Derrick Woodberry v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2023 CA 0203
2023 CW 0099

DERRICK WOODBERRY

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VERSUS
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LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS

Judgment Rendered: SEP 1. 5 2023

Appealed from the
19th Judicial District Court
Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana
No. C681512

The Honorable Timothy E. Kelley, Judge Presiding

Derrick Woodberry Plaintiff/Appellant,
St, Gabriel, Louisiana In Proper Person

Jonathan Vining Defendant/ Appellee,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Louisiana Department of

Public Safety and Corrections

BEFORE: WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND WOLFE, JJ.

W OLFE, J.

Derrick Woodberry, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of

Public Safety and Corrections ( DPSC), filed a supervisory writ application and an

appeal of the district court' s judgment that affirmed DPSC' s final decision in

Administrative Remedy Procedure ( ARP) number LSP -2018- 2482 and dismissed

his petition for judicial review of that decision. We affirm the judgment and dismiss

the writ application.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1995, Woodberry was convicted of a sex offense and other crimes, and

sentenced to terms of imprisonment that were ordered to run concurrent with a thirty-

five -year sentence.' While incarcerated, he opted to forego earning incentive wages

in exchange for earning good time credits toward early release. As a result of the

good time credits he earned, Woodberry was determined to be eligible for release in

November 2011. As a convicted sex offender, DPSC regulations and Louisiana law

required Woodberry to have an approved residence plan prior to release. Since

Woodberry did not have an approved residence, he was advised that he would remain

incarcerated until he had an approved plan or until he completed the full term of his

sentence.
The only proposed residence plan contained in the record was rejected

due to the residence' s proximity to a playground.

While he remained incarcerated, a detainer was placed on Woodberry, and he

was arrested and convicted of additional charges. 2 In January 2014, he was

sentenced to terms of imprisonment that were ordered to run concurrent with two

life sentences. In relation to those sentences, DPSC determined that Woodberry was

eligible to earn incentive wages as of April 20, 2014.

See Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, Docket Number 371- 742.

2
See Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, Docket Number 512- 931.

2

Woodberry now contends that he is owed all incentive wages " earned" while

serving his original sentence— i.e., the incentive wages he bargained away when he

opted into the good time program. Woodberry reasons that since he was never

released from custody, he never " received" the good time credits he earned and is

alternatively owed the wages. Woodberry filed an ARP, seeking backpay of the

incentive wages, alleging he " was deprived of [them] without due process of law."

DPSC denied the ARP at both the first and second steps.3 In its second step response,

DPSC explained that Woodberry was not entitled to incentive wages while earning

good time credits against the original thirty -five-year sentence.

Unsatisfied with DPSC' s response, Woodberry filed a petition for judicial

review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. The matter was referred to a

commissioner for screening pursuant to La. R.S. 15: 1178 and La. R. S. 15: 1188. 4

The commissioner recommended that the district court affirm DPSC' s decision and

dismiss Woodberry' s petition with prejudice. In her report, the commissioner noted

that the record contained no indication that Woodberry filed a petition for judicial

review contesting DPSC' s failure to release him on his scheduled good time release

date in 2011, nor had any party alluded to such. The commissioner further noted

that if Woodberry had not been sentenced on the new convictions, DPSC would have

been required to hold him in custody until an approved residence plan was submitted

or until his full-term release date. The commissioner concluded that Woodberry' s

failure to submit an adequate residence plan so that he could be released on his good

3
In its first step response, DPSC denied Woodberry' s claim for backpay of the wages he would
have received if he had not opted into the good time program, but noted that Woodberry was owed
a pay supplement for " a few weeks" that were missed after April 20, 2014. The payment of
incentive wages after 2014 is not at issue in this appeal.

4
The office of commissioner for the Nineteenth Judicial District Court was created to hear and
recommend disposition of criminal and civil proceedings arising out of the incarceration of state
prisoners. La. R.S. 13: 711 and 13: 713( A). The district courtjudge " may accept, reject, or modify

in whole or in part the findings or recommendation made by the commissioner and also may
receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the commissioner with instructions." La. R.S.
13: 713( C)( 5).

3

time release date did not void the good time contract. The commissioner found no

evidence to show that DPSC breached the contract' s terms and no authority to

support Woodberry' s request for backpay of the incentive wages he forfeited. After

de novo review, the trial court adopted the commissioner' s reasons as its own,

affirmed DPSC' s decision, and dismissed the petition for judicial review.

DISCUSSION

Judicial review of this matter is governed by La. R.S. 15: 1177, which allows

a reviewing court to reverse or modify DPSC' s decision only if substantial rights of

the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative decisions or findings

are: ( 1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; ( 2) in excess of the

statutory authority of the agency; ( 3) made upon unlawful procedure; ( 4) affected by

other error of law; ( 5) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of

discretion; or ( 6) manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and

substantial evidence on the whole record. When reviewing DPSC' s decision, the

district court functions as an appellate court. Marchand v. Louisiana Department

of Public Safety & Corrections, 2020- 0747 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2124121), 322 So. 3d

269, 272, writ denied, 2021- 00457 (La. 9/ 27/ 21), 324 So. 3d 104. An aggrieved party

may appeal a final judgment of the district court to the appropriate appellate court.'

La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)( 10). On appeal of the district court' s judgment, the appellate

court reviews the administrative record de novo under the criteria of La. R.S.

15: 1177( A)( 9). Marchand, 322 So. 3d at 273. The appellate court owes no

deference to the district court' s factual findings or legal conclusions, just as the

Woodberry filed a supervisory writ application and an appeal, seeking review of the district
court' s judgment. The writ application was referred to this appellate panel.
See Woodberry v.
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2023- 0099 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 4/ 24123)
unpublished writ action). Since the district court' s judgment dismissed Woodberry' s petition for
judicial review, it is a final, appealable judgment. See La. R.S. 15: 1177( A)(10); Bell v. Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2019- 0755 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 9117119), 2019 WL
4447590 ( unpublished writ action).Accordingly, we dismiss Woodberry' s supervisory writ
application and consider the merits of Woodberry' s appeal. Cf. Anderson v. Laborde
Construction Industries, L.L.C., 2019- 0356 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 3112120), 311 So. 3d 1072, 1079
n. 9.

91

Louisiana Supreme Court owes no deference to the factual findings or legal

conclusions of the appellate court. Marchand, 322 So.2d at 273.

On appeal, Woodberry argues that he is constitutionally entitled to receive the

incentive wages he would have been paid if he had not opted to receive good time

credits, as DPSC lacks authority to withhold the wages when it did not award the

good time credits earned. He acknowledges that La. R.S. 15: 574. 4. 3 requires that

sex offenders have an approved residence plan prior to good time release.6 He states

that he " does not contest the language or authority of [that] statute with respect to

his release or any liberty interest." However, he complains that La. R.S. 15: 574. 4. 3

was not in effect and he was not advised of any such residence plan requirement

when he waived his incentive wages to earn good time credits. He further complains

that DPSC has failed to promulgate rules and regulations expressly informing

inmates that incentive wages would be lost if no residence plan is approved.

This court has held that the law in effect at the time of release governs the

terms of release, rather than the law in effect at the time of the commission of the

underlying offense or at the time the inmate enters into the good time credits

program. Bancroft v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, 635 So. 2d 738, 741

La. App. 1st Cir. 1994). Further, "[ t]he fact that [ an inmate] has a constitutionally

6
Inmates released from custody as a result of diminution of sentence based on good time credits
are released as if on parole. La. R.S. 15: 571. 5( A); State ex rel. Square v. State, 2015- 1409 ( La.
1113117), 206 So. 3d 872, 872- 73 ( per curiam); Bancroft v. Louisiana Department of
Corrections, 635 So. 2d 738, 740- 41 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
Louisiana Revised Statutes
15: 574. 4. 3( E)( 1),
which was designated as La. R.S. 15: 574.4( 5)( 1) prior to its amendment by 2010
La. Acts 241, § 1 ( eff. Aug. 15, 2010), provides:

In cases where parole is permitted by law and the offender is otherwise eligible, the
committee on parole shall not grant parole to any sex offender either by an order of the
committee on parole or office of adult services pursuant to R.S. 15: 571. 3 until the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections, division of probation and parole, has
assessed and approved the suitability of the residence plan of such offender. In approving
the residence plan of the offender, the department shall consider the likelihood that the
offender will be able to comply with all of the conditions of his parole.
Woodberry correctly argues on appeal that the Commissioner' s report cited an incorrect statute
for this requirement. Since we conduct do nova review of the administrative record while
performing our review, that error is inconsequential. See Marchand, 322 So. 3d at 273.

5

protected interest in good time does not deprive the legislature of the right to enact

legislation that possibly has the effect of impacting that statutorily created interest."

Kozlowicz v. State, Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 2008- 1806 ( La.

App. 1st Cir. 3/ 27/ 09), 9 So. 3d 1000, 1006. Any conditions imposed on an inmate

eligible for release as a result of diminution of sentence are valid so long as they are

lawful on the proposed date of release. Kozlowicz, 9 So. 3d at 1007; Bancroft, 635

So. 2d at 741. " The fact that those conditions may not have been required at the time

the [ inmate] chose to earn good time credit is not legally relevant." Kozlowicz, 9

So. 3d at 1007 ( citing Bancroft, 635 So. 2d at 741); see also Thompson v. Louisiana

Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2016- 0545 ( La. App. 1st Cir.

2/ 17/ 17), 2017 WL 658734, * 3 ( unpublished) ( finding that the imposition of an

approved residence requirement prior to a sex offender' s release does not result in

an ex post facto application of law or violation of the Louisiana or United States

Constitution).

Additionally, this court has recognized that the result of an inmate opting to

earn good time credits is that the inmate becomes eligible for early release. See

Kozlowicz, 9 So. 3d at 1007; Bancroft, 635 So. 2d at 741. There is no dispute that

Woodberry became eligible for early release based on his good time credits.

However, he could not be released without an approved residence plan. We find no

constitutional violation by DPSC for its compliance with the mandates of La. R. S.

15: 574. 4. 3. This court has previously recognized that DPSC takes no action to

deprive an inmate of his good time when it is statutorily prohibited from releasing

the inmate because the inmate failed to comply with the approved residency

requirement. Kozlowicz, 9 So. 3d at 1006.

Woodberry raises arguments that DPSC bore the responsibility of obtaining an approved
residence plan for him and that its failure to do so breached its contractual obligation to him. We
find no merit to these arguments. See Thompson, 2417 WL 658734, * 3 ( recognizing that it was
the obligation of the inmate to obtain an approved residence plan prior to his early release).

31

In support of his contention that his good time option should be considered

voided, Woodberry argues that the good time form he signed provides that the

contractual agreement may be voided. The form requires that the inmate

acknowledge that he may fail to earn good time through disciplinary actions or other

means as provided by law and also " that [ DPSC] may void this option at any time,

in the event that it is determined that [ the inmate is] ineligible to receive good time

at this particular rate." However, by signing the form the inmate explicitly

recognizes that the inmate cannot revoke his option during the sentence or term for

which he is incarcerated. Thus, rather than supporting Woodberry' s claims, the good

time option form actually confirms that he is not entitled to recoup the wages he

bargained away to earn the good time credits.

Essentially, after being convicted of additional crimes and sentenced to life

imprisonment, Woodberry realizes he made a bad choice in opting into the good

time program while serving his original sentence.' We find no authority that would

entitle him to the relief he seeks.

CONCLUSION

After thorough review of the record in this matter in accordance with La. R.S.

15: 1177( A), we find no error in the district court' s judgment that affirmed DPSC' s

decision. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. Supervisory

writ application 2023 CW 0099 is dismissed. All costs of this appeal are assessed

to Derrick Woodberry.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; WRIT DISMISSED.

8
Although the record does not contain the details of the crimes that resulted in the life sentences,
it does establish that Woodberry has been incarcerated since 1995. The commissioner' s report
indicates that the offenses occurred in 1992— before the original sentence was imposed and before
Woodberry signed the good time option form.

7