State Of Louisiana v. Donovan Darville

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

NUMBER 2023 KA 0990

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DONOVAN DARVILLE

Judgment Rendered:

Appealed from the
Twenty -Third Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Ascension
State of Louisiana
Docket Number 37, 382
The Honorable Jason Verdigets, Judge Presiding

Ricky L. Babin Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Donald D. Candell

Lindsey Manda
Assistant District Attorneys
Gonzales, Louisiana

Lieu T. Vo Clark Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Mandeville, Louisiana Donovan Darville

BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., PENZATO, AND STROMBERG JJ.

GUIDRY, C.J.

The defendant, Donovan Darville, was charged by grand jury indictment

with second degree murder ( count one), in violation of La. R. S. 14: 30. 1, and

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon ( count two), in violation of La. R.S.

14: 95. 1. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as

charged.
The defendant filed a motion for new trial, arguing his second degree

murder conviction was unconstitutional, as it was based on an eleven -to -one jury

verdict.1 The trial court granted his motion for new trial and vacated the

defendant' s conviction for second degree murder. For the conviction of possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty

years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence, and this court affirmed his conviction and sentence on

appeal. State v. Darville, 20- 1135 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 18/ 21), 2021 WL 4844343

unpublished).

The defendant was later re -tried on the charge of second degree murder, and

a jury unanimously found him guilty. The trial court sentenced him to life

imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension

of sentence to run concurrently with his sentence for possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. The defendant now appeals, asserting he did not intelligently and

knowingly waive his right to counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm the

conviction and sentence.

1 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 ( 2020).
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FACTS

Evangelean Gaona lived in Prairieville, Louisiana, with Tessa Menier and

Clarence Harvey, the victim. Gaona and Harvey were romantically involved. The

defendant and Gaona then had a sexual encounter, after which Harvey and the

defendant began arguing. About a week later, on April 18, 2017, the defendant

was at Gaona' s trailer when Harvey pulled up in a vehicle. The defendant

approached Harvey' s vehicle and began yelling at him. The defendant had a

revolver in his hand and accused Harvey of having a gun. Harvey walked away

from the defendant towards the stairs of the trailer. As Harvey walked away, the

defendant shot him multiple times, killing him. Harvey did not possess a weapon

at any time before he was shot and killed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in

allowing him to represent himself without obtaining a knowing and intelligent

waiver of the right to counsel.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La. Const. art.

I, § 13 give a defendant the right to counsel as well as the right to defend himself.

A defendant may represent himself only if he makes an unequivocal request to

represent himself and knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel.

State v. Ferguson, 15- 0427, p. 7 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 18/ 15), 181 So. 3d 120, 131,

writ denied, 15- 1919 ( La. 11/ 18/ 16), 210 So. 3d 282. Although a defendant need

not have the skill and experience of a lawyer to competently and intelligently
choose self r
-epresentation, he should be made aware of the dangers and

disadvantages of self -representation so the record will establish he knows what he

is doing and his choice is made with eyes wide open. Faretta v. California, 422

U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ( 1975). Assertion of that right

must also be clear and unequivocal." State v. Bell, 09- 0199, p. 17 ( La. 11/ 30/ 10),

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53 So. 3d 437, 448, cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1025, 131 S. Ct. 3035, 180 L.Ed.2d 856

2011).

In accepting a waiver of counsel, the trial court should advise the defendant

of the nature of the charges, the penalty range for the charges, as well as the

dangers and disadvantages of self r-epresentation, such as the failure to recognize

objections to inadmissible evidence and the inability to adhere to technical rules

governing trials. Additionally, the trial court should inquire into the defendant' s

age, education, and mental condition and should determine according to the totality

of circumstances whether the accused understands the significance of the waiver.

Ferguson., 15- 0427 at 7- 8, 181 So. 3d at 131. In order to sufficiently establish on

the record the defendant is making an intelligent and knowing waiver, the inquiry

should involve an interchange that elicits more than " yes" or " no" responses from

the defendant. See State v. Strain, 585 So. 2d 540, 542 ( La. 1991). Once the

defendant has made an unequivocal request to represent himself, the trial court

must determine whether the defendant is competent to waive counsel and is

voluntarily exercising his informed free will." State v. Santos, 99- 1897, p. 3 ( La.

9/ 15/ 00), 770 So. 2d 319, 321 ( per curiam) ( quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95

S. Ct. at 2541). The competency at issue is a defendant' s competence to waive his

right to counsel, not his competence to represent himself Santos, 99- 1897 at 3, 770

So. 2d at 321.

Whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and unequivocally

asserted the right to self -representation must be determined on a case- by- case

basis, considering the facts and circumstances of each case. State v. Leger, 05-

0011, p. 53 ( La. 7/ 10/ 06), 936 So. 2d 108, 147- 48, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127

S. Ct. 1279, 167 L.Ed.2d 100 ( 2007). The propriety of allowing a defendant to

make this election shall not be judged by what happens in the subsequent course of

that representation. Rather, it is the record made in recognizing the waiver that

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controls. The trial court has much discretion in determining whether the

defendant' s waiver is knowing and intelligent, and an appellate court should not

reverse such a ruling unless an abuse of that discretion is shown. Ferguson, 15-

0427 at 8, 181 So. 3d at 131- 32.

On January 10, 2022, the morning before trial was scheduled to begin, the

trial court convened for a hearing on the defendant' s pro se motion to quash.2At

that time, defense counsel informed the court the defendant wished to represent

himself, and the following colloquy ensued:

THE COURT:
Mr. Darville, why do you think that would be in your best
interest to represent yourself?

MR. DARVILLE:

Because I asked my lawyer to file my motion to quash. She
didn' t file it. Also, during trial, I asked Allen Davis to make an
objection. He didn' t make an objection. So therefore, I have
ineffective assistance of counseling coming from the counselors. So
therefore, I feel that it is in my best interest that I represent myself,
Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Let' s take those two issues up. So the second issue, regarding
Mr. Davis, he won' t even be representing you in this trial, Ms. Jones
will. So that is a nonissue. You don' t have to worry about that. Then
on the first issue regarding not filing a motion, you know, your
counsel may disagree with whether the motion...

MR. DARVILLE:

I wish to represent myself as my own defense, Your Honor.
That is my best defense, Your Honor, is to represent myself.

THE COURT:
Okay. And you think that is wise on these kind of charges,
charges of murder?

MR. DARVILLE:
Yes, sir.

THE COURT:
Okay. Well we will go forward then with you representing
yourself.

2 The motion to quash was denied. Further, on motion of the State and over the defendant' s
objection, the trial was continued to March 15, 2022, and ultimately began on July 12, 2022.
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The trial court indicated that counsel would be seated at the defense table to assist

the defendant if he wanted any help.

On appeal, the defendant argues he did not intelligently and knowingly

waive his right to counsel, because the trial court failed to inform him of the

dangers and disadvantages of self r-epresentation. Quoting the colloquy from the

January 10, 2022 hearing, he contends the trial court failed to conduct any

meaningful inquiry into his decision to represent himself. However, the defendant

fails to acknowledge the trial court' s subsequent discussion of the defendant' s

decision to represent himself and waive his right to counsel.

During trial, the trial court indicated while there was " a good record over the

course of [ the] case regarding the fact" that the defendant wanted to represent

himself, the court wanted to ask additional questions for the record.' The trial

court questioned the defendant about his education level; his ability to read, write,

and understand the English language; and his familiarity with the legal system.

The defendant confirmed he filed numerous pro se pleadings and that he was

present at his first trial with counsel. The defendant said he understood the nature

of the charged offense and the potential sentence he could receive if convicted.

Finally, the defendant affirmed that he had expressed to the trial court on multiple

occasions that he wanted to represent himself on the murder charge. The trial court

thereafter found the defendant had the competency to waive counsel and validly

waived his right to counsel under the totality of the circumstances.

In light of the foregoing, we find the trial court fully advised the defendant

of the dangers and disadvantages of self r-epresentation and the defendant' s waiver

of his right to counsel was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The

defendant' s initial waiver was knowing and intelligent, as he was unequivocal in

his wish to represent himself, he filed numerous pro se motions, and he knew the

3 At this point in the proceedings, the defendant had participated in the jury selection process and
had cross- examined several witnesses with counsel present for advisory purposes.
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nature of the charge and potential sentence he could receive, having been present at

his first trial. Furthermore, once the instant trial began, the defendant confirmed he

wanted to represent himself, and the trial court again found the defendant' s waiver

was knowing and voluntary. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in granting the defendant' s request to represent himself, and this assignment of

error lacks merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

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