Eugene Latour, II v. Emanee Q. Brock, Et Al.

Supreme Court of Louisiana
June 21, 2023
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
EUGENE LATOUR, II
VS.
EMANEE Q. BROCK, ET AL.
No. 2023-CC-00262
_ _ _ _
_ _
IN R
E: Annett Holdings d/b/a TMC Transportation - Applicant Defendant; Applying
For Supervisory Writ, Parish of Evangeline, 13th Judicial District Court Number(s)
78173A, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Number(s) CW 22-00618;
_ _ _ _ _ _
June 21, 2023
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Hughes, J., dissents.
JLW
SJC
JTG
WJC
JBM
PDG
06/21/2023 "See News Release 029 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2023-CC-00262
EU
GENE LATOUR, II
VS.
EMANEE Q. BROCK, ET AL.
O
n Supervisory Writ to the 13th Judicial District Court, Parish of Evangeline
P
ER CURIAM
We are called upon to decide whether an employer is entitled to summary
judgment, on the ground that it is not vicariously liable for an accident caused by the
wife of its employee. For the reasons that follow, we conclude summary judgment
is appropriate.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Annett Holdings, Inc. d/b/a TMC Transportation (“TMC”) employed Jeremy
Brock. Although Mr. Brock was a Louisiana resident, TMC assigned him to its
Georgia facility. While in Georgia, Mr. Brock, who was a member of the Louisiana
National Guard, would drive to and from Louisiana on his off days to visit with his
family and/or attend to his military obligations.
On November 28, 2018, Mr. Brock notified his manager at TMC that he had
to report back to Louisiana for his military -related drill requirement. He further
advised that his TMC issued vehicle was undergoing maintenance. TMC agreed to
provide a rental vehicle to Mr. Brock to allow him to travel to Louisiana for drill and
then return to Georgia for work.
Mr. Brock picked up the rental vehicle and drove it to his home in Louisiana
on November 29, 2018. After arriving at his home, Mr. Brock and his wife, Emanee
Brock, decided to go shopping and purchase groceries and other household items.
06/21/23

2

After some discussion,1 Mr. Brock allowed his wife to drive the rental vehicle to the
store.
The couple then proceeded to the store, with Mrs. Brock driving the rental
vehicle and Mr. Brock as a passenger. During the trip, Mrs. Brock was involved in
an accident when the rental vehicle rear-ended a vehicle driven by plaintiff, Eugene
Latour, II . Following the accident, Mrs. Brock was cited for driving with a
suspended driver’s license due to her failure to pay a parking ticket.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant suit against several defendants including
TMC. Plaintiff alleged TMC was vicariously liable for the actions of Mr. Brock and
his wife.
After d iscovery, TMC moved for summary judgment. It argued the
undisputed facts established that Mrs. Brock was not its employee and it therefore
could not be vicariously liable for her actions. It further contended Mr. Brock was
not in the course and scope of his employment at the time he allowed Mrs. Brock to
drive the rental vehicle.
Plaintiff opposed TMC’s motion for summary judgment. He argued there
were questions of fact as to whether Mr. Brock was on a mission for TMC at the
time of the accident and whether Mr. Brock negligently entrusted the vehicle to his
wife, who had a suspended license.
After a hearing, the district court denied TMC’s motion for summary
judgment. In oral reasons for judgment, the district court indicated it believed
summary judgment was precluded “because of conflicting testimony and a mixture
of fact and law analysis required to determine status.”
TMC applied for supervisory review. The court of appeal denied writs.

1 Mr. Brock claims he initially told his wife not to drive the rental vehicle but instead take their
personal vehicle. However, he ultimately relented and agreed to allow her to drive the rental
vehicle because it was at the end of the driveway.

3

Upon TMC’s application to this court, we ordered written briefing pursuant
to the provisions of La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(H).2 Having received briefs from both
parties, w e now review the district court’ s ruling on the motion for summary
judgment on the merits.

DISCUSSION
A ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed under a de novo
standard, with the appellate court using the same crite ria that govern the district
court’s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether
there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Catzen v. Toney, 2022-01261 (La. 1/18/23), 352 So.3d
972, 974; Jones v. Whips Elec., LLC , 2022-01035 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So.3d 846 ,
848; Guidry v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 2019-1999 (La. 2/26/20), 289 So.3d 1026,
1027. Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1), the burden on the party moving
for summary judgment “does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s
claim, action, or defense.” Reynolds v. Bordelon, 2014-2371 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So.
3d 607, 610–11. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an
adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but
his response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. La. Code Civ. P. art. 967(B); Bufkin v. Felipe’ s
Louisiana, LLC, 2014-0288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So.3d 851, 858. Once a motion for
summary judgment has been properly supported by the moving party, the failure of

2 As required by the article, we permitted the parties an opportunity to request oral argument and
entertained TMC’s request for argument. After careful consideration, we found oral argument was
unnecessary under the undisputed facts of this case and therefore elected to exercise our discretion
to consider the matter on written briefs only.

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the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the
granting of the motion. Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging Inc ., 2008-0528 (La.
12/2/08), 995 So.2d 1184, 1187 (citing Babin v. Winn–Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-
0078 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37, 40).
In essence, plaintiff alleges TMC is vicariously liable for the actions of its
employee, Mr. Brock, who negligently entrusted the rental vehicle to his wife. TMC
contends it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the undisputed facts
demonstrate Mrs. Brock was not its employee and Mr. Brock was not in the course
and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
In Baumeister v. Plunkett, 1995-2270 (La. 5/21/96), 673 So.2d 994, 996, we
summarized the law relating to vicarious liability as follows:
The law in this area is clear that an employer is liable for
a tort committed by his employee if, at the time, the
employee was acting within the course and scope of his
employment. Orgeron v. McDonald , 93 –1353 (La.
7/5/94), 639 So.2d 224, 226. The course of employment
test refers to time and place. Benoit v. Capitol
Manufacturing Co., 617 So.2d 477, 479 (La. 1993). The
scope of employment test examines the employment-
related risk of injury. Id.

According to Louisiana Civil Code article 2320,
“[m]asters and employers are an swerable for the damage
occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise
of the functions in which they are employed.” In fact, this
Court has held that in order for an employer to be
vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employee
the “tortious conduct of the [employee must be] so
closely connected in time, place, and causation to his
employment duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm
fairly attributable to the employer’ s business, as
compared with conduct instituted by purely person al
considerations enti rely extraneous to the employer’ s
interest.” Barto v. Franchise Enterprises, Inc., 588 So.2d
1353, 1356 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 591 So.2d
708 (1992) (quoting LeBrane v. Lewis , 292 So.2d 216,
217, 218 (La. 1974)). [emphasis added].

In the instant case, the undisputed facts establish that at the time of the
accident, Mr. Brock had left TMC’s premises in Georgia and returned to his home

5

in Louisiana. He did not travel to Louisiana for any work-related purposes; instead,
he did so in order to participate in military training related to his service in the
Louisiana National Guard. His actions at the time of the accident were purely
personal because his in tent was to travel to the store with his wife to purchase
groceries and other household items. These facts indicate Mr. Brock’s actions were
not taken in furtherance of his employer’s interests.
Nonetheless, plaintiff emphasizes Mr. Brock’s use of a vehicle rented by TMC
in order to travel to Louisiana. Plaintiff asserts this fact raises the question of
whether TMC benefited from Mr. Brock’s use of the rental vehicle, because it would
allow him to return to the jobsite in Georgia more qu ickly than if he were required
to rely on alternative transportation.
We see no merit to this argument. The jurisprudence has long recognized that
an employee’s use of a company car or truck does not give rise to vicarious liability
where the employee’s trip is personal. See Johns v. Hunt Lumber Company, Inc. ,
250 So.2d 543, 549 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971) (explaining that an employee’s use of a
company truck to go the grocery store “was strictly a personal mission and of no
benefit to his employer . . .”). Similarly, the mere fact the employer may receive an
indirect benefit from the employee’s use of a company vehicle does not place the
employee within the course and scope of employment when the employee is on a
purely personal mission. See Keen v. Pel State Oil Co ., 332 So.2d 286, 291 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1976) (“[t]he fact that an employee can make it to work faster in a car
than by bus or some other means of transportation likewise does not bring the trip
within the course and scope of employment”); see also Zambrano v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 2019-0769 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/12/20) . ___ So.3d ___ (“even though
G&T may have received an incidental benefit from the advertising on Rivera’s truck,
this is too tenuous to place Rivera in the course and scope of his employment at the
time of the accident. ”). Thus, even assuming TMC received some indirect or

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incidental benefits from Mr. Brock’s use of the vehicle rented by TMC, these
benefits are not sufficient to place him in the course and scope of his employment at
the time of the accident.
Finally, plaintiff submits there are questions of fact as to whether Mr. Brock
was negligent in entrusting the use of the rental vehicle to his wife when he knew
she had a suspended license. We see no reason to reach this issue in the context of
the instant case, as it is not relevant to the question of TMC’s vicarious liability. As
we have explained, the undisputed evidence demonstrates Mr. Brock was on a
personal mission at the time of the accident and was not in the course and scope of
his employment. Therefore, any discussion of whether Mr. Brock might be liable to
plaintiff under a negligent entrustment theory is not germane to the question of
whether TMC is entitled to summary judgment.
In sum, we find TMC has satisfied its burden on summary judgment by
establishing the absence of factual support for an essential element of plaintiff’s
vicarious liability claim. Plaintiff has not produ ced any evidence of a material
factual dispute. Summary judgment in favor of TMC is therefore mandated.

DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the writ is granted and made peremptory. The
judgment of the district court is reversed and s ummary judgment is granted ,
dismissing the claims of plaintiff, Eugene Latour, I I, against Annett Holdings, Inc.
d/b/a TMC Transportation with prejudice.