Rick Sutton v. Jack Adams, Charles Adams and Polly Point Imports Corp.

RICK SUTTON * NO. 2024-CA-0760

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
JACK ADAMS, CHARLES *
ADAMS AND POLLY POINT FOURTH CIRCUIT
IMPORTS CORP. *
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:

RICK M. SUTTON NO. 2024-C-0571

VERSUS

CHARLES ADAMS, POLLY POINT
IMPORTS CORP, DEFENDANTS
AND JACK ADAMS

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2016-11427, DIVISION “F-14”
Honorable Jennifer M Medley, Judge
******
Judge Dale N. Atkins
******
(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase,
Judge Dale N. Atkins)

Robert G. Harvey, Sr.
LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT G. HARVEY, SR., APLC
600 North Carrollton Avenue
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, Rick M. Sutton

Stephanie M. Poucher
PHELPS DUNBAR, LLP
365 Canal Street, Suite 2000
New Orleans, LA 70130

Charles L. Rice, Jr.
RICE LAW GROUP, LLC

3501 Tulane Ave
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, Jack Adams

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED
AUGUST 4, 2025

DNA
JCL
TGC

This protracted matter stems from a failed business venture between the

parties and has been before this Court on numerous occasions; but the present

dispute, a suspensive appeal consolidated with a writ application, specifically

concerns a mandamus. Appellant/Relator is Jack Adams (“Mr. Adams”), while

Rick M. Sutton (“Mr. Sutton”) is the Appellee/Respondent. In his appeal, Mr.

Adams seeks review of the trial court’s August 22, 2024 judgment, which granted

the “Application for Writ of Mandamus” (“Mandamus Application”) filed by Mr.

Sutton. In his writ application, Mr. Adams seeks review of the trial court’s refusal

to consider his exceptions before ruling on Mr. Sutton’s Mandamus Application.

For the following reasons, we grant Mr. Adams’ writ application, vacate the trial

court’s August 22, 2024 judgment, and remand this matter for further proceedings

consistent with this Opinion.

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY

In a recent Opinion, this Court explained the original dispute between these

parties as follows:

In 2011, Rick Sutton and Jack Adams entered into a business
relationship regarding the operation/creation of a jewelry shop and art
gallery on Royal Street. They formalized their agreement through the

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formation of business entities named RJANO Holdings, Inc.
[(“RJANO”)] and Maison Royale, LLC [(“Maison Royale”)]. RJANO
was the entity that leased the property and Maison Royale was the
entity that operated the business. The relationship between Mr. Sutton
and Mr. Adams deteriorated and numerous lawsuits have followed.

Sutton v. Adams, 2024-0287, p. 1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/21/25), ___ So.3d ___, ___,

2025 WL 880000, at *1. The lawsuits began in 2014. Pertinent to this consolidated

appeal and writ are the following four lawsuits filed and still pending in Orleans

Parish Civil District Court (“CDC”).

Pertinent Lawsuits

Breach of Contract Suit (2014-10709, Division “N”):

First, in 2014, Mr. Sutton filed a lawsuit wherein he alleged breach of

contract and damages, and he named Mr. Adams, Maison Royale, and RJANO as

defendants. This matter was CDC Number 2014-10709 and assigned to Division

“N” of that court.

RICO Suit (2016-11427, Division “D”):

Then, in 2016, Mr. Sutton filed another lawsuit in which he asserted various

claims, including violation of the Louisiana Racketeering Act (“RICO”), violations

of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”), fraud and

misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and detrimental reliance against Mr.

Adams; Mr. Adams’ father Charles; and Polly Point Imports Corporation. This

matter was CDC Number 2016-1147 and assigned to Division “D” of that court.

On October 25, 2017, the trial court dismissed Mr. Sutton’s RICO and LUTPA

claims, and this Court affirmed on appeal. Sutton v. Adams, 2018-0196, p.10 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 12/19/18), 318 So.3d 776, 784, writ denied, 2019-0346 (La. 4/22/19),

267 So.3d 1112.

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Abuse of Process Suit (2017-3907, Division “L” originally; Division “N” later):1

Third, Mr. Adams filed a 2017 lawsuit in which he alleged abuse of process

regarding Mr. Sutton’s allegations in the RICO Suit. This lawsuit was CDC

Number 2017-3907 and was originally assigned to Division “L” of that court.

Nullity Suit (2019-3156, Division “N” originally; Division “D” later):

Fourth and finally, in 2019, Mr. Sutton filed a Petition to Nullify the October

25, 2017 judgment issued in the RICO Suit. This suit was CDC Number 2019-

3156 and was originally assigned to Division “N” of that court.

On August 26, 2019, Division “D” transferred the Nullity Suit to itself

because it was the division that issued the judgment of dismissal in the RICO Suit,

which judgment Mr. Sutton sought to annul via the Nullity Suit. Thereafter the

then-presiding judge of Division “D” ascended to this Court, and the Louisiana

Supreme Court appointed a pro tempore judge.

Orders of Recusal and Re-Allotment

On January 10, 2023, the pro tempore judge issued an “Order of Recusal and

Re-Allotment” in docket number “2019-3156 c/w 2019-3156” (the docket number

for the Nullity Suit) because her law firm represented a party in the litigation. The

pro tempore judge’s order directed the Clerk of Civil District Court for Orleans

Parish (“Clerk of Court”) to “re-allot this matter in its entirety to another non-

domestic Division of [the] [c]ourt, omitting Division ‘D’.” Subsequently, on

February 3, 2023, the pro tempore judge issued a second “Order of Recusal and

Re-Allotment” in docket number “2019-03156 c/w 2016-11427” (the docket

1 In Sutton v. Adams, 2022-01672, p. 11 (La. 3/7/23), 356 So.3d 1038, 1047, the
Louisiana Supreme Court ordered Division “N” to hold a contradictory hearing to determine
whether the Abuse of Process Suit should be transferred to that division and consolidated with
the Breach of Contract Suit pending in that division. After holding such a hearing, Division “N”
transferred the Abuse of Process Suit to itself.

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numbers for the Nullity Suit and the RICO Suit, respectively). Like the pro

tempore judge’s first order, the second order directed the Clerk of Court to “re-

allot this matter in its entirety to another non-domestic Division of [the] [c]ourt,

omitting Division ‘D’.” However, the second order contained a stamped portion

that stated, “LET THIS CASE BE REALLOTED TO DIV. F.”

Mandamus Application and Exceptions

Thereafter, on July 30, 2024, Mr. Sutton filed his Mandamus Application

listing the docket number as “2016-11427 c/w 2019-3156” (the docket numbers for

the RICO Suit and Nullity Suit, respectively) at the top of the pleading. According

to Mr. Sutton, the pro tempore judge’s February 3, 2023 order meant that CDC

Number 2019-3156 (the Nullity Suit) had been “officially re[-]allotted [to Division

‘F’] by judgment of the [c]ourt.” Further, Mr. Sutton alleged that matters were “set

to be heard” before Division “F” “on August 8, 2024[,] and thereafter” regarding

his Nullity Suit. Nonetheless, as contended by Mr. Sutton, opposing counsel filed

pleadings related to the Nullity Suit in Division “N” (where the Breach of Contract

and Abuse of Process Suits were pending) instead of Division “F”, and the Clerk of

Court referred to the Nullity Suit as a Division “N” case. Mr. Sutton’s Mandamus

Application sought an order “instructing the Clerk of Court to correct the docket

number 2019-3156 [the Nullity Suit] to show that the case has been properly re[-

]alloted to Division [‘F’].”

In response to Mr. Sutton’s Mandamus Application, on August 7, 2024, Mr.

Adams filed peremptory Exceptions of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, No

Cause of Action, No Right of Action, and Violation of the Bankruptcy Court’s

Automatic Stay; a declinatory Exception of Insufficiency of Service of Process;

and dilatory Exceptions of Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceedings, Improper

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Cumulation of Claims, and Improper Joinder of Parties (collectively

“Exceptions”).

Hearing and Judgment

On August 8, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Mr. Sutton’s Mandamus

Application. Counsel for Mr. Adams asserted the trial court needed to rule on Mr.

Adams’ Exceptions before hearing the merits of Mr. Sutton’s Mandamus

Application, but the trial court refused to do so and stated, “But you filed it the day

before” and “on the eve [of]” the hearing. On August 22, 2024, the trial court

issued its judgment regarding Mr. Sutton’s Mandamus Application:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
Plaintiff, Rick M. Sutton’s, Application for Writ of Mandamus, is
hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the matter pending in Division “L-6” entitled
“Adams, Jack v. Sutton, Rick M.,” which bears docket number 2017-
03907 [the Abuse of Process Suit], be TRANSFERRED to Division
“F-14,” before the Honorable Judge Jennifer M. Medley.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the matter pending in Division “N-8” entitled
“Sutton, Rick M. v. Adams, Jack et al,” which bears docket number
2019-03156 [the Nullity Suit], be TRANSFERRED to Division “F-
14,” before the Honorable Judge Jennifer M. Medley.

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
ORLEANS CIVIL DISTRICT CLERK OF COURT is hereby
ORDERED to prepare the above-entitled and numbered matter to be
TRANSFERRED in accordance with this Judgment.

....

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Defendant, Jack Adams’ Answer, Exceptions, and Affirmative
Defenses to Rick M. Sutton‘s Application for Writ of Mandamus, filed
on August 7, 2024, is hereby EXCLUDED and PROFERRED
pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1636.

IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Defendant, Jack Adams’, Peremptory’ Exceptions of Lack of Subject

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Matter Jurisdiction, No Cause of Action, No Right of Action, and
Violation of the Bankruptcy Court's Automatic Stay Provisions;
Declinatory/Exception of Insufficiency of Service of Process; and
Dilatory Exceptions of Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceedings,
Improper Cumulation of Claims, and Improper Cumulation of Claims,
and Improper Joinder of Parties, to the Application for Writ of
Mandamus, filed on August 7, 2024, is hereby EXCLUDED and
PROFERRED pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article
1636.

IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that this Judgment is a final judgment in accordance with
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1841 and Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure Article 1918.

(Footnotes omitted.) Mr. Adams’ timely writ application and appeal to this Court

followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In his brief filed in his appeal (2024-CA-0760), Mr. Adams asserts four

assignments of error:

1. Assignment of Error No. 1: The Mandamus Judgment is an
absolute nullity.

2. Assignment of Error No. 2: The CDC Clerk of Court lacks the
legal authority to transfer a pending case to a different division
of CDC absent an order made pursuant to Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure [A]rticles 253.1, 253.2, and 1561.

3. Assignment of Error No. 3: Because the decision of whether
to transfer a pending case (let alone two pending cases) to a
different division of CDC requires the exercise of a
considerable amount of discretion, such an action may not be
ordered pursuant to a mandamus “application.”

4. Assignment of Error No. 4: [Mr.] Sutton’s Mandamus
“Application” unlawfully seeks to circumvent the bankruptcy
court’s automatic stay provisions.

In his writ application (2024-C-0571), Mr. Adams asserts two assignments of

error:

1. The trial court erred in holding that [Mr.] Adams’ timely filed
peremptory, declinatory, and dilatory exceptions were untimely

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and failing to hear and dispose of the exceptions before ruling
on the merits of [Mr.] Sutton’s . . . Application for Writ of
Mandamus.

2. The trial court erred in failing to grant [Mr.] Adams’ unheard
peremptory, declinatory, and dilatory exceptions.

Because we find resolution of Mr. Adams’ first assignment of error in his writ

application (2024-C-0571) to be dispositive, our discussion will focus on the

argument raised therein. Thereafter, our discussion will turn to the issue of having

the above-described, substantially related, and pending suits between these parties

before different divisions of the trial court.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Adams contends the trial court erred in holding that his Exceptions were

untimely and in failing to hear and dispose of those Exceptions before ruling on the

merits of Mr. Sutton’s Mandamus Application. Resolution of this issue requires us

to consider and apply the relevant rules and code articles concerning when a party

must file an exception to an application for writ of mandamus for it to be timely,

such that the trial court must hear and dispose of the exception before ruling on the

merits of the application for writ of mandamus. As this Court has explained, a trial

court’s application of a statute or code article to the facts of a case constitutes “a

question of law to be reviewed under the de novo standard of review.” Hurel v.

National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2025-0049, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/11/25), ___

So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 762645, at *3 (citing State v. Crowther, 2024-0625, p. 7

(La. App. 4 Cir. 1/31/25), 408 So.3d 277, 283). With this standard of review in

mind, we turn to the section of the Code of Civil Procedure concerning mandamus

proceedings.

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Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3861 defines mandamus as “a

writ directing a public officer, a corporation or an officer thereof, or a limited

liability company or a member or manager thereof, to perform any of the duties set

forth in [La. C.C.P. arts.] 3863 and 3864.” An application for a writ of mandamus

may be disposed of via summary proceeding. La. C.C.P. art. 2592(6). As explained

in La. C.C.P. art. 2596, “[t]he rules governing ordinary proceedings are applicable

to summary proceedings, except as otherwise provided by law.” One such

exception is found in La. C.C.P. art. 2593, which states:

A summary proceeding may be commenced by the filing of a
contradictory motion or by a rule to show cause, except as otherwise
provided by law.

Exceptions to a contradictory motion, rule to show cause,
opposition, or petition in a summary proceeding shall be filed prior to
the time assigned for, and shall be disposed of at, the trial. An answer
is not required, except as otherwise provided by law.

No responsive pleadings to an exception are permitted.

(Emphasis added.)

This Court considered and applied La. C.C.P. art. 2593 in the case of Gilkes

v. Bower, 1999-0574 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/1/99), 734 So.2d 98. Therein, Jennifer

Gilkes (“Ms. Gilkes”) sought a preliminary injunction, which is a summary

proceeding as listed in La. C.C.P. art. 2592(8). Id. at p. 2, 734 So.2d at 100. On the

morning of the injunction hearing, Craig Bower (“Mr. Bower”) filed exceptions to

the jurisdiction of the trial court mere minutes prior to the commencement of the

injunction hearing. Id. at p. 4, 734 So.2d at 101. The record reflected Mr. Bowers

did not argue his exceptions or present evidence in support thereof, and the trial

court did not address or dispose of Mr. Bower’s exceptions prior to ruling on Ms.

Gilkes’ request for a preliminary injunction. Id. at p. 5, 734 So.2d at 101.

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Acknowledging that Mr. Bowers only filed his exceptions “on the morning of the

trial of the preliminary injunction,” this Court nonetheless stated, “the trial court

should have considered [the exceptions] on the trial on the preliminary injunction.”

Id. This Court held “the trial court erred in not considering and disposing of these

exceptions on the trial of the preliminary injunction” because La. C.C.P. art. 2593

mandates that the trial court dispose of an exception at trial so long as the

exception was filed prior to the trial. Id. In his appeal to this Court, Mr. Bowers

contended “that the trial court must have overruled the exceptions, albeit without

any pronouncement” and asked this Court “to consider the merits of . . . the alleged

denial of the exceptions.” Id. However, this Court explained that without a ruling

on the exceptions, the Court was “unable to consider the merits of [Mr. Bower’s]

writ application as it pertain[ed] to the alleged denial of the exceptions.” This

Court granted Mr. Bowers’ writ application; vacated the judgment granting Ms.

Gilkes’ preliminary injunction on the basis that it violated La. C.C.P. art. 2593; and

remanded the matter to the trial court.

We find the same course of action taken in Gilkes must be followed in the

matter sub judice. Mr. Adams filed his Exceptions prior to the hearing on the

merits of Mr. Sutton’s Mandamus Application, such that La. C.C.P. art. 2593

required the trial court to consider and rule on the Exceptions prior to ruling on the

Mandamus Application. The trial court did not do so and thus legally erred.

Therefore, Mr. Adams’ first assignment of error in his writ application has merit.

We note the trial court did not provide a reason for declining to rule on Mr.

Adams’ Exceptions, though the transcript of the hearing indicates the trial court

considered the Exceptions to be untimely. To the extent the trial court considered

Mr. Adams’ Exceptions untimely on the basis of the deadlines for filing exceptions

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found in the “Rules for Civil Proceedings in District Courts,” we also hold this was

in error because “[a] local rule cannot take precedence over statutory law.”2 Kyle v.

Johnson, 2001-2482, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So.2d 979, 982 (citing In

Re Westlake Petrochemicals Corp. Ethylene Plant Part 70, 1999-1726, p. 4 (La.

App. 1 Cir. 11/3/00), 769 So.2d 1278, 1279).

Mr. Adams’ second assignment of error in his writ application concerns the

merits of his Exceptions; but, as in Gilkes, we are unable to consider Mr. Adams’

writ application as it pertains to the merits of the Exceptions without the trial

court’s ruling on same. Accordingly, we pretermit discussion of Mr. Adam’s

second assignment of error in his writ application. Also like in Gilkes, we vacate

the judgment rendered in violation of La. C.C.P. art. 2593, i.e., the August 22,

2024 judgment that granted Mr. Sutton’s Mandamus Application, and we remand

the matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. That judgment is

the basis of Mr. Adams’ four assignments of error in his appeal and in light of the

vacatur, we also pretermit discussion of those assignments of error too.

Prior to consideration of and a ruling on Mr. Adams’ Exceptions, we find it

necessary for Division “N” to hold a contradictory hearing pursuant to La. C.C.P.

art. 1561,3 LA. C.C.P. art. 253.2,4 and Rule 9.3 of the Rules for Civil Proceedings

2 Rule 9.8(c) of the Rules for Civil Proceedings in District Courts states that “no hearing

on an exception or motion will be scheduled until at least fifteen calendar days after filing.” Rule
9.9(b) provides:

When a party files an exception or motion, that party shall concurrently furnish
the trial judge and serve on all other parties a supporting memorandum that cites
both the relevant facts and applicable law. The memorandum for motions and
exceptions, other than motions for summary judgment, shall be served on all other
parties so that it is received by the other parties at least fifteen calendar days
before the hearing, unless the court sets a shorter time.

Though we do not know if these Rules were the basis for the trial court finding Mr. Adams’
Exceptions to be untimely, we nonetheless address them in the interest of being thorough.

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in District Courts.5 Division “N” is instructed to determine whether transfer of the

RICO and Nullity Suits to that division is appropriate and/or in the interest of

justice because they are substantially related to the cases currently pending in that

division (the Breach of Contract and Abuse of Process Suits). As noted earlier in

this Opinion, Division “N” is the division to which the Clerk of Court allotted the

first-filed suit between these parties, the Breach of Contract Suit. The Louisiana

Supreme Court previously ordered Division “N” to hold such a hearing regarding

whether to transfer the Abuse of Process Suit to that division in light of the

pending Breach of Contract Suit. Sutton v. Adams, 2022-01672, p. 11 (La. 3/7/23),

356 So.3d 1038, 1047. We find judicial efficiency warrants such action.
3 Regarding consolidation, La. C.C.P. art. 1561(A) provides:

When two or more separate actions are pending in the same court, the section or
division of the court in which the first filed action is pending may order
consolidation of the actions for trial or other limited purposes after a contradictory
hearing, upon a finding that common issues of fact and law predominate, and, in
the event a trial date has been set in a subsequently filed action, upon a finding
that consolidation is in the interest of justice. The contradictory hearing may be
waived upon the certification by the mover that all parties in all cases to be
consolidated consent to the consolidation.
4 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 253.2 is titled “Transfer and reassignment of

pending cases.” It states:

After a case has been assigned to a particular section or division of the
court, it may not be transferred from one section or division to another section or
division within the same court, unless agreed to by all parties, or unless it is being
transferred to effect a consolidation pursuant to Article 1561. However, the
supreme court, by rule, may establish uniform procedures for reassigning cases
under circumstances where an expeditious disposition of cases may be
effectuated.
5 Rule 9.3 of the Rules for Civil Proceedings in District Courts provides:

All pleadings filed shall be randomly assigned to a particular section or division
of the court in accordance with La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 253.1 before presentation
of a pleading to any judge. The method of allotment for each district court is set
forth in Appendix 9.3. Provided, to the extent allowed by La. Code Civ. Proc. art.
253.3, each district court shall designate in Appendix 9.3: (1) those matters that
ordinarily will not be allotted to a particular section or division of the
court and instead will be signed by the duty judge or by any judge authorized to
sign such pleadings; and (2) those pleadings that, although filed in actions that
will be allotted, may be presented for signature to the duty judge or to any judge
authorized to sign such pleadings.

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DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Mr. Adams’ writ application; vacate the

trial court’s August 22, 2024 judgment; and remand this matter for further

proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED

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