not meet that
standard.

We cannot discern any legal error on our review of this matter. The record

lodged in this Court reveals a reasonable factual basis for approving only those

undisputed expenses at this juncture. Considering the particular, unique

circumstances occurring in this case, we cannot say the district court’s decision to

deny the remaining claimed expenses was manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.8

Award of Costs Against Executor

Appellants contend that the district court erred as a matter of law in

assessing all costs against Executor on the traversal proceedings. According to

their argument, because the judgment approved some of the expenses, Executor

was successful on some of his claims and should have been assessed with costs.

We disagree.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1920 governs assessment of

costs, and provides:

Unless the judgment provides otherwise, costs shall be
paid by the party cast, and may be taxed by a rule to
show cause.

Except as otherwise provided by law, the court may
render judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against
any party, as it may consider equitable.

A district court is afforded great discretion in assessing costs, and such an

award is generally only disturbed upon a showing that the court abused its

8 Nothing in this opinion should be construed to preclude any future-appointed executor from

petitioning to homologate an amended, and properly supported, tableau of distribution or any
opposing party from filing an exception of prescription or opposition pursuant to the Dead Man’s
Statute, La. R.S. 13:3721.

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discretion. Butler v. Louisiana Mut. Med. Ins. Co., 15-1191, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir.

5/25/16), 195 So.3d 570, 573. “[W]hile the ‘abuse of discretion standard is highly

deferential, … a court necessarily abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an

erroneous view of the law.’ ” Barre-Williams v. Ware, 20-0665, p. 4 (La. App. 4

Cir. 4/28/21), 365 So.3d 760, 768 (quotation omitted). Although, generally, the

party cast in judgment should be taxed with costs, the district court has wide

discretion to assess costs in any equitable manner and against any party in any

proportion it finds equitable, even against the party who prevailed on the merits.

Lakewood Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Smith, 14-1376, p. 25 (La. App. 4 Cir.

12/23/15), 183 So.3d 780, 795. See also Williams v. Leeper, 21-1177, p. 7 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 341 So.3d 850, 856 (collecting cases). As some courts have

explained, “a prevailing party may be taxed with costs if that party in some way

incurred additional costs pointlessly or engaged in other conduct which would

equitably justify the prevailing party being assessed.” Butler, 15-1191, pp. 4-5, 195

So.3d at 574 (internal quotations omitted).

The record reveals longstanding delays and animosity among the heirs,

culminating in Executor’s removal. Siblings’ resounding complaint remains that

Executor failed to provide any accounting in the twenty-year period while the

succession remained open, such that the expenses in dispute are largely

unsubstantiated. Moreover, as Siblings point out, Executor failed to appear for the

hearing on the motion to traverse and thus avoided the ability to be questioned on

the nature of these expenses. The district could have reasonably determined that

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Executor engaged in conduct to incur the costs of the traversal proceedings. Under

the circumstances revealed in the record, we find no abuse of discretion in casting

Executor with costs associated with the motion to traverse.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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