State Of Louisiana v. Kamron Kajon Jacquot

STATE OF LOUISIANA

FIRST CIRCUIT

2023 KA 1254

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

I

Judgment Rendered:

On Appeal from the Thirty -Second Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Terrebonne
State of Louisiana
Docket No. 826094

Honorable David W. Arceneaux, Judge Presiding

Joseph L. Waitz, Jr. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney State of Louisiana
Joseph S. Soignet
Special Prosecutor

J. Christopher Erny
Amanda Mustin
Assistant District Attorneys
Houma, Louisiana

Prentice L. White Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Kamron Kajon Jacquot

BEFORE: McCLENDON,, NESTER, AND MILLER., 33.

McCLENDON., I

Defendant, Kamron Kajon Jacquot, was charged by grand jury indictment with one

count of first degree murder ( count one), in violation of LSA- R. S. 14: 30, and one count

of attempted first degree murder ( count two), in violation of LSA- R. S. 14: 27 and 14: 30.

He entered a plea of not guilty to the charges and, following a jury trial, was found guilty

of the responsive verdicts of second degree murder, in violation of LSA- R. S. 14: 30. 1, and

attempted manslaughter, in violation of LSA- R. S. 14: 27 and 14: 31. The trial court denied

defendant's motion for post -verdict judgment of acquittal. Thereafter, the trial court

sentenced defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence on count one and twenty years at hard labor on

count two, to run concurrently. Defendant now appeals, asserting that the evidence

was insufficient to sustain his second degree murder conviction. For the following

reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On December 31, 2020, defendant attended a New Year's Eve party in the Jolie
Oaks subdivision in Thibodaux, Louisiana. A physical altercation ensued between

defendant and Eric Thibodaux, one of the victims, after Thibodaux approached Jolie

Hickox, with whom both he and defendant had a relationship, and began whispering in
her ear. The altercation escalated, after which Thibodaux and Matthew Badeaux, the

second victim, were both shot multiple times. Badeaux survived, but Thibodaux did not.

Several witnesses identified defendant as the shooter, and he was later arrested and

charged with the first degree murder of Thibodaux and the attempted first degree murder

of BadeaUX. 2

I The trial court ordered that defendant be " committed to the custody of the Louisiana Department of
Public Safety and Corrections to serve a sentence of life without benefit of probation, parole or suspension
of sentence" for his second degree murder conviction but did not specify the sentence was to be served at
hard labor. However, "
a sentence committing a prisoner to the Department of Corrections is necessarily
at hard labor." State v. Lawson, 2004- 334 ( La. App. 5 Cir. 9/ 28/ 04), 885 So. 2d 618, 621 n. 2; see also
Rochon v. Blackburn, 97- 2799 ( La. App. I Cir. 12/ 28/ 98), 727 So. 2d 602, 604.

2 The bill of indictment listed Thibodaux and Badeaux by their initials, and defendant similarly refers to
them by their initials in his appellate brief. However, LSA- R. S. 46: 1844( W) does not prohibit the use of the
victims' names in this case and, thus, we refer to them as such.

K

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his sole assignment of error, defendant asserts that the evidence presented at

trial was insufficient to support his second degree murder conviction. Specifically,

defendant contends that the State failed to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

homicide was committed in self-defense. Alternatively, defendant suggests that the

shooting was committed in " sudden passion" and in the " heat of blood" such that the

responsive verdict of manslaughter should be entered. He does not contest the

sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his attempted manslaughter conviction.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due

process. See U. S. Const. amend. XIV; LSA -Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of reviewing

a claim of insufficient evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the State

proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 ( 1979); State v.

Coleman, 2021- 0870 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 4/ 8/ 22), 342 So. 3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022- 00759

La. 11/ 21/ 23), 373 So. 3d 460. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in LSA-

C. Cr. P. art. 821( 6), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct

and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Welch, 2019-0826 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

2/ 21/ 20), 297 So. 3d 23, 27, writ denied, 2020- 00554 ( La. 9/ 29/ 20), 301 So. 3d 1193.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the

reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed,

the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the

circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.

Coleman, 342 So. 3d at 12.

Second degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as a killing committed "[ w] hen

the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]" LSA- R. S.

14: 30. 1( A)( 1). Specific intent is " that state of mind which exists when the circumstances

indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow

9

his act or failure to act." LSA- R. S. 14: 10( 1). Specific intent can be formed in an instant.

State v. Cousan, 94- 2503 ( La. 11/ 25/ 96), 684 So. 2d 382, 390. Specific intent to kill

may be inferred from a defendant's act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. Welch,

297 So. 3d at 27. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the

factfinder. Id.

A homicide is justifiable "[ w] hen committed in self-defense by one who reasonably

believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and

that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger." LSA- R. S. 14: 20( A)( 1).

However, an aggressor may not claim self-defense without showing he first withdrew

from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knew or should

have known of his intention to withdraw and discontinue the conflict. See LSA- R.S. 14: 21.

When self-defense is raised by the defendant, the State has the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not perpetrated in self-defense. State v.

Brown, 2023- 0293 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 28/ 23), 380 So. 3d 18, 23. Thus, the issue in this

case is whether a rational factfinder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not kill

the victim in self-defense. Id.

The responsive verdict of manslaughter is defined, in pertinent part, as:

A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 ( first degree
murder) or Article 30. 1 ( second degree murder), but the offense is
committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by
provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and
cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if
the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an
average person' s blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was
committed[.]

LSA- R. S. 14: 31( A)( 1); see also LSA- C. Cr. P. art. 814(A)( 3).

The existence of " sudden passion" and " heat of blood" are not elements of the

offense but,
rather, are mitigating factors which the defendant must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Dearmas, 2022- 0494 ( La. App. I Cir.

11/ 4/ 22), 356 So. 3d 9, 14, writ denied, 2022- 01839 ( La. 5/ 23/ 23), 360 So. 3d 1254;

State v. Mellion, 2021- 1116 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 8/ 22), 342 So. 3d 41, 45, writ denied,

2022- 00732 ( La. 6/ 22/ 22), 339 So. 3d 1186, cert. denied, — U. S. 143 S- Ct- 319,

0

214 L. Ed. 2d 141 ( 2022). If a man unreasonably permits his impulse and passion to

obscure his judgment, he will be fully responsible for the consequences of his act.

Mellion, 342 So. 3d at 48. Provocation and time for cooling off are determinations made

by the trier of fact under the standard of the ordinary person with ordinary self-control.

Dearmas, 356 So. 3d at 15. Thus, an appellate court must determine whether a rational

trier of fact, upon reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

could have found that the mitigating factors had not been established by a preponderance
of the evidence. State v. Veal, 2022- 0641 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 22), 2022 WL

17841516. 1* 4 ( unpublished).

In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical

evidence, one witness' s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support

a factual conclusion. Mellion, 342 So. 3d at 48. Provocation testimony is an issue of

credibility. Mellion, 342 So. 3d at 47. Where there is conflicting testimony about factual

matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the
witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not re -assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh
the evidence to overturn a determination of guilt. State v. Bessie, 2021- 1117 ( La. App.
I Cir. 4/ 8/ 22), 342 So. 3d 17, 23, writ denied, 2022- 00846 ( La. 9/ 20/ 22), 346 So. 3d 802.

At trial, Dr. Michael Defatta was accepted as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr.

Defatta performed the autopsy on Thibodaux on January 4, 2021. Thibodaux was six -

feet five -inches tall and weighed one -hundred and ninety pounds. The autopsy revealed
abrasions on Thibodaux's chin, neck, left arm, and right shoulder, which Dr. Defatta

testified could have been a result of injuries sustained in a fight. Seven gunshot entry

wounds were documented, including wounds to Thibodaux's ( 1) left upper back, ( 2) right

lateral hip, ( 3) right upper buttock, ( 4) back of the right forearm, ( 5) back of the left

forearm, ( 6) right lower back, and ( 7) right buttock. With the exception of the gunshot

wound to the right lateral hip, all of the gunshot wounds were inflicted from behind. The

gunshot wound to the right lower back was fatal, given that the bullet traveled into

Thibodaux"s chest cavity where it pierced his lung and heart.

5

Matthew Badeaux, the other victim, was twenty-one years old and attending

Nicholls State University at the time of trial. Badeaux testified that on the night of the

shooting, he and some friends decided to go to the party in Jolie Oaks. Most of the night,

Badeaux remained in the garage until he saw a large crowd of people gather in the front

yard.
As Badeaux approached the group of people, he saw Thibodaux, his fraternity

brother, emerge from the group of people fighting. Badeaux asked Thibodaux where his

ride was and began walking with him down the street toward the parked vehicles.

Badeaux testified that he and Thibodaux had walked a good distance from the house

where the party took place when he felt an intense burning sensation in his left shoulder.

Badeaux realized he had been shot, but claimed he did not see who had shot him.

Badeaux was shot in his hand, shoulder, lower back, rib, and legs. However, the State

introduced bodycam footage from that night wherein Badeaux told the police he had seen

a gun and identified a black man as the shooter. Badeaux estimated a couple of minutes

elapsed between when he and Thibodaux started walking to when he was shot.

Detective Chris DeHart with the Terrebonne Parish Sheriffs Office testified that

defendant was identified as the shooter by eyewitness Lauryn Ordoyne. Detective DeHart

also stated that numerous videos were recorded at the party and posted on social media,

some of which were played for the jury. Several of them depicted the initial physical

altercation between Thibodaux and defendant. Subsequent videos showed Michael

Guidry and defendant fighting. Another video, which Detective DeHart testified was

recorded less than a minute before the shooting, showed Thibodaux, Badeaux, and

Michael Guidry walking down the street toward the parked vehicles. Additionally, a video,
which was recorded by defendant as he fled, depicted injuries to defendant's right eye

and mouth.
It was Detective DeHart's understanding that defendant's injuries were

caused by Michael Guidry and Jhy Orgeron, not Thibodaux.

Detective Mitchell Legendre, the Assistant Chief of Detectives with the Terrebonne

Parish Sheriffs Office, testified that he responded to the scene of the shooting and
thereafter arrested defendant on January 1, 2021, at an apartment. After advising

n.

defendant of his Miranda3 rights, Detective Legendre asked him if the gun was in the

apartment. According to Detective Legendre, defendant responded that he threw the

gun over the Schriever overpass and said he was the only shooter. Defendant also told

Detective Legendre that he shot because he was scared. Efforts to retrieve the gun were

unsuccessful, and the gun had not been recovered at the time of trial. Detective Legendre

testified the investigation revealed that the distance between the house and the location

where Thibodaux and Badeaux were shot was between 150 and 170 feet.

Lauryn Ordoyne testified that she saw defendant, whom she knew from high

school, fighting at the party. Ordoyne and her friends decided to leave the party and,

while waiting by their vehicle for another friend, she saw two guys walking away from
the party. Ordoyne saw defendant walking toward the guys, and she heard defendant

ask, " Where y'all going now?" Ordoyne thought that defendant was looking down at his

phone; however, her friend, Hunter Trosclair, told her that defendant had a gun. She

then heard the gunshots and saw defendant shooting. Ordoyne got in Trosclair's vehicle,
they left, and she called 911. Ordoyne testified that defendant was walking quickly
toward the guys, and it appeared "[ h] e was going after them."

Sammi Lodrigue, at whose apartment defendant was arrested, testified that

defendant told her after the party that he had gotten into an argument with a guy and
had slapped him. Lodrigue thought the fight had something to do with a girl. Defendant

told Lodrigue that the guy had called him the " N" word. 4 Lodrigue said that defendant

called her from the party and said he was jumped. Defendant said that he was hurt, and

Lodrigue heard him crying, which she said was uncommon. Lodrigue testified that when

she saw defendant, his face " was busted up [ and] he was bleeding all over his face."
Jolie Hickox testified that she graduated from South Lafourche High School with

Thibodaux, and, while both were attending Nicholls, they started a romantic relationship.
Hickox said she was also in a non- exclusive relationship with defendant. At the party,

Thibodaux approached Hickox inside the house, and defendant told Thibodaux to get

I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 ( 1966).
4
During Lodrigue' s testimony, the State requested and was granted permission to treat her as an adverse
witness.

19

away from her. Hickox said Thibodaux initially walked away, but came back to whisper

in her ear. Defendant slapped Thibodaux, and then all three separated. Later, Thibodaux

approached Hickox again, and defendant slapped him a second time. Hickox testified

that she saw Thibodaux and defendant outside talking to one another a few minutes later

and then saw the fight start.

The first fight was only between Thibodaux and defendant. After the two were

pulled apart, Hickox said that defendant appeared angry, and he started a second fight

with Thibodaux and Thibodaux's friends. The second fight ended and another fight

involving a lot of people began. Hickox recalled seeing Shy Orgeron and Michael Guidry

in the fight, but not Thibodaux, and she recalled seeing defendant on the ground. After

the fight broke up, Hickox saw people walking down the street and then heard the
gunshots.
She did not see who was shooting or initially see who got shot. Hickox said

she left the party and was immediately contacted by defendant. Defendant told Hickox

that he was the shooter and that he loved her. He later texted her asking if she was

involved with Thibodaux and telling her that her friend was dead. Hickox testified that

she never saw Thibodaux start any confrontation that night. On cross-examination,

Hickox agreed that defendant was outnumbered during the subsequent fights and, at one

point, was at the bottom of the fighting pile.

Cullen Nickolyn was a friend of defendant and saw Thibodaux, whom he did not

know, whisper in Hickox"s ear. Nickolyn testified that Thibodaux seemed disrespectful

and smiled when defendant told him to stop. After Thibodaux whispered in her ear again,

defendant slapped him. Nickolyn said that Thibodaux smiled again and turned around.

Sometime later, Thibodaux and defendant confronted one another by the front door of
the house, and defendant slapped Thibodaux again. A fight ensued, but Nickolyn said

the fight between Thibodaux and defendant lasted only a few seconds before people
started to jump in. Nickolyn explained that at least ten people got on top of defendant
while he was on the ground and punched him. The next time Nickolyn saw defendant,

defendant had pulled a gun out of his backpack and was running down the street. On
cross- examination,
Nickolyn agreed it was possible that defendant was running away
from danger as he had been jumped by ten people. However, he did not recall seeing

NO

anyone trying to fight or attack defendant when he pulled out the gun, and he did not

see anyone else with a gun or weapon of any kind.

Jordyn Marie testified that she saw around ten people on top of defendant at the

party. When Marie heard the gunshots, she ran to her car. Defendant got in her car and

asked her to take him to a hotel in Gray. Marie testified that defendant seemed

overwhelmed and unlike himself when he got in her car, and she testified he had injuries

and blood on his face.

Hickox' s roommate, Maitlynn Lerille, corroborated previous testimony that

defendant slapped Thibodaux inside the house. According to Lerille, Thibodaux and his

group of friends said they were going to leave the party after the first slap. 5 Five or ten

minutes later, they walked back into the house after deciding not to leave. Lerille later

saw Thibodaux and defendant exchanging words in the doorway and saw the second slap
that escalated into the brawl.
Lerille testified Thibodaux, who she said looked beaten up,

left the fight and told Lerille to tell Hickox that he did not want to talk to her again. Lerille

testified that defendant had not known about Hickox's relationship with Thibodaux and
that she knew he would be upset when he found out.

Michael Guidry testified that after he broke up the initial fight between defendant

and Thibodaux, defendant kept trying to fight Thibodaux. Eventually, Guidry, Thibodaux,

and Badeaux started walking down the street to leave. They had walked about fifty yards
when Guidry glanced backward and saw defendant approaching them quickly. Guidry
saw defendant grab what he thought was a gun, and Guidry ran into the woods.
Defendant testified at trial, explaining that he was prescribed Trileptal for his

tripolar"
disorder and Prozac for depression and anxiety. 6 According to defendant,

tripolar disorder is a personality disorder that causes him to black out when he
experiences extreme emotion. Defendant testified that he met Hickox about five or six

months prior to the incident when they started working together, and he considered their

relationship to be exclusive by the beginning of December 2020. Shortly before midnight

I Thibodaux's group of friends consisted of Cody Rodrigue, Dante Torres, Jhy Orgeron, Michael Guidry,
Zachary Vega, and Terry Lee Griffin, all of whom testified at trial.

6 There was no medical evidence introduced at trial regarding defendant's diagnoses or medications.

7

on December 31, 2020, defendant received a call from Hickox asking him to meet her at

the New Year's Eve Party in Jolie Oaks. He testified that it was apparent upon arriving

that he did not look like anyone else at the party and that he was mistaken as a drug

dealer. While talking to some of his friends, he saw a guy (Thibodaux) walk up to Hickox,
lean down, and whisper in her ear. He told Thibodaux that Hickox was with him, and

Thibodaux looked at him and smiled. Defendant said that he continued talking to his

friends, but he saw Thibodaux walk back up to Hickox and whisper in her ear again.

According to defendant, it was clear Hickox did not want Thibodaux's attention. Feeling

the need to intervene, defendant slapped Thibodaux, who again smiled. Defendant

stated that he felt that Thibodaux was disrespecting both him and Hickox.

Later that night, defendant and Thibodaux met by the front door. Defendant

claimed Thibodaux said, " I' m f*** ing her too and [ Hickox] think[ s] she all that because

she["s] f*** ing with n******.' q Defendant then slapped Thibodaux again, and the initial

fight ensued. Two of Thibodaux's friends intervened, and the fight stopped. Defendant

claimed that after the fight stopped, he was walking to get his hat and glasses, which

had fallen off during the initial fight, when he was ambushed by two guys who started

swinging at him. Multiple individuals jumped into the crowd to fight defendant, including

Thibodaux. Defendant fell to the ground, and people punched him in the face, kicked

him, and held his arms down. While on the ground, he heard someone say they were
going to get their gun. Ten or twenty seconds later, defendant was able to get up and
run to his bag. He testified that he got his weapon from his bag to protect himself and

ran toward Marie's car, after which he blacked out and " that's when everything just

happened." Defendant admitted that he threw the gun over a bridge at some point

because he was scared.

On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he purposefully skipped a
dosage of his medication on the day of the party and that his tripolar disorder made him

experience anger more acutely than an average person. He also confirmed that he

started a violent situation by slapping Thibodaux. Although he did not have a permit to

I The State recalled Zachary Vega, Thibodaux's stepbrother, as a rebuttal witness. Vega denied that
Thibodaux used the " N" word at the party, and he said it would have been out of character for Thibodaux
to say the " N" word.

0

carry a concealed firearm, defendant said he regularly carried a gun to protect others and

himself. Defendant said that after watching the videos from that night, which were played

for the jury, he learned that it was his cousin, Tai'lean Carter, who said he was going to
get a gun.

Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and

attempted manslaughter. On appeal, defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient

to sustain his second degree murder conviction. Defendant does not deny that he shot

and killed Thibodaux; rather, he contends the homicide was committed in self-defense.

Defendant argues he acted with the force necessary to save him from danger as he was

faced with the imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm. In the

alternative, he asserts the evidence presented at trial only supported a conviction for

manslaughter, as he was provoked and shot Thibodaux in the heat of passion.

In finding defendant guilty of second degree murder, it is clear that the jury
determined that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not

committed in self-defense and concluded the use of deadly force against Thibodaux was

neither reasonable nor necessary. Multiple witnesses, including defendant, testified that

defendant initiated the physical altercation by slapping Thibodaux twice. While the initial

altercation involved defendant and Thibodaux only, the fight thereafter escalated, and

defendant was outnumbered. However, the testimonial and physical evidence showed

that Thibodaux had walked about 150 to 170 feet toward the parked vehicles to leave

when defendant ran after him and fired at least thirteen times from behind. Thibodaux

was not trying to fight or attack defendant when he pulled out the gun. Based on our

review of the evidence, we do not find that defendant could have reasonably believed

that he was in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm at the
time he grabbed his gun and ran in pursuit of Thibodaux, who was unarmed. See State

v. Delco, 2006- 0504 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 15/ 06), 943 So. 2d 1143, 1150, writ denied, 2006-

2636 ( La. 8/ 15/ 07), 961 So. 2d 1160.

Moreover, defendant's act of fleeing the scene after the shooting and failing to
report it are inconsistent with a theory of self-defense. Flight following an offense

reasonably raises the inference of a " guilty mind." State v. Rosario -Colon, 2019- 0406

11

La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 27/ 19), 289 So. 3d 126, 135, writ denied, 2019- 01806 ( La. 1/ 28/ 20),

291 So. 3d 1055, cert. denied, _ U. S. , 140 S. Ct. 2727, 206 L. Ed. 2d 859 ( 2020). A

rational juror could have reasonably concluded that the killing was not necessary to save

defendant from the danger envisioned by LSA- R. S. 14: 20( A)( 1), that defendant was the

aggressor in the conflict, and, as such, was not entitled to claim self-defense. See LSA-

R. S. 14: 21; State v. Dunn, 2021- 0630 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 21), 340 So. 3d 77, 87, writ
denied, 2022- 00095 ( La. 4/ 5/ 22), 335 So. 3d 834.

The jury's verdict reflects that it also rejected defendant's claim that the shooting
was committed in " sudden passion" and in " heat of blood"
or that the shooting was a

result of sufficient provocation. A reduction of second degree murder to manslaughter

requires that the killing be " committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately
caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool

reflection." LSA- R. S. 14: 31( A)( 1). The jury clearly found that defendant failed to meet

his burden of proving the mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. See

Dearmas, 356 So. 3d at 14; Mellion, 342 So. 3d at 47- 48. We find such determination

was not irrational based on the evidence.

As discussed, the testimony at trial indicated that Thibodaux stopped fighting and
retreated after his altercation with defendant. Several minutes later, defendant grabbed

his gun, took off running, and started shooting at Thibodaux from behind as he was

walking away. Defendant fired at least thirteen shots and disposed of his gun after fleeing
the scene.
Nothing in the moments leading up to the shooting established that defendant

had been provoked by Thibodaux to the extent that a reasonable person in defendant's
position would have lost his self-control. Even accepting defendant's assertion that

Thibodaux used a racial slur, it is well- settled that mere words or gestures, however

offensive or insulting, will not reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter. See

Mellion, 342 So. 3d at 47. Nothing in the record suggests Thibodaux initiated the

confrontation or provoked defendant. Rather, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that

defendant was angered by Thibodaux's interest in Hickox, slapped Thibodaux twice

before starting a brawl, and chased after Thibodaux before shooting him from behind.

12

Finally, defendant argues that because the jury found him guilty of the responsive

verdict of attempted manslaughter of Badeaux, it erred in determining he was guilty of

second degree murder of Thibodaux instead of the responsive verdict of manslaughter.

Defendant contends the verdicts are inconsistent insomuch as the jury must have found

the mitigating factors of sudden passion and heat of blood were present for the offense

against Badeaux, but not present for the offense against Thibodaux. The State, in

response, argues that the attempted manslaughter verdict was a compromise verdict

which has no effect on the second degree murder conviction. We agree.

A jury has the prerogative to compromise and render a lesser verdict whenever it

could have convicted as charged. State ex rel. Ellaire v. Blackburn, 424 So. 2d 246,

251 ( La. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 959, 103 S. Ct. 2432, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1318 ( 1983). A

compromise verdict is a verdict which does not " fit" the evidence, but which the jurors

deemed to be fair. Id. " Judicial tolerance of inconsistent verdicts rendered by a single

jury has been a longstanding feature of the jury system." State v. Quinn, 2019- 00647

La. 9/ 9/ 20), 340 So3d 829, 835 ( per curiam), cert. denied, _ U. S. , 141 S. Ct.

1406, 209 L. Ed. 2d 139 ( 2021). Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Id. Based

on the jurisprudence, we find no merit to defendant's argument that the inconsistent

verdicts require a reduction of his second degree murder conviction to manslaughter.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility

of witnesses for that of the trier of fact and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an

exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See
State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 1 So3d 417, 418 ( per curiam). Viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact

could have found that defendant failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he

acted in sudden passion or heat of blood to justify the lesser verdict of manslaughter. This
assignment of error is without merit.

R10= 0 I

Pursuant to LSA-C. Cr. P. art. 920( 2), this court routinely conducts a review of all

appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and
without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023- 0117 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

13

11/ 3/ 23), 378 So. 3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024- 00027 ( La. 5/ 21/ 24), — So. 3d

After a careful review of the record, we note one potential error.

The record reflects that defendant was not physically present when the trial court

imposed his sentences, having been removed for disruptive behavior. Louisiana Code of

Criminal Procedure article 835( A) provides that a defendant must be present when

sentence is pronounced in felony cases. However, paragraph ( B) of LSA- C. Cr. P. art. 835

allows the trial court, by local rule, to impose sentence via simultaneous audio-visual

transmission in accordance with LSA- C. Cr. P. art. 562. That article provides, in pertinent

part:

In a case where the offense is a noncapital felony or a misdemeanor, the
defendant, who is confined in a jail, prison, or other detention facility in
Louisiana, may, with the court' s consent and the consent of the district
attorney, appear at ... sentencing by simultaneous audio-visual transmission
if the court, by local rule, provides for the defendant's appearance in this
manner and the defendant waives his right to be physically present at the
proceeding.

LSA- C. Cr. P. art. 562( A). The transcript reflects that defendant was initially present in

person for sentencing but was eventually removed during victim impact statements.

Defendant had several outbursts involving expletives and asked numerous times that he

be taken out of the courtroom. Thereafter, defendant was escorted to the parish jail for

security purposes and was allowed to appear by audio-visual transmission with the

consent of the State, trial court, and defense counsel. Because defendant repeatedly

asked to be removed from the courtroom and made no subsequent objection to his

removal, we find he waived his right to be physically present at the pronouncement of
his sentences.
Thus, we do not recognize a patent error by the trial court pronouncing
the sentences in the absence of defendant's physical presence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences of defendant,
Kamron Kajon Jacquot.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

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