2023-K-0730 Precedential Writ Granted; Reversed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Jeffery Turner

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit · Filed December 8, 2023

The holding in the court’s own words

We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from Defendant’s residence pursuant to the warrant.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2023-K-0730

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
JEFFERY TURNER *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 557-565, SECTION “C”
Honorable Benedict J. Willard, Judge
******
Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge
Tiffany Gautier Chase)

Jason R. Williams
District Attorney
Brad Scott
Chief of Appeals
Zachary Phillips
Assistant District Attorney
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/RESPONDENT

Devin C. Jones
JOHN T. FULLER & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
650 Poydras St., Suite 2760
New Orleans, LA 70112

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR

WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED

DECEMBER 8, 2023

JCL Relator, the State of Louisiana, seeks review of the district court’s October

TFL 19, 2023 ruling granting the motion to suppress evidence filed by the defendant,

TGC Jeffery Turner (“Defendant”). For the reasons that follow, we grant the writ and

reverse the district court’s ruling.

Defendant is charged with one count of aggravated assault with a firearm, a

HH violation of La. R.S. 14:37.4. Defendant filed an omnibus motion to suppress
HH
KKK evidence wherein he asserted that “the warrant was without probable cause, was
jKK
KK based upon stale information, was based upon misrepresentations, intentional or

inadvertent, and was otherwise in violation of the defendant’s rights . . .”

Detective Sam Biscoe testified as the sole witness at the suppression

hearing. Additionally, the search warrant authorizing the search of Defendant’s

residence, including the sworn application was introduced into evidence. The

district court granted the motion to suppress, stating, “Motion to suppress is

granted based on the witness testimony from the reports. One is silver. The weapon

you’re saying is in [the] reports is a dark-colored weapon.”

Detective Biscoe testified that he conducted a follow-up investigation of an

incident of road rage that occurred on I-10 West on January 10, 2023. The victim

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had reported to the responding officer that as he entered onto I-10 West via the

Orleans Avenue/Vieux Carré on-ramp, the driver of the vehicle traveling in the

center lane did not allow him to merge into the center lane. The driver rolled down

his window, asked the victim if he had not seen his vehicle, and directed an

expletive to the victim; the victim responded that he had not seen the vehicle and

shouted the expletive at the other driver. The two men continued to exchange the

expletive until the other driver produced a silver handgun, pointed it at the victim,

and stated, “Say it again.” At this point, the victim discontinued the exchange and

called the police to report the matter.

The victim described the offending vehicle to the 911 operator as a large,

black mid-2000’s SUV and provided the vehicle’s license plate number. He also

described his assailant as a medium to heavy-set black male with a brown

complexion in his forties.

Detective Biscoe conducted a records check on the license plate and then on

the vehicle’s registered owner, which revealed that the vehicle was a black 2008

Ford Expedition and was registered to Defendant at a home address on New

Orleans Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, 70119. A records check of the driver’s

license of Defendant revealed a date of birth, height, and weight consistent with the

description of the assailant provided by the victim.

Detective Briscoe subsequently drove by Defendant’s home address and

observed the 2008 Ford Expedition parked in front of the residence “for an

extended period of time, indicating that it was registered to that address and it

belonged there.” On January 20, 2023, Detective Briscoe obtained warrants

authorizing the search of Defendant’s residence and vehicle for “[f]irearms,

ammunition, firearm asseccsories [sic], ammunition, mobile devises with GPS

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data, [and] vehicle registration paperwork.” During the search of Defendant’s

residence, Detective Briscoe recovered a black and blue colored Taurus 9 mm.

handgun and an Airsoft gun, which he explained “was not an actual firearm, but

looked very much like it.”1 No weapons were discovered inside Defendant’s

vehicle.

The State asserts in its writ application that the district court erred in

granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because the firearm seized from

Defendant’s residence did not match the description of the firearm used in the

offense, as indicated in Detective Briscoe’s report. Specifically, the district court

noted that the victim described the weapon as a silver handgun, while the firearm

seized was apparently black and blue in color.

When evidence is seized pursuant to a search warrant, the defendant has the

burden to prove the grounds of his motion to suppress evidence. La. C.Cr.P. at.

703(D). As delineated previously, the record demonstrates that Detective Briscoe

searched Defendant’s residence pursuant to a search warrant;2 thus, Defendant bore

the burden of proof on his motion to suppress.

Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is shown when the facts

and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably

trustworthy information, are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an

offense has been committed and evidence may be found at the place to be

searched. State v. Cunningham, 11-0886, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/21/12), 88 So.3d

1196, 1201. An issuing magistrate’s determination of probable cause for a search

1 La. R.S. 14:37.4(B) defines “firearm” as “an instrument used in the propulsion of shot, shell, or

bullets by the action of gunpowder exploded within it.”
2 The search warrant authorized the seizure of “firearms,” without specification as to color.

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warrant must be accorded great deference and does not involve certainties or proof

beyond a reasonable doubt. Cunningham, 11-0886, p. 7, 88 So.3d at 1201 (citing

State v. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d 830, 832-33 (La. 1983)). Reviewing courts should

interpret the affidavit in a realistic and common sense fashion with an awareness

that it is normally prepared by non-lawyer police officers in the midst and haste of

a criminal investigation. Id. (citing State v. Green, 02-1022, p. 8 (La. 12/4/02), 831

So.2d 962, 969). Consequently, the task for a reviewing court is simply to insure

that under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a substantial basis

for concluding probable cause to issue the warrant existed. State v. Hankton, 17-

1108, p. 4 (La. 7/20/17), 222 So.3d 41, 44 (citing State v. Lee, 05-2098, p. 14 (La.

1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 122).

Detective Briscoe attested to sufficient facts to support the validity of the

warrant. The supporting affidavit contains the victim’s account of the altercation,

including the assailant pointing a firearm at the victim and implicitly threatening to

shoot him. Further, the victim provided the 911 operator with a description of the

assailant and of the assailant’s vehicle, including the license plate number. Records

searches conducted by Detective Briscoe revealed that the vehicle involved in the

assault was registered to Defendant at his New Orleans Street address. Detective

Briscoe drove by Defendant’s residence and observed the vehicle parked in front

of the residence. Defendant offered no evidence to support the conclusory,

boilerplate allegations of his motion to suppress that the warrant was not supported

by probable cause, was based on stale information, was based on

misrepresentations, and was otherwise unconstitutional.

Moreover, the district court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress based

solely on the reasoning that the firearm seized pursuant to the warrant was not the

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same firearm described in the police report. However, the search warrant

authorized the seizure of “firearms,” etc., and the district court did not address

Defendant’s arguments regarding the validity of the warrant in its ruling from the

bench. The district court’s reasoning that the item seized was described differently

in the police report than Det. Biscoe’s testimony does not constitute a proper basis

upon which to suppress the evidence pursuant to Defendant’s motion to suppress.3

The United States Supreme Court has held that evidence seized pursuant to a

warrant based on less than probable cause need not be suppressed if the officers

who executed the warrant believed it to be validly issued. State v. Long, 03-2592,

p. 6 (La. 9/9/04), 884 So.2d 1176, 1180 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). In Leon, the Court evaluated the

costs and benefits of suppressing “reliable physical evidence seized by officers

reasonably relying o[n] a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate” and

found that “such evidence should be admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief.”

Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 913, 104 S.Ct. at 3415). In formulating this

judicially created good faith rule, the Court reasoned that the good faith of an

officer in the execution of a warrant signed by a neutral magistrate should be

enough for the evidence obtained as a result of the search to be admissible. Id.

(citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 913, 104 S.Ct. at 3415). Thus, the Court expressed a

strong preference for warrants over warrantless searches by allowing evidence

3 Nonetheless, Defendant is not precluded from filing other motions addressing issues as to the

relevancy of the seized firearm and the identification of the firearm used in the incident. We note
that those issues were not included in Defendant’s motion to suppress, and Defendant presented
no argument at the hearing, nor were issues of relevancy and identification properly before the
court. See State v. Marshall, 22-0145, p. 30 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/15/22), 342 So.3d 1029, 1048
(“For a trial court to raise a challenge on its own, or to grant relief on grounds other than those
asserted in a petition, deprives the parties an opportunity to brief and argue those grounds.”)
(citing State v. Jackson, 14-0655, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/26/14), 154 So.3d 722, 725).

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seized in constitutionally questionable searches to be admissible into evidence if

the officers were relying on a validly issued warrant. Id.

The Court in Leon based its ruling on the purpose of the exclusionary rule --

to deter police misconduct -- and found that suppression is not necessary unless

some sort of police misconduct was implicated. The Court, however, set forth four

instances in which the good faith doctrine would not apply: (1) where the affiant

misled the magistrate by including misleading statements in the affidavit that the

affiant knew were false or that he should have known were false in the absence of

a reckless disregard for the truth; (2) where the magistrate abandoned his detached

and neutral role; (3) where the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable

cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable;” or (4)

where the warrant was so facially deficient that the officers could not presume it to

be valid. Long, 03-2592, p. 7, 884 So.2d at 1181 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104

S.Ct. at 3421).

Applying these factors to the current case, we find that the record contains

no evidence of any misleading statements that were contained in the affidavit

presented to the magistrate. Notably, the affidavit stated that the victim described

the gun used in the assault as being silver in color. Additionally, there was no

evidence that the issuing magistrate was not neutral and detached, no evidence that

the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief

in its existence entirely unreasonable,” and no evidence of a deficiency in the

warrant. We therefore find that none of the four Leon exceptions applies to justify

suppression of this evidence that was seized pursuant to a warrant.

We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting

Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from Defendant’s residence

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pursuant to the warrant. We therefore grant this writ application and reverse the

district court’s ruling of October 19, 2023 granting Defendant’s motion to suppress

evidence.

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