721 St. Charles, LLC v. Gibbs Residential, LLC and Commercial Realty Developers, LLC

721 ST. CHARLES, LLC * NO. 2024-CA-0603

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
GIBBS RESIDENTIAL, LLC *
AND COMMERCIAL REALTY FOURTH CIRCUIT
DEVELOPERS, LLC *
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2020-08628, DIVISION “F-14”
Honorable Jennifer M. Medley
******
Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Rosemary Ledet,
Judge Rachael D. Johnson)

Patrick J. Lorio
H. Minor Pipes, III
PIPES MILES BECKMAN, L.L.C.
1100 Poydras Street
Suite 3300
New Orleans, LA 70163

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

Nicole Montagnet Montjoy
ATTORNEY AT LAW
23489 Arcadia Farm Road
Pass Christian, MS 39571

Fernand L. Laudumiey, IV
CHAFFE MCCALL, LLP
1100 Poydras Street
Suite 2300
New Orleans, LA 70163

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART
MAY 8, 2025

RLB
RML
This is an appeal of the district court’s ruling that awarded damages and
RDJ
attorney’s fees to the plaintiff for a breach of contract. For the reasons below, we

affirm the trial court’s decision in part, amend in part and reverse in part.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At issue is a contract dispute between the owner of 721 St. Charles Ave.1

(“721”) and two companies, Gibbs Residential, LLC (“Gibbs”) and Commercial

Real Estate Developers, LLC (“CRD”). On February 18, 2018, Gibbs signed a

standard form contract that exclusively leased 721 (“The Gibbs Lease”) to serve as

a staging ground for the construction2 of a condominium building on the adjacent

731 St. Charles Ave. Steve Montagnet is a principle owner of 731 St. Charles Ave.

LLC (“731”).

The standard form Lease was confected by 721. The Lease contained a

damages and repairs provision, (“Clause 13”) that stated:

13. REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE. Tenant shall, at
its expense, repair all damage caused by Tenant’s
employees and invitees, maintain striping, and perform
routine custodial services to keep the surfaces within the
Premises (if any) in a clean condition. All other

1 721 St. Charles Avenue is owned by 721 St. Charles Ave. LLC. We will refer to both as 721. 731 St.

Charles Avenue is owned by 731 St. Charles Ave. LLC. We will refer to both as 731.
2 Gibbs served as the general contractor of the 731 construction project.

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maintenance, repair and/or replacement of or on the
Premises shall be promptly and diligently performed by
Tenant at Tenant’s expense, so that the Premises shall be
in good condition and repair at all times and in compliance
with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Tenant
shall specifically maintain the parking surface of the
Leased Premises and return it to the Landlord in the
condition received at the commencement of the Lease.

Gibbs failed to complete the construction project in a timely manner

preventing a third-party parking company, S and P Parking (“SP”), from taking

possession of 721.3 Gibbs was discharged from the 731-construction project and

ceased use of 721 on or around December 1, 2019.

The owner of 731, Steve Montagnet, arranged for his company CRD to take

over the Gibbs Lease in order to prevent project delays. CRD entered into a Lease

with 721 on December 1, 2019, which was extended through June 30, 2020 (“CRD

Lease”). The CRD Lease was almost identical to the Lease signed by Gibbs, with

the exception of a hand-written provision inserted under Clause 13, added by the

owners of 721 and agreed to by CRD. The distinction bound CRD to be

responsible for any damages caused by their possession of 721 and to repair

damages caused by Gibbs’ possession. The addition to Clause 13 stated: “This

shall apply to Gibbs Residential LLC & damage applicable to [its] use up until

12/19 and throughout previous use of lot and drive.”

Damages caused during Gibbs’ possession included a removal of an

electrical pole that fed power to light fixtures, damaged and destroyed brick

pavers, removal of underground wiring and removal of electrical boxes. There was

extensive damage to the lot’s asphalt surface and striping paint4. Gibbs did not

make, nor was it asked, to make any repairs on the lot after termination from the

731 job or the cessation of its possession of 721.

3 SP signed a Lease to operate the 721-lot starting on July 1, 2019; ending on June 30, 2024. Due to
Gibbs’ delays, the start of the Lease was delayed until July 1, 2020. As the date approached SP noticed
that cars were still on the lot, electrical poles and light fixtures were without power, hanging wire hazards,
damages to asphalt and brick pavers. SP terminated the Lease per its terms.
4 There is also testimony that bollards were moved from their location on the lot.

2

At the end of its 721 possession, CRD performed patch work repairs on the

asphalt surface and restriped parking lines. CRD did not address any of the

aforementioned damages caused by Gibbs. An owner of 721, Craig Boes (“Boes”)

repined that the work done by CRD was inadequate to return the lot to pre-Gibbs

condition and hired an outside company to repair the damages at the expense of

$106,077.89. Repairs included complete asphalt resurfacing.

On October 9, 2020, 721 filed suit for breach of contract naming Gibbs and

CRD as joint defendants. It avers that 721 was not returned to proper condition and

sought repair damages, lost profits from the SP Lease, attorney’s fees, and post

judgment interest. Gibbs settled claims with 721 prior to the one-day bench trial

held on February 20, 2024, releasing it from all claims without prejudice. The trial

court concluded that CRD was liable for damages caused during the duration of the

Leases. The court awarded all of 721’s repair costs, ($106,077.87). At a later

hearing on May 15, 2024, the court awarded attorney’s fees ($51,770.71) and

judicial interest to 721; CRD appealed.

In its appeal, CRD assigns three errors from the trial court’s ruling: that the

trial court erroneously interpreted the CRD Lease and expanded the intent of the

parties, that the trial court erroneously found that CRD and Gibbs were not

solidary obligors and that damages should be reduced by the amount of Gibbs’

virile share, that the Lease signed by CRD erroneously concluded that CRD’s

failure to restore 721 to pre-Lease condition constituted a “default” and entitled

721 to an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Where factual findings are pertinent to the interpretation of a contract,

those factual findings are not to be disturbed unless manifest error is shown.

However, when appellate review is not premised upon any factual findings made at

the trial level, but is, instead, based upon an independent review and examination

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of the contract on its face, the manifest error rule does not apply. In such cases,

appellate review of questions of law is whether the trial court was legally correct or

legally incorrect.” Bodenheimer v. Carrollton Pest Control & Termite Co., 17-

0595, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/14/18), 317 So. 3d 351, 357 (quoting New Orleans

Jazz and Heritage Foundation, Inc. v. Kirksey, 09-1433, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir.

5/26/10), 40 So. 3d 394, 401))

ANALYSIS:

BREACH OF CLAUSE 13:

CRD alleges that Clause 13 of the CRD Lease was expanded by the court to

include improvements to 721, rather than repairs. From a review of the trial

transcript, both 721’s and CRD’s understanding of the Lease was clear, even

though their interpretation differed. Boes contended that:

When Gibbs was kicked off the job. Mr. Montagnet’s company took
over the [L]ease, as part of that [they] agreed that they would repair
any damage and perform any maintenance that wasn’t performed
either during their [L]ease or Gibbs’.

Boes believed that the asphalt patch work job done by CRD was not

sufficient to return the lot back to its intended use. In his testimony, Boes

explained in detail that the repairs 721 made were necessary to return the lot to pre-

Gibbs form, to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Further,

that asphalt work done by CRD was “quilt patched, scarred and dented” and not a

consistent finish that was present before Gibbs took possession. As a result, its

surface was conducive to water retention. Boes contended that other physical

elements that were removed from the lot: electrical pay boxes, lighting, light poles,

and wiring should have been addressed.

CRD contended that it satisfied the contractual obligation to return the

leased premises in the condition received at the commencement of the Gibbs

Lease.

4

At trial, Mr. Montagnet stated his interpretation of what the obligation

meant:

Q. [Attorney for 721]: “So what did you understand that this
handwritten language obligated CRD to do with respect to the damage
during the Gibbs [L]ease?”
A. Steve Montagnet: “My understanding was that CRD, to the point
of which Gibbs construction did not …. Repair” [the lot] “while [it
was] in charge and had their [L]ease with Mr. Boes, that we would do
it. That is CRD would do it”5.

Mr. Montagnet, testified that he knew there would be “some repair

necessary” caused by Gibbs. In his opinion, CRD’s obligation was upheld and that

the finished work was actually “a little bit better” than the pre-Gibbs condition.

Further, Mr. Montagnet testified that the asphalt resurfacing done by 721 was a

capital improvement and beyond CRD’s scope of obligation. Mr. Montagnet stated

that other elements of Gibbs’ damage including electrical conduits and light

fixtures were not addressed by CRD because they were “Gibbs’ responsibility.”

Further, the brick paver damages were the City of New Orleans’ responsibility. He

asserted that the repairs he made to asphalt were adequate and in line with other

parking lots he owned.

The trial court disagreed with Mr. Montagnet’s assessment and found that

721’s repairs following CRD’s possession were necessary. “Where there are two

permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be

manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Davis v. Nola Home Constr., L.L.C., 16-

1274, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/14/17), 222 So. 3d 833, 840. We find no manifest

error in the trial court’s determination.

SOLIDARY OBLIGATION

CRD also argues that the trial court erred in failing to find that both CRD

and Gibbs were solidary obligors as it related to the duration of the Gibbs Lease.

5 Pre and post execution of the CRD/721 Lease obligation, the notion of being responsible for the Gibbs
damage was continually brought to the attention of CRD by 721.

5

As a result, that CRD is owed a virile share credit for Gibbs’ solidary liability.

“An obligation is solidary for the obligors when each obligor is liable for the

whole performance.” La. C.C. art. 1794. “Solidarity of obligation shall not be

presumed [and] a solidary obligation arises from a clear expression of the parties’

intent or from the law.” La. C.C. art. 1796. “Among solidary obligors, each is

liable for his virile portion. If the obligation arises from a contract or quasi-

contract, virile portions are equal in the absence of an agreement or judgment to

the contrary.” La. C.C. art. 1804.

In the instant case, CRD and Gibbs had no express intent to be indivisibly

obligated to each other for damages that resulted from their possessions of 721.

Neither defendant presented a precise calculation of specific damages caused by

each other. In her deposition, Lauren Gibbs stated that “[i]t would be very hard to

differentiate between what Gibbs Residential did and what some alleged other

party may have done in trying to parse who is responsible for what.”6

The Gibbs Lease and the CRD Lease were different instruments. Gibbs was

not made aware of any new terms other than an “understanding” that the obligation

of 721’s upkeep had shifted from Gibbs’ responsibility to CRD. Gibbs never

returned to the site, nor were they asked to return. The parties never met to

formally discuss damages and the transition from Gibbs’ possession to CRD’s was

facilitated by 721.

“The coextensive obligations for the ‘same thing’ create the solidarity of the

obligations. When it is not clear that the parties are all obliged to the same thing…

then an obligation in solido is not presumed and must be expressly stipulated.[7]

However, when it is entirely clear that the parties are all obliged to the same

6 Lauren Gibbs is the owner of Gibbs Construction (which includes Gibbs Residential).
7 La. C.C. art. 2093 [now La. C.C. art. 1796].

6

thing… then there is an obligation in solido by definition, as a matter of law.”

Berlier v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 01-1530, p. 9 (La. 4/3/02), 815 So. 2d 39, 45.

In Berlier, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that four asbestos-related

defendants were solidarily obligated to a settlement, even though two of the

defendants had legally released themselves from the case. The Supreme Court held

that one performance contemplated by the defendants bound all defendants to the

same act. The case at hand demonstrates that even as separate agreements, only

one object of performance was contemplated on the part of the defendants. Stated

differently, when CRD replaced Gibbs, CRD and Gibbs were both obligated by

separate obligations to repair the same damages to 721 that occurred from

February 18, 2018, to December 1, 2019.

Gibbs and CRD are also indivisibly bound by the same obligation. “An

obligation is indivisible when the object of performance, because of its nature... is

not susceptible to division.” La. C.C art. 1815. “An indivisible obligation with

more than one obligor is subject to the rules governing solidary obligations.” La.

C.C. art. 1818. “When distinct obligors owe the same indivisible performance to

one obligee, they are solidarily bound to that obligee, regardless of their

intentions.” Id., Comment B.

“If the parties in the present case had intended for the obligation to be

divisible, then one would reasonably suspect that they would have determined each

pro-rata portion, and each defendant would be bound for a sum certain.” Berlier,

01-1530, p. 14, 815 So. 2d at 48. The defendants never made such a determination,

nor was there any communication between them regarding damages. Pursuant to

La. C.C. art. 1818, the rules of solidary obligation apply for the Gibbs term. In the

absence of an agreement to the contrary, the default rules for virile shares, as

outlined in La. C.C. art. 1804 are applied and each defendant owes a proportional

amount of damages.

7

“When negligence of two persons combines to produce the injury of a third,

the parties at fault are joint tort-feasors, and are liable in solido, to the injured

plaintiff.” Walker v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 22-0763, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/3/23),

382 So. 3d 243, 253, as amended on reh'g (May 30, 2023).8 “A non-party found

liable at trial may be assigned a virile share.” Id. A plaintiff may also settle and

release a joint tort-feasor reducing his claim against the other obligors in

proportion to the debt owed by a released obligor. Id. This is known as a virile

share credit.

In their brief, 721 asserts that if CRD wants a virile share reduction of the

costs, then it had the burden of proving that Gibbs was liable by offering evidence

of their purported liability at trial. Walker notes that “when a defendant urges the

fault of a non-party, it is incumbent on the defendant to provide evidence which

preponderates that fault actually exists on the part of the non-party.” Id. In

addition, “a pre-trial settlement shifts the burden of proving liability on the part of

the released tortfeasors from the plaintiff to the remaining defendant or

defendants.” Watts v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 12-0620, p. 12 (La. App. 1 Cir.

9/16/13), 135 So. 3d 53, 63.

CRD calculated Gibbs’ responsibility for much of the damage on the record

at trial. While this was not a precise, pro rata calculation, CRD presented copious

amounts of evidence that Gibbs caused damages and left things different from the

way they found them.9 There was no dispute in the record that Gibbs removed

physical components that were situated on the lot. Gibbs never made any repairs,

and it was known by CRD that Gibbs was responsible for these issues. Watts

bolsters the point that in the absence of specific, proof of pro-rata damages entered

into the record by each defendant, a virile share allotment is appropriate.

8 This tort case uses the terms “tort-feasor contribution” and “virile share liability” interchangeably.
9 In Watts, the court noted that the evidence produced on record included Dow as a settling defendant.

Since the record reflects Dow’s fault, this was sufficient to show that Dow was at fault. Watts, 12-0620, p.
12 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/13), 135 So. 3d 53, 63.

8

We conclude that Gibbs and CRD are solidarily liable for the obligations

required during the duration of the Gibbs Lease. There is nothing in the record to

pin point what damages were caused by CRD during the seven-month post-Gibbs

Lease possession. We reduce the damage award by Gibbs’ virile share.10

ATTORNEY’S FEES

Finally, we discuss if the award of attorney’s fees for a breach of Clause 13

was an error. CRD asserts that the trial court erred by concluding that its failure to

return the parking lot to pre-Gibbs condition constituted a default. Specifically,

CRD claims that the contract does not automatically include a recovery in

attorney’s fees for a breach in Clause 13, and that attorney’s fees are awarded only

in limited instances occurring in the event of a default.

“The law of contracts in Louisiana is very specific: [a]greements legally

entered into have the effect of laws on those who have formed them. In following

this language, we have declared that parties are free to make their own contracts,

and however unusual, drastic, or unreasonable features may be therein, they should

be enforced so long as they do not contravene good morals or public

policy.” Evangeline Par. Sch. Bd. v. Energy Contracting Servs., Inc., 617 So. 2d

(La. App. 3rd Cir.1993) 1259, 1263.

Both Leases contained a default and termination provision (“Clause 18”) and

a remedies provision that gave the lessor options in the event of a default by the

lessee (“Clause 19”). These provisions state (in pertinent part):

18. DEFAULT AND TERMINATION. If Tenant fails
to make payment of any rent when due, and if such failure
shall continue for a period of seven (7) calendar days after
written notice thereon from Landlord is received by
Tenant, the Landlord shall have the right to terminate this
Lease. If, during the Term, Tenant twice fails to make
payment of any rent when due, and Landlord sends written
notice thereof to Tenant, then if Tenant either (i) fails to
make payment of any rent when due for a third time during
10 We also note that the record presented to us, had sufficient consideration of the issue of solidary

liability for trial court consideration.

9

such twelve (12) month consecutive period, or (ii)
breaches any of the covenants, terms and conditions of this
Lease during such twelve (12) month consecutive period,
then Landlord shall have the right to terminate this Lease
without further notice to Tenant.

19. REMEDIES. Upon the occurrence of any
Default, Landlord shall be entitled to exercise all, or any
of the following remedies: (a) to immediately terminate this
Lease, and to sue for and collect past due rent plus
attorney’s fees and court costs, (b) to take possession of
the Premises and to sue for and recover all rents, and other
payments, then accrued or thereafter accrued, plus any
attorney’s fees and court costs, (c) to accelerate all rent due
under this Lease and to sue for and recover any and all past
rent and future rent due under this Lease, plus any
attorney’s fees and court costs, or (d) any remedy
otherwise authorized under any Applicable Law.

Clause 19 grants the lessee the right of remedy in the event that the acts of

the lessor result in a default. In short summary, remedies available include four

options: (a) termination; (b) eviction; (c) acceleration of the rent due; (d) anything

that is authorized by law. Subsections 19 (a), (b) and (c) note that attorney’s fees

can be collected. 721 contends that subsection (b) under Clause 19 permits the

award of attorney’s fees to expand to a breach in Clause 13. Specifically, they

assert that “other payments” within the meaning of Clause 19 includes payment for

repairs and maintenance.

“As a general rule, attorney fees are not due and owing a successful litigant

unless specifically provided for by contract or by statute.” Frank L. Beier Radio,

Inc. v. Black Gold Marine, Inc., 449 So. 2d (La. 1984), 1014, 1015. To determine

the extent that Clause 19’s language “other payments” applies to any other types of

breaches in the Lease, we must look at Clause 18 which specifically addresses

instances of default and termination.

Every instance of the included language of Clause 18 is specific to rent

payments, thus the instances in which a default can be applied to remedies are

limited. Clause 18 makes no mention of a default due to damages, repairs or

10

maintenance as contemplated in Clause 13. 721 could have drafted Clause 18 to

also include damages, maintenance and repairs. Moreover, Clause 13 could have

imposed attorney’s fees upon a breach of its terms. Clause 13 could have also

referred to Clause 19’s inclusion of “other payments” to trigger its available

remedies. The attorney for 721 who furnished this contract failed to include any of

this language.11 Even if the remedies under Clause 19’s “other payments” did

extend to Clause 13, they are still limited to the instances of default outlined in

Clause 18, which did not occur. Contrary to 721’s argument, the term “other

payments” does not automatically grant a remedy for any breach outlined in the

contract. Attorney’s fees are not specifically provided for a breach in Clause 13.

In their reliance on Rogers v. Restructure Petroleum Mktg. Servs. 721 argues

that if the word “default is not otherwise defined in a commercial lease, it means

failure to perform an obligation to do.” Id., 01-1396. P. 5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/6/02).

If this is the case then a default would apply to Clause 13’s obligations.

Even if we were to assume that default was not expressly defined in this

Lease, which we do not, the law requires us to construe any unclear provisions

against the drafter of the contract. “In the case of doubt that cannot be otherwise

resolved, a provision in a contract must be interpreted against the party who

furnished its text… A contract executed in a standard form of one party must be

interpreted, in case of doubt in favor of the other party.” La. C.C. art. 2056.

Therefore, we find that the award of attorney’s fees for breach of Clause 13 was in

error.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part; amend in part; and

reverse in part. We affirm the finding that CRD is liable to 721 for a breach in

11 Clause 5 outlines penalties and late fees for failure to pay or past due rent. This Clause points

to remedies outlined in Clause 19 in the event of a default. This coupled with Clause 18 make it
hard for any other conclusion to be drawn other than the drafter of this contract contemplated a
default to be limited to instances of lost or late rent.

11

contract and amend the judgment to reduce and credit the damages owed by 50%.

We also reverse the awarding of attorney’s fees to 721 and remand to the district

court for further proceedings in line with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART; AMENDED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART

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