Arona T. Walker and Arona T. Walker on Behalf of Leona C. Walker v. Kate Brown, M.D. and Her Insurance D.E.F. Insurance and Louisiana State University School of Medicine in New Orleans, Faculty Group Practice, A/K/A Lsu Health Healthcare Network and Its Insurance, X.Y.Z. Insurance

ARONA T. WALKER AND * NO. 2024-C-0564
ARONA T. WALKER ON
BEHALF OF LEONA C. *
WALKER, DECEASED COURT OF APPEAL
*
VERSUS FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
KATE BROWN, M.D. AND STATE OF LOUISIANA
HER INSURANCE D.E.F. *******
INSURANCE AND LOUISIANA
STATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF MEDICINE IN NEW
ORLEANS, FACULTY GROUP
PRACTICE, A/K/A LSU
HEALTH HEALTHCARE
NETWORK AND ITS
INSURANCE, X.Y.Z.
INSURANCE

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2022-10981, DIVISION “F-14”
Honorable Jennifer M. Medley
******
Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano,
Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge Rachael D. Johnson, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott)

Liz Murrill, Attorney General
Timothy R. Wynn, Assistant Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice, Litigation Division
330 Marshall Street, Suite 777
Shreveport, LA 71101

Mary Katherine F. Koch, Assistant Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice, Litigation Division
1450 Poydras Street, Suite 900
New Orleans, LA 70112

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, KATE BROWN, M.D.

Stephen N. Chesnut
1413 Chartres Street, Suite A
New Orleans, LA 70116

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT, ARONA T. WALKER

WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED

JANUARY 27, 2025

JCL This is a tort claim. Relator/defendant, Kate Brown, M.D. (“Dr. Brown”),

RLB seeks supervisory review of the district court’s July 29, 2024 judgment denying Dr.

PAB Brown’s peremptory exception of no cause of action filed as to the second

RDJ amending petition by plaintiff/respondent, Arona T. Walker (“Walker”). For the
NEK
reasons that follow, we grant the writ, we reverse, and we render judgment

granting the exception and dismissing all claims against Dr. Brown.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying litigation stems from Walker’s claim that Dr. Brown failed

to timely complete and sign (or refuse to sign) the death certificate of Leona C.

Walker (“Decedent”), Walker’s deceased, adult daughter, who had special needs

and lived with Walker. Dr. Brown was Decedent’s primary care physician. Walker

brought the instant litigation against Dr. Brown; Dr. Brown’s alleged employer,

Louisiana State University School of Medicine in New Orleans Faculty Group

Practice, a Louisiana Non-Profit Organization, d/b/a LSU Healthcare Network; and

their alleged insurers.

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The case has been appealed to this Court on two prior occasions. See Walker

v. Brown, 23-0261 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/22/23), 372 So.3d 845 (vacating default

judgment against Dr. Brown); Walker v. Brown, 24-0198 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/17/24),

390 So.3d 427 (granting supervisory writ; vacating summary judgment; and

remanding for contradictory hearing). Since the inception of the litigation, Walker

has filed an original and three amending petitions for damages. Walker has not

brought any claim against the funeral home or the coroner in this litigation.

Whether Walker may have a cause of action to bring such claims is not presently

before this Court. The single issue currently before this Court is whether Walker’s

petitions state a cause of action under which the law provides any remedy against

Dr. Brown.

On December 2, 2022, Walker filed her original petition for damages

alleging the following. On December 3, 2021, Decedent was pronounced dead at

her residence. The police, New Orleans Emergency Medical Services, and the New

Orleans Coroner’s Office were called and responded. The coroner advised Walker

that no autopsy or investigation was necessary and that Dr. Brown must be

informed of the death. The police and coroner notified the funeral home, D.W.

Rhodes Funeral Home (“Rhodes”), to obtain the body. According to the petition,

on December 7, 2021, Rhodes unsuccessfully attempted to send Decedent’s death

certificate electronically to Dr. Brown for her signature. Thereafter, Walker and

Rhodes attempted to contact Dr. Brown both by phone and electronically on

several occasions, but the death certificate was not signed. On January 11, 2022,

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Rhodes spoke with Dr. Brown’s office and learned that Dr. Brown was not

registered with the Louisiana Electronic Event Registry System (LEERS) and

could not receive the death record electronically for her signature. On February 15,

2022, Dr. Brown’s office informed Rhodes that the Louisiana Department of Vital

Records was awaiting a registration application from the funeral home. According

to Rhodes, “the doctors themselves should have registered” with the Department of

Vital Records. Rhodes then provided to Dr. Brown via email a registration

application, which was publicly available on the internet. On March 11, 2022,

Walker contacted Dr. Brown’s supervisors and left a message. On March 14, 2022,

Walker spoke with “Ms. Biagas (representative),” “Attorney Jim Hritz and Dr.

Jane Weitz,” and on the same date, Dr. Brown signed the death certificate at her

supervisors’ direction. On March 25, 2022, Walker received the death certificate.

Walker alleged that, because of Dr. Brown’s delay in signing the death certificate,

she sustained pain, stress, aggravation of a pre-existing medical condition,

depression, anxiety, and sleepless nights.

On December 29, 2023, Walker filed a first amending petition, in which she

alleged that Dr. Brown assumed the duty to sign the death certificate and the

responsibility of determining the cause of death when she signed the death

certificate. On May 2, 2024, Walker filed a second amending petition. She alleged

that Dr. Brown’s failure to timely return the original death certificate, either signed

or unsigned, prevented Rhodes from filing the death certificate with the local

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registrar. According to the second amending petition, Dr. Brown failed to inform

Rhodes that she would not sign the death certificate.1

On May 10, 2024, Dr. Brown filed a peremptory exception of no cause of

action, arguing that Louisiana law provides no legal duty for Dr. Brown to sign the

death certificate. Dr. Brown further argued that she did not assume a duty to

Walker. Instead, she argued, under La. R.S. 40:49, where the death occurred at

home without medical attendance, the funeral director was required to immediately

notify the local registrar so that the coroner could perform the mandated

investigation and certification. In her June 18, 2024 opposition to the exception,

Walker contended that her claim sounds in negligence and gross negligence, in that

Dr. Brown negligently failed to return the original death certificate to the funeral

home, which prevented the funeral home from filing the original. Walker also

claimed that the local registrar could not send out another original without the

return of the first one.

On June 27, 2024, a hearing went forward on the exception. On July 29,

2024, the district court rendered judgment overruling the exception of no cause of

action. Dr. Brown timely brought an application for supervisory writ, arguing that

the exception should be granted and all claims against her should be dismissed

with prejudice.

1 Walker also filed a third amending petition to provide an email address for service of process,

but no additional facts are alleged that are relevant to this writ application.

4

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Appellate courts review a ruling on a peremptory exception of no cause of

action under the de novo standard of review because the exception raises a question

of law. Herman v. Tracage Dev., L.L.C., 16-0082, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/21/16),

201 So.3d 935, 939 (citation omitted). The function of the exception of no cause of

action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition, which is done by determining

whether the law affords a remedy to anyone on the facts alleged in the petition. Id.,

16-0082, p. 5, 201 So.3d at 939 (citation omitted). In reviewing the petition, the

court must accept the well-pleaded allegations of fact as true. Ramey v. DeCaire,

03-1299, p. 7 (La. 3/19/04), 869 So.2d 114, 118. However, the court is “not

compelled to accept a party’s legal conclusions as facts,” and legal conclusions

asserted in the petition “are not considered well-pled factual allegations for

purposes of an exception of no cause of action.” Henderson v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 21-0654, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/17/21), 335 So.3d 349, 353

(citations omitted).

The party filing the exception bears the burden to demonstrate that the

petition states no cause of action. Ramey, 03-1299, p. 7, 869 So.2d at 119. “In

deciding an exception of no cause of action a court can consider only the petition,

any amendments to the petition, and any documents attached to the petition.” 2400

Canal, LLC v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Louisiana State Univ. Agr. & Mech. Coll., 12-0220,

p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/7/12), 105 So.3d 819, 825. “A court cannot consider

assertions of fact referred to by the various counsel in their briefs that are not pled

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in the petition.” Id. “The grant of the exception of no cause of action is proper

when, assuming all well pleaded factual allegations of the petition and any annexed

documents are true, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he seeks as a matter of

law.” Id.

Walker claims that she sustained damages due to Dr. Brown’s failure to

timely sign and return the medical portion of her deceased daughter’s death

certificate. She asserts that her claims arise in negligence and gross negligence. As

this Court explained:

Both ordinary negligence and gross negligence are
analyzed under a duty-risk analysis. Though gross
negligence and ordinary negligence have distinct
meanings, they are both forms or different degrees of
negligence. The lack of care on the part of the tortfeasor
distinguishes ordinary negligence from gross negligence.
The duty-risk analysis requires the plaintiff to prove four
distinct elements: (1) existence of a duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3)
the breach is a cause in fact of damage; and (4) actual
damage was sustained by the plaintiff.

Bradix v. Advance Stores Co., Inc., 17-0166, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/16/17), 226

So.3d 523, 529 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

The existence of a duty is a question of law, wherein the court’s inquiry “is

whether the plaintiff has any law (statutory, jurisprudential, or arising from general

principles of fault) to support the claim that the defendant owed him a duty.”

Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 22-00849, p. 6 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 467, 473

(citations omitted).

Louisiana Revised Statute 40:47 states the general requirement that “[a]

certificate of every death … shall be filed with a registrar within five days after its

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occurrence.” More specifically, La. R.S. 40:49 imposes enumerated duties

concerning death certificates on the funeral director, coroner, and physician last in

attendance upon the deceased.2 The relevant portions of La. R.S. 40:49 provide:

A. The funeral director or person acting as such shall
prepare and file the certificate of death or spontaneous
fetal death or stillbirth provided for in R.S. 40:47.

B. In preparing a certificate of death or spontaneous fetal
death or stillbirth, he shall:

(1) First obtain and enter on the certificate the personal
data required by the state registrar from the person best
qualified to supply such data.

(2) Except as provided in Paragraph (4) of this
Subsection, if the death occurred with medical
attendance, present the certificate of death to the
physician last in attendance upon the deceased, who shall
certify over his signature within twenty-four hours the
cause of death to his best knowledge and belief; or, if the
spontaneous fetal death occurred with any person in
attendance, present the certificate of spontaneous fetal
death to the physician, midwife, or other person in
attendance at the spontaneous fetal death for the
certification of the fact of spontaneous fetal death and
such medical data pertaining to the spontaneous fetal
death as the physician or midwife can furnish in his
professional capacity.

(3) Except as provided in Paragraph (4) of this
Subsection, if the death occurred without medical
attendance, or if the physician or midwife or other person
last in attendance at the death or spontaneous fetal death
refuses or for any reason fails to sign the certificate,
immediately notify the appropriate local registrar. The
local registrar shall, prior to issuing a permit for burial,
cremation, or other disposition of the body, inform the
coroner, and refer the case to him for immediate
investigation and certification of the information required

2 We have not located any reported case interpreting La. R.S. 40:49. Walker cites to Morris v.

Jones Funeral Home, Inc., 20-1002 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/18/21), 328 So.3d 472, wherein a plaintiff
brought an action against a funeral home alleging a violation of La. R.S. 40:47 for failure to file
a death certificate within five days. No similar claim against the funeral home is raised in this
litigation.

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under Paragraph (2) of this Subsection. Provided,
however, that nothing in this Section shall be construed
to require an investigation, autopsy or inquest in any case
where death occurred without medical attendance solely
because the deceased was under treatment by prayer or
spiritual means alone in accordance with the tenets and
practices of a recognized church or religious
denomination, and under such eventualities, the death
certificate may be completed on the basis of information
received from persons having knowledge of the facts.

(4) Whether the death or spontaneous fetal death
occurred with or without medical attendance, if the
circumstances of the case suggest that the death or
spontaneous fetal death was caused by other than natural
causes, the local registrar shall refer the case to the
coroner or medical examiner for investigation and
certification.

(5) When death occurs more than ten days after the
decedent was last treated by a physician, the case shall be
referred to the coroner for investigation to determine and
certify the cause of death.

(6) When inquiry is required by the coroner, he shall
determine the cause of death and shall complete and sign
the medical certification within forty-eight hours after
taking charge of the case.

(7) If the cause of death cannot be determined within
forty-eight hours after death, the attending physician or
coroner shall give the funeral director or person acting as
such notice of the reason for the delay, and final
disposition of the body shall not be made until authorized
by the attending physician or coroner.
…
(12) The medical certification shall be completed, signed,
and returned to the funeral director, if applicable, within
twenty-four hours after death by the physician in charge
of the patient's care for the illness or condition which
resulted in death, except when a coroner’s inquiry is
required. In the absence of the physician or with his or
her approval the certificate may be completed and signed
by his or her associate physician, the chief medical
officer of the institution in which death occurred, the
physician who performed an autopsy upon the decedent,
or the coroner, provided such individual has access to the
medical history of the case, views the deceased at or after
death, and death is due to natural causes.

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Louisiana Revised Statute 40:49 contemplates differing statutory

responsibilities depending on whether the death occurred “with medical

attendance” or “without medical attendance.” The statute discusses the role of the

physician using the following terms:

• “physician last in attendance upon the deceased” La. R.S. 40:49(B)(2)

• “physician or midwife or other person last in attendance at the death”
La. R.S. 40:49(B)(3)

• “death occurs more than ten days after the decedent was last treated
by a physician” La. R.S. 40:49(B)(5)

• “attending physician” La. R.S. 40:49(B)(7)

• “physician in charge of the patient’s care for the illness or condition
which resulted in death, except when a coroner’s inquiry is required”
La. R.S. 40:49(B)(12).

No statutory definition of these terms3 is provided in Section 40:49 or

elsewhere in Chapter 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. A general definition of

“physician” is found in La. R.S. 40:32(11) as “a person authorized under the laws

of this state to practice medicine.”

3 Similar terms regarding the “physician, if any, last attending to the deceased” are used in La.

R.S. 40:34.10, which provides for the required contents of the death certificate, in relevant part:

The certificate of death shall contain, as a minimum, the following
items:
…
(19) The medical certification of the physician, if any, last
attending to the deceased, which certificate shall be made and
signed by the physician within twenty-four hours after death with
his name and address. In the absence of a physician, the parish
coroner shall sign the certificate. In either event, the certification
shall contain the following items:
(a) The fact and date of death, including year, month, day, and the
time of the day.
(b) Time in attendance.
(c) Time he last saw the deceased alive.
(d) Cause of death. . . .

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The Supreme Court provides guidance in the relevant standard for statutory

construction:

The function of statutory interpretation and the
construction given to legislative acts rests with the
judicial branch of the government. The rules of statutory
construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the
intent of the Legislature. Legislation is the solemn
expression of legislative will, and, thus, the interpretation
of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative
intent. We have often noted the paramount consideration
in statutory interpretation is ascertainment of the
legislative intent and the reason or reasons which
prompted the Legislature to enact the law. The starting
point in the interpretation of any statute is the language
of the statute itself. When a law is clear and unambiguous
and its application does not lead to absurd consequences,
the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the
Legislature. However, when the language of the law is
susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted
as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose
of the law. Moreover, when the words of a law are
ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining
the context in which they occur, and the text of the law as
a whole. Further, the Legislature is presumed to act with
full knowledge of well-settled principles of statutory
construction.

Burgess v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 16-2267, pp. 9-10 (La.

6/29/17), 225 So.3d 1020, 1026 (quoting Catahoula Par. Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana

Mach. Rentals, LLC, 12-2504, pp. 12-13 (La. 10/15/13), 124 So.3d 1065, 1073).

We find La. R.S. 40:49 clear and unambiguous. The “physician” – to whom

the statute imputes responsibilities for completing a death certificate – is a

physician who is physically present and providing care at the time of the death. No

allegation is contained in the original or amending petitions that Dr. Brown was

physically present and providing care at the time of death. Rather, the petitions

10

allege that Decedent died at home. Walker has failed to allege sufficient facts that

would bring Dr. Brown within the confines of these statutory responsibilities.

In opposition to the exception, Walker argues that she alleged negligence

and gross negligence through violations of La. R.S. 40:50(A), which states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary, the funeral director or other person required by
law to initiate a death certificate shall initiate such
certificate in original only, and shall file the original with
a local registrar. The local registrar of each parish shall
retain this original in his office for a period of ten days
from the date the certificate is filed.

Walker contends that Dr. Brown should have returned the original death

certificate because the local registrar could not send out another original without

the first one being returned. This argument fails to rely on any well-pleaded factual

allegations. Rather, Walker states a legal conclusion, clothed as fact. We are

unable to consider such a claim as true for the purpose of an exception of no cause

of action. Henderson, 21-0654, pp. 5-6, 335 So.3d at 353. Rather, looking to the

language of the statute itself, La. R.S. 40:50 does not set forth any statutory duty

on a physician.

Walker also argues that Dr. Brown assumed a duty to timely complete the

death certificate, either through conversations between her office administrators

and the funeral home or by ultimately completing the death certificate three

months after the death. We find no support for such assertions. Again, Walker’s

contention that Dr. Brown assumed a duty is a legal conclusion, not a well-pleaded

11

factual allegation, and the court is not bound to accept it as true.4 Henderson, 21-

0654, pp. 5-6, 335 So.3d at 353. Moreover, we find no support in the law for the

proposition that any lack of action on the part of Rhodes or the coroner in

instigating the coroner’s investigation and completion of the death certificate, as

provided in La. R.S. 40:49(B)(3), imputes a responsibility upon a primary care

physician who is not present at the death.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, “there is an almost universal legal

duty on the part of persons to conform to the standard of conduct of a reasonable

person in like circumstances.” Ramey, 03-1299, p. 8, 869 So.2d at 119 (citations

omitted). “Whether a legal duty exists, and the extent of that duty, depends on the

facts and circumstances of the case and the relationship of the parties.” Id.

Accepting the well-pleaded allegations of fact in the petitions as true, we find that

Walker failed to state a cause of action in negligence or gross negligence. Walker’s

factual allegations do not show any circumstances imposing a duty on Dr. Brown

to complete or sign the medical portion of the death certificate or to return any

signed or unsigned death certificate sent to her office. Moreover, Walker’s petition

does not articulate a relationship between Dr. Brown and Decedent giving rise to a

duty on Dr. Brown to complete the death certificate or return it, signed or

unsigned. We cannot say under the facts alleged that the law provides Walker with

any recourse against Dr. Brown. Therefore, we conclude that the peremptory

4 Walker also posits in her opposition to this writ application that Dr. Brown bears responsibility

for failing to advise Rhodes that she had not seen or treated Decedent within ten days of death,
and that Rhodes and the coroner must have been unaware of this fact. These suppositions are
arguments outside the four corners of the petition, which the court may not consider on an
exception of no cause of action. 2400 Canal, LLC, 12-0220, p. 7, 105 So.3d at 825.

12

exception of no cause of action should have been granted, and the district court

erred in denying the exception.

We recognize that, under La. C.C.P. art. 934, “[w]hen the grounds of the

objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of

the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment

within the delay allowed by the court.” However, the article goes on to say that

“[i]f the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so

removed, or if the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action,

claim, demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed.” Id. As this Court has observed,

the right to amend the petition is not absolute, and the Code of Civil Procedure

does not permit amendment when it would constitute a vain and useless act. DLN

Holdings, L.L.C. v. Guglielmo, 21-0640, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/29/22), 366 So.3d

461, 476 (citations omitted).

The record herein reflects that the petition has been twice amended, and no

showing is made of any new facts that Walker would allege if permitted leave to

further amend her petition. Walker’s claims are that Dr. Brown was Decedent’s

primary care physician who was not present or providing medical care at the time

of death. Beginning four days after the death, a funeral home, Rhodes,

unsuccessfully attempted sending a death certificate to Dr. Brown’s office

electronically, and Dr. Brown ultimately completed and signed the medical portion

of the death certificate more than three months after the death. We do not find that

Walker can successfully remove the grounds for this exception. Amendment of the

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petition would be a vain and useless act. Walker’s claims against Dr. Brown must

be dismissed as a matter of law without further opportunity to amend her petition

for damages.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we grant the writ, reverse the judgment

of the district court, and render judgment granting the exception of no cause of

action and dismissing all claims against Kate Brown, M.D.

WRIT GRANTED; REVERSED

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