State of Louisiana v. James Jefferson

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2023-KA-0520

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL

JAMES JEFFERSON * FOURTH CIRCUIT

* STATE OF LOUISIANA

*******

APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 551-321, SECTION “C”
Honorable Benedict J. Willard, Judge
******
Chief Judge Terri F. Love
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge
Rosemary Ledet)

Jason Rogers Williams
District Attorney, Orleans Parish
Brad Scott, Chief of Appeals
Zachary M. Phillips
Assistant District Attorney
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE/APPELLEE

Mary Constance Hanes
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
1538 Short Street
New Orleans, LA 70118

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED
February 8, 2024

TFL
RLB
RML
Defendant, James Jefferson, was convicted of second-degree murder, a

violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1; two counts of felon in possession of a firearm,

violations of La. R.S. 14:95.1; and armed robbery with a firearm, a violation of

14:64.3. The victim of the second-degree murder was Jamonta Johnson (“the

decedent”) and the victim of the armed robbery was the decedent’s younger sister,

Jimmice Johnson (“Jimmice”). The murder and armed robbery offenses were

separate incidents that occurred on different dates. On appeal, Defendant contends

the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on the second-degree murder

charge and the felon in possession of a firearm charge involving the decedent’s

shooting death.

In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a

rational fact finder could have found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder

and a felon in possession of a firearm. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s

convictions and the sentences imposed.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

The State charged Defendant with second-degree murder, two counts of

felon in possession of a firearm, armed robbery, and obstruction of justice. The

1

second-degree murder charge and the felon in possession of a firearm charge—

count three—resulted from the decedent’s shooting death, which occurred on April

16, 2019. The armed robbery charge and the felon in possession of firearm

charge—count five—arose from the March 23, 2019 robbery of Jimmice.

Defendant entered not guilty pleas to all the charges.

In connection with the armed robbery of Jimmice, co-defendant, Jonathan

Bush (“Bush”), was charged with armed robbery committed with the use of a

firearm and felon in possession of a firearm in the same indictment. The charges

against Bush were resolved through a plea agreement with the State prior to trial.1

The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to sever the murder-related

charges from the armed robbery offenses. This Court denied supervisory writ

review.2

Defendant opposed the State’s motion to introduce the statement of a

deceased witness, Shantrell Reese—Defendant’s former girlfriend—pursuant to

La. C.E. art. 804(B)(7).3 The trial court ruled the statement was admissible. This

1 Bush pled guilty to an amended count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and the State

dismissed the felon in possession of a firearm charge.
2 See State v. Jefferson, 2021-0329 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/2/21).

3 Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 804(B)(7) provides the following:

(7)(a) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement offered against a party that has
engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability of the declarant as a witness.

(b) A party seeking to introduce statements under the forfeiture by wrongdoing
hearsay exception shall establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
party against whom the statement is offered, engaged or acquiesced in the
wrongdoing.

2

Court and the Supreme Court denied writs. 4 Thereafter, the trial on the merits took

place.

Trial Testimony Summation

The underlying facts developed through testimony adduced at trial included

the following. 5

Detective Joseph Jefferson

Det. Jefferson, the lead homicide detective in the decedent’s April 16, 2019

murder, testified that he received a call after midnight regarding the shooting and

arrived on the scene around 12:45 a.m. Det. Jefferson identified the photographs

of the crime scene and the decedent’s body. Det. Jefferson verified that the

decedent was shot as he attempted to enter his apartment. He found no indication

that the decedent had a gun on his person and did not find a gun in decedent’s car.

Det. Jefferson stated that he canvassed the area; however, he was unable to

locate any eyewitnesses to the homicide. While on the scene, Det. Jefferson

testified that a “guy just came up to [his] car” and told him there was “a suspicious

person in the area.” However, “this guy” did not see the face of the suspicious

person because a hoodie was pulled over his head and face. The suspicious person

was not identified and Det. Jefferson did not believe that he was involved in the

murder. The guy who approached Det. Jefferson also was not identified. Det.

4 See State v. Jefferson, 2021-0643 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/12/21). See also State v. Jefferson, 2021-
01691(La. 11/16/21), 327 So.3d 506.

5 The parties stipulated to the authenticity of the six audio 911 calls that the State introduced into

evidence. The callers reported that a black male had been shot multiple times outside his
apartment complex.

Dr. Cynthia Gardner, the expert forensic pathologist who performed the decedent’s autopsy,
testified that the decedent suffered four gunshot wounds through his body that were “in and out;”
the decedent’s body showed no signs of a recent physical altercation; and the shots were fired
greater than two feet from the decedent.

3

Jefferson averred that although three semi-automatic casings were recovered, the

weapon used in the homicide was never located.

Det. Jefferson testified that he interviewed the decedent’s mother, an older

sister, and the decedent’s girlfriend, Feltralynn Hall, on April 19, 2019. Det.

Jefferson learned from Ms. Hall that she had received an Instagram message sent

from an account bearing the name “Tootsiereloaded.” 6 The message indicated that

the decedent’s death was related to an armed robbery of Jimmice that had occurred

a few weeks before the homicide. Det. Jefferson discovered that the decedent had

“facilitated” the two individuals believed to have robbed Jimmice to do some

carpentry work at Jimmice’s music studio.

Det. Jefferson testified that a “cell phone dump” obtained from the

decedent’s cell phone showed that he had pictures of Bush and Defendant in his

phone. The decedent’s possession of these photographs indicated to the detective

that the decedent wanted to do something about his little sister’s robbery. The

State introduced the photographs of Defendant and Bush which were recovered

from the decedent’s cell phone. The name “Jonathan Bush” was written under

Bush’s photograph.

Det. Jefferson testified that he obtained a surveillance video taken on March

23, 2019, at the storage facility location where Jimmice was robbed. The video,

which was played for the jury, depicted Defendant entering the facility before

Jimmice’s arrival. After Jimmice’s arrival, Defendant followed in a separate

6 Det. Jefferson later determined that the “Tootsiereloaded” account belonged to a woman named

Lashonda Cotton, a cousin of a former friend of Ms. Hall. Det. Jefferson said that he was never
able to speak to Ms. Cotton. Neither Ms. Cotton nor Ms. Hall testified at trial.

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elevator. When Defendant departed the storage facility, the video showed

Defendant carrying bags similar to the ones Jimmice had upon her arrival.

After Det. Jefferson’s initial testimony, he was later called to testify

regarding his interview of Shantrell Reese, Defendant’s deceased girlfriend, with

whom Defendant shared a child.7

Det. Jefferson’s Testimony Re: Statement of Shantrell Reese

Det. Jefferson learned from Fourth District Officers that Ms. Reese had

information concerning the decedent’s homicide. He said that he first obtained

direct knowledge of Defendant through his interview of Ms. Reese.

Defendant objected to the State’s introduction into evidence of the audio of

Ms. Reese statement. However, the State pointed out the trial court’s previous

ruling that Ms. Reese’s statement was admissible under La. C.E. art. 804(B)(7)

because the preponderance of the evidence established that her unavailability for

trial—her murder—resulted from Defendant’s wrongdoing. The State cited Ms.

Reese’s text messages to a friend in which she relayed, in part, that “I need you to

take care of my kids. I’m being threatened. James keeps calling me, harassing me,

sending me letters saying I better not appear in court. And I’m scared but God got

me.” The State then played the audio recording of Ms. Reese’s statement to the

jury after the trial court overruled Defendant’s objections.

Ms. Reese’s statement began with her announcement that “I’m not showing

up to court.” She stated, “[i]t was a robbery. They robbed a young man’s sister.”

7 Det. Jefferson also testified in his initial testimony that on the night before the murder, a friend

of the decedent picked the decedent up at the dealership where the decedent worked, driving
decedent’s vehicle. The friend had borrowed the decedent’s car. The two then drove to the
residence of a relative of the friend, at which point the friend retrieved his vehicle. The
decedent then followed the friend to the friend’s home, and later, the decedent went to his
residence. Det. Jefferson said he spoke to the friend and the decedent’s co-workers and failed to
uncover anything “suspicious.”

5

She stated that “it didn’t make it to the police” because it was “a drug situation.”

Ms. Reese said that she didn’t know either the “young man who got killed” or his

sister. She stated that she “just [knew] what her baby daddy [told her].”

Ms. Reese said that on the evening of the murder, Defendant called and told

her “to go outside and see if there are any police lights in Parc Fontaine.”8 Ms.

Reese said that at the time, she lived close to Parc Fontaine. When Ms. Reese went

outside, she could see flashing lights. She stated that after she told Defendant that

police lights could be seen, he replied, “[i]t’s done.” She asked Defendant what he

meant by that comment. He answered, “[w]e got him. We killed the dude.”

Ms. Reese stated that Defendant later “came inside” around “twelve

something,” after “they put the guns up.” She emphasized that Defendant said,

“[w] e got him. The dude got out of his car, he was walking up to his door. He

turned around, he was just like, ‘[w]hat’s up?’” She guessed that the decedent was

killed thereafter. Ms. Reese was of the opinion that the sister must have known

that the decedent was going to retaliate and surmised that Defendant killed the

decedent as a preemptive action to avoid retaliation by the decedent as a result of

Jimmice’s armed robbery.

Ms. Reese told Det. Jefferson that she could tell him “what kind of weapon

it was.” She said it was “an AR, or some type of chopper. It was a big gun.” She

believed that two guns were used in the homicide, but said that she “knew it was

his work” because he had called her and then returned to the house and “told [her]

about it.” Ms. Reese maintained that the gun had been in the house and was under

the bed at one time.

8 The name of decedent’s apartment complex was “Parc Fontaine or “Rue Parc Fontaine.”

6

Towards the end of the interview, Ms. Reese identified Defendant through

his driver’s license photograph provided by Det. Jefferson. However, Ms. Reese

refused to sign the photograph. She stated that she and Defendant had been living

together at the time of the murder. Ms. Reese did not provide any details about

their domestic dispute, but said that she was aggravated and that she “wanted her

baby.”

Det. Jefferson confirmed that the photograph Ms. Reese had identified as

Defendant matched the photograph of Defendant depicted on Defendant’s certified

conviction packet. Det. Jefferson verified that the conviction packet showed

Defendant had previously pled guilty to armed robbery and illegal possession of

stolen things. Det. Jefferson added that he subpoenaed Defendant’s phone records

based on the telephone number provided by Ms. Reese.

Det. Jefferson stated that Ms. Reese provided information that had not been

generally released to the media, such as Jimmice’s robbery by two men, the fact

that a rifle— a choppa—was used in the murder—and that the murder occurred as

the decedent was entering his residence. He also noted that Defendant’s phone

records verified that he called Ms. Reese around the time frame provided by Ms.

Reese.

On cross-examination, Det. Jefferson acknowledged that the information

regarding Jimmice’s robbery had been known to family members. He also said

Defendant had physical custody of Ms. Reese’s and Defendant’s baby, who was

about a week old at the time of the interview. Det. Jefferson confirmed that Ms.

Reese said that she wanted her baby back and said she would “play dirty.” Det.

Jefferson also testified that there was only one type of bullet casing found at the

7

scene and that the homicide happened after midnight, not around 11:00 p.m. as

deduced by Ms. Reese.

On re-direct examination, Det. Jefferson provided that Ms. Reese’s

statement established that Defendant was not home at the time of the shooting. He

explained that Ms. Reese never said with certainty that two different types of

bullets had been used in the shooting; instead, that comment was made in an “off-

hand” manner. Det. Jefferson expounded that Ms. Reese had also used midnight

and 1:00 a.m. references in describing the time frame and events surrounding the

shooting. He confirmed that Ms. Reese could see lights from near where the

murder took place based on her location. Det. Jefferson maintained that although

Ms. Reese did not expressly tell him why she did not want to come to court, about

four other people with knowledge of the murder indicated they were too scared to

testify or talk to Det. Jefferson.

Jimmice Johnson

Jimmice testified that she produced music. On March 23, 2019, she was

building a music recording studio on the sixth floor of a storage facility on Tulane

Avenue. She had hired a person she knew as “Two,” later identified as Bush, to

complete construction on the studio. She testified that the decedent had arranged

for “Two” to paint walls and put floors down in the studio.

Jimmice identified herself on the surveillance video. She testified that she

arrived at the storage facility alone. She brought a purse and a bag containing her

portable speaker. Jimmice heard a knock on the door shortly after her arrival. She

opened the door and saw Defendant and Bush. Jimmice said Bush was carrying a

“smaller weapon.” Defendant carried an assault rifle, which he held with two

hands. Jimmice testified that the two rushed into the studio. Defendant held her

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down while Bush hit her on both sides of her head with his weapon, and she fell to

the floor.

Jimmice testified that Defendant and Bush took her purse and $2000 in cash

from her pockets. Bush told her that the next time he saw her he would kill her,

and then the two men left. She asserted that Defendant carried her bag, booksack,

and a briefcase when he left.

Jimmice explained that she did not call the police; she was afraid because

the two men had threatened to kill her. About two weeks after the robbery, she

said the decedent was killed. Jimmice relayed that she spoke to Det. Jefferson two

or three times. The detective showed her photographs, which she “matched. . .

with what [she] recognized.”

On cross-examination, Jimmice conceded that she had “no personal

knowledge” as to who killed her brother. She described the assault rifle carried by

Defendant as half the length of her body and acknowledged that in the surveillance

video, Defendant did not appear to be carrying the rifle as he exited the elevator.

She suggested that Bush may have carried the assault rifle out of the storage

facility as Bush was not seen leaving the scene on the video.

Maria Tucker, Ph.D.

Dr. Tucker, an NOPD crime analyst, testified as an expert in the area of

“historical cell site analysis and cellphone record analysis.” Dr. Tucker analyzed

Defendant’s cell phone records beginning on April 15, 2019 through April 18,

2019. She testified that during that period, Defendant’s cell phone was “primarily

in the Algiers area everywhere from right around the location of [decedent’s

apartment complex], as well as slightly more towards the highway.” About an

hour before the murder, she said that Defendant’s phone was detected around the

9

decedent’s address. At the time of the homicide, about 12:20 a.m., Defendant’s

phone was not in use. Dr. Tucker explained that she could not “say anything about

the specific location when [the phone] is not in use.” Dr. Tucker confirmed that at

12:28 a.m. on April 16, 2019, Defendant placed a call from his phone to Ms.

Reese’s phone. The call was made from the Algiers area, within the area between

decedent’s apartment complex and the expressway.

On cross-examination, Dr. Tucker testified that she was not aware that the

Defendant’s residence was slightly less than a mile from decedent’s address.

Susan Hurst

The State called Ms. Hurst, a finger print expert with the Louisiana State

Police, to testify as a prosecution witness. Ms. Hurst asserted that Defendant’s

fingerprints matched those relating to Defendant’s 2008 convictions for armed

robbery and possession of stolen things included in the certification packets the

State had introduced into evidence. 9

Jury Verdict/Post-Trial Proceedings

After a four-day trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged of second-

degree murder, two counts of felon in possession of a firearm and armed robbery

with a firearm. The jury hung on the obstruction of justice charge related to the

homicide investigation.

Defendant’s motion for new trial on each of the convictions and his motion

to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and evidence were denied. On the

same date of the denial, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment

9 The decedent’s mother, Doris Jones Anderson, also testified. She said that she was the mother
of ten children, including the decedent and Jimmice. She testified that the decedent “had some
mishaps” and had served time at Angola. She said that while serving time, the decedent earned
many certificates “because he wanted to come out and be a productive citizen.”

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without benefits for the second-degree murder conviction and twenty years

imprisonment at hard labor for each of the two counts of felon in possession of a

firearm, to run concurrently to all counts. The trial court also sentenced Defendant

to serve fifty years imprisonment at hard labor for armed robbery with a firearm,

also to run concurrently, and imposed an additional five years under La. R.S.

14:64.3, to run consecutively.

The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for an appeal.

ERRORS PATENT

The record herein reflects that the trial court did not observe the twenty-four

hour delay before sentencing, as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 after denial of

Defendant’s motion for new trial. However, Defendant expressly waived the time

delay and did not challenge his sentence as excessive. As such, any error in failing

to observe the sentencing delays as allotted in La. C.Cr.P. art. 873 is deemed

harmless; and accordingly, this Court is not required to vacate Defendant’s

sentences and remand for resentencing. See State v. Scott, 2023-0022, p. 5 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 8/30/23), 372 So.3d 42, 49.

The record also reflects that the trial court failed to specify that Defendant’s

sentences for his convictions of felon in possession of a firearm and armed

robbery, as well as the five-year armed robbery enhancement, were to be served

without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, as required by law.

See La. R.S. 14:95.1(B); La. R.S. 14:64(B); La. R.S. 14:64.3(A).

This Court has applied the following analysis when statutory restrictions are

not recited at sentencing:

“[P]aragraph A of La. R.S. 15:301.1 provides that in
instances where the statutory restrictions are not recited
at sentencing, they are contained in the sentence, whether

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or not imposed by the sentencing court.” State v.
Wyatt, 2011–0219, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/22/11), 83
So.3d 131, 143 (citing State v. Williams, 2000-1725
(La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790). Accordingly, “this Court
need take no action to correct the trial court's failure to
specify that the defendant’s sentences be served without
benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence”
because it is statutorily effected. State v. Wyatt, 2011–
0219, p. 20, 83 So.3d at 143 (citing La. R.S.
15:301.1(A)).

State v. Dominick, 2013-0270, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14), 133 So.3d

250, 252. Thus, this Court is not required to take any action on the trial court’s

error in not expressly citing the sentencing restrictions as the error is

statutorily self-correcting.

We now review Defendant’s assignment of errors.

DISCUSSION

Defendant’s assignments of error contend that the evidence was insufficient

to convict on the second-degree murder charge and the related offense of felon in

possession of a firearm.

Standard of Review-Sufficiency of the Evidence

Generally, when assessing the sufficiency of evidence to support a

conviction, the reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact finder could have found

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). This review must include consideration

of the whole record, as a rational fact finder would do. State v. Gibson, 2015-0682,

p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 186 So.3d 772, 780.

12

The appellate court’s role does not encompass assessing witness credibility

or reweighing the evidence. State v. Barbain, 2015-0404, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir.

11/4/15), 179 So.3d 770, 776-77. Hence, the reviewing court does not decide

whether it believes a witness or if the conviction is contrary to the weight of the

evidence. See Gibson, 2015-0682, p. 13, 186 So.3d at 780. Rather, credibility

determinations and the weight attributed to the evidence fall within the province of

the fact finder. State v. Rainey, 2015-0892, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 189

So.3d 439, 444. Any conflicting testimony regarding factual matters goes to the

weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of evidence. Id. A single witness’

testimony, if believed by the fact finder, is sufficient to support a factual finding

unless the testimony shows an internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with

the physical evidence. See State v. Williams, 2011–0414, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir.

2/29/12), 85 So.3d 759, 771.

We now apply these precepts to Defendant’s second-degree murder and

felon in possession of a firearm convictions.

Second-Degree Murder

Second-degree murder is defined in pertinent part as “the killing of a human

being: (1) when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily

harm.” La. R.S. 14:30.1. Louisiana Revised Statute 14:10(1) defines specific

criminal intent as “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate

that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow

his act or his failure to act.” “Specific intent may be inferred from the

circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant.” Id.

Defendant’s insufficiency of the evidence claim as to the second-degree

murder conviction argues that the State’s case rested entirely on Ms. Reese’s

13

unsubstantiated claims. He maintains Ms. Reese’s statement was unreliable and

cites the State’s failure to produce an eyewitness to the shooting and the lack of

physical evidence linking Defendant to the shooting.

Defendant acknowledges that the testimony of a single eyewitness may be

sufficient to establish guilt; however, without citing to any authority, he suggests

that the witness must be an eyewitness. He maintains that not only was Ms. Reese

not an actual eyewitness, but her statement revealed that she was completely wrong

in placing the time of the murder at 11:00 p.m. and also wrong in her belief that the

shooting involved two types of bullets. As such, he urges that these alleged

inconsistencies presented an irreconcilable conflict with the evidence developed

about the shooting, and consequently, her overall statement is insufficient to

support his second-degree murder conviction.

Defendant also supports his insufficiency of the evidence claim by arguing

that the State’s evidence did not establish his physical presence at the crime scene.

He points out that Dr. Tucker, the State’s cell phone record tracking analyst, could

not provide a specific location of Defendant’s phone at the time of the crime. He

argues that Dr. Tucker’s testimony which detected Defendant’s phone around the

decedent’s apartment complex “backfired” when Dr. Tucker admitted on cross-

examination that she was not aware that Defendant lived just .8 miles from the

decedent’s address.

The State counters that its evidence clearly supported a finding that

Defendant killed the decedent on April 16, 2019. The State primarily highlights

Ms. Reese’s statement regarding Defendant’s admission that he killed the

decedent. Additionally, the State emphasizes that Ms. Reese’s text messages

demonstrated Ms. Reese felt threatened by Defendant; and moreover, Ms. Reese’s

14

unavailability for trial as a result of her homicide was attributed to Defendant’s

wrong-doing. The State references Det. Jefferson’s testimony that the Instagram

message sent to Ms. Allen, the decedent’s girlfriend, indicated that retaliation for

Jimmice’s robbery was the motive for decedent’s murder. The State also asserts

that notwithstanding Defendant’s contention that he lived near the decedent, that

Dr. Tucker’s geolocation tracking of Defendant’s cell phone nevertheless placed

Defendant in the area of the decedent’s apartment complex near the time of the

murder. Additionally, Dr. Tucker’s analysis verified Defendant’s phone call to Ms.

Reese shortly after the murder.

Upon review, we find the evidence the State introduced at trial was

sufficient for a rational fact finder to convict Defendant pursuant to the Jackson

standard enunciated herein. The Jackson standard “leaves juries broad discretion

in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial, requiring

only that jurors draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”

Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655 (2012). Accordingly, a sufficiency of the

evidence review considers whether the State’s case was so lacking that it should

not have been submitted to the jury. See Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S.

237, 243(2016). We do not find that to be the case in the instant matter.

Here, the State introduced evidence of Defendant’s admission that he killed

the decedent and Ms. Reese’s text messages, which directly implicated Defendant

in her death. Defendant contends that alleged inconsistencies in Ms. Reese’s

account of the murder and Ms. Reese’s alleged domestic dispute with Defendant

rendered her statement unreliable. However, we re-emphasize that “[c]redibility

determinations, as well as the weight to be attributed to the evidence are soundly

15

within the province of the trier of fact.” State v. Scott, 2012-1603, p. 11 (La. App.

4 Cir. 12/23/13), 131 So.3d 501, 508.

Moreover, Defendant’s argument that he rebutted the State’s phone tracking

evidence that had him near the decedent’s address to prior to the murder is

unpersuasive. Defendant raises this argument to suggest that his proximity to the

decedent was not dispositive because he lived in the same vicinity as the decedent.

However, the fact that Defendant and the decedent may have lived in the same

vicinity did not foreclose a reasonable inference reached by the jury that

Defendant’s proximity to the decedent on the night of the murder evidenced

Defendant’s involvement in the murder. In support of this inference, the State

cited Ms. Reese’s statement that Defendant was not at his residence at the time of

the shooting and Defendant’s documented cell phone call to Ms. Reese shortly

after the shooting.

Upon review, Defendant has made no showing that the evidence was

insufficient to convict Defendant of second-degree murder. Therefore, this

assignment of error lacks merit.

Felon in Possession of a Firearm

In this alleged error, Defendant reiterates that Ms. Reese’s statement was

insufficient to convict on the felon in possession of a firearm charge, maintaining

the State offered no evidence that he was seen with a firearm and stressing that the

murder weapon was not found.

To convict a defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon the

State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) possessed a

firearm; (2) was previously convicted of an enumerated felony; (3) possessed the

firearm within ten years of the previous conviction; and (4) had the general intent

16

to commit the offense. La. R.S. 14:95.1; State v. Fields, 2012-0674, p. 6 (La. App.

4 Cir. 6/19/13), 120 So.3d 309, 315.

“Actual possession of the firearm is not necessary to prove the possession

element of La. R.S. 14:95.1; constructive possession is sufficient.” State v. Fields,

2012-0674, p. 6, 120 So.3d at 315. A person is in constructive possession of a

firearm if it is subject to his dominion and control. State v. Johnson, 2003-1228, p.

5 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So.2d 995, 998. The facts of each case determines whether

the proof is sufficient to establish possession. State v. Harris, 1994-0970, p. 4 (La.

12/8/94), 647 So.2d 337, 338-39. Guilty knowledge may be inferred from the

circumstances and proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Johnson, 2003-

1228, p. 5, 870 So.2d at 998. Well-settled jurisprudence requires that when

circumstantial evidence forms the basis of a conviction, such evidence must consist

of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main

fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v.

Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372, 378 (La. 1982). The elements must be proven such that

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438. This

statutory test comports with the Jackson constitutional sufficiency test to evaluate

whether all evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt to a rational jury. See State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 968 (La.

1986).

Here, it is uncontested that the decedent was killed by a firearm. Ms.

Reese’s statement included her representation that Defendant said “[w] e got him;

we killed the dude.” Ms. Reese’s statement also maintained that Defendant and

another person returned after the murder to her shared residence with Defendant to

17

“put the guns up.” She maintained that she had seen Defendant’s gun previously

and described the gun as “a choppa, a big gun.”

As with the second-degree murder conviction, Defendant suggests that the

underlying evidence surrounding his conviction on the felon in possession of a

firearm charge was unreliable, and at best, circumstantial. However, when

considering circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact has the authority to decide

what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, the

manner in which competing inferences should be resolved, reconciled, or

compromised; and the weight and effect to be given to each permissible inference.

State v. Spears, 2005-0964, p. 3 (La. 4/4/06), 929 So.2d 1219, 1222 (citations

omitted). In the instant case, the jury found that the only reasonable inference to

be drawn from Ms. Reese’s statement is that Defendant was logically in possession

of a firearm at the time he intended to commit the offense of murder. Defendant

presented no competing inference or objective countervailing evidence to contest

the State’s evidence. Thus, Ms. Reese’s statement, which the jury found credible,

was sufficient evidence to satisfy the first element—possession—and the fourth

element—intent—required to convict for felon in possession of a firearm.

Next, the testimony of Susan Hurst and the State’s introduction of the

certification packets reflecting Defendant’s prior convictions for armed robbery

and possession of stolen things, satisfied elements two and three to prove felon in

possession of a firearm: a prior conviction of an enumerated felony and possession

of the firearm within ten years of the previous conviction. Ms. Hurst’s testimony

identified Defendant as the individual having a prior conviction for armed robbery

and possession of stolen things in 2008 referenced in the certification packets.

Hence, the State proved that Defendant was previously convicted of the requisite

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enumerated felony and that Defendant’s possession of the firearm involved in the

decedent’s April 2016 murder was within ten years of the previous 2008

convictions. Accordingly, this assigned error also is not meritorious.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant has not shown that he is entitled

to relief on his claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict. Accordingly,

we affirm Defendant’s convictions and the sentences imposed.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED

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