State Of Louisiana v. Jessie James Baker

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2023 KA 0815

STATE OF LOUISIANA
1

VERSUS

JESSIE JAMES BAKER

Judgment Rendered: APR 19 2024

Appealed from the
21st Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Tangipahoa
State of Louisiana
Docket No. 1500445

The Honorable Brenda B. Ricks, Judge Presiding

Scott M. Perrilloux Counsel for Appellee,
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Le' Anne H. Malnar
Brett Sommer
Assistant District Attorneys
Amite, Louisiana

Ravi G. Shah Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,
Covington, Louisiana Jessie James Baker

BEFORE: McCLENDON, HESTER, AND MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J.

The defendant, Jessie James Baker, was charged by bill of information with

illegal carrying of weapons, a violation of La. R.S. 14: 95( E)' ( Count I) related to

possession of a firearm while unlawfully in possession of a controlled dangerous

substance, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a violation of La. R.S.

14: 95. 1' ( Count II), each with an offense date of January 16, 2015. He pled not

guilty. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty on both counts. On

Count I, the defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment at hard labor

without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. On Count II, he

was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. These sentences were the maximum

allowed within the range provided for the respective felonies. The sentences were

ordered to run concurrently. The defendant appealed; and after review, this court

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affirmed the defendant' s convictions. See State v. Baker, 2020- 1253 ( La. App.
Cir. 1111121), 332 So. 3d 692. The defendant did not assign error as to his

sentence, which was only reviewed as to patent error.

The State then filed a habitual offender bill of information accusing the

defendant of a previous conviction. 3 Following a hearing, the trial court adjudged
the defendant a second -felony offender on both counts and vacated the

corresponding previously -imposed sentences. Based on the adjudication, the trial

court resentenced the defendant as follows: on Count I, to forty years

Section ( E) of La. R. S. 14: 95 was subsequently amended and reenacted by La. Acts
2016, No. 543, § 1. However, for purposes of our discussion herein, we will apply the version of
La. R. S. 14: 95( E) in effect at the time the defendant was charged.

2The penalty provision of La. R. S. 14:95. 1, Section ( B), was subsequently amended and
reenacted by La. Acts 2017, No. 281, § 1, to reduce the minimum term of imprisonment from ten
to five years. For purposes of our discussion herein, however, we will apply the version in effect
at the time the defendant was charged.

3The State identified the predicate offense as the defendant' s October 25, 2005 conviction
for attempted armed robbery, under Twenty -First Judicial District Court Docket No. 95168.

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imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence; and on Count Il, to forty years imprisonment at hard labor.' The trial

court ordered that the sentences imposed run concurrently. On August 29, 2022,

the defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence which, following a hearing,
the trial court granted in part, resentencing him on Count I to twenty years

imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence. As to Count II, the defendant' s sentence remained unchanged, with the

trial court denying any reconsideration thereof. These sentences were the

maximum allowed under the applicable habitual offender law.

The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying in
part his Motion to Reconsider Sentence by
and otherwise
imposing

unconstitutionally excessive sentences on both Counts I and II. For the following

reasons, we affirm the defendant' s habitual offender adjudication, vacate the

sentence, and remand for resentencing with instructions.

FACTUAL HISTORY

Though more fully recounted in our previous opinion, on January 16, 2015,

Officer Henry Dejean (" Officer Dejean"), with the Hammond Police Department,

was part of a street crimes unit surveilling the Blue Store on Range Road when he

observed the defendant drive into the parking lot and complete, what he believed to

be, a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Officer Dejean followed the defendant,

initiated an investigatory stop, and, upon speaking to the defendant, smelled

marijuana emanating from the vehicle. When Officer Dejean asked the defendant

to step out of the vehicle, the defendant started the engine, and attempted to leave.

Officer Dejean reached into the vehicle to stop the defendant, a struggle ensued,

We note that when imposing the sentence on Count 1I, the trial court did not state that
the sentence would be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
See La. R.S. 14: 95. 1( 13).
Nonetheless, as La. R.S. 15: 301. 1( A) provides, any applicable " without
benefits" provision is self -activating. See State v. Howard, 2018- 0317 ( La. App. 1" Cir.
9/ 21/ 18), 258 So. 3d 66, 72, n. 1, writ denied, 2018- 1650 ( La. 5/ 6/ 19), 269 So. 3d 692.

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and the defendant reached for the center console where Officer Dejean saw a

handgun. Eventually, through the assistance of backup, the defendant was taken

out of his vehicle, and the officers found a bag of marijuana on the defendant' s

person.
Additionally, a fully loaded handgun, with a live round in the chamber,

was seized from the vehicle. The K-9 unit then arrived, with the K-9 dog alerting

on the defendant' s vehicle. The vehicle was searched, and suspected marijuana

shavings were found on the floorboard. See Baker, 332 So. 3d at 694- 95.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred: ( 1) in denying

in part his Motion to Reconsider Sentence; and ( 2) by imposing the maximum

available sentences on both counts, which he claims are unconstitutionally

excessive. The defendant does not contest his adjudication as a second offender.

Both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions prohibit the imposition

of cruel or excessive punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; La. Const. art. 1, § 20,

Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v.

Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 767 ( La. 1979). A sentence is unconstitutionally

excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or

constitutes nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and

suffering. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and

punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks one' s

sense of justice. State v. Livous, 2018- 0016 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 24/ 18), 259 So. 3d

1036, 1044, writ denied, 2018- 1788 ( La. 4/ 15119), 267 So. 3d 1130. The trial court

has great discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits, and such a

sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of an abuse of discretion.

State v. Scott, 2017- 0209 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 15117), 228 So. 3d 207, 211, writ

denied, 2017- 1743 ( La. 8131118), 251 So. 3d 410.

El

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894. 1 sets forth the factors for

the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of

La. C. Cr.P. art. 894. 1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court

adequately considered the criteria. Scott, 228 So. 3d at 211. The articulation of

the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr.P. art. 894. 1, not rigid or

mechanical compliance with its provisions. The trial judge should review the

defendant' s personal history, his prior criminal record, his family dependents, the
seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that he will commit another crime, and

his potential for rehabilitation through correctional services other than

confinement.
On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether

the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence

might have been more appropriate. Scott, 228 So. 3d at 211.

The factors guiding the decision of the trial court are necessary for an
appellate court to adequately review a sentence for excessiveness and, therefore,

should be in the record. State v. Shippl, 98- 2670 ( La. App.
1St
Cir. 9124199), 754

So. 2d 1068, 1072. Otherwise, a sentence may appear to be arbitrary or excessive

and not individualized to the particular defendant. State v. Green, 558 So. 2d

1263, 1268 ( La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 564 So. 2d 317 ( La. 1990). When the

reasons for an apparently severe sentence in relation to the particular defendant and

the actual offense committed do not appear in the record, a sentence may be

vacated and remanded for resentencing. Shipp, 754 So. 2d at 1072.

Thus, to aid the trial court in its obligation to fairly sentence the defendant,

La. C. Cr.P. art. 894. 1 sets forth factors for the trial court to consider. While the

trial courts are afforded great discretion in sentencing, the appellate court still must

review the sentences to ensure that there has been no abuse of that discretion. To

aid the appellate court in this review in the context of a habitual offender

proceeding, La. R.S. 15: 529. 1 directs that the trial court shall provide written

5

reasons for its determination. Here, the trial court did not provide written reasons,

nor does the record reflect that the court considered the enumerated criteria.

In State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276, 1280- 81 ( La. 1993), the Louisiana

Supreme Court opined that if a trial judge were to find that the punishment

mandated by the Habitual Offender Law makes no " measurable contribution to

acceptable goals of punishment"
or that the sentence amounted to nothing more

than "
the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering" and is " grossly out of

proportion to the severity of the crime," he has the option, indeed the duty, to

reduce such sentence to one that would not be constitutionally excessive. In State

v. Johnson, 97- 1906 ( La. 3/ 4/ 98), 709 So. 2d 672, 677, the Louisiana Supreme

Court further noted that, given the legislature' s constitutional authority to enact

statutes such as the Habitual Offender Law, it is not the sentencing court' s role to

question the legislature' s wisdom in requiring enhanced punishments for multiple
offenders.
Instead, the sentencing court is only allowed to determine whether the

particular defendant before it has proven that the mandatory minimum sentence is

so excessive in his case that it violates the constitution. Departures downward

from the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law should occur only in
rare situations. Johnson, 709 So. 2d at 677.

Do_rthey and Johnson recognize that sentences within the range provided by

the legislature may yet be constitutionally excessive. Generally, defendants

employ this body of caselaw in search of a sentence below the mandatory

minimums. Here, the defendant received a maximum sentence under the

sentencing scheme. In arguing for a lesser sentence, he notes that the predicate

offense was committed when he was sixteen years old, and the present conviction

was not for a crime of violence. He further argues that, if committed today, Count

I on his 2015 bill of information would not violate the referenced statute due to the

amendment to La. R.S. 14: 95( E) and that the sentencing range has been reduced

M

under La. R.S. 14: 95. 1. While the trial court may very well have considered these

facts, we have nothing in the record to 'confirm this nor anything to review.
Pursuant to the applicable version of La. R.S. 14: 95( E), whoever commits

the crime of illegal carrying of weapons while in the possession of or during the
sale or distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, " the offender shall be [... ]

imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than ten years

without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence." Additionally,

as to the crime ofpossession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the applicable

version of La. R.S. 14: 95. 1( B) provides that the punishment for such an offense is

imprison[ ment]
at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than twenty years
without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence[.]"

Under the applicable versions of the Habitual Offender law, "[ i] f the second

felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by

imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to

imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one- half the longest

term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction."

La. R.S. 15: 529. 1 ( A)( 1). Accordingly, the sentencing range for the defendant' s

conviction on Count I was imprisonment at hard labor between five and twenty

years and, for Count II, imprisonment at hard labor between ten and forty years.

As noted, following the trial court' s ruling on the defendant' s Motion to

Reconsider Sentence, on Count I, the defendant' s sentence was reduced to twenty

years imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence and, on Count II, the defendant' s sentence remained

See La. R.S. 15: 529. 1( K)(1) ( except as otherwise provided, " the court shall apply the
provisions of this Section that were in effect on the date that the defendant' s instant offense was
committed."). Accordingly, we apply the version of La. R.S. 15: 529. 1( A)( 1) in effect at the time
the defendant committed the instant offenses on January 16, 2015.

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unchanged:
forty years imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation,
parole, or suspension of sentence.'

The legislature passed the Habitual Offender Law to deter and punish
recidivism.
Under this statute, a defendant with multiple felony convictions is
treated as a recidivist who is to be punished for the instant crime in light of his
continuing disregard for the laws of our state. He is subjected to a longer sentence

because he continues to break the law. See Johnson, 709 So. 2d at 677.

Maximum sentences may be imposed for the most serious offenses and the

worst offenders or when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety in
light of his past repeated criminality. State v. Parker, 2012- 1550 ( La. App. 1" Cir.
4126/ 13), 116 So. 3d 744, 754, writ denied, 2013- 1200 ( La. 11/ 22/ 13), 126 So. 3d
478.
The legislature has crafted the scheme to take the seriousness of the offense
into account.
The underlying offense is assigned a sentencing range by the
legislature, and the second or subsequent offender statute provides a multiplier for
a maximum sentence based upon the number of proven prior offenses. The

minimum within the range is a fraction of the maximum. So, for example, for

every second offender, the legislature has crafted a sentencing range of not less

than one- half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed

for a first conviction.
All second offenders can then be treated individually by the
trial court when tailoring a sentence within the provided range.

Here, while it is true that this defendant was previously convicted of a

felony, the same is true of all defendants found to be second offenders.

Furthermore, the upper end of the range accounts for the severity of the offense the
State seeks to enhance. Thus, to say that a defendant should be sentenced to the

The predicate conviction used under La. R.S. 14: 95. 1 and the predicate conviction used
under La. R.S. 15: 529. 1 were obtained on the same day. Multiple convictions obtained on the
same day prior to October 19, 2004, shall be counted as one conviction for the purpose of this
Section. See La. R. S. 15: 529. 1( B). In the instant case, the defendant was convicted in October
of 2005, so the convictions are treated separately.

8

maximum because of the severity of his crime ignores the fact that the legislature
has designated a range within which just those offenders should be sentenced.
One cannot distinguish a particular offender by simply pointing out that he falls
within a category of like offenders. One can distinguish the offender by
considering, among other things, those factors contained in La. C. CrR art. 894. 1. 8

After a thorough review of the record, it appears the trial court did not

supply any reasons, either oral or written, for the sentence imposed. Accordingly,

we question whether the trial court adequately complied with Article 894. 1. The

7While ameliorative sentencing changes may not apply retroactively, they may guide the
court when imposing a sentence. See State v. Thompson, 2022- 01391 ( La. 5/ 2/ 23), 359 So. 3d
1273, 1276 ( per curiam).

While our jurisprudence demonstrates a healthy reticence toward remand when it is not
apparent from the record that the trial court considered or reviewed the Article 894. 1 criteria,
courts have certainly been willing to remand within the context of post -conviction relief. See
State v. Allen, 2022- 00508 ( La. 1111/ 22), 348 So. 3d 1274 ( per curiam); State v._Thompson,
2022- 01391 ( La. 5/ 2/ 23), 359 So. 3d 1273 ( per curiam).

The importance of compliance with Article 894. 1 in sentencing is highlighted in Justice
Crighton' s concurring opinion in State v. Toney, 2021- 01805 ( La. 1/ 26/22), 332 So. 3d 77:

1] write separately to emphasize the importance of a recitation of full and
comprehensive reasons for the trial court' s consecutive sentences. Although the
trial court need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance
outlined in La. C.Cr.P. art. 894. 1, the record must reflect that he or she adequately
considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the defendant. State
v. Smit 433 So. 2d 688, 698 ( La. 5123/ 83).
In my view, it is imperative the trial
court provide an adequate expression of the reasons for sentences such as these,
some of which reach the maximum allowed.

Justice Crighton considered the loss ofjudicial economy caused by the failure to establish
in the record that the factors were considered or reviewed, which he opined could be avoided by
conducting a few additional steps in the trial court, in State v. Aguliar-Benitez, 2021- 00174 ( La.
10/ 10/ 21), 332 So. 3d 618, 622 ( per curiam), as follows:

In the absence of a PSI, however, I believe a full sentencing hearing
should be conducted in which the trial court is presented with all mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, so that the trial court can carefully apply the
sentencing guidelines provided in La. C. Cr.P. art. 894. 1. Moreover, sentencing is
a critical stage of the proceedings at which the right to the effective assistance of
counsel is sacrosanct. See generally State v. Harris, 2018- 1012 ( La. 719120), _
So. 3d ____,available at 2020 WL 3867207. Even in the absence of a PSI, it is
incumbent upon both the State and defense counsel to call witnesses and present
evidence to inform the court of the nature of the person standing before it who is
to be sentenced. Furthermore, a fully developed record is crucial for appellate
review, especially if, after repeated and fruitless remands, a reviewing court
decides it is appropriate to amend the sentence, pursuant to State v. Telsee, 425
So. 2d 1251 ( La. 1983), which the opinion offers as one option for an appellate
court to consider when it is faced with the alternative of repeated unfruitful
remands.

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trial court may have good reasons for imposing the terms of imprisonment, but
those reasons are not articulated and do not appear in the record before us. While

we do not specifically find this sentence to be excessive, by remanding the case for
resentencing, we give the trial court an opportunity to state sufficient reasons to

justify the imposition of the maximum sentence. See Shipp, 754 So. 2d at 1072-

73; State v. Moses, 615 So. 2d 1030, 1035 ( La. App. 1St Cir.), writ denied, 524 So.
2d 1223 ( La. 1993); Green, 558 So. 2d at 1268.
By remanding, we also allow for

the defendant to inform the court, if he can, of factors that mitigate toward a lesser

sentence.
Accordingly, the instant sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to

the trial court for resentencing.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the defendant' s habitual offender

adjudication is affirmed, his sentence is vacated, and this matter is remanded for

resentencing by the trial court.

HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE
VACATED; REMANDED.

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