Thomas D'Aquin v. the Housing Authority of New Orleans

THOMAS D'AQUIN * NO. 2024-C-0584

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY *
OF NEW ORLEANS FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
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APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2024-00026, DIVISION “I-14”
Honorable Lori Jupiter, Judge
******
Chief Judge Terri F. Love
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(Court composed of Chief Judge Terri F. Love, Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge
Joy Cossich Lobrano)

BELSOME, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT

Kathryn M. Knight
Rachel W. Wisdom
Katelyn N. McGibney
Stone Pigman Walther Wittmann L.L.C.
909 Poydras Street, Suite 3150
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RELATOR, HOUSING AUTHORITY OF
NEW ORLEANS

David H. Williams
Corina Lopez
Southeast Louisiana Legal Services
1340 Poydras Street, Suite 600
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, THOMAS D’AQUIN

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
NOVEMBER 13, 2024

TFL
JCL Relator, Housing Authority of New Orleans (“HANO”), seeks review of the

trial court’s denial of the peremptory exception of no cause of action. Finding

plaintiff is entitled to judicial review of HANO’s decision to terminate his housing

assistance, the application for supervisory review is granted, but relief is denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Thomas D’Aquin, was a recipient of housing assistance through the

Housing Choice Voucher Program (“HCVP”) enacted through Section 8 of the U.S.

Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. HANO is the administrator of the HCVP

program for Orleans Parish on behalf of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

Development (“HUD”). Mr. D’Aquin was incarcerated, allegedly due to actions

stemming from his mental disability, and was absent from his unit for 180 days.

HANO proposed terminating Mr. D’Aquin’s assistance based on this alleged

violation of “24 C.F.R. § 982.312 and HANO’s Administrative Plan by being absent

from his unit for longer than allowed.” HANO scheduled a hearing regarding the

proposed termination of his vouchers. Because Mr. D’Aquin was incarcerated, he

was unable to attend the hearing. In spite of Mr. D’Aquin’s absence, HANO issued

a default voucher termination.

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After being released from prison, Mr. D’Aquin requested a reasonable

accommodation for reinstatement of his voucher based upon his mental illness. Mr.

D’Aquin was granted an informal hearing. However, HANO found that Mr.

D’Aquin “failed to establish a direct connection between his mental health and his

incarceration” and upheld the voucher termination. Mr. D’Aquin then sought a

formal hearing. The hearing officer at the formal hearing upheld the findings of the

informal hearing.

Mr. D’Aquin filed a Petition for Judicial Review Seeking Restoration of

Section 8 HCVP Assistance in the Orleans Parish Civil District Court, again seeking

redress from HANO’s termination of his housing assistance voucher. HANO then

filed a Peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action and Order to Dismiss, asserting

that Mr. D’Aquin was not entitled to further review of HANO’s termination of his

housing assistance voucher. The trial court denied HANO’s exception. HANO’s

application for supervisory review followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Peremptory exceptions of no cause of action present the question of whether

the law extends a remedy against the defendant to anyone under the factual

allegations in the petition. Indus. Cos., Inc. v. Durbin, 02-0665, p. 6 (La. 1/28/03),

837 So. 2d 1207, 1213. “The exception is triable on the face of the petition and, for

the purpose of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts

in the petition must be accepted as true.” Id. The exception should not be granted

unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of any claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id., 02-0665, p. 7, 837 So. 2d at

1213. “Every reasonable interpretation must be accorded the language of the

petition in favor of maintaining its sufficiency and affording the plaintiff the

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opportunity of presenting evidence at trial.” Id. Exceptions of no cause of action

are reviewed de novo, because they raise a legal issue. Simmons v. Dep’t. of Child.

and Fam., 15-0034, p. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/24/15), 171 So. 3d 1147, 1152 (citing

Indus. Cos., 02-0665, pp. 6-7, 837 So. 2d at 1213).

NO CAUSE OF ACTION

HANO filed an Exception of No Cause of Action, contending, “(1) federal

law governed the dispute; (2) the governing federal regulations do not provide

Plaintiff with a right to judicial review; and (3) judicial review under the Louisiana

Administrative Procedure Act (“LAPA”) did not apply to HANO because HANO is

not a state agency.” HANO’s exception is dependent upon the assertion that Mr.

D’Aquin has no right to seek judicial review of its administrative decision.

The parties agree that Mr. D’Aquin has no right to review under the Louisiana

Administrative Procedure Act. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has

repeatedly stated, “[i]t is well settled than an individual’s right of judicial review of

administrative proceedings is presumed to exist.” Loop, Inc. v. Collector of

Revenue, 523 So. 2d 201, 202 (La. 1987)(citing Delta Bank & Trust Co. v. Lassiter,

383 So. 2d 849, 335 (La. 1980), Buras v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension, 367 So. 2d

849, 851 n.4 (La. 1979), and Bowen v. Doyle, 253 So. 2d 200, 204 (La.

1971)(Addressing former La. Const. Art. 1, §6)). Further, this Court held that trial

courts possess the power to review the decisions of administrative agencies. Werner

v. Bd. of Trs. of New Orleans Police Pension Fund of City of New Orleans, 360 So.

2d 615, 617 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978). See also Tanner v. City of Baton Rouge, 422

So. 2d 1263, 1265 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (“Though the trial court termed its review

an ‘appeal’, it was actually exercising its exclusive original jurisdiction to review

decisions of administrative boards.”).

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Mr. D’Aquin maintains Cooley v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Slidell, 747 F.3d

295 (5th Cir. 2014), supports his position. We agree. In Cooley, the U.S. Fifth

Circuit affirmed the trial court’s reinstatement of the plaintiff’s Section 8 benefits

terminated by the Slidell Housing Authority by granting her motion for summary

judgment. 747 F.3d at 296. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit noted that the “Louisiana

Supreme Court has not yet addressed the preclusive effects of agency decisions in

this precise context.1” Cooley, 747 F.3d at 298. The Fifth Circuit noted in a footnote,

however:

Although the parties make reference to the Louisiana Administrative
Procedure Act (LAPA) in discussing the appropriate level of deference,
that Act does not apply because the SHA is a political subdivision of
the State. La.Rev.Stat. § 40:384(16) (public housing authorities are
political subdivisions); La. Const. art. VI, § 44 (defining “political
subdivision”); La.Rev.Stat. § 49:951(2) (excluding political
subdivisions from the definition of “agency” covered by LAPA). If
LAPA did apply, we would owe substantial deference to the factual
findings made by the Eastern District of Louisiana, and not to the
SHA’s factual findings. See La.Rev.Stat. § 49:964(F)-(G). Because the
LAPA does not apply, the Louisiana Constitution governs Cooley’s
claims insofar as it guarantees a right to judicial review even in the
absence of statutory authorization. See La. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 22; Loop,
Inc. v. Collector of Revenue, 523 So.2d 201 (La.1987).

Cooley, 747 F.3d at 298 n.8.

The Fifth Circuit further noted that in “[m]aking its Erie guess, the district

court applied the standard articulated by the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the First

1 The context involved a city housing authority terminating Section 8 housing benefits for failure

to attend an annual recertification meeting under the following mitigating circumstances: 1)
Cooley, the Section recipient, temporarily moved out of her apartment and into her mother’s
apartment to settle her affairs after her mother passed away on March 29, 2012: 2) Cooley moved
back into her apartment on April 18, 2012; 3) in the interim, the housing authority mailed her a
letter informing her of an April 17, 2012 recertification hearing; 4) upon returning home on April
18, 2012, Cooley found a notification from the post office informing that it had a letter for her; 5)
she retrieved the letter the following day; 6) the letter from the housing authority stated Cooley
could reschedule the meeting by contacting the housing authority within three days of receiving
the letter; 7) when Cooley attempted to see her case worker on April 19, the caseworker refused
to see her without an appointment, and scheduled her for April 20, 2012; and 8) on April 24, 2012,
the housing authority notified Cooley that it would terminate her Section 8 participation, effective
May 31, 2012.

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Circuit, which stated that an agency action may be upheld when it is ‘supported by

substantial evidence, in that the action is not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of

discretion.’” Cooley, 747 F3.d at 298, (quoting Tanner, 422 So. 2d at 166. see also

Bowers v. Firefighters’ Retirement System, 08-1268, p. 4 (La. 3/17/09), 6 So. 3d

173, 176 (“The scope of review of administrative agencies in the performance of a

discretionary duty is restricted to determination of whether the agency’s action can

be deemed to have been unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or whether it amounted

to an abuse of power.”).

Mr. D’Aquin’s petition raised issues of reasonable accommodations for his

mental disability, mitigating circumstances, and alleged HANO relied on improper

legal authorities for terminating his participation in the Section 8 program.

Additionally, HANO admitted, in the memorandum in support of the Exception of

No Cause of Action, that the agency should have postponed the initial hearing on

Mr. D’Aquin’s housing assistance until after his incarceration. All of these

allegations present a cause of action for injunctive relief to reinstate wrongfully

terminated benefits. Accordingly, we find the trial court correctly denied HANO’s

peremptory Exception of No Cause of Action and deny relief.

DECREE

For the above-mentioned reasons, Mr. D’Aquin is entitled to seek review of

HANO’s termination of his housing assistance. As such, the trial court did not err

by denying HANO’s Exception of No Cause of Action. The application for

supervisory review is granted, but relief is denied.

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

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