Deutsch Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-R4 v. Maylois Conerly Price, (a/K/A Maylois Conerly, Maylois Price, Maylois Bacot, Maylois Conerly Bacot)

DEUTSCH BANK NATIONAL * NO. 2023-CA-0747
TRUST COMPANY, AS
TRUSTEE FOR AMERIQUEST *
MORTGAGE SECURITIES COURT OF APPEAL
INC., ASSET-BACKED PASS- *
THROUGH CERTIFICATES, FOURTH CIRCUIT
SERIES 2005-R4 *
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS *******

MAYLOIS CONERLY PRICE,
(A/K/A MAYLOIS CONERLY,
MAYLOIS PRICE, MAYLOIS
BACOT, MAYLOIS CONERLY
BACOT)

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2020-00367, DIVISION “N-8”
Honorable Ethel Simms Julien, Judge
******
Judge Rosemary Ledet
******
(Court composed of Judge Rosemary Ledet, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge
Rachael D. Johnson)

Amanda S. Stout
McGLINCHEY STAFFORD, PLLC
One American Place, 14th Floor
301 Main Street
Baton Rouge, LA 70801

Stephen W. Rider
McGLINCHEY STAFFORD, PLLC
601 Poydras Street, 12th Floor
New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

Maylois C. Bacot
5696 Stillwater Drive
New Orleans, LA 70128

Pro Se
PRO SE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED
April 23, 2024

RML
SCJ
RDJ
This appeal is a commercial litigation dispute arising out of an executory

proceeding. Defendant-in-Reconvention – Deustche Bank National Trust

Company, as Trustee for Ameriquest Mortgages Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed

Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-R4 (“Deutsche Bank”) – filed a petition for

executory process to foreclose on a mortgage loan (“the Loan”).1 In response, the

Plaintiff-in-Reconvention – Maylois Bacot (“Ms. Bacot”)2 – filed a reconventional

demand against, among others, Deustche Bank.3 In response, Deustche Bank filed

an exception of no cause of action. After a hearing, the trial court sustained the

exception and dismissed Ms. Bacot’s claims. From this judgment, Ms. Bacot

appeals. We affirm.

1 The caption includes one of the Appellee’s company names as “Deustch” Bank, however, the

correct spelling is “Deustche” Bank. In this opinion, we refer to it as Deustche Bank.
2 The caption refers to Ms. Bacot as “Maylois Conerly Price”; in this opinion, we refer to her as

Ms. Bacot.
3 In addition to Deustche Bank, Ms. Bacot also named the following parties as defendants-in-

reconvention (collectively “Defendants”): PHH Mortgage Services (“PHH”), and LOGS Legal
Group, LLC (“LOGS”) (then-known as Shapiro & Daigrepont, LLC), McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC
(“McGlinchey”) and Amanda Stout (“Ms. Stout”).

1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2005, Ms. Bacot signed a promissory note payable to the order of

Ameriquest Mortgage Securities (“AMS”) together with a mortgage as security for

the note. PHH serviced the loan for Deustche Bank.4 Over time, issues arose

regarding Ms. Bacot’s mortgage payments. On several occasions, she made her

monthly payments untimely. Ms. Bacot and PHH entered into various loan

modification agreements to help her meet her obligations. Nevertheless, Ms. Bacot

failed to comply with the terms of the modification agreement. As a result,

Deustche Bank filed a petition for executory process to foreclose on Ms. Bacot’s

home. On the previous appeal in this matter, Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. as Tr. for

Ameriquest Mortgage Sec. Inc. v. Price, 21-0430, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/15/21),

333 So.3d 1280, 1286 (“Deustche Bank I”), this Court held that Deustche Bank

complied with the procedures necessary to foreclose by executory process and

remanded this case for further proceedings.

On remand, Ms. Bacot filed a reconventional demand, which the trial court

ordered severed from the executory process suit. Only Ms. Bacot’s reconventional

demand is at issue in this appeal.5 Ms. Bacot makes the following allegations in her

reconventional demand:

• PHH acted deceptively and failed to report note payments that Ms.
Bacot had made. Further, PHH instructed her not to take action on

4 Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”) was the original loan servicing company for Deustche

Bank. In the time that has passed since Ms. Bacot executed the promissory note, Ocwen and PHH
have merged, with PHH as the surviving entity. Thus, only PHH is mentioned in this opinion.
5 Ms. Bacot filed an original and amended reconventional demand. In this opinion, we refer to

both as “the reconventional demand.”

2

her loan while they investigated her fraud claim. This advice
resulted in a wrongful foreclosure initiated by Deustche Bank.

• Defendants discriminated against Ms. Bacot due to her disability
and race.

• Defendants colluded against Ms. Bacot through deceptive business
practices to fraudulently deprive her of her property. Defendants
willfully and wantonly breached their duties and obligations owed
to Ms. Bacot.

• Defendants’ acts violated the following federal laws: 42 U.S.C. §
1985, 42 U.S.C. § 1986, 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair
Housing Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act.

• PHH and Ms. Stout withheld discoverable information about the
mortgage from Ms. Bacot.

• Ms. Stout violated the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and the
Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to investigate the facts in
this matter before filing for executory process and by filing false
documentation.

• Deustche Bank and PHH filed and maintained false records and
engaged in forgery.

In response to the reconventional demand, Defendants filed peremptory

exceptions of res judicata and no cause of action.6 After a hearing, the trial court

sustained the exception of no cause of action and dismissed all of Ms. Bacot’s

claims against Defendants with prejudice. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a peremptory exception of

no cause of action using a de novo standard of review because the exception raises

a question of law. Herman v. Tracage Development, L.L.C., 16-0082, p. 4 (La.

6 LOGS was not a party to the exception of no cause of action sustained by the trial court. Thus,

Ms. Bacot’s allegations against LOGS are not at issue on this appeal.

3

App. 4 Cir. 9/21/16), 201 So.3d 935, 939 (citations omitted). “The function of the

peremptory exception of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the

petition, which is done by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the

facts alleged in the pleading.” State, Div. of Admin., Office of Facility Planning &

Control v. Infinity Sur. Agency, L.L.C., 10-2264, p. 8 (La. 5/10/11), 63 So.3d 940,

945-46 (citing Ramey v. DeCaire, 03-1299, p. 7 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 118;

Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1235

(La. 1993)).

DISCUSSION

Although Ms. Bacot assigns four errors, the primary issue is whether the

trial court erred in sustaining Defendants’ exceptions of no cause of action and

dismissing Ms. Bacot’s reconventional demand. A second issue we consider is

whether the trial court’s judgment was procured by fraud on the court.7 We divide

our analysis into three parts: state law claims, federal law claims, and fraudulent

judgment claims.

State Law Claims

Ms. Bacot alleges that PHH’s advice that she not take action on her loan

while her fraud claim was investigated, coupled with Deustche Bank’s filing of the

petition for executory process, amounted to the following state law violations:

negligence, tortious interference with contract, breach of contract, fraud, and abuse

7 Ms. Bacot also presents the issue of whether the trial court violated her due process rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the
Louisiana Constitution by sustaining the Defendants’ exceptions of no cause of action. Because
we affirm the trial court’s judgment, we do not consider this issue.

4

of process. Ms. Bacot also alleges that Deustche Bank and PHH filed and

maintained false records and engaged in forgery in violation of Louisiana criminal

law. We address these state law claims as follows.

Negligence and Contract Claims

The Louisiana Credit Agreement Statute (“Credit Agreement Statute”), La.

R.S. 6:1121, et seq., provides that “[a] debtor shall not maintain an action on a

credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets

forth the relevant terms and conditions, and is signed by the creditor and debtor.”

La. R.S. 6:1122. The Credit Agreement Statute further provides that “[t]he

agreement of a creditor to take or not take certain actions such as entering into a

new credit agreement, forbearing from exercising remedies under a prior credit

agreement, or extending installments due under a prior credit agreement” shall not

give rise to a claim that a new credit agreement is created unless the requirements

of La. R.S. 6:1122 are satisfied. La. R.S. 6:1123(A)(3). “A credit agreement shall

not be implied from the relationship, fiduciary, or otherwise, of the creditor and

debtor.” La. R.S. 6:1123(B).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has observed that to allow debtors to bring

breach of contract claims based on an oral agreement to lend money would

circumvent the writing requirement of the Credit Agreement Statute, thwart the

Legislature’s intent, and render the statute meaningless. King v. Parish Nat’l Bank,

04-0337, pp. 10-11 (La. 10/19/04), 885 So.2d 540, 547 (citing Jesco Const. Corp.

v. Nationsbank Corp., 02-0057, p. 4 (La. 10/25/02), 830 So.2d 989, 992).

5

Here, Ms. Bacot failed to provide a written agreement to base her claims that

PHH advised her not to take action as the fraud investigation was ongoing. This

claim does not meet the writing requirement of La. R.S. 6:1122 of the Credit

Agreement Statute. Thus, trial court did not err in dismissing Ms. Bacot’s state law

claims.

Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act Claims

Ms. Bacot next contends that Defendants’ acts and omissions are in violation

of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act, La. R.S. 51:1401, et seq., (“LUPTA”).

LUPTA exempts federally insured financial institutions, their subsidiaries, and

their affiliates from its jurisdiction. La. R.S. 51:1406. Actions or transactions

subject to the jurisdiction of the commissioner of financial institutions, the

financial institutions and insurance regulators of other states, or federal bank

regulators who possess authority to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices are

also exempt from the LUPTA. Id.

Deustche Bank is exempt because it is a federally chartered bank insured by

the Federal Deposit Insurance Company. PHH serviced Ms. Bacot’s loan with

Deustche Bank, making it a residential mortgage lender subject to the regulation of

the Louisiana Commissioner of Financial Institutions through the RMLA; thus,

PHH is exempt.8 The trial court did not err in finding that Ms. Bacot failed to state

a cause of action under LUPTA.

8 Residential mortgage lenders are instead subject to the regulation of the Louisiana Commissioner

of Financial Institutions under the Louisiana S.A.F.E Residential Mortgage Lending Act (RMLA),
La. R.S. 6:1081, et seq. The RMLA defines “residential mortgage lender” as “a person who
engages in a residential mortgage lending activity as a mortgage broker or mortgage lender, or

6

Claims under La. C.C.P. art. 863

Ms. Bacot alleges that Defendants violated La. C.C.P. art. 863 by failing to

investigate the matter before filing the executory process petition.9 She fails to

state any specific facts that demonstrate how Defendants did not comply with their

responsibilities to properly investigate the facts alleged in the executory process

petition. As a result, Ms. Bacot failed to state a cause of action against Defendants

under La. C.C.P. art. 863.

Claims under the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct

Ms. Bacot’s reconventional demand asserts that Ms. Stout and her law firm,

McGlinchey, violated the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct in three

respects: making intentional fraudulent misrepresentations, committing fraud on

both.” La. R.S. 6:1083(19). Servicing a mortgage loan falls under the definition of “residential
mortgage lending activity.” La. R.S. 6:1083(20).
9 Louisiana Civil Code of Civil Procedure Article 863(B) provides in relevant part:

B. Pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit or certificate, except
as otherwise provided by law, but the signature of an attorney or party shall
constitute a certification by him that he has read the pleading, and that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, he
certifies all of the following:

(1) The pleading is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.

(2) Each claim, defense, or other legal assertion in the pleading is warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law.

(3) Each allegation or other factual assertion in the pleading has evidentiary support or,
for a specifically identified allegation or factual assertion, is likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery.

(4) Each denial in the pleading of a factual assertion is warranted by the evidence or,
for a specifically identified denial, is reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.

7

the court, and withholding discoverable evidence. None of these alleged actions is

within the jurisdiction of this Court. Addressing violations of the Louisiana Rules

of Professional Conduct is a matter within the jurisdiction of the Louisiana

Attorney Disciplinary Board and the Louisiana Supreme Court. See La. Const. Art.

V, Section V; Ricco v. Luminais, 15-1109, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/27/16), 192

So.3d 858, 864. We lack jurisdiction to consider this issue.

Criminal Law Claims

Ms. Bacot next alleges that Defendants filed false records in the trial court

and engaged in forgery. These are alleged criminal violations of La. R.S. 14:133

and La. R.S. 14:72. As the trial court observed in its reasons for judgment, only a

district attorney may enforce criminal statutes. Thus, the trial court did not err in

dismissing Ms. Bacot’s criminal law claims.

Federal Law Claims

Ms. Bacot asserts that Defendants’ conduct has violated the following

federal laws: the United States Constitution, the Fair Housing Act, the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act.

Due Process Allegations

Executory proceedings are expressly authorized under the Louisiana Code of

Civil Procedure. See La. C.C.P. art. 2631. Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court

has held that statutes relating to executory process are constitutional

notwithstanding alleged due process violations. See Buckner v. Carmack, 272

8

So.2d 326 (La. 1973). In Deustche Bank I, this Court held that Deustch Bank

followed proper procedure in its executory process proceeding against Ms. Bacot.

Deutsche Bank, 21-0430, p. 10, 333 So.3d 1280 at 1286.

Although Ms. Bacot asserts her due process rights were violated by

Defendants, no fact exists in the reconventional demand that specifies how due

process was denied here. A general allegation of the unconstitutionality of the

executory process is not sufficient. Thus, Ms. Bacot failed to state a cause of action

under the Constitution.

Ms. Bacot further alleges violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (conspiracy to

interfere with civil rights) and 42 U.S.C § 1986 (action for neglect to prevent). The

federal Fifth Circuit has held that in order for a plaintiff to state a claim under 42

U.S.C 1985(3), the following four elements must be alleged:

1) conspiracy involving two or more persons; 2) for the purpose of
depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws; and 3) an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy; 4) which causes injury to a person or property or
deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. 10

Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652–53 (5th Cir.1994) (citation omitted).

Also, “[the] plaintiff must allege some class-based animus.” Burns-Toole v. Byrne,

10 42 U.S.C § 1985(3) (depriving persons of rights or privileges) provides in relevant part:

…[I]n any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.

9

11 F.3d 1270, 1276 (5th Cir. 1994). A complaint does not sufficiently allege a

cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 unless it alleges the existence of a

conspiracy prohibited by 42 U.S.C § 1985. See Dowsey v. Wilkins, 467 F.2d 1022,

1026 (5th Cir.1972); see also Loy v. Clamme, 804 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir.1986)

(citation omitted).

The trial court ruled that Ms. Bacot failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C §

§ 1985 and 1986 because she did not set forth facts to support a conspiracy

between defendants or that any Defendant acted out of racial animus. Ms. Bacot

asserts that PHH discriminated against her on the basis of her disability, which

satisfies the need to allege class-based animus. Nevertheless, her claim fails to

meet the elements outlined in Hilliard. Only one defendant, PHH, is mentioned as

having a class-based motivation in its actions against Ms. Bacot. A conspiracy

must involve two or more persons. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing

Ms. Bacot’s claims under 42 U.S.C § § 1985 and 1986.

Fair Housing Act
Ms. Bacot also alleges that Defendants violated the Fair Housing Act. See

42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. To state a claim under the Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff

must plead four elements:

(1) that they were a member of a protected class, (2) they attempted to
engage in a “real estate-related transaction” [with the defendant] and
met all relevant qualifications for doing so; (3) the defendant refused to
transact business with the plaintiff despite their qualifications, (4) and
the defendant [] continued to engage in that type of transaction with
other parties with similar qualifications.

Ray v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 627 Fed.Appx. 452 (6th Cir.2015) (citation

omitted). Here, Ms. Bacot does not allege that Deustche Bank or PPH took any

10

action based on her race or disability. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing

Ms. Bacot’s Fair Housing Act claims.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

Ms. Bacot claims that Defendants violated the Federal Debt Collections

Procedures Act (FDCPA). See 15 U.S.C § 1692, et seq. Federal courts have held

that the FDCPA “is directed at independent debt collectors and not creditors

attempting to collect on their own debts.” Beck v. Alliance Funding Co., 113

F.Supp.2d 274, 275 (D. Conn.2000) (citing Meads v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc.,

686 F.Supp. 330, 333 (S.D.Ga.1988); Aubert v. American General Finance, Inc.,

137 F.3d 976, 978). Moreover, “[u]nder the FDCPA, a debt collector does not

include ‘“any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or

asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ... concerns a debt

which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person.’” Brumberger

v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp., 84 F.App’x. 458, 459 (5th Cir.2004) (citing 15

U.S.C § 1692a(6)(F)).

Deustche Bank began executory proceedings to collect on its own debt.

Further, Ms. Bacot did not plead that PHH obtained the rights to service her loan

after she was in default. Neither Defendant is considered a debt collector subject to

the FDCPA. As a result, Ms. Bacot failed to state a cause of action under the

FDCPA and the trial court did not err in dismissing these claims.

Fair Credit Reporting Act

11

Ms. Bacot also alleges that Defendants’ conduct violates the Fair Credit

Reporting Act (FCRA). See 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. The FCRA requires

furnishers of credit information to provide accurate information to consumer

reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C § 1681s-2(a). Furnishers of credit information

must also conduct a reinvestigation of information provided to consumer reporting

agencies after notice of a customer dispute is received from the consumer reporting

agency. See 15 U.S.C 1681s-2(b). While no private right of action exists for

violations of 15 U.S.C § 1681s-2(a), the FCRA allows for private individuals to

sue for violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). See 15 U.S.C 1681s-2(c) and 1681s-

2(d).

Ms. Bacot does not allege that any Defendant received a notice of customer

dispute from a consumer reporting agency or that they failed to reinvestigate after

receiving such a notice. Further, and as noted by the trial court in its reasons, Ms.

Bacot failed to state a cause of action for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)

because no private right of action exists under that section. Thus, the trial court did

not err in dismissing Ms. Bacot’s FDCPA claim.

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

Ms. Bacot alleges that Defendants’ conduct violated the Real Estate

Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., (“RESPA”). As the trial

court observed in its reasons for judgment, only Sections 2605, 2607, and 2608 of

RESPA establish a private right of action. These sections mandate disclosure

relating to assignment of loan servicing, prohibit kickbacks, and prohibit property

12

sellers from requiring purchasers to buy title insurance from a specific company.

None of these sections provide for a private right of action for erroneously filing a

foreclosure action, which is the crux of Ms. Bacot’s allegations against

Defendants. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing Ms. Bacot’s RESPA

claim.

Fraudulent Judgment Claim

Finally, Ms. Bacot contends that the trial court’s judgment was procured by

fraud or fraud on the court. Ms. Bacot cites to La. C.C.P. art. 2004, which provides

that “[a] final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be annulled.”

Nevertheless, Louisiana courts have held that “[a]n action for nullity alleging fraud

or ill practice is a relative nullity that must be asserted in a direct action filed in the

court that rendered the judgment; and the adverse party must be cited to appear as

in ordinary suits.” State v. Ramos, 18-136, p. 3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/17/18), 264

So.3d 564, 567 (citations omitted). Here, Ms. Bacot has not filed an action to annul

the trial court’s judgment for vices of substance in the trial court. As a result, this

issue is not properly before this Court.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment dismissing Ms. Bacot’s

claims is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

13