State Of Louisiana v. David Bourgeois

Supreme Court of Louisiana
April 09, 2024
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
DAVID BOURGEOIS
No. 2023-K-00862
_ _
_ _ _ _
IN
RE: David Bourgeois - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Writ Of Certiorari,
Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Number(s) 22- 3418, Court of
Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Number(s) 23-KP-140;
_ _ _ _ _ _
April 09, 2024
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., dissents and would grant and docket.
Crain, J., dissents.
McCallum, J., dissents in part and assigns reasons.
SJC
JDH
JTG
PDG
04/09/2024 "See News Release 016 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No.
2023-K-00862
STA
TE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
DAVID BOURGEOIS
On W
rit of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Parish of Jefferson
P
ER CURIAM:
Writ granted. Defendant was convicted of four violations of a protective order,
La.R.S. 14:79 . The court of appeal, with one dissent, found the evidence was
sufficient under the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99
S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), to prove that defendant violated the protective
order on four occasions by parking within 100 yards of the protected person’s
residence. State v. Bourgeois , 23 -140 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/23), 367 So.3d 133.
Judge Regan (pro tempore) dissented and would find the evidence presented at trial
necessarily left reasonable doubt as to whether defendant came within 100 yards of
the residence. We agree with the dissent that the State’s proof with regard to
defendant’s distance from the home was lacking. As the dissent found, a deputy
testified that he did not know how long the driveway was or if it was more than 100
yards, and he did not know if defendant was closer than 100 yards to the house. In
addition, the dissent noted, the distance cannot be determined from the pictures.
However, the State now contends that defendant also violated the protective
order in another manner, unrelated to the distance he maintained from the protected
person’s residence, by stalking, following, harassing, or threatening her. The
underlying conduct remain the same, i.e. that on four occasions defendant parked
near the end of the protected person’s driveway or across the street from her
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residence. Defendant responds to the State’s argument by contending that the finder
of fact, the trial judge in this bench trial, made statements while ruling that only
addressed defendant’s distance from the home and did not make any explicit findings
with regard to this alternative theory of guilt.
While defendant is correct that the trier of fact, the judge in this bench trial,
commented about his assessment of distance and did not make an explicit finding
with respect to the second way the protective order can be violated, the State is
correct that in applying the due process standard of Jackson v. Virginia the pertinent
inquiry in a bench trial remains, as it does in jury trials, on the rationality of the result
and not on the thought processes of the particular fact finder. See State v. Marshall,
2004-3139, pp. 6–7 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 362, 367–8 (describing how to apply
the Jackson v. Virginia standard to bench trials). Nonetheless, when we apply the
Jackson v. Virginia standard to the evidence presented at this trial (rather than
confine review to the reasons expressed by the fact finder ), we find the evidence
insufficient to support the convictions under the State’s alternative theory as well.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find it
insufficient to prove that defendant violated the protective order on four occasions
by stalking, following, harassing, or threatening the protected person.
Accordingly, we grant defendant’s application to reverse the ruling of the
court of appeal, which affirmed the convictions for four counts of violating a
protective order. We vacate the four convictions and sentences at issue here, and we
acquit defendant of the charges.
REVERSED