Eddie L. Collier, III and Terrell Collier v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, and John P. Miller

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2023 CA 1211

, EDDIE L. COLLIER, Ill AND TERRELL COLLIER
AA ap
Nt VERSUS

Je BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND
AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE AND
JOHN P. MILLER

Judgment Rendered: JUL 2 2 2024

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On Appeal from the 19th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge

State of Louisiana
Trial Court Docket Number C654579, Div./Sec. 25

Honorable Wilson E. Fields, Judge Presiding

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Matthew T. Lofaso Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Eddie L. Collier, HI and
and Terrell Collier

Zachary S. Walker
S. Bradley Rhorer
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Liz Murrill Counsel for Defendants/Appellants,
Attorney General Board of Supervisors of Louisiana

Christopher W. Stidham State University and Agricultural
Special Assistant Attorney General and Mechanical College and

Baton Rouge, Louisiana Michael “Clay” Crain

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BEFORE: WELCH, THERIOT, PENZATO, GREENE, AND STROMBERG, JJ.

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PENZATO, J.

Defendants/appellants made an offer of judgment to the plaintiffs/appellees
pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 970 in the amount of $120,000, exclusive of legal interest
and court costs. In a judgment signed on August 2, 2023, the trial court denied the
defendants’ motion for judgment on the offer of judgment, granted the plaintiffs’
cross-motion for judgment on the offer of judgment, and entered judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs, against the defendants, in the amount of $120,000, together with
legal interest from the date of judicial demand until paid, and court costs in the
amount of $3,585.78, with legal interest from date of judgment until paid. The
defendants appealed from the trial court’s August 2, 2023 judgment. After review,
we reverse and render.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Eddie L. Collier, HI, and his wife, Terrell Collier, filed suit against the Board
of Supervisors of Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College
(LSU) and LSU employees, John P. Miller and Michael “Clay” Crain, seeking
damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by Mr. Collier. The Colliers
alleged that Mr. Collier was injured while participating in a training at an agency
under the direction of the State of Louisiana, through LSU. According to the
Colliers, Mr. Miller and Mr. Crain “conspired” with employees of LSU to perform
pranks on patrons of the training institute and/or Mr. Miller and Mr. Crain rigged a
cooler with a rubber snake, which “leaped forward out of the cooler” in a striking
motion as Mr. Collier opened the cooler. Mr. Collier jumped back and fell to the
ground, allegedly injuring his left knee. The Colliers maintained that the defendants
were independently negligent, and LSU was also liable for the negligent acts of its
employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Colliers sought general

and special damages for the personal injuries purportedly sustained by Mr. Collier

in this incident, as well as the loss of consortium purportedly experienced by Mrs.
Collier.

LSU and Mr. Crain answered, denying the plaintiffs’ factual allegations and
denying liability (LSU and Mr. Crain are collectively referred to as “LSU”). The
designated record on appeal does not contain an answer or other appearance by Mr.
Miller. Therefore, Mr. Miller’s status in this litigation is unclear.

On June 13, 2023, LSU made an offer of judgment to the Colliers pursuant to
La. C.C.P. art. 970. Without any admission of liability, LSU offered $120,000
“exclusive of court costs, interest, attorney’s fees, and any other amount which may
be awarded to Eddie and Terrell Collier pursuant to statute or rule, and in full
settlement” of the Colliers’ claims for damages.’ On June 14, 2023, the Colliers
accepted LSU’s offer of judgment. Two days later, LSU sent a letter to the Colliers
responding to their verbal request for LSU to pay interest and court costs in addition
to $120,000. LSU declined the request, stating its position that the offer of judgment
and acceptance constituted an enforceable compromise agreement that may not be
revoked by either party.

LSU subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the offer of judgment,
asking the trial court to enter a judgment in the total amount of $120,000, with each
party to bear its own court costs. See La. C.C.P. art. 970(A). LSU maintained the
Colliers were not entitled to any additional sums, particularly court costs and
interest, since they accepted the offer of judgment of $120,000, made exclusive of

these amounts. LSU asserted there was no legal basis to tax it with the Colliers’

' The offer of judgment stated the offer was made by LSU to settle all claims, including the
Colliers’ claims against Mr. Miller. However, the August 2, 2023 judgment was not rendered
against Mr. Miller; he was not mentioned in the judgment. Therefore, we likewise do not render
judgment in favor of or against Mr. Miller.

court costs and/or legal interest, because the offer was made without an admission
of liability and no trial was held.’

In response, the Colliers filed a cross-motion for judgment on the offer of
judgment, seeking judgment in their favor, against LSU, in the amount of $120,000,
plus legal interest from the date of judicial demand and all recoverable court costs.
According to the Colliers, legal interest from the date of judicial demand and court
costs must be added to the judgment, pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4203 and La. C.C.P.
art. 1920, because the offer of judgment was made exclusive of legal interest and
court costs. The Colliers reasoned that, when an offeree accepts an offer of judgment
that is exclusive of legal interest and court costs, those amounts are to be added to
the specific amount of the offer, if legal interest and court costs are otherwise
recoverable in that particular type of case.

At the conclusion of the contradictory hearing on the parties’ motions, the trial
court denied LSU’s motion and granted the Colliers’ cross-motion. A written
judgment was signed on August 2, 2023, granting judgment in favor of the Colliers
and against LSU in the amount of $120,000, together with legal interest from the
date of judicial demand until paid, and court costs in the amount of $3,585.78, with
legal interest on this sum from the date of judgment until paid.

LSU filed this appeal, asserting the trial court legally erred by awarding
prejudgment legal interest on the offer of judgment and by taxing it with the Colliers’

court costs.

7 Interest is either legal or conventional. La. R.S. 9:3500(A). Legal interest on sums which are the
object of a judicial demand is called “judicial interest.” La. R.S. 13:4202. Codal authority and
jurisprudence refer to legal interest and judicial interest interchangeably. See Smith v. Quarles
Drilling Co., 2004-0179 (La. 10/29/04), 885 So.2d 562, 563 n.1. For purposes of this opinion, we
use the term “legal interest.”

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 970 pertinently states:?

A. At any time more than twenty days before the time specified for the
trial of the matter, without any admission of liability, any party may
serve upon an adverse party an offer of judgment for the purpose of
settling all of the claims between them. The offer of judgment shall be
in writing and state that it is made under this Article; specify the total
amount of money of the settlement offer; and specify whether that
amount is inclusive or exclusive of costs, interest, attorney fees, and
any other amount which may be awarded pursuant to statute or rule.
Unless accepted, an offer of judgment shall remain confidential
between the offeror and offeree. If the adverse party, within ten days
after service, serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party
may move for judgment on the offer. The court shall grant such
judgment on the motion of either party.

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C. If the final judgment obtained by the plaintiff-offeree is at least
twenty-five percent less than the amount of the offer of judgment made
by the defendant-offeror or if the final judgment obtained against the
defendant-offeree is at least twenty-five percent greater than the amount
of the offer of judgment made by the plaintiff-offeror, the offeree must
pay the offeror’s costs, exclusive of attorney fees, incurred after the
offer was made, as fixed by the court.

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E. For purposes of comparing the amount of money offered in the offer
of judgment to the final judgment obtained, which judgment shall take
into account any additur or remittitur, the final judgment obtained shall
not include any amounts attributable to costs, interest, or attorney fees,
or to any other amount which may be awarded pursuant to statute or
rule, unless such amount was expressly included in the offer.

* * *

The function of La. C.C.P. art. 970 is to compensate the rejected offeror who

was forced to incur greater trial litigation costs than he would have if the offeree had
accepted the settlement offer. Article 970 is punitive in nature and, therefore, must

be strictly construed. Crawford v. United Services Automobile Association, 2003-

2117 (La. App. Ist Cir. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 668, 671.

In Dauterive v. Tile Redi, LLC, 2020-96 (La. App. 5th Cir. 10/5/20), 304 So.3d

1076, 1080, writ denied, 2020-01280 (La. 1/12/21), 308 So.3d 710, the court

3 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 970(A) and (C) were recently. See 2024 La. Acts No.

502, § 1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2024). However, these amendments are not applicable here.

5

considered the interplay of Article 970’s subsections, noting subsection (E) provides
the method of calculating the difference between the offer of judgment and the final
judgment. To compare the offer of judgment and the final judgment, the final
judgment shall contain any amount obtained as a result of additur or remittitur, but
shall not include any amounts attributable to costs, interest, or attorney fees, or any
other amount that may be awarded pursuant to statute or rule, unless expressly
indicated in the offer. Dauterive, 304 So.3d at 1080. Thus, the exclusive/inclusive
language mandated in Article 970(A) is used, per subsection (E), to calculate the
amount owed if the offer of judgment is rejected and the matter goes to trial.
Dauterive, 304 So.3d at 1080.

We agree with this analysis and conclusion and find the exclusive/inclusive
requirement of Article 970 does not determine whether LSU must pay legal interest
and court costs in this instance, where the offer was made and accepted exclusive of
these amounts. Instead, we must look to La. R.S. 13:4203 and La. C.C.P. art. 1920
— the laws that provide for an award of legal interest and court costs in tort
proceedings.

We must determine whether the judgment granting the Colliers’ motion for
judgment on LSU’s offer of judgment, made pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 970, is a

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judgment “sounding in damages ‘ex delicto’” within the meaning of La. RS.
13:4203, such that LSU must pay legal interest to the Colliers. This presents a
question of law, which we review de novo. See Amedee v. Aimbridge Hospitality
LLC, 2021-01906 (La. 10/21/22), 351 So.3d 321, 332. Next, we must determine
whether LSU was properly cast with the Colliers’ court costs pursuant to La. C.C.P.
art. 1920 where the Article 970 offer of judgment was made exclusive of court costs
and accepted by the offeree. To the extent we must interpret Article 970 to resolve

this issue, we apply the de novo standard of review. See Amedee, 351 So.3d at 332.

However, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s fixing of court costs

absent an abuse of the sound discretion afforded the trial court. Williams v. Leeper,
2021-1177 (La. App. Ist Cir. 4/8/22), 341 So.3d 850, 856. The parties do not cite
any case, and we have found none, squarely addressing the issues presented in this
appeal.

Before reaching these issues, we address the Colliers’ reliance on Crawford,
899 So.2d 668. The Colliers assert that Crawford supports their argument that, if
the offeree accepts an Article 970 offer of judgment made exclusive of court costs
and legal interest, the offeror must pay the offeree the principal sum (here, $120,000)
plus “those certain other amounts” if the law governing the subject type of action
permits recovery of those certain other amounts.

This court in Crawford stated that an Article 970 offer of judgment made
“exclusive of all costs, interest, attorney fees, and any other amount which may be
awarded” means that costs, interest, attorney fees, and any other amount which may
be awarded will be “over and above” the total amount of the settlement offer.
Crawford, 899 So.2d at 672. For the following reasons, we find Crawford is
distinguishable and is not dispositive of the issues presently before this court.

The sole issue in Crawford was whether the plaintiff's insurer was entitled to
reduce its Article 970 offer of judgment by the amount of payments already made to
the plaintiff/insured.* Reversing the trial court, the Crawford court concluded the
insurer was not entitled to reduce the offer of judgment, because the offer was made

“exclusive of all costs, interest, attorney fees, and any other amount which may be

‘ The plaintiff in Crawford filed consolidated suits against his insurer in connection with two car
accidents. Prior to the offer of judgment, the trial court determined liability in favor of Crawford
for the first car accident, and the parties stipulated to liability, again in favor of Crawford, for the
second accident. The trial court found coverage existed for both accidents; however, the amount
of coverage for the first accident was subject to a credit of $55,000 and the amount of coverage
for the second accident was subject a credit of $105,000. Crawford, 899 So.2d at 669. Also prior
to the offer of judgment, the parties stipulated the plaintiff would be entitled to a five percent
penalty and a twenty percent attorney fee award on any damages awarded, with penalties and
attorney fees to be calculated on the final award to plaintiff from each accident after the stipulated
past credits were applied. Crawford, 899 So.2d at 669. The issue in Crawford was whether the
credit amounts should be deducted from the offer of judgment. Crawford, 899 So.2d at 673.

awarded pursuant to statute, rule, or stipulation.” Crawford, 899 So.2d at 672.
Concluding the insurer intended that the total offer of judgment would be reduced
by the amount of its prior payments would create ambiguity and would render the
specificity requirement of La. C.C.P. art. 970 meaningless, referring to the
requirement in Article 970 that the offer specify whether it is made exclusive or
inclusive of costs, interest, attorney fees, and any other amounts which may be
awarded. Crawford, 899 So.2d at 673. Here, LSU is not seeking to reduce the
amount of the offer of judgment; instead, it seeks to pay only what was offered and
accepted — nothing more, nothing less.

In addition to other amounts, the plaintiff in Crawford was awarded legal
interest and court costs. Crawford, 899 So.2d at 674. There is no discussion in
Crawford explaining why or how the court determined the plaintiff was entitled to
those amounts, and we decline to speculate. However, there is nothing in Crawford
or in the text of Article 970 to suggest an offeree is entitled to an award of legal
interest and court costs simply because he accepted an offer, which expressly
excluded these amounts. See La. C.C. art. 9.° Instead, the offerees, the Colliers,
must otherwise be entitled to the additional amounts sought, including legal interest
and court costs.

For instance, in Dauterive, 304 So.3d at 1083, the court of appeal affirmed the
trial court’s judgment granting a motion for partial summary judgment in the
defendant’s favor, finding the plaintiffs failed to prove entitlement to attorney fees,
costs, and legal interest after accepting the defendant’s Article 970 offer of judgment
made exclusive of these amounts. There was no finding of liability against the

defendant for the plaintiffs’ redhibition cause of action; therefore, attorney fees,

> Louisiana Civil Code Article 9 states, “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application
does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.”

costs, and interest were not recoverable under La. C.C.P. art. 2545. Dauterive, 304
So.3d at 1082.

Similarly, in Hendrick v. Patterson, 47,668 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1/16/13), 109
So.3d 475, writ denied, 2013-0670 (La. 4/26/13), 112 So.3d 849, the plaintiff was
not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs where the Article 970 offer of
judgment was made exclusive of these amounts and there was no liability finding
against the defendant under the New Home Warranty Act, which provided for an
award of attorney fees and costs if the builder violated the Act. See La. R.S.
9:3149(A). Attorney fees and penalties are only assessed against the defeated party
when the statutory requirements are met. Hendrick, 109 So.3d at 484-85. Although
the court in Hendrick ordered that interest be awarded on the judgment on the offer
of judgment from the date of judicial demand, we note that, like in Crawford, there
is no discussion to explain why or how the court in Hendrick determined the plaintiff
was entitled to interest, nor is there mention of the application of La. R.S. 13:4203
to the plaintiff's claims under the New Home Warranty Act. Hendrick, 109 So.3d
at 484-85.° Additionally, it appears the issue of whether any award of legal interest
was appropriate was not raised before the court; instead, the court was tasked with
deciding when legal interest began to run. Hendrick, 109 So.3d at 484-85.
Entitlement to Legal Interest

The Colliers’ suit is based on general negligence (La. C.C. art. 2315) and
respondeat superior (La. C.C. art. 2320). Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315
provides that a tortfeasor must compensate a tort victim for all of the damages
occasioned by his act and must put the victim in the position he would have occupied
if the tort had not been committed. Duet v. Landry, 2017-0937 (La. App. Ist Cir.

4/30/18), 250 So.3d 918, 923. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320 provides that

® Instead, the Hendrick court cited La. R.S. 9:3500, which states, in part, that legal interest is fixed
at the rate fixed in La. R.S. 13:4202 on all sums which are the object of a judicial demand.
Hendrick, 109 So.3d at 485.

employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by their employees in the
exercise of the functions in which they are employed. Ledet v. Robinson Helicopter
Co., 2015-1218 (La. App. Ist Cir. 4/15/16), 195 So.3d 89, 92, writ denied, 2016-
00937 (La. 9/6/16), 204 So.3d 1002.

“Damages” refers to pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for
an injury sustained. Duet, 250 So.3d at 923. In the delictual context, La. C.C. art.
2315 authorizes compensatory damages, which include reparation for physical
suffering, inconvenience, loss of earnings and services, expenses incurred, and
mental suffering. Duet, 250 So.3d at 923. The primary objective of awarding
general damages is to attempt, with monetary compensation, to restore the injured
party to the state the party was in at the time immediately preceding injury. Hebert
v. Boesch, 2015-1791 (La. App. Ist Cir. 6/3/16), 194 So.3d 798, 804, writ denied,
2016-1257 (La. 10/28/16), 208 So.3d 889.

An award of prejudgment legal interest is an extension of the compensatory
damages, which may be necessary to make a plaintiff whole. Thomas v. A. Wilbert
& Sons, LLC, 2015-0928 (La. App. Ist Cir. 2/10/17), 217 So.3d 368, 405, writs
denied, 2017-0952, 2017-0967 (La. 11/13/17), 229 So.3d 478, 230 So.3d 204.7 An
award of legal interest in tort cases is governed by La. R.S. 13:4203, which provides,
“Legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding
in damages, ‘ex delicto’, which may be rendered by any of the courts.”® Legal

interest runs from the plaintiff's first judicial claim against any party responsible for

’ Citing Trans—Global Alloy Ltd. v. First National Bank of Jefferson Parish, 583 So.2d 443, 458
(La. 1991) (quoting Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d
147 (1981)).

8 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1921 states the court shall award interest in the
judgment as prayed for or as provided by law. The phrase “as provided by law” refers to La. R.S.
13:4203, among other codal provisions. See La. C.C.P. art. 1921, Official Revision Comments —
1960, Comment (c).

10

a single tortious act. Edwards v. Daugherty, 2003-2103 (La. 10/1/04), 883 So.2d
932, 947.

In tort cases, legal interest on judgments for damages attaches automatically,
by operation of law, and is owed until the judgment is paid, regardless of whether it
was prayed for in the petition or specifically awarded in the judgment. Preston v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Oregon, 2021-0647 (La. App. Ist Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 94,
96-97.” Any person cast in judgment in an action ex delicto is liable for judicial
(legal) interest at the prevailing rate set forth in La. R.S. 13:4203. Rose v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 2003-606 (La. App. 5th Cir. 11/12/03), 861 So.2d 692, 695, writ denied,
2003-3420 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 850. In Rose, the excess insurer stipulated to
liability and causation but was not liable for legal interest because the jury awarded
the plaintiff less than the primary policy limits. The excess insurer owed no damages
to the plaintiff and was, therefore, not cast in judgment and did not owe legal interest.
Rose, 861 So.2d at 694-95.

Similarly, in Hardy v. Poydras Properties, 97-2547 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1/13/99), 737 So.2d 793, 796, writs denied, 99-0764, 99-0769 (La. 5/7/99), 740
So.2d 1285, 1293, the trial on the plaintiffs’ claim for damages arising out of a fire
was bifurcated, and the trial court entered a judgment of liability against the primary
insurer. Prior to the damages trial, the primary insurer settled with the plaintiffs, and
an issue arose between the primary and excess insurers concerning whether the
primary insurer was obligated to pay legal interest at the time of the settlement.
Hardy, 737 So.2d at 802. The court of appeal concluded the liability judgment was
not a judgment “sounding in damages” within the meaning of La. R.S. 13:4203.

Hardy, 737 So.2d at 803. Absent a monetary award of damages, there was no basis

° An award of legal interest is also designed to compensate a plaintiff for his loss of the use of
money to which he is entitled, the use of which defendant had during the pendency of the litigation.
Hall v. Brookshire Bros., Ltd., 2002-2404 (La. 6/27/03), 848 So.2d 559, 574.

1]

for a calculation of interest. The court concluded La. R.S. 13:4203 was not
applicable to the settlement agreements. Hardy, 737 So.2d at 803.

Here, LSU was not cast in judgment. LSU does not owe, nor has it agreed to
pay, “damages” as that term is defined above. Unlike an award of general damages
and legal interest, the primary objective of an offer of judgment is not to restore the
injured party to his pre-injury state through monetary compensation. See Hebert,
194 So.3d at 804. Instead, LSU sought to reach a compromise to resolve the
Colliers’ claims, with the benefit of the penalty provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 970(C)
in the event the Colliers rejected the offer. See La. C.C. art. 3071.'° We conclude
the judgment on LSU’s Article 970 offer of judgment is not a judgment sounding in
damages ex delicto within the meaning of La. R.S. 13:4203. The Colliers are not
entitled to legal interest on the amount of the offer of judgment; thus, the trial court
erred as a matter of law by awarding legal interest in favor of the Colliers.
Entitlement to Costs

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1920 states, “Unless the judgment
provides otherwise, costs shall be paid by the party cast, and may be taxed by a rule
to show cause. Except as otherwise provided by law, the court may render judgment
for costs, or any part thereof, against any party, as it may consider equitable.” The
costs of the clerk, sheriff, witness’ fees, costs of taking depositions and copies of
acts used on the trial, and all other costs allowed by the court, shall be taxed as costs.
La. R.S. 13:4533.

As an initial matter, we note that Article 1920 is not limited to judgments
sounding in damages, like La. R.S. 13:4203. There is nothing in the text of Article
1920 that prohibits its application to a judgment rendered on a motion for judgment

on an Article 970 offer of judgment. See La. C.C. art. 9.

10 Louisiana Civil Code Article 3071 states, “A compromise is a contract whereby the parties,
through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning
an obligation or other legal relationship.”

12

A trial court is given great discretion in taxing court costs in any manner it
deems equitable. See La. C.C.P. art. 1920; State, Department of Transportation &
Development v. Restructure Partners, L.L.C., 2007-1745 (La. App. Ist Cir. 3/26/08),
985 So.2d 212, 234, writ denied, 2008-1269 (La. 9/19/08), 992 So.2d 937. However,
such discretion is not unlimited. Discretion in the assessment of court costs is
restricted to the realm of what is equitable. Broussard v. Delchamps, Inc., 571 So.2d
855, 860 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), writ denied, 575 So.2d 370 (La. 1991). What is
“equitable” can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, which necessarily
requires a review of the facts involved. Johnson v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 476 So.2d
1074, 1075 (La. App. 3d 1985). See Hughes v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 35,043 (La. App.
2d Cir. 8/22/01), 793 So.2d 537, 549 (“We do not find the trial court’s procedure of
assessing court costs to be equitable as required under La. C.C.P. art. 1920.”).

When each party is successful in part, the judicial tendency is to assess some
of the court costs to each party. This approach is sometimes applied in tort cases to
apportion costs in the same percentages as a comparative fault allocation. See Frank
L. Maraist, Judgments; court costs, | La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Procedure § 12:4
(2d ed. 2021 update). For instance, in Adams v. Rhodia, Inc., 2007-0897R (La. App.
Ist Cir. 2/13/09), 5 So.3d 288, 291, this court concluded the trial court abused its
discretion by inequitably assigning 98% of costs to a defendant found to be only
10% at fault. This court modified the assessment of costs to achieve a more equitable
result, more reflective of the allocation of fault between the parties. Adams, 5 So.3d
at 291.

Here, the trial court did not provide reasons for taxing LSU with the Colliers’
court costs, and we find no equitable basis to tax costs against LSU in this instance.
LSU’s offer of judgment was made exclusive of costs, which the Colliers

unequivocally accepted. By agreeing to a compromise, each party made concessions

13

to settle the dispute. See La. C.C. art. 3071. Thus, each party was successful in part,
and the only equitable resolution is for each party to bear its own court costs.

Under the unique facts of this case, we find the trial court abused its discretion
by inequitably entering judgment against LSU, ordering it to pay the Colliers’ costs
in the amount of $3,585.78, with interest from the date of judgment until paid, and
erred by failing to order each party to bear its own costs.'!

DECREE

We reverse the August 2, 2023 judgment denying the motion for judgment on
offer of judgment filed by the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University
and Agricultural and Mechanical College and Michael “Clay” Crain, granting the
cross-motion for judgment on offer of judgment filed by Eddie L. Collier, IN and
Terrell Collier, and rendering judgment in favor of the Colliers, and against the
Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical
College and Michael “Clay” Crain in the amount of $120,000, together with legal
interest from the date of judicial demand until paid, and court costs in the amount of
$3,585.78 with legal interest from the date of judgment until paid.

We grant the motion for judgment on offer of judgment filed by the Board of
Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
and Michael “Clay” Crain and render judgment in favor of Eddie L. Collier, IJ and
Terrell Collier in the amount of $120,000, with each party to bear its own court costs
incurred in the trial court. Each party shall also bear its own costs on appeal.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

'l Ty many instances where the apportionment of court costs is considered on appeal, there is an
allocation of fault and/or a prevailing party. For instance, see Reynolds v. Louisiana Department
of Transportation, 2015-1304 (La. App. Ist Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So.3d 56, 59; Stewart v. City of
Hammond, 2020-0851 (La. App. Ist Cir. 3/29/21), 322 So.3d 1253, 1264; Williams, 341 So.3d at
856. Because there was neither an allocation of fault nor a prevailing party in this case, we rely on
principles of equity.

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/
[

“

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT

DOCKET NUMBER
2023 CA 1211

EDDIE L. COLLIER, III AND TERRELL COLLIER
VERSUS
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE
UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL
COLLEGE, AND JOHN L. MILLER
GREENE, J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent and think the trial court’s judgment awarding legal interest
and costs to the Colliers should be affirmed.

Because the Colliers accepted (rather than rejected) LSU’s offer of judgment, I
agree that La. C.C.P. art. 970(C) and (E)'s language does not determine whether LSU
must pay interest and costs in this case. However, I do not think La. R.S. 13:4203 and
La. C.C.P. art. 1920 control. Rather, I think the language of the parties’ compromise
agreement is the law between them and determines whether LSU is liable for interest
and costs. SeeLa. C.C. art. 1983. Parties are free to construct their own bargains, unless
the bargain contravenes public policy. CDI Corp. v. Hough, 2008-0218 (La. App. 1 Cir.
3/27/09), 9 So.3d 282, 287-88. Thus, I would use applicable Louisiana Civil Code articles
regarding interpretation of contracts to resolve the issue.

In the compromise offer, LSU offered as follows and the Colliers accepted as

written:

LSU hereby offers in judgment $120,000 inclusive of all damages, including but not
limited to damages awarded for any claim which the plaintiffs, Eddie L- Collier, IN and Terrell
Collier, have against LSU, Clay Crain, and/or John Miller, exclusive of court costs, interest,
attoriey’s fees, and any other amount which may be awarded to Eddie and Terrell Collier pursuant
to statute or rule, and in full settlement of Eddie and Terrell Collier’s claims for damages against
LSU, Crain and/or Miller in the above referenced suit.

The above language includes multiple confusing and conflicting provisions that render it
ambiguous. For example, the offer is “inclusive” of all damages, “exclusive” of court costs

and interest, and “in full settlement” of the Colliers’ claims.

I think these provisions create doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved — thus, I
would construe them against LSU under two Civil Code principles. First, under La. C.C.
art. 2056, doubtful text in a contract must be interpreted against the party who furnished
the text. Second, under La. C.C. art. 2057, when the doubt arises from a lack of necessary
explanation that one party should have given, the contract must be interpreted favorably
to the other party. Here LSU provided the ambiguous text contained in the offer and is
also the party who should have given the “necessary explanation” of exactly what amount
of money was being included and excluded in full settlement of the Colliers’ claims.

Thus, interpreting the compromise against LSU, I would use this Court's analysis
from Crawford, 899 So.2d 668, 672, wherein we explained that “exclusive of” interest
and costs means that interest and costs will be over and above the total amount of the
settlement offer. I agree with the reasoning in Crawford and think the trial court correctly
rendered judgment against LSU for $120,000, plus legal interest and costs.

Further, even if La C.C.P. art. 1920 does control as to costs, I disagree that the

trial court abused its discretion in assessing costs in this case.