Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors Through Louisiana State University v. Jasmine L. Lewis

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT

2023 CA 0647

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS THROUGH
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

VERSUS

JASMINE L. LEWIS

Judgment Rendered: NOV 0 0 2023
1

On Appeal from the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
No. 719444, Section 21

The Honorable Ronald R. Johnson, Judge Presiding

Jeff Landry Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

Attorney General Louisiana State University Board of
Amy D. Richard Supervisors Through Louisiana
Olivia G. Boudreaux State University
Kirsten E. Smith
Assistant Attorneys General
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Gregory Thomas Akers Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Joshua Paul Melder Jasmine L. Lewis
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

BEFORE: WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND WOLFE, JJ.

HOLDRIDGE, J.

In this suit on an open account, the appellant, Louisiana State University

Board of Supervisors through Louisiana State University ( LSU), appeals from a

trial court judgment rendered in favor of the appellee, Jasmine L. Lewis, that

sustained a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription and

dismissed LSD' s claim with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and

remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 26, 2022, LSU filed a suit on an open account against Jasmine L.

Lewis, alleging that Ms. Lewis was indebted to LSU in the amount of $7, 662. 80,

together with interest, late/ other charges, collection costs, and attorneys' fees.

According to the allegations in the petition, Ms. Lewis enrolled in classes at LSU

in 2012 and 2013, wherein she incurred the debt. LSU attached to its petition Ms.

Lewis' academic record for 2012 and 2013, which showed that the last payment

made by Ms. Lewis to LSU was on May 25, 2018. LSU asserted that the debt

incurred by Ms. Lewis was an educational obligation due to a public institution of

higher education, and was subject to a thirty-year liberative prescription period

pursuant to La. R.S. 9: 5701( A).1

In response to the suit on open account, Ms. Lewis filed a peremptory

exception raising the objection of prescription and a motion for sanctions. Ms.

Lewis argued that LSU erroneously claimed that the thirty-year prescriptive period

under La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) applied to this case because LSU did not attach any

evidence either in authentic form or under private signature by the parties

containing the terms of its open account agreement. Ms. Lewis further argued that

1 Louisiana Revised Statutes La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) provides, in pertinent part, that " actions for
debts including student loans ... to any ... educational institution in the state ... are prescribed by
thirty years, provided the debt is evidenced in writing."
2

LSU was limited to the three- year prescriptive period set forth in La. C. C. art.

3494, which made LSU' s action against Ms. Lewis prescribed.' Therefore, Ms.

Lewis argued that the suit should be dismissed with prejudice.

Ms. Lewis further argued that LSU' s arguments had no basis in law and

therefore the trial court should sanction LSU for violating La. C.C. P. art. 863.

Specifically, Ms. Lewis argued that LSU violated La. C. C.P. art. 863( B)( 2) 1 by

deliberately bringing an action against [ Ms.] Lewis which it clearly knew had

prescribed." In support of her argument, Ms. Lewis cited Louisiana State

University System Board of Supervisors Through Louisiana State University

Veterinarian Teaching, Hospital v. Johnson, 2020- 272 ( La. App. 3 Cir. 417121), 318

So. 3d 292, 302, writ denied, 2021- 00618 ( La. 9127121), 324 So. 3d 98, wherein the

Third Circuit upheld the trial court' s decision to impose sanctions on LSU for

bringing a prescribed cause of action and falling to certify that its claim was

warranted by existing law. Therefore, Ms. Lewis argued that like the Johnson

case, the facts of this case warranted sanctions on LSU for violating La. C.C.P. art.

863( B)( 2).

LSU opposed Ms. Lewis' motion and peremptory exception raising the

objection of prescription, arguing that its claim was not prescribed and that as the

exceptor, the burden of proof was on Ms. Lewis to prove that her claim was not

prescribed. LSU argued that La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) was the prescriptive period that

applied to this case because it was for an open account to an educational

institution. LSU further argued that La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) did not require an

z Louisiana Civil Code article 3494 provides that an action on an open account is subject to a
libcrative prescriptive period of three years.

3 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 863( B)( 2) states that a signed pleading by an attorney
certifies that "[ elach claim, defense, or other legal assertion in the pleading is warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law,"
3

authentic act or an act under private signature, as the statute specifically stated that

the debt is evidenced in writing." LSU argued that the language of La. R.S.

9: 5701( A) should be given its common meaning to require written evidence of the

debt consistent with the definition provided by La. C.E. art. 1001( 1). 4 Therefore,

LSU argued that it was not required to produce an open account agreement in the

form of an authentic act or under private signature to receive the thirty-year

prescriptive period as mandated by La. R.S. 9: 5701( A).

On February 16, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Ms. Lewis'

peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription and motion for

sanctions. No evidence or testimony was offered at the hearing by either party. At

the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On

March 7, 2023, the trial court signed a judgment, sustaining Ms. Lewis'

peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription and dismissing LSU' s

claim against Ms. Lewis with prejudice. The judgment further denied Ms. Lewis'

motion for sanctions.' LSU subsequently appealed the judgment.

APPLICABLE LAW

The objection of prescription is properly raised through a peremptory

exception and must be specially pled. La. C. C. P. art. 927. Prescription statutes are

strictly construed against prescription and in favor of the claim sought to be

extinguished by it. Seale & Ross PLC v. Littleleaf Properties, LLC, 2021- 0083

La. App. 1 Cir. 1014121), 2021 WL 4520217, at * 2 ( unpublished). Ordinarily, the

party pleading the exception of prescription bears the burden of proving the claim

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 1001( 1) states:

Writings and recordings. " Writings" and " recordings" consist of letters, words,

numbers, sounds, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing,
photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or
other form of data compilation.

5 We note that the motion for sanctions is not at issue in this appeal.
4

has prescribed. However, when the face of the petition reveals that the plaintiffs

claim has prescribed, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show why the claim has

not prescribed. Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2009- 2632, 2009- 2635 ( La. 716110),

45 So. 3d 991, 998. When, as in this case, no evidence is introduced at the hearing

to support or controvert the exception of prescription, the exception must be

decided upon facts alleged in the petition with all allegations accepted as true.

Harris v. Breaud, 2017- 0421 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 27/ 18), 243 So. 3d 572, 578. If no

evidence is introduced to support or controvert the exception, the manifest error

standard of review does not apply, and the appellate court' s role is to determine

whether the trial court' s ruling was legally correct. Harris, 243 So. 3d at 578- 579.

DISCUSSION

The parties disagree over the prescription statutes applicable to this case and

how to interpret them. LSU asserts that the thirty-year prescriptive period in La.

R.S. 9: 5701 is the proper prescriptive period in this case rather than the three- year

prescriptive period provided in La. C.C. art. 3494. In cases involving statutory

interpretation, the fundamental question is legislative intent and the ascertainment

of the reason or reasons that prompted the legislature to enact the law. Law

Industries, LLC_v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 2018- 1756

La. App. 1 Cir. 312120), 300 So. 3d 21, 27, writ denied, 2020- 00745 ( La. 10/ 6120),

302 So. 3d 515. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and

enforce the intent of the legislature. Id.

The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the

statute itself. Dejoie v. Medley, 2008- 2223 ( La. 515109), 9 So. 3d 826, 829. When

a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd

consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may

be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La. C. C. art. 9; Conerly v. State,

5

97- 0871 ( La. 7/ 8/ 98), 714 So.2d 709, 710. Therefore, in construing a statute, an

appellate court is bound to consider all parts together, giving effect to all parts, if

possible,
not construing as surplusage any sentence, clause, or word, if a

construction can be legitimately found which will give meaning to and preserve all

words of the statute. Louisiana Gil & Gas Assn Inc. v. Caldwell, 2015- 0889 ( La.

1 Cir. 2118116), 2016 WL 687144, 4(
App. at * unpublished).

Louisiana Civil Code article 3494 states, in pertinent part:

The following actions are subject to a liberative prescription of three
years:

1) An action for the recovery of compensation for services rendered,
including payment of salaries, wages, commissions, professional
fees, fees and emoluments of public officials, freight, passage,
money, lodging, and board;

4) An action on an open account[.]

In 2018, La. C. C. art. 3494 was amended when the legislature removed " tuition

fees" from La. C. C. art. 3494( 1). See 2018 La. Acts. No. 471, § 1 ( eff. Aug. 1,

2018).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 5701 states:

A. Except as provided in Subsection B of this Section, actions for
debts including student loans, stipends, or benefits due to any
charitable or educational institution in the state or to any fund
bequeathed for charitable or educational purposes, or educational
obligations owed to the state or its agencies, other than obligations
created under the Federal Family Education Loan Program, are
prescribed by thirty years, provided the debt is evidenced in
writing.

B. Actions for debts, due to public institutions of higher education in
this state, other than student loans, stipends, or benefits are
prescribed by ten years, provided the debt is evidenced in writing.

Pursuant to the general rules of statutory construction, where two or more

statutes deal with the same subject matter, the statute more specifically directed to

the matter at issue must prevail over a statute more general in character if they

rel

cannot be reconciled. Pumphrey v. City of New Orleans, 2005- 0979 ( La. 414106),

925 So. 2d 1202, 1210. Pursuant to the rules of statutory interpretation, La. R.S.

9: 5701( A) applies to this case because it is the more specific statute rather than the

general statute, La. C. C. art. 3494. See Burge v. State, 2010- 2229 ( La. 2111111),

54 So. 3d 1110, 1113 ( per curiam).

In this case, Ms. Lewis, as the exceptor, has the initial burden of proving that

her claim has not prescribed on the face of the petition. Since no evidence was

introduced to support or controvert Ms. Lewis' peremptory exception raising the

objection of prescription, the exception must be decided upon facts alleged in the

petition with all allegations accepted as true, and this court must determine if the

trial court was legally correct in applying La. C. C. art. 3494 rather than La. R.S.

9: 5701( A) to the facts of this case.

In its petition, LSU asserts that Ms. Lewis has a debt for an educational

obligation due to an educational institution in the state of Louisiana. The petition

further provides that this debt was incurred in 2012 and 201.3, and LSU filed its

petition on an open account in 2022. LSU attached to its petition an itemized

invoice and affidavit showing that Ms. Lewis was indebted to LSU in the amount

of $7, 662. 50. Accepting these allegations as true, LSU asserts that its petition is

not prescribed on its face, as the facts show that LSU filed its petition within the

thirty-year prescriptive period as mandated by La. R.S. 9: 5701( A).

Although Ms. Lewis agrees that La. R. S. 9: 5701( A) is the more specific

statute providing a prescriptive period for educational institutions, she argues that

the statute has a writing requirement that requires the obligation to be either an

authentic act or an act under private signature. Specifically, Ms. Lewis argues that

evidenced in writing" as stated in La. R.S. 9: 5701( A)

demonstrates the legislature' s intent that educational obligations to be in authentic

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act or act under private signature for the [ thirty-year] prescriptive period to apply."

In support of her argument, Ms. Lewis relies on the Johnson case, wherein the

Third Circuit held that:

Louisiana law does not require an open account to be in written form.
However, La. R.S. 9: 5701 expressly states the debt must be evidenced
in writing. Thus, for purposes of applying the longer prescriptive
period, written form is required by law to prove the obligation, and the
writing must take the form of either an authentic act or act under
private signature. Johnson, 318 So. 3d at 299.

After reviewing the record, we find that the Johnson case is inconsistent with

Louisiana jurisprudence that does not require an open account to be in written

form. We agree with the statutory interpretation by Judge Fitzgerald in his dissent

in Johnson that:

An open account is not a particular type of contract that is required by
law to be in writing. ... The statutory language in question—
provided the debt is evidenced in writing"— requires written proof of
the debt; the debt is the balance on the open account. The documents
attached to LSU' s petition constitute written proof of that debt.... But
the interpretation given [ in Johnson], requiring the open account itself
to be in written form ... renders the prescriptive statute meaningless
for future actions on open accounts. Johnson, 318 So. 3d at 305
Fitzgerald, J., dissenting in part).

We find that the debt due on the open account is the remaining balance owed

by Ms. Lewis in the sum of $7, 662. 80. LSU evidenced the debt due with the

itemized invoice showing the billing statement for Ms. Lewis and the affidavit it

attached to its petition verifying the debt owed by Ms. Lewis in accordance with

La. R.S. 9: 5701( A). Louisiana courts have held that in a suit on open account, it is

of crucial importance that an itemized statement of the account, showing all the

debits and all the credits which produce the balance due, be produced. Capital One

Bank (USA)_NA_v. Young, 2015- 70 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 9/ 23/ 15), 176 So. 3d 695, 697.

Only in this way is the sum due on account mathematically documented. Id. Thus,

we find that the evidence submitted by LSU satisfies the writing requirement of

La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) and establishes a prima facie showing that LSU is entitled to

the amount sought.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court' s ruling was not legally correct in

finding that LSU' s claim was prescribed and dismissing its claim with prejudice.

We find that on the face of LSU' s petition, it alleged sufficient facts and dates

showing that its claim fell within the thirty-year prescriptive period provided in La.

R.S. 9: 5701( A). Ms. Lewis offered no evidence, testimony, or documents to prove

that the thirty-year prescriptive period under La. R.S. 9: 5701( A) did not apply to

this case. Therefore, we find that the trial court incorrectly found that LSU did not

satisfy the writing requirement of La. R.S. 9: 5701( A), as the record clearly shows

that LSU provided the proper documentary evidence showing the debt incurred by

Ms. Lewis. Therefore, we reverse the trial court' s judgment and remand for

further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

The March 7, 2023 judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All costs of this

appeal are assessed to the appellee, Jasmine L. Lewis.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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