Thoepholia Thomas individually and on behalf of daughter Azyria O. Thomas v. BNSF Railway Company

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT

NO. 2023 CA 1209

THEOPHOLIA THOMAS
VERSUS
A BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY
“ < Judgment Rendered: AUG 06 2024
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LG On Appeal from the
M 16th Judicial District Court

Parish of St. Mary, State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 131516

The Honorable Keith R.J. Comeaux, Judge Presiding

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Timothy C. Gaarder Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee,
John S. Carroll Theopholia Thomas
Kansas City, Missouri
Edward J. Walters, Jr.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Kevin M. Dills Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant,
Robert D. Felder BNSF Railway Company
Jami Lacour Ishee
Lafayette, Louisiana
Thomas M. Flanagan
Anders F. Holmgren
New Orleans, Louisiana
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BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, WOLFE, MILLER, AND STROMBERG, JJ.

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WOLFE, J.

This suspensive appeal arises out of a collision between a garbage truck and
a train at a railroad crossing in Baldwin, Louisiana. Following a jury verdict
awarding $8,307,050.00 in damages to the garbage truck driver, the railroad
company appeals and raises issues concerning liability, an inconsistent verdict
regarding the allocation of fault and causation, and an excessive quantum award for
general damages. For the following reasons, we vacate and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

On September 16, 2016, at approximately 11:35 a.m., Theopholia Thomas!
was driving a garbage truck on a collection route for Pelican Waste & Debris, L.L.C.,
in the Town of Baldwin. As Mr. Thomas drove in a southwesterly direction on
Railroad Avenue, which runs parallel with multiple railroad tracks that are owned
and maintained by different railroad companies, he stopped before turning off of
Railroad Avenue onto Lockley Street. Each of the two employees working from
the back of the garbage truck, known as “hoppers,” jumped off of the truck to empty
garbage cans located near the intersection. One of the hoppers walked across the
railroad crossing to access the few houses located on the other side of the dead-end
Lockley Street. The weather was rainy, but there were no visual obstructions
blocking the view of oncoming trains in either direction along the railroad tracks.

Mr. Thomas did not see or hear any oncoming trains as he proceeded to turn
right onto Lockley Street in order to access the Lockley Street crossing over the

railroad tracks. It is undisputed that this particular railroad crossing was maintained

' The plaintiff's name is spelled and referenced several ways throughout the record, including
“Theo Thomas.” We note the correct spelling is “Theopholia Thomas.”

* Both streets are public and are maintained by the town, and the crossings are owned and
maintained by the various railroad companies.

by the BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”).? The wooden plank crossing was
marked with a standard railroad cross-buck sign that warned of the railroad crossing,
along with a stop sign mounted on the same pole. Mr. Thomas admitted that he did
not stop at the stop sign after turning onto Lockley Street, because he had stopped
prior to turning. He denied seeing or hearing any oncoming trains coming from the
north side of the Lockley Street crossing. There was testimony about a blind spot
due to the side mirrors on the garbage truck.

When Mr. Thomas entered the Lockley Street railroad crossing, his turn was
too wide, which resulted in the left front tire of the garbage truck dropping off the
wooden planks on the south side of the crossing. The tire was then stuck between
the railroad tracks. Mr. Thomas immediately began a process of reversing and
pulling forward to maneuver the garbage truck fully up onto the crossing. Once he
was successful in backing out of the area where the garbage truck’s tire was stuck,
he realigned all four truck tires onto the crossing, and he began to pull forward to go
across. It was at that point that Mr. Thomas saw the oncoming BNSF train, which
was blaring its horn and bearing down on the Lockley Street crossing at
approximately 36 miles per hour. Mr. Thomas made a quick decision to accelerate
the garbage truck in an attempt to clear the train’s path, but before Mr. Thomas had
cleared the crossing, the BNSF train collided with the rear portion of the garbage
truck. The truck was knocked onto its left side, spilling garbage everywhere. The
garbage truck was pushed down the railroad tracks until the BNSF train came to a

stop. Mr. Thomas survived the collision, but was injured.‘

3 While there are multiple sets of railroad tracks at the Lockley Street crossing, this case involves
only the first wooden crossing that Mr. Thomas encountered, which was owned and maintained
by BNSF.

4 Mr. Thomas has not been able to return to work since the accident. His most significant injury
required a two-level fusion surgery to stabilize his low back. Mr. Thomas suffered surgical
complications, including a spinal fluid leak that required two more surgeries, infections for six
months post-op due to an open wound at the surgical site, and residual radiating leg pain that may
require future back surgeries, as well as spinal cord stimulator treatment. Mr. Thomas also suffers

Go

As aresult of the accident and injuries, Mr. Thomas filed suit against BNSF.?
Mr. Thomas alleged that the crossing was not properly maintained by BNSF.
According to several witnesses and exhibits at trial, the crossing was narrower than
the street and was, therefore, in violation of industry standards, as well as BNSF’s
internal standards, which required railroad crossings to be at least one foot wider
than the traveled roadway. Following a six-day jury trial on the merits in May of
2022, the jury was given a special verdict form composed of seven interrogatories.
The jury returned the verdict form with responses to the interrogatories as follows:
(1) Was BNSF Railway Company negligent?
Yes X No
If the answer to question 1 is yes, proceed to question 2.

If the answer to question 1 is no, sign at the end and return to the
courtroom.

(2)Was the negligence of BNSF Railway Company a
proximate cause of the accident?

Yes X No
If the answer to question 2 is yes, proceed to question 3.

If the answer to question 2 is no, sign at the end and return to the
courtroom.

(3) Was Theo Thomas negligent?

Yes X No
If the answer to question 3 is yes, proceed to question 4.
If the answer to question 3 is no, proceed to question 5.

(4) Was the negligence of Theo Thomas a proximate cause of
the accident?

Yes No xX
Proceed to question 5.

(5)Please state the percentage of negligence, if any[,|
attributable to the below parties.

from flashbacks regarding the accident and depression related to his chronic pain and life changes
since the accident.

> Mr. Thomas initially brought suit individually and on behalf of his daughter, Azyria O. Thomas.
His daughter’s loss of consortium claim was later dismissed. All other defendants, including the
Town of Baldwin, Chris Gary and Sir Johnson (BNSF employees), and Pelican Waste & Debris,
L.L.C., were dismissed prior to trial.

(Note that the total of your percentage must be 100%)
BNSF Railway Company: 85 %

Theo Thomas: 15 %

Proceed to question 6.

(6)Did Theo Thomas suffer any damage as a result of the
accident on September 16, 2016?

Yes_X No
If the answer to question 6 is yes, proceed to question 7.

If the answer to question 6 is no, sign at the end and return to
the courtroom.

(7) Without deducting any sums for the percentage of
negligence, if any, which you have assigned above to Theo
Thomas, please state what sum of money, if any, would
reasonably and fairly compensate Theo Thomas for the

following:

- Past Lost Wages: $ 330,000.00
Future Lost Wages: $ 491,000.00
Past Medical Expenses: $ 112,000.00
Future Medical Expenses: $ 840,000.00

Past and Future Pain and
Suffering: $ 5,000,000.00

Past, Present and Future
Loss of Enjoyment of Life: $ 3,000,000.00

Franklin, Louisiana, this 31st day of May, 2022

/s/ Debra Goulas
Jury Foreperson

BNSF immediately objected to the jury verdict, maintaining that the verdict
should be set aside as inconsistent and a new trial ordered pursuant to La. Code Civ.

P. art. 1813. BNSF pointed out that the jury’s answers to questions 4 and 5 were

6 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1813 provides, in pertinent part, with emphasis added:

E. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise
inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of judgment

inherently inconsistent in that the jury found Mr. Thomas to be negligent, yet the
negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident, and then assigned Mr. Thomas
15% of the fault for the accident. The trial court noted “[i]t look[ed] like that to [the
court,] too” and stated that “the inconsistency” could be handled in a post-trial
motion.

After the trial, BNSF filed a formal written objection to the inconsistent jury
verdict and entry of any judgment on that verdict. Mr. Thomas opposed. During the
hearing that followed, Mr. Thomas’s counsel indicated that Mr. Thomas was willing
to accept the 15% allocation of fault to him and argued that the jury clearly found
that BNSF was 85% at fault for the accident. The trial court subsequently denied
BNSF’s objection to the jury verdict. On August 30, 2022, the trial court signed a
final judgment in accordance with the jury verdict in favor of Mr. Thomas in the
amount of $8,307,050.00, that included the 15% fault allocated to Mr. Thomas.
BNSF moved for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and, alternatively, moved
for a new trial, which Mr. Thomas opposed. The trial court issued written reasons
for judgment and denied BNSF’s motions.

BNSF then filed this suspensive appeal, assigning error to the trial court’s
entry of a judgment when there was an inconsistency in the jury’s findings. BNSF
also assigns error to entry of a judgment against it in the absence of evidence of a
breach of duty and in the absence of legal causation. Essentially, BNSF argues that
Mr. Thomas was the sole party at fault for his failure to stop, look, and listen from a
position where he had a clear view of the approaching train that had the right of way;
he negligently made a wide turn that caused the garbage truck tire to become stuck;

and then he panicked and attempted to beat the oncoming train instead of backing

but may return the jury for further consideration of its answers or may order anew
trial.

off of the crossing to allow the train to pass. Additionally, BNSF maintains that the
general damage award is excessive and a clear abuse of discretion.’

Because it affects our standard of review, we first consider the issue raised by
BNSF regarding the trial court’s commission of a legal error by entering judgment
despite the jury’s having returned irreconcilably inconsistent responses to the
interrogatories posed by the jury verdict form. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1812 and
1813. See also Oddo v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 2014-0004 (La. App. 4th Cir.
8/20/15), 173 So.3d 1192, 1200, writ denied, 2015-1712 (La. 11/6/15), 180 So.3d
308.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Verdict forms are governed by La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1812 and 1813. Article
1812 addresses the form and content of certain special verdict forms, with a written
finding upon each issue of fact. Article 1813 covers general verdict forms
accompanied by answers to written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact.
When the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the trial court shall direct
the entry of the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers. La. Code Civ.
P. art. 1813(C). When the answers are consistent with each other, but one or more
is inconsistent with the general verdict, the trial court may direct the entry of
judgment in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or
may return the jury for further consideration, or may order a new trial. La. Code
Civ. P. art. 1813(D). However, when the answers are inconsistent with each other
and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not
direct the entry of judgment, but may return the jury for further consideration of its

answers or may order a new trial. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1813(£).

Tn an alternative assignment of error, BNSF argues that if the liability is reversed, then the award
of costs against BNSF should be vacated or modified.

Reversible error may occur when a jury verdict form or interrogatories are so
misleading or confusing that a jury is precluded from reaching a verdict based on
correct law and facts. See Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Dresser-Rand Company,
2015-2002 (La. App. Ist Cir. 10/31/16), 207 So.3d 1131, 1137, writ denied, 2016-
02114 (La. 1/13/17), 215 So.3d 248. Appellate court review extends to laws and
facts. See La. Const. art. V, sec. 10(B). We find that the interrogatories concerning
the negligence, proximate cause of the accident, and the percentage of fault, if any,
to be allocated to Mr. Thomas were confusing in that the jury was not clearly
instructed as to the allocation of fault if the negligence of Mr. Thomas was found
not to be a proximate cause of the accident. When a jury gives inherently
inconsistent responses to questions on a verdict form, the trial court should return
the jury for further consideration or may order a new trial. See La. Code Civ. P. art.
1813(E); Ferrell v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 94-1252 (La. 2/20/95), 650 So.2d
742, 747. The trial court followed neither prescribed course in this case, even though
the trial court recognized the inconsistency in the jury’s findings after BNSF
objected. The trial court again acknowledged the inconsistency in its written reasons
for judgment: “This finding of 15% fault [answer to question number five] is
inconsistent with question number four where the jury found that the negligence of
[Mr.] Thomas was not the proximate cause of the accident.”

Further, La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812(C) directs the jury to attribute a percentage
of fault to a party only after it has determined that such party was negligent and that
this negligence was a legal or proximate cause of the accident. Ferrell, 650 So.2d
at 747. However, the jury in this case found that Mr. Thomas was negligent and
15% at fault in the accident, but that his negligence was not a legal or proximate
cause of the accident. When a jury finds a plaintiff to have been negligent but not a
proximate cause of the accident, and still apportions a percentage of fault to the

plaintiff, the findings are inherently inconsistent and are irreconcilable. The only

two options available to a trial court when the jury verdict is internally inconsistent
is to return the jury for further consideration or order a new trial. La. Code Civ. P.
art. 1813(E). The fact that Mr. Thomas was willing to accept the 15% fault
apportioned to him is not relevant in this situation, since the jury did not find that his
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. The two different responses by
the jury as to negligence and legal causation directly conflict with one another. See
Oddo, 173 So.3d at 1202.

Once the jury found that Mr. Thomas’s negligence was not a proximate cause
of the accident in response to interrogatory number four, there could be no
percentage of fault allocated to Mr. Thomas in response to interrogatory number
five. Accordingly, the jury should have been directed to stop answering questions
with respect to Mr. Thomas’s percentage of fault after they answered “No” to
interrogatory number four. The directions accompanying interrogatory number four,
however, only instructed the jury to proceed to interrogatory number five,
concerning the percentages of “negligence” attributable to both parties. The
instruction was incorrect and undoubtedly misled the jury that had already found
both parties were negligent, but that both parties’ negligence was not the proximate
cause of the accident. See Oddo, 173 So.3d at 1203. The incorrect instructions
accompanying the jury’s interrogatories certainly contributed to the inconsistency in
the jury’s answers with regard to Mr. Thomas.

We find that the trial court’s failure to follow Article 1813(E) under these
circumstances constitutes reversible error. See Diez v. Schwegmann Giant
Supermarkets, Inc., 94-1089 (La. App. Ist Cir. 6/23/95), 657 So.2d 1066, 1069,
writ denied, 95-1883 (La. 11/17/95), 663 So.2d 720. As we previously stated, under
La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812(C), the jury may only attribute a percentage of fault to a

party or nonparty that is negligent if its negligence was a legal or proximate cause

of the accident. Oddo, 173 So.3d at 1204, citing Ferrell, 650 So.2d at 747, and

Stevens v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 95-2347 (La. App. 4th Cir. 3/27/96), 672 So.2d
1031, 1033. Without question, the inconsistency in the jury’s verdict made it
impossible for the trial court to “enter judgment in conformity with the jury’s
answers ... and according to applicable law.” See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812(D).
Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1813(E), the inconsistency in the jury’s verdict
required the trial court to order a new trial since it did not follow the only other
option of sending the jury back to reconsider its answers. See Diez, 657 So.2d at
1069. See also Palumbo v. Shapiro, 2011-0769 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/14/11), 81
So0.3d 923, 930, writ denied, 2012-0140 (La. 3/23/12), 85 So.3d 93. Accordingly,
the trial court’s denial of BNSF’s motion for new trial was legal error.

The trial court’s legal error mandates that this court either remand the matter
for a new trial, or alternatively, conduct a de novo review of the record on appeal.
When faced with a legal error that has tainted a jury verdict, the general rule is that
where the record is “otherwise complete, the appellate court should make its own
independent de novo review of the record and determine a preponderance of the
evidence.” Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 735. See also
Oddo, 173 So.3d at 1205. In this case, however, after examining the record, we
have determined that a preponderance of the evidence cannot be determined fairly
from acold record. There is substantial testimonial conflict that can only be resolved
depending upon the fact-finder’s view of the witnesses’ credibility.’ In such cases,

the appellate court may conclude that the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new

8 For instance, while experts testified about the requirements that railroad crossings be at least one
foot wider than the traveled roadway surface, motorists are required to stop, look, and listen, as
well as yield the right of way to trains before entering railroad crossings. Testimony conflicted
about the facts surrounding the breach of these duties, whether the train’s horn was blaring as it
approached the crossing, the timing of when the truck and train were visible to each other, and
whether Mr. Thomas could have backed up completely out of harm’s way prior to the collision.
Likewise, the extent and severity of Mr. Thomas’s injuries, and the possibility of future surgeries,
along with his ability to return to work, all require credibility determinations that are not possible
from a review of a cold record.

10

trial. See Diez, 657 So.2d at 1070-1071. Therefore, we conclude that the trial
court’s entry of judgment on the inconsistent jury verdict and denial of BNSF’s
motion for new trial were reversible errors, and we must vacate the judgment. We
are convinced that the interests of justice would be served best by remanding for a
new trial. See Id. at 1072.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and

remand this case for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

JUDGMENT VACATED AND REMANDED.

11

STATE OF LOUISIANA THEOPHOLIA THOMAS

FIRST CIRCUIT VERSUS
COURT OF APPEAL BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY
DOCKET NUMBER 2023 CA 1209

AUG 06 2024

_. MILLER, J., dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s opinion herein.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1813 provides that when the jury’s
answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent
with the general verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of judgment but may
return the jury for further consideration of its answers or may order a new trial. La.
C.C.P. art. 1813(E).

According to the jury verdict form, the jury found that Mr. Thomas was
negligent (Question Three), but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the
accident (Question Four), yet attributed 15% “negligence” to Mr. Thomas and 85%
to BNSF (Question Five). Recognizing this inconsistency, the trial court did not
direct entry of the inconsistent verdict. Instead, at a hearing following BNSF’s
written objection to the jury verdict, Mr. Thomas indicated that he was willing to
accept the allocation of 15% fault and a final judgment was then entered allocating
15% fault to Mr. Thomas and 85% fault to BNSF. This error thus inured to the
benefit of BNSF.

The court resolved the inconsistency in the verdict by accepting Mr. Thomas’s
waiver. The practical solution employed herein by the trial court, i.e., resolving the
inconsistencies in the jury verdict form, then entering a judgment, distinguishes this

case from Ferrell v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, 94-1252 (La. 2/20/95),

650 So. 2d 742, 747, Oddo v. Asbestos Corporation Ltd., 2014-0004 (La. App. 4th

Cir. 8/20/15), 173 So. 3d 1192, 1201-1202, writ denied, 2015-1712 (La. 11/6/15),

1

180 So. 3d 308, Diez v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 94-1089 (La. App.

1 Cir. 6/23/95), 657 So. 2d 1066, 1068-1069, writ denied, 95-1883 (La. 11/17/95),

663 So. 2d 720, and Palumbo v. Shapiro, 2011-0769 (La. App. 4‘ Cir. 12/14/11), 81

So. 3d 923, 929-930, writ denied, 2012-0140 (La. 3/23/12), 85 So. 3d 93. In each
of these cited cases, the trial court entered judgment but took no remedial action
before entering the jury’s inconsistent verdict.

I disagree with the majority’s analysis to the extent that it renders the
permissive “may” in La. C.C.P. art. 1813(E) mandatory. The “cardinal rule of

statutory interpretation is that the word ‘may’ is permissive.” Pierce Foundations,

Inc. v. Jaroy Construction, Inc., 2015-0785 (La. 5/3/16), 190 So. 3d 298, 304.

Because of the permissive language of La. C.C.P. art. 1813(E), I believe the trial
court had the option to resolve any inconsistencies post trial without returning the
matter to the jury for further consideration of its answers or ordering a new trial.

Consistent with this problem-solving approach, I find the reasons set forth by
the trial court to be particularly persuasive:

This Court is troubled with the defendant being able to claim an
error on the part of the Court that benefits the defendant and ask for a new
trial as a result of that error. The plaintiff is willing to accept the error and
accept the apportionment of 15% fault on Mr. Thomas’s part; therefore,
the Court will enter judgment as requested by the plaintiff and deny the
defendant’s objection to the entry of the judgment. The Court
distinguishes both the Ferrell and the Stevens case[s] ... in that in each of
those cases the aggrieved party was requesting an increase of the award
based on the percentage of fault allocated to it. In this particular case, the
aggrieved party is the benefactor of the error and is now requesting a new
trial even though it is receiving the benefit of the reduction of the
judgment by the percentage of fault. Should this Court want to enter 100%
fault on the part of BNSF, then BNSF could object due to the
inconsistency. However, BNSF is receiving the lesser of the two amounts
of fault that can be interpreted by the verdict form, and should not be able
to complain and receive a new trial based on an error that benefits them.
Therefore, the Court will deny the objection to the entry of the judgment
by BNSF and enter a judgment in compliance with these Reasons.

In my view, the remedial actions taken by the trial court are consistent with

principals of judicial economy and not violative of La. C.C.P. art. 1813(E). On

appeal, the parties do not request a new trial and should not be awarded one. Any
right to complain about the allocation of fault or the amount of the damage award is

preserved for appellate review and can be addressed by this court.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT

DOCKET NUMBER
2023 CA 1209

THOEPHOLIA THOMAS INDIVIDUALY AND ON BEHALF OF
DAUGHTER AZYRIA O. THOMAS

VERSUS

i BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, ET AL.

WELCH, J., dissenting. AUG 06 2024

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion. I do not believe the jury’s verdict
was inconsistent or that it should be set aside. It is well-settled that a jury’s verdict based
on a jury verdict form should not be set aside unless the form is so inadequate that the jury
is precluded from reaching a verdict based on correct law and facts. Thomas v.
Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 2018-0869 (La. App. 1* Cir. 10/2/19), 289 So.3d
579, 593, writ denied, 2019-01767 (La. 1/14/20), 291 So.3d 687. In this case, the jury
verdict form and the interrogatories that followed were not inadequate, confusing, or
misleading. The jury was asked whether Mr. Thomas was negligent, and if so, they were
to determine whether his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. The jury was
then instructed to state the percentage of negligence attributable to the parties. The jury
responded to these interrogatories by finding that Mr. Thomas was negligent, that he was
negligent in the amount of 15%, but that his negligence (of 15%) was not a cause of the
accident. Thus, the jury interrogatories were not misleading, confusing, or inadequate such
that the jury was prevented from dispensing justice or from reaching a verdict based on the
law and the facts.

In addition, with regard to the jury’s award of damages in the amount of $5,000,000
for past and future pain and suffering and $3,000,000 for past and future loss of enjoyment
of life, based on my review of the record and the particular facts of this case, ie. Mr.
Thomas’s particular injuries and their effect on his life (permanent, life-altering physical

and mental injuries with daily physical and emotional pain) coupled with a study of prior

awards in truly similar cases, I do not believe that the jury abused its discretion. See
Barber Brothers Contracting Company, LLC v. Capitol City Produce Company,
LLC, 2023-00788 (La. 6/28/24), So.3d__,__—«, 2024 WL 3218636 *25-26; see also
Marable v. Empire Truck Sales of Louisiana LLC, 2016-0876 (La. App. 4 Cir.
6/23/17), 221 So.3d 880 (affirming general damage award of $40,000,000 for the plaintiff,
who was 64 years-old and suffered from a disabling brain injury and other serious injuries
as a result of the accident); Soileau v. Smith True Value and Rental, 2011-1594 (La.
App. 3" Cir. 1/30/14), 130 So.3d 1060 (affirming $7,500,000 in general damages after a
loader detached from a trailer and fell on the plaintiffs leg and the plaintiff suffered from
daily pain requiring pain and sleep medication); and Shephard v. AIX Entergy, Inc.,
51,965 (La. App. 2™ Cir. 5/23/18), 249 So.3d 194, 210 (affirming $7,500,000 where
plaintiff sustained burns to 33-49% of his body and returned to work after his injuries).

Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.