State of Louisiana v. Sharonda S. Freeman

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2023-K-0074

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
SHARONDA S. FREEMAN *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 553-254, SECTION “M1”
Honorable Juana M. Lombard, Commissioner
******
Chief Judge Terri F. Love
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge
Rosemary Ledet)

Samuel H. Winston
Jeigh L. Britton
Winston Bergeron, LLP
1700 Josephine Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70113

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR, SHARONDA FREEMAN

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
FEBRUARY 7, 2023

TFL This application for supervisory review arises from the conviction and
JCL sentence of Sharonda Freeman for one count of simple battery in magistrate court.
RML After sentencing, Ms. Freeman sought review from the Appellate Division of

Criminal District Court, wherein two judges affirmed without reasons the judgment

of the magistrate court, and one judge dissented without reasons.

Ms. Freeman now seeks review of her conviction and sentence from this

Court. After review, we find sufficient evidence was presented to find Ms.

Freeman guilty of simple battery and that her sentence was within the vast

discretion of the magistrate court. As such, we grant the writ, but deny relief. The

request for a stay is also denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 16, 2021, Ms. Freeman was a teacher in the Aurora Program at

the Harriet Tubman Charter School in New Orleans when a nine-year-old student,

swung his backpack and hit Ms. Freeman’s face. Instead of following the school

protocol, Ms. Freeman pointed in the student’s face and grabbed him by the

backpack strap.1 After reviewing the video footage of the incident, the school

1 As described by counsel for Ms. Freeman in the writ application.

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administrator spoke with Ms. Freeman and terminated her employment.

Ms. Freeman was then charged with a misdemeanor violation of La. R.S.

14:35 Simple Battery. Following a bench trial in magistrate court, Ms. Freeman

was convicted and subsequently sentenced to three days imprisonment with 57

days suspended and six months active probation. Ms. Freeman was also required

to participate in anger management counseling, complete fifty hours of community

service, and submit to six drug tests. Her imprisonment was stayed and the

magistrate court was ordered to set post-conviction bail. See State v. Freeman, 22-

0577 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/25/22), 348 So. 3d 135, 136.

Ms. Freeman sought review of her conviction and sentence from the

Appellate Division of Criminal District Court. A panel of three judges affirmed

her conviction and sentence, with two judges voting to affirm and one judge

dissenting without reasons. Ms. Freeman now seeks our supervisory review and

requests expedited consideration, as she is scheduled to report to serve out her

sentence on February 16, 2023.

Ms. Freeman contends there was insufficient evidence to convict her of

simple battery and that her sentence was excessive.

SIMPLE BATTERY

Ms. Freeman avers there was insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction.

Specifically, Ms. Freeman maintains that she lacked the requisite criminal intent,

that she did not use force or violence, and that the “discipline” she imposed was

“reasonable and justified” within the student-teacher dynamic.

This Court previously stated:

When assessing the sufficiency of evidence to
support a conviction, the appellate court must determine
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

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to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the
essential elements of the crime charged. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560
(1979); State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965 (La.1986); State
v. Heck, 560 So.2d 611 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990), writ
denied, 566 So.2d 395 (La.1990). The reviewing court
must consider the record as a whole and not just the
evidence most favorable to the prosecution; and, if
rational triers of fact could disagree as to the
interpretation of the evidence, the rational decision to
convict should be upheld. State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d
1305 (La.1988); State v. Green, 588 So.2d 757 (La.App.
4th Cir.1991).

State v. Hernandez, 96-0115, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/18/96), 686 So. 2d 92, 94.

“Battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of

another; or the intentional administration of a poison or other noxious liquid or

substance to another.” La. R.S. 14:33. Simple battery is defined as “a battery

committed without the consent of the victim.” La. R.S. 14:35(A). “General

criminal intent is present when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the

ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed

criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.”

Hernandez, 96-0115, p. 3, 686 So. 2d at 94-95.

It is undisputed that Ms. Freeman made contact with the student’s person.

However, Ms. Freeman contends that she lacked the criminal intent, did not use

force or violence, or that the force used was justified in the student-teacher

relationship.

During the bench trial, Detective Marcia Willis-Watson testified that she

investigated the incident between Ms. Freeman and the special needs student.

After discovering that the student did not receive “any physical injuries other than

just maybe some unwanted touching,” Detective Willis-Watson believed the

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charge of simple battery was appropriate.

The school administrator/director of the Aurora Program, Carissa

Kolakauskas, testified that:

every student in our program — we are a small program.
Last school year we had 22 students. Every student in our
program has an individualized education plan that are in
special education and receive special education services.
This includes counseling, occupational therapy, physical
therapy and academic supports.

She stated that the student victim’s accommodations were as follows:

He had small group and individualized academic
instruction. He also received speech language pathology
services. He had special transportation and a shorten
school day.

Ms. Kolakauskas stated that the staff is trained with a focus on verbal de-

escalation strategies, but that everyone also learns safe physical restraints for

students posing a risk to themselves or others. Ms. Kolakauskas testified that she

witnessed the student swing his backpack up in the air, hit Ms. Freeman in the

face, and knock her sunglasses off.

She provided surveillance footage of the incident, as she maintains the

surveillance cameras and only one other person on her staff can control the

cameras. Ms. Kolakauskas testified that she informed Ms. Freeman: “we don’t

tolerate any sort of physical aggression towards students and that I was going to

have to terminate her.”

The magistrate court ruled at the conclusion of the bench trial as follows:

That being said, your next argument about consent
might have flown if this was an adult. But first of all,
this is a special needs child. Just like a minor can not
consent to be raped. They can not consent to having sex.
A special needs child that is nine therefore probably not
even nine intellectually based on the fact that he is
special needs, I don’t think he can legally consent to

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being shoved, pushed or abused. So we are going to
strike the second argument that he didn’t legally consent
or that the State had to prove that the child didn’t legally
consent because he is minor. He is a very young child
with special needs and the State did prove that it was
with special needs. In fact, I think the defendant was his
special needs teacher. I don’t think that the argument of
consent or lack thereof is valid in this particular case.
Last but not least, the custodian testified that she is
the only one of the only two people that have the log in
and access to those videos. So she is the keeper of those
video records. She observed the video. The Court
observed the video and it is very clear that it was an
unwanted touching.
Now, I will say that my mother was a special
needs teacher and I know special needs teachers get
attacked in the classroom all the time. Unfortunately,
that is a risk of the job because of the kids mental state.
But the thing is, if she had swung back right and there I
might have had a different reaction or a different ruling.
But she didn’t respond at the time of the attack. She
stopped. She gathered her glasses. The child got all the
way to the front entrance of the school. Then she
attacked him. That means there was a cooling off period.
That was an intentional move to go over there and touch
that child at that point. That child was out of her
custody, out of her control and in the control of another
teacher.

Our review of the video 1.2 reveals that the student swung his backpack up

in the air when it struck Ms. Freeman in the face, dislodging her sunglasses at

around the 44-second mark. Ms. Freeman stops and picks up her glasses, but does

not leave her classroom until around the 2:08 minute mark. Video 1.3 depicts Ms.

Freeman walking into the school’s foyer wherein she walks around looking at her

phone from about the five-second mark and exchanges words with someone off

camera. At approximately the 1:02 minute mark, Ms. Freeman corners the student

in a corner of the foyer, she exchanges words with the student, and appears to push

or shove the student’s head. Ms. Freeman then points her finger/hand in the

student’s face and, at about the 1:15 minute mark, grabs the student by the

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backpack strap, preventing him from fleeing. The student then runs from the

school.

The record reflects that a rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond

a reasonable doubt each of the essential elements of simple battery were proven.

Firstly, the student did not consent to the use of force/violence. Secondly, that Ms.

Freeman did use force or violence against the student, as depicted in the video. As

such, we find there was sufficient evidence to sustain Ms. Freeman’s conviction

for simple battery.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

Ms. Freeman contends that her sentence, while within the statutory range, is

excessive under the circumstances of the case.

This Court outlined the review of a claim of excessive sentencing as follows:

Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution
explicitly prohibits the imposition of excessive sentences.
State v. Wilson, 2014-1267, p. 23 (La. App. 4 Cir.
4/29/15), 165 So.3d 1150, 1165. “The excessiveness of a
sentence is a question of law, and a reviewing court will
not set aside a sentence [for excessiveness] absent a
manifest abuse of discretion by the trial [judge].” State v.
Alridge, 2017-0231, p. 39 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/18), 249
So.3d 260, 288, writ denied, 2018-1046 (La. 1/8/19), 259
So.3d 1021. (The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated the judgment, and remanded on Ramos grounds).
Although a sentence is within the statutory limits,
the sentence may still violate a defendant’s constitutional
right against excessive punishment. State v. Every, 2009-
0721, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/24/10), 35 So. 3d 410, 417
(quoting State v. Smith, 2001-2574, p. 6 (La. 1/14/03),
839 So.2d 1, 4). “However, the penalties provided by the
legislature reflect the degree to which the criminal
conduct is an affront to society.” State v. Cassimere,
2009-1075, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/17/10), 34 So. 3d 954,
958 (quoting State v. Landry, 2003-1671, p. 8 (La. Ap. 4
Cir. 3/31/04), 871 So.2d 1235, 1239). A sentence is
unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, is
nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and

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suffering, and is grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the crime. State v. Ambeau, 2008-1191, p. 9 (La. App.
4 Cir. 2/11/09), 6 So.3d 215, 221 (citing State v.
Bertrand, 2004-1496, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/15/04),
891 So.2d 752, 757). “A sentence is grossly
disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are
considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks
the sense of justice.” State v. Vargas-Alcerreca, 2012-
1070, p. 25 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/13), 126 So.3d 569, 583
(quoting State v. Galindo, 2006-1090, pp. 15-16 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 10/3/07), 968 So.2d 1102, 1113).
A trial court is afforded broad discretion in making
sentencing decisions and an appellate court will not set
aside an imposed sentence if the record supports the
sentence imposed. State v. Bradley, 2018-0734, p. 8 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 5/15/19), 272 So.3d 94, 99-100 (quoting
State v. Williams, 2015-0866, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1/20/16), 186 So.3d 242, 250). Thus, “[t]he relevant
question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence
might have been more appropriate.” State v. Mathieu,
2018-964, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/6/19), 283 So.3d
1041, 1045 (citing State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96),
674 So.2d 957).
In reviewing a claim that a sentence is excessive,
an appellate court generally must determine whether the
trial judge has adequately complied with statutory
guidelines in La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and whether the
sentence is warranted under the facts established by the
record. State v. Wiltz, 2008-1441, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir.
12/16/09), 28 So.3d 554, 561 (quoting State v. Batiste,
2006-0875, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06), 947 So.2d
810, 820). However, even where there has not been full
compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, resentencing is
unnecessary where the record shows an adequate factual
basis for the sentence imposed. State v. Stukes, 2008-
1217, p. 25 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/9/09), 19 So.3d 1233, 1250
(quoting Batiste, 2006-0875, p. 18, 947 So.2d at 820).
Further, La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D) expressly states that an
“appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for
excessiveness if the record supports the sentence
imposed.”

State v. Mitchell, 21-0488, pp. 5-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/15/21), 334 So. 3d 449, 453-

54.

Simple battery is a probatible offense up to six months imprisonment. The

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magistrate court sentenced Ms. Freeman to six months with all but three days

suspended. She received six months active probation, requiring anger management

classes, drug testing, and community service. We recognize this was Ms.

Freeman’s first offense and that she has begun to comply with the requirements of

her sentence, i.e., anger management and community service, but do not find that

the magistrate court abused its vast discretion in sentencing Ms. Freeman to serve

three days in prison, suspending the remaining time.

DECREE

For the above-mentioned reasons, we find that the record sufficiently

supports Ms. Freeman’s conviction for simple battery and that her sentence was

within the vast discretion afforded. Accordingly, we grant Ms. Freeman’s writ,

deny the request for a stay, and deny relief. Ms. Freeman’s conviction and

sentence remain intact.

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

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