Dane Lynn Taylor v. Rebecca Godfrey Taylor

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA

CURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2023 CA 1237

VERSUS

i i
REBECCA
y •, TAYLOR

Judgment Rendered:

On Appeal from the 20th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of West Feliciana
State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 24361

Honorable Kathryn E. Jones, Judge Presiding

J. Andrew Murrell Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Dane Lynn Taylor

G. Bruce Kuehne Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Rebecca Godfrey Taylor

BEFORE: THERIOT, PENZATO, AND GREENE, JJ.

PENZATO, J.

Dane Lynn Taylor appeals the trial court' s August 10, 2023 judgment, which

decreed that the net proceeds of the civil action entitled Rebecca Faith Taylor, et al.

v. Ivan Pozgaj Zagreb, etc., C. A. 18- 674- SDD-RLB, U.S. D.C. M.D.LA. were the

separate property of Rebecca Godfrey Taylor. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dane and Rebecca Taylor were married in 1988. Prior to their marriage, they

entered into a marriage contract providing for a separate property regime. In 2017,

Rebecca was injured in an automobile accident and filed a civil action entitled

Rebecca Faith Taylor, et al. v. Ivan Pozgaj Zagreb, etc., C. A. 18- 674- SDD-RLB,

U.S. D.C. M.D.LA. The parties negotiated a settlement that resulted in net proceeds

of $403, 000.00. Pursuant to Rebecca' s instructions, on May 6, 2021, her attorney

wrote a check payable to Dane for $380, 000. 00 of that amount.

Dane filed a petition for divorce on June 2, 2022. Rebecca answered the

petition and filed a reconventional demand seeking the return of the proceeds of the

civil action, which she asserted were her separate property. The parties stipulated to

a trial to determine the ownership of the proceeds.

At trial, the parties jointly introduced into evidence the deposition of Michael
In his
Hesse, the attorney who represented Rebecca and Dane in the civil action.'

deposition, Mr. Hesse testified that the case was mediated, but not resolved in

mediation. Rather, following mediation, the parties were able to negotiate a

settlement in the amount of $625, 000. 00. After paying medical expenses, Mr.

Hesse' s firm received a check in the amount of $534, 483. 24. Legal fees were

deducted, leaving $ 403, 000.00 as the net to the client. Mr. Hesse testified he did not

Mr. Hesse testified that although a consortium claim was asserted on behalf of Dane, no quantum
was presented in connection with the claim and less than I% of the effort he put into the case was
related to Dane' s claim. Dane was not involved in the automobile accident, and there was no
evidence presented at the trial that any portion of the $ 380,000.00 was for a loss of consortium.
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know what effect the receipt of the settlement funds would have on Rebecca' s status

for social security disability benefits and suggested to Rebecca the possibility of
Mr. Hesse further testified Rebecca was not
setting up a special needs trust.

accepting of setting up a trust but insisted upon directing a payment of $380,000.00
to Dane. Rebecca wrote and signed instructions directing payment of $380, 000.00
which Mr.
to Dane; $ 14, 000. 00 to Michael Godfrey; $4, 000. 00 for "the other thing",

Hesse understood to be the payment of an outstanding judgment against Rebecca;

and " the rest to [ Rebecca]," which was $ 5, 000. 00. Mr. Hesse testified Rebecca

never told him the payment to Dane was a gift and he did not perceive it as such; it

was his understanding Rebecca wanted the money to be in Dane' s name because he
was in charge of the money.

Rebecca testified she was injured in an automobile accident in 2017, as a result

of which she underwent seven major surgeries in four and a half years. She applied

for social security disability and began receiving payments in approximately 2019.
Rebecca testified she opened an account to deposit the disability payments, and Dane

told her she could not have more than $ 2, 000.00 in the account at a time. According

to Rebecca, when Mr. Hesse received the settlement funds, she instructed him to

make a check payable to Dane in the amount of $380, 000. 00. She testified she

directed the check to Dane because she thought she could not have any more than

2, 000. 00 in her account at any time.

Dane testified that he did not recall any conversations with Rebecca about the

settlement funds prior to receiving them. According to Dane, the day Rebecca

brought the check home, she handed it to him and told him it was to make up for all

that she had put him through over the years. Dane testified he deposited the check

from Mr. Hesse' s law firm made payable to him into a savings account controlled

solely by him. He further testified he transferred a portion of the $ 380, 000. 00 into

an investment account in his name and he was the sole person with access to the

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investment account. Dane testified it was his impression Rebecca intended to donate

the funds to him for all the things she had done in the past.

April Taylor Magee, the couple' s daughter, testified Rebecca told her she was

giving the settlement proceeds to Dane for everything she had put him through.
April further testified she was no longer in contact with Rebecca. Rebecca denied

the conversation with April had taken place.

Following the testimony of the parties, the trial court found Rebecca did not
donate the settlement funds to Dane, and Rebecca was therefore the owner of the

funds. The trial court issued written reasons for its ruling on July 12, 2023, stating

as follows:

Rebecca' s testimony established that she receives social security
disability payments based on her residual effects from the personal
injuries and asserted that she had been repeatedly told by Dane that she
could only have $ 2000[. 00] in accounts in her name at any given time
to preserve her right to receive the disability payments. This Court is
firmly convinced that Rebecca believed that $2000[. 00] limit to be true,
regardless of whether it is actually an accurate statement of the
correlation between social security disability payments and a related
personal injury monetary settlement. Both parties confirmed that they
did not seek expert financial advice on the handling of these funds. It
is much more reasonable to believe that Rebecca took Dane' s advice
that she could not receive a large lump sum of money and still preserve
her social security disability payments, than to believe Dane' s self-
that Rebecca had truly intended to donate
serving testimony
380, 000[. 00] to him due to previous unpleasantries between them,
especially when a donation of those funds represented the entirety of
the net proceeds of her personal injury case.

This Court finds that there was no donation made by Rebecca.
Her intent was not to donate to Dane, but to use him to " hide" the
380, 000[. 00] lump sum personal award in order to preserve her ability
to continue to receive social security disability benefits. This action

may have been foolhardy and based on an inaccurate perception by
Rebecca of social security disability rules; however, her actual intent
and subsequent actions were based upon that belief. The Court also
believes that her belief relative to the $ 2000[. 00] limit was encouraged
by Dane.

Therefore, because there was no actual donation made, only a
transfer for purposes of sequestering the money out of Rebecca' s name,
the $ 380,000[. 00] personal injury proceeds were initially, and are still,

owned by Rebecca, even though the proceeds check was made payable
to Dane.

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On August 10, 2023, the trial court signed a judgment in accordance with its

written reasons. Dane appeals, essentially contending the trial court erred by failing

to find a valid donation inter vivos occurred and that the $ 380, 000.00 is his separate

property.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

A donation inter vivos is a contract by which a person, called the donor,

gratuitously divests himself, at present and irrevocably, of the thing given in favor
of another, called the donee, who accepts it. La. C. C. art. 1468. Unless otherwise

provided by law, a donation inter vivos shall be made by authentic act. La. C. C. art.
1541.

One exception to the requirement of an authentic act is the donation of an

incorporeal movable, which may be made by authentic act or by compliance with

the requirements otherwise applicable to the transfer of that particular kind of

incorporeal movable. La. C. C. art. 1550. Under Louisiana property law, a check is

classified as an incorporeal movable. See La. C. C. art. 473. Ballex v. Ballex, 2019-

1271 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 6/ 20), 308 So. 3d 332, 336. The donation inter vivos of a

check is effective without any formality beyond the negotiation of same. Id. at 337.

The donee has the burden of proving the donation and the proof must be strong

and convincing. Matherne v. Polite, 2022- 0194 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 4/ 22), 355 So.

3d 664, 668. In order for a donation to be valid, there must be a divestment,

accompanied by donative intent. Schindler v. Biggs, 2006- 0649 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

6/ 8/ 07), 964 So. 2d 1049, 1053. Donative intent is a question of fact that is subject

to the manifest error standard of review. Matherne, 355 So. 3d at 668. Thus, a court

of appeal may not set aside a trial court' s factual finding unless it is manifestly

erroneous or clearly wrong. A trial court' s factual finding is manifestly

erroneous/ clearly wrong when, after review of the entire record, the appellate court

finds that no reasonable factual basis exists for the finding and that it is manifestly

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erroneous or clearly wrong. See Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and

Development, 617 So. 2d 880, 882 ( La. 1993). If, in light of the record in its entirety,

the trial court' s findings are reasonable, then the appellate court may not reverse,

even if convinced it would have weighed the evidence differently sitting as the trier

of fact. Matherne, 355 So. 3d at 668. Where the factfinder' s determination is based

on its decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, its finding

can virtually never be manifestly erroneous. Id.

Upon review of the record in this case, we cannot say the trial court was

manifestly erroneous in its factual finding that Rebecca lacked the donative intent to
donate the settlement proceeds to Dane. The trial court, after hearing the testimony

and considering the evidence introduced at trial, made the factual determination that
Rebecca never intended to irrevocably give the settlement proceeds to Dane. Dane

had the burden of proving the donative intent by strong and convincing evidence.

He offered what the trial court concluded was his " self-serving testimony" that it

was his impression Rebecca intended to donate the funds to him due to previous

unpleasantries between them. There was conflicting testimony as to whether

Rebecca and April ever discussed the decision to place the settlement funds in

Dane' s name. Based upon the record and Rebecca' s testimony that she directed the

check be made payable to Dane because he told her she could not have more than

2,000. 00 in her account or she would risk losing her disability payments, we find

there is a reasonable factual basis to support the trial court' s finding.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the trial court' s August 10, 2023 judgment is affirmed.

Appeal costs are assessed to Dane Lynn Taylor.

AFFIRMED.

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