State Of Louisiana v. Louis Howard

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

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2023 KA 1060

STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS

LOUIS HOWARD
JUN 03 2024

JUDGMENT RENDERED:

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Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
Parish of East Baton Rouge ¢ State of Louisiana
Docket Number 07-18-0223 « Section 8

The Honorable Tiffany Foxworth-Roberts, Presiding Judge
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Yigal Bander COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Frank W. Breaux DEFENDANT—Louis Howard

M. Connor McCain
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Hillar C. Moore, Ill COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Allison Miller Rutzen

Assistant District Attorney
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

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BEFORE: WELCH, WOLFE, AND STROMBERG, JJ.

WELCH, J.

The Grand Jury of the Parish of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana charged
the defendant, Louis Howard, by grand jury indictment with second degree murder,
a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. The defendant pled not guilty. Following a jury trial,
a unanimous jury convicted the defendant as charged. The trial court denied the
defendant’s motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, motion
for new trial. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the mandatory
term of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or
suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(B). The defendant now appeals, raising
two assignments of error—the evidence was legally insufficient to prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
prejudicial “other acts” evidence under La. C.E. art. 412.4. For the following
reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS

The victim, Bianca Queen, was found deceased in her home on Annette Street
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on March 17, 2018. Queen had been stabbed seven times
and shot in the face once. The defendant, Queen’s live-in boyfriend and the father
of her eighteen-month-old son, was questioned by police and arrested for second
degree murder later that same day.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

In his first assignment of error, the defendant asserts the evidence was
insufficient to find him guilty of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, he claims there was no direct evidence of his guilt, and the
circumstantial evidence introduced at trial failed to exclude his reasonable
hypothesis of innocence that he was misidentified as the perpetrator.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due

process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review

for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found that the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the
defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573
(1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 11, writ
denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460; see also La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B).
When the issues on appeal relate to both the sufficiency of the evidence and one or
more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the
evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992). When addressing the
sufficiency of the evidence, consideration must be given to the entirety of the
evidence, including inadmissible evidence which was erroneously admitted, to
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Id.

When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense,
La. R.S. 15:438 mandates “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends
to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.” This is not a separate test for evaluating the evidence; rather, all of the
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to
convince a rational juror the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Cabellero, 2022-0441 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22), 356 So.3d 389, 394, writ denied,
2022-01777 (La. 4/25/23), 359 So.3d 982. When a case involves circumstantial
evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by
the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another
hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680
(La. 1984); State v. Bessie, 2021-1117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 17, 22,

writ denied, 2022-00846 (La. 9/20/22), 346 So.3d 802.

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as “the killing of a human
being...[w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily
harmf.]” La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). “Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which
exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the
prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. RS.
14:10(1). Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a
defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant’s
actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Coleman, 342 So.3d at 12; see_also
State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 592-93, cert. denied,
552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007). Specific intent is an ultimate
conclusion to be resolved by the factfinder. Coleman, 342 So.3d at 12.

The State bears the burden of proving the elements of the offense, along with
the burden of proving the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator. Draughn, 950
So.2d at 593. When, as in this case, the key issue is the defendant’s identity as the
perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to
negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Hughes, 2005-0992
(La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051. A positive identification by only one witness
is sufficient to support a conviction. Bessie, 342 So.3d at 23.

Catherine Dukes, Queen’s aunt, had last seen Queen on March 16, 2018.
Queen went to Dukes’ daughter’s house at approximately 9:00 p.m. and left around
10:45 p.m. Dukes said that while Queen was there, the defendant called her once,
which Queen’s cell phone records confirmed. According to Dukes, Queen’s
demeanor changed when she received the phone call from the defendant.

Carol Tackno, Queen’s mother, testified that Queen was in a relationship with
the defendant for two to three years. Tackno lived across the street from Queen and
the defendant, and she saw Queen every day. Queen had two children at the time of

her death—eighteen-month-old Traylon and seven-year-old Montavia. When

Tackno did not hear from Queen on March 17, 2018, she called the defendant to ask
if he had talked to her, but he stated he had been unable to reach Queen on the phone.
The defendant informed Tackno that he brought Traylon to his mother’s house in
Port Allen, which Tackno testified was unusual. To her knowledge, the defendant
had never brought Traylon to his mother’s house because Queen and the defendant’s
mother did not get along. Thereafter, Tackno went to Queen’s house, entered
through her unlocked front door, and found Queen deceased, lying face down on the
kitchen floor. Tackno called 9-1-1 at 4:50 p.m. Additionally, Tackno testified about
an incident between Queen and the defendant that occurred approximately eleven
months prior to the murder wherein Tackno witnessed the defendant hit Queen with
a cell phone, causing Queen’s head to bleed.

Detective Saundra Watts was assigned to the homicide division of the Baton
Rouge Police Department and was the lead detective on the case. Detective Watts
testified that upon arriving at the crime scene, she collected several broken knife
blades and knife handles from the kitchen floor and thereafter submitted the evidence
to the crime lab. She further testified that items of monetary value, such as Queen’s
cell phone, wallet, purse, and television, were still present in the house. There were
no signs of forced entry other than an open window in the back bedroom. Detective
Watts testified that when the defendant and Traylon arrived on the scene at her
request, she observed suspected blood on Traylon’s shirt. According to Detective
Watts, the house was located in a high crime area.

A uniform patrol officer transported the defendant to the Violent Crimes Unit
office located at the Louisiana State Police Compound for questioning. After being

advised of and waiving his Miranda! rights, the defendant provided a statement to

' Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

the police, which was played for the jury during the trial. According to the defendant,
he had been dating Queen for about five years. He claimed that at the time of her
death, they were “on good terms;” however, the defendant later admitted to having
been physical with Queen in the past. The defendant was questioned about an
incident in November 2017 where Queen claimed the defendant stood behind her
vehicle, kicked the vehicle, and spat on it. The defendant indicated that Queen’s
family believed he was the one who killed her, but he denied any involvement. The
defendant said that he left the house with Traylon to go to his mother’s house around
1:00 a.m., and it took him between twenty to thirty minutes to drive there. He
claimed that when he left the house, Queen was “full of life.” When asked why he
would bring his young child to his mother’s house at that time of night without
packing extra clothes, the defendant said that his mother wanted to see Traylon. He
told the police that his and Queen’s house was located in a bad neighborhood and
that he regularly heard gunshots. During the interview, the defendant repeatedly
concealed his arms and hands inside his shirt. Detective Watts testified she thought
the defendant was trying to hide them. Detective Watts asked to see the defendant’s
hands and thereafter observed a cut on one hand.” When the defendant was then left
alone in the interview room, he could be seen examining his fingernails, and a
clicking noise could be heard. Detective Watts testified that when she watched the
recording, it appeared to her that the defendant was “plucking his fingernails off.”
The defendant was arrested for Queen’s murder at the conclusion of the interview.
During the investigation, Detective Watts reviewed cell phone records and
learned that a 9-1-1 call was made from Queen’s cell phone at 12:24 a.m. on March

17, 2018.° After that call, there were no more outgoing calls made from Queen’s

? The cut is not obvious on the video recording.

3 The 9-1-1 call lasted only a few seconds before the phone was disconnected, and it is unclear
exactly what was said during those few seconds. Two voices can be heard during the call—Queen’s
voice and the voice of an unidentified man. In closing arguments, the State theorized Queen said,

phone. Approximately ten minutes later, at 12:36 a.m., the defendant called his
mother. The defendant’s mother called him at 12:50 a.m., talked with him for
approximately fifteen minutes, and called again at 1:06 a.m. Then, at 2:49 a.m., the
defendant again called his mother, though he told Detective Watts that he was at his
mother’s house at that point. The defendant tried calling Queen at 7:51 a.m. and 8:34
a.m. the next morning. Detective Watts testified the cell phone records and the
defendant’s timeline indicated to her that he was not honest in his interview.

Dr. William “Beau” Clark, the coroner of East Baton Rouge Parish was
qualified at trial as an expert in emergency medicine. Dr. Clark testified about his
determination of Queen’s cause and manner of death based on the autopsy performed
by a deputy coroner. According to the autopsy report, Queen suffered seven stab
wounds to the forehead, right temporal scalp, right side of her neck, right side of her
chest, right forearm, right thigh, and left side of her lower jaw, as well as a gunshot
wound to the left side of the face. In examining the stab wounds to her right thigh,
two pieces of a broken knife blade were recovered from her pelvic bone. Dr. Clark
concluded the gun was fired over two feet away from Queen because there was no
soot, stippling, or muzzle imprint on the entrance wound. Dr. Clark said that the
wounds on Queen’s hands were indicative of a struggle and could be considered
defensive wounds. Toxicology analysis revealed alprazolam, hydrocodone, and
oxycodone in Queen’s system, though the levels were low enough for Dr. Clark to
categorize as normal prescribed levels. Dr. Clark testified that it was medically
impossible to determine the precise time of Queen’s death.

Ashley Cook, a forensic DNA analyst with the Louisiana State Police Crime
Lab, was qualified as an expert in DNA analysis. Cook explained that DNA can be

obtained from skin cells, saliva, blood, semen, and hair. She testified that blood has

“He got a gun. My one-year-old in here.” The defense disputed the State’s interpretation of what
was said during that 9-1-1 call.

a higher concentration of DNA than skin cells. Cook analyzed evidence submitted
in this case and determined that DNA found on the handle of a knife recovered from
the crime scene was consistent with DNA from both Queen and the defendant.
However, Cook testified she would expect to find an individual’s DNA on a knife
in that person’s house if that individual had touched the knife. Cook testified there
was additional DNA present on the knife inconsistent with the DNA profile of either
Queen or the defendant. The defendant could not be excluded as the major
contributor of DNA collected from a presumptive blood stain on Traylon’s shirt.
Regarding the presumptive blood on a piece of drywall taken from the crime scene,
Cook testified the defendant and Queen could not be excluded as contributors of the
DNA. Cook explained the mixture of DNA was indistinguishable, meaning the two
donors of the DNA profile potentially left behind the same amount of DNA.

On appeal, the defendant argues the case rested largely on circumstantial
evidence, and the State failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
He contends the evidence—specifically, the open window in the bedroom and the
possible presence of someone else’s DNA on one of the knives—showed someone
else could have broken into the house and killed Queen. The defendant argues no
rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of
second-degree murder and the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator beyond a
reasonable doubt.

The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony
of any witness. State v. Dunn, 2021-0630 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d
77, 85, writ denied, 2022-00095 (La. 4/5/22), 335 So.3d 834. Moreover, when there
is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon
the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not
its sufficiency. The trier of fact’s determination of the weight to be given evidence

is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence

to overturn a factfinder’s determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97-2261 (La. App.
1 Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 929, 932. We are constitutionally precluded from acting
as a “thirteenth juror” in assessing what weight to give evidence in criminal cases.
Dunn, 340 So.3d at 85.

In finding the defendant guilty, it is clear the jury rejected the defendant’s
theory that he was misidentified as the perpetrator of the murder. His claim that
someone broke into the house and killed Queen is disputed by the lack of forced
entry (other than the open window) and the fact that monetary items were still
present in the home, including a television, a laptop, a gaming system, two pairs of
Air Jordan tennis shoes, and Queen’s wallet, purse, and cell phone.

Based on the record before us, we find the jury could have reasonably
accepted the testimony of any of the State’s witnesses establishing the defendant was
the perpetrator and rejected the defendant’s claim of misidentification. Though the
defendant did not testify at trial, the jury watched his recorded interview with
Detective Watts wherein he claimed Queen was “full of life” when he left the house
with their eighteen-month-old son at 1:00 a.m. on March 17, 2018. However, the
evidence showed Queen dialed 9-1-1 at 12:24 a.m. and a man’s voice can be heard
in the background before the call disconnected. At 12:36 a.m., the defendant called
his mother. The defendant’s mother called him at 12:50 a.m., talked with him for
about fifteen minutes, and then called him again at 1:06 a.m. The defendant said he
left his house at 1:00 a.m. and that it took about twenty to thirty minutes to get to his
mother’s house. Nearly two hours later, at 2:49 a.m., the defendant again called his
mother even though he claimed that he was at her house. The State presented
meticulous evidence showing the timeline of the defendant’s actions during the
hours following Queen’s 9-1-1 call. This evidence wholly undermined the

defendant’s claim that Queen was still alive when he left the house. Thus, we find

that the jury reasonably rejected the defendant’s hypothesis that an alternative
perpetrator killed Queen.

Additionally, the jury could have rationally concluded the defendant was the
perpetrator based on the presence of a fresh cut on the defendants hand when he
was interviewed the day of Queen’s murder coupled with the defensive wounds on
Queen’s hands and the broken knives found on the kitchen floor and lodged in
Queen’s pelvic bone. In the video recording of the defendant’s statement, the
defendant could be seen repeatedly trying to hide his hands and also tear off his
fingernails, which the jury could have reasonably inferred was an attempt to conceal
and remove evidence of his involvement in the crime. Moreover, suspected blood
was found on Traylon’s shirt which matched the defendant’s DNA profile. The
defendant admitted that he did not pack clothes for his son despite his intention to
stay the night at his mother’s house, and Queen’s mother said to her knowledge, the
defendant had never previously brought Traylon to his mother’s house.

The jury heard all of the testimony and viewed all of the evidence presented
at trial and found the defendant guilty as charged. The defendant’s hypothesis of
innocence on appeal is that someone else killed Queen, which is the same argument
rejected by the jury at trial. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation
of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby
overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence
presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306
(La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of
the offense and all of the elements of second-degree murder. This assignment of error

is without merit.

10

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court abused
its discretion in allowing the State to introduce evidence of other acts pursuant to La.
C.E. art. 412.4, as the probative value of the evidence was not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

On October 25, 2021, the State filed a “Supplemental Notice of Intention to
Introduce Article 412.4 C.E. Evidence” relating to an incident between the defendant
and Queen that occurred on April 30, 2017.4 Following a Prieur’ hearing on
November 2, 2021, the trial court granted the State’s motion. The trial court found
that: (1) the defendant and Queen were household members or dating partners; (2)
the incident involved abusive behavior; (3) the incident was not overly remote; and
(4) the evidence was highly relevant. Further, the trial court found the evidence was
substantially more probative than prejudicial, noting the evidence established the
volatile relationship between the defendant and Queen and established an escalation
of the defendant’s violence. At trial, Tackno testified that she witnessed an
altercation between the defendant and Queen on April 30, 2017, after the defendant
went through the contents of Queen’s cell phone. Tackno said the defendant grabbed
Queen and hit her on the head with the cell phone. The State offered, filed, and
introduced and published to the jury a 9-1-1 call made by Queen after the incident

and several photographs depicting her head injuries.

4 The State’s first notice of intent to introduce “Article 412.4 C.E. Evidence” pertained to the
November 2017 incident that the defendant referred to in his police interview. The defendant does
not assign error to the trial court’s ruling allowing that evidence to be admitted.

5 In State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La. 1973), the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the
procedures to be followed when the State intends to offer evidence of criminal offense other than
those for which the defendant is being prosecuted. See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 720. The purpose of
the Prieur hearing is to offer the defendant an opportunity to defend against the admission of
“other crimes” evidence. State v. Baker, 452 So.2d 737, 743 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984). The trial
court must determine, outside the presence of the jury, whether the evidence complies with the
standards for allowing the introduction of such evidence. Great discretion is afforded to the trial
court in this area. See State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d 466 (La. 1981).

il

Generally, evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant is inadmissible
at trial due to substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant. State v. Hicks,
2022-0350 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22), 354 So.3d 715, 718, writ denied, 2022-01749
(La. 4/12/23), 359 So.3d 29. Such evidence, however, may be admitted by certain
statutory and jurisprudential exceptions to the exclusionary rule when it tends to
prove a material issue and has independent relevance other than showing that the
defendant is of bad character. Id. See La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1). One exception is set
forth in La. C.E. art. 412.4, which provides in pertinent part:

A. When an accused is charged with a crime involving
abusive behavior against a family member, household
member, or dating partner . . . evidence of the accused’s
commission of another crime, wrong, or act involving
assaultive behavior against a family member, household
member, or dating partner ... may be admissible and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is

relevant, subject to the balancing test provided in Article
403.

The admissibility of evidence under La. C.E. art. 412.4 is not limited to those
actions that are identical or similar in nature to the charged crime. Hicks, 354 So.3d
at 719. Evidence of prior acts of domestic abuse is admissible if relevant and the
probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Id. As used in this balancing test,
prejudice limits the introduction of probative evidence of prior misconduct only
when it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial. Id. Remoteness in time, in most cases, is
only one factor to be considered when determining whether the probative value of
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. A lapse in time goes to the weight of
the evidence, rather than to its admissibility. State v. Germany, 2021-1614 (La.
App. | Cir. 9/26/22), 353 So.3d 804, 821, writ denied, 2022-01568 (La. 1/11/23),
352 So.3d 983.

The burden is on the defendant to show that he was prejudiced by the
admission of other crimes evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s

ruling on the admissibility of evidence pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1) will not

12

be disturbed. This same standard is applied to the rulings on the admission of other
acts evidence under La. C.E. art. 412.4. Hicks, 354 So.3d at 719.

On appeal, the defendant concedes Queen was a household member or dating
partner; the incident involved assaultive behavior; the incident was not overly
remote; and evidence of the incident was relevant to “some limited degree under La.
[C.E.] art. 412.4.” However, the defendant argues the probative value of the evidence
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under La. C.E.
art. 403. While acknowledging the action of hitting Queen on the head with a cell
phone was reprehensible, the defendant questions whether evidence of that action
made it significantly more likely that he was the individual who stabbed and shot
Queen.

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
The defendant was charged with fatally stabbing and shooting a dating partner or
household member, and the probative value of the evidence of the April 2017
incident was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See La. C.E. arts.
412.4 and 403. Additionally, any prejudice from evidence showing that
approximately eleven months before the instant offense, the defendant engaged in
assaultive behavior against Queen, was outweighed by the probative value of the
evidence on the issues of motive, opportunity, intent, absence of mistake or accident,
and identity. See La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1). Evidence of the incident tended to prove a
material fact at issue—i.e., whether or not the defendant acted with the specific intent
to kill Queen—and to rebut his defense of misidentification. See Hicks, 354 So.3d
at 719. Therefore, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of

all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and

proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117

13

(La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La.
5/21/24), _ So.3d___, 2024 WL 2284735. After a careful review of the record,
we have found one patent error.

The transcript reflects that after the trial court imposed the defendant’s
sentence, the trial court advised the defendant that he had “two years from the date
that your conviction becomes final to seek post[-]conviction relief.”° The
prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief is two years
after the judgment of conviction and sentence becomes final under the provisions of
La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A); State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-
0153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La.
8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Nevertheless, the trial court’s failure to correctly advise
the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on his sentence and is not
grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. Out of an abundance of
caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we note for the record and advise the
defendant La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A) generally provides that no application for post-
conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be
considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence
have become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. See LeBoeuf,
943 So.2d at 1143.

DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

© The minutes, however, reflect that the trial court correctly advised the defendant he had “two
years from the finality of the judgment of conviction and sentence” to seek post-conviction relief.
When there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails. State
vy. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

14