Jonathan Murray v. Universal Parking and Transportation, LLC

JONATHAN MURRAY * NO. 2024-CA-0787

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
UNIVERSAL PARKING AND *
TRANSPORTATION, LLC FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2023-05534, DIVISION “B”
Honorable Marissa Hutabarat, Judge
******
Judge Dale N. Atkins
******
(Court composed of Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge
Dale N. Atkins)

Cesar R. Burgos
Robert J. Daigre
BURGOS & ASSOCIATES, LLC
3535 Canal Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, Jonathan Murray

Matthew A. Sherman
Nicholas R. Varisco
CHEHARDY, SHERMAN, WILLIAMS, RECILE, & HAYES, L.L.P.
One Galleria Boulevard, Suite 1100
Metairie, LA 70001

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE, Universal Parking and
Transportation, LLC

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
JULY 8, 2025

DNA

PAB

TGC

The underlying dispute in this matter is about unpaid wages and a request for

a mandamus for access to financial records; and the present appeal concerns

enforcement of a forum selection clause in an agreement between the parties.

Appellant, Jonathan Murray (“Mr. Murray”), seeks review of the trial court’s

August 28, 2024 judgment, which sustained the “Declinatory Exception of Lack of

Personal Jurisdiction and Declinatory Exception of Improper Venue” filed by

Appellee, Universal Parking and Transportation, LLC (“Universal”). The judgment

also dismissed Mr. Murray’s claims without prejudice. For the following reasons,

we reverse in part, affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand this matter for further

proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petition for Damages

On June 21, 2024, Mr. Murray filed a “Petition for Unpaid Wages and

Mandamus” (“Petition”) in Orleans Parish Civil District Court and listed Universal

as the sole defendant. Mr. Murray contended in his Petition that Universal was “a

Louisiana limited liability company with its registered office in the Parish of

Orleans.” According to Mr. Murray, he was both an employee and an “Operator

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Member”1 of Universal beginning in September 2021; but Universal terminated his

employment “without cause, effective December 19, 2022.” Mr. Murray explained

that he and other Operator Members, who were also employees of the company

like him, agreed to defer some of their salary from September through December

2021 “to avoid financial hardship to [Universal].” Specifically, Mr. Murray stated

he agreed to defer salary in the total amount of $14,445.61, yet he ultimately did

not receive that amount within the time limitations set forth in the Louisiana Wage

Payment Act (“LWPA”).2 Mr. Murray alleged that, “despite amicable demand,” he

still had not been paid as of the filing of his Petition. Accordingly, Mr. Murray

asserted he was entitled to the unpaid wages, penalty wages, and attorney fees

under the LWPA. In his Petition, Mr. Murray asserted venue was proper in Orleans

Parish Civil District Court under La. C.C.P. art. 42 because Universal’s registered

1 In his Petition, Mr. Murray referred to himself as a “Member/Owner” of Universal.

However, the subject agreement between Mr. Murray and Universal referred to him as one of
seven “Operator Members.” Accordingly, this Opinion will use the phrase “Operator
Member(s)” instead.
2 The LWPA is codified at La. R.S. 23:631, et seq. The law provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1)(a) Upon the discharge of any laborer or other employee of any kind
whatever, it shall be the duty of the person employing such laborer or other
employee to pay the amount then due under the terms of employment, whether the
employment is by the hour, day, week, or month, on or before the next regular
payday or no later than fifteen days following the date of discharge, whichever
occurs first.

(b) Upon the resignation of any laborer or other employee of any kind
whatever, it shall be the duty of the person employing such laborer or other
employee to pay the amount then due under the terms of employment, whether the
employment is by the hour, day, week, or month, on or before the next regular
payday for the pay cycle during which the employee was working at the time of
separation or no later than fifteen days following the date of resignation,
whichever occurs first.

La. R.S. 23:631(A).

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office was in Orleans Parish3 and proper under La. R.S. 23:639 because he

performed the work giving rise to his claim for unpaid wages in Orleans Parish.4

Additionally, Mr. Murray requested a writ of mandamus pursuant to La.

C.C.P. art. 3861 regarding certain financial records.5 To this end, Mr. Murray

alleged that under Universal’s Limited Liability Company Agreement (“LLC

Agreement”), not only did the company have to maintain financial records and

books, but he was permitted access to those records as an Operator Member.

Nonetheless, and “[d]espite amicable demand,” Mr. Murray asserted that Universal

provided him with only certain records and “failed and/or refused to provide [him]

with . . . additional financial records.” In sum, Mr. Murray claimed he was entitled

to a writ of mandamus directing Universal to either provide him with copies of the

financial records; grant him access to the records during ordinary business hours;

or to show cause why it should not be ordered to do so.

Amending Petition

On February 6, 2024, Mr. Murray filed a “Supplemantal [sic] and Amending

Petition for Unpaid Wages and Mandamus” (“Amending Petition”). In pertinent

part, Mr. Murray explained that Universal actually paid his deferred salary to him

on July 27, 2023, i.e., prior to the filing of his Petition. Regardless, Mr. Murray

asserted he was entitled to past due wages, reasonable attorney fees, and the costs

of the proceedings. Additionally, Mr. Murray reiterated his request for a

3 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 42 lists the general rules of venue.

4 Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:639 provides that “[i]n addition to all other locations and

courts in which such suit may be appropriate, workmen, laborers, clerks, and all other employees
may sue their employers or hirers for any wages or salary due and owing in the district court of
the parish where the work was performed.”
5 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 3861 defines mandamus as “a writ directing

a public officer, a corporation or an officer thereof, or a limited liability company or a member or
manager thereof, to perform any of the duties set forth in Articles 3863 and 3864.”

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mandamus regarding Universal’s financial records. Again, Mr. Murray alleged that

venue was proper in Orleans Parish Civil District Court.

Exceptions

On June 4, 2024, Universal filed its “Declinatory Exception of Lack of

Personal Jurisdiction and Declinatory Exception of Improper Venue” (collectively

“Exceptions”), alleging that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mr.

Murray’s suit and that he filed suit in the improper venue. To this end, Universal

asserted it was clear Mr. Murray’s claims constituted allegations of violations of

the LLC Agreement. Yet, according to Universal, Mr. Murray and Universal

“expressly submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of the federal and

state courts located in the City of Atlanta, State of Georgia” in the LLC

Agreement.

Universal attached the LLC Agreement as an exhibit to its memorandum in

support of its Exceptions. At the outset, the LLC Agreement listed Mr. Murray as

one of the Operator Members of Universal; and Mr. Murray’s signature appeared

at the end of the LLC Agreement. The LLC Agreement stated that Universal was

“formed as a limited liability company under the laws of the State of Delaware . . .

by the filing of the Company’s Certificate of Formation . . . with the Delaware

Secretary of State.”

The “Administration” section of the LLC Agreement provides, in relevant

part, regarding the company’s financial records:

11.3 Reporting Requirements

(a) The Board of Managers shall use commercially reasonable
efforts to cause to be delivered to each Member (i) within ninety (90)
days after the end of each Fiscal Year, (A) information concerning the
Company as shall be necessary for the preparation by such Member of

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his, her or its federal income tax return and (B) consolidated annual
financial statements of the Company, including a consolidated balance
sheet of the Company as of the last day of the most recently
completed Fiscal Year and consolidated statements of income and
cash flow for the most recently completed Fiscal Year, and (ii) within
forty-five (45) days after the end of each quarter (other than the fourth
quarter) of each Fiscal Year, consolidated quarterly financial
statements of the Company, including a consolidated balance sheet of
the Company as of the last day of such quarter and consolidated
statements of income and cash flow for such quarter. Each Member
shall, or shall use commercially reasonable efforts to cause its
employees, agents, representatives or other Affiliates to, prepare and
provide to the Board of Managers such information as necessary or
reasonably requested by the Board of Managers in connection with the
timely preparation and delivery of the information set forth in the
preceding sentence.

(Hereinafter “Provision 11.3”.) The LLC Agreement also listed the percentage

interest of ownership for each Operator Member but did not provide information

regarding the salary of those Operator Members who were also employees.

The LLC Agreement also contained the following pertinent provision:

14.15 Jurisdiction; Venue; Waiver of Jury Trial. Each party
hereto hereby expressly submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal and state courts located in the City of Atlanta, State of
Georgia. Each party hereby irrevocably waives, to the fullest extent
permitted by law, any objection that it may have or hereafter have to
the laying of the venue in any such proceeding brought in such a court
and any claim that any such proceeding brought in such a court has
been brought in an inconvenient forum.[6]

Universal asserted that because Mr. Murray signed the LLC Agreement as an

employee and as an Operator Member of Universal, he bound himself to the above

provision (hereinafter “Provision 14.15”). Further, Universal asserted that Mr.

Murray violated Provision 14.15 by filing suit in Orleans Parish. Universal argued

that “[p]etitions, like the one in this case, which are filed in violation of forum

6 The provision contains two additional sentences, neither of which is relevant to this

appeal.

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selection clauses, are properly dismissed on an exception of improper venue and/or

personal jurisdiction under [La. C.C.P. arts.] 923, 925, and 932(B).”

Opposition

On July 3, 2024, Mr. Murray filed an “Opposition to Exception [sic] of Lack

of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue” (“Opposition”). Regarding

Universal’s Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (hereinafter “Jurisdiction

Exception”), Mr. Murray contended the Louisiana Secretary of State’s records

contained a company by the name of “Universal Parking and Transportation,

LLC,” which was registered to do business in Louisiana and was a Louisiana

entity, not a Delaware one. In light of that, Mr. Murray asserted it was “axiomatic”

that the Orleans Parish Civil District Court has personal jurisdiction over a

Louisiana limited liability company like Universal. In support, Mr. Murray

attached a certificate from the Louisiana Secretary of State, which listed the

following information:

Name: UNIVERSAL PARKING AND TRANSPORTATION
LLC

Type: Limited Liability Company

City: New Orleans

Status: ACTIVE

Business: UNIVERSAL PARKING AND TRANSPORTATION
LLC

The certificate listed the company’s domicile address, mailing address, registered

agent’s address, and officer’s address as a location in New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr.

Murray further asserted that even if Universal were deemed a Delaware company,

the Orleans Parish Civil District Court would still have personal jurisdiction over it

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because Universal had substantial contacts with Louisiana. To this end, Mr.

Murray stated that Universal operates parking lots in New Orleans.

Turning to Universal’s Exception of Improper Venue (hereinafter “Venue

Exception”), Mr. Murray did not dispute that the LLC Agreement contained a

forum selection clause. However, he argued that enforcement of Provision 14.15

“would be unreasonable and would violate policy expressly declared by the

[Louisiana] [L]egislature.” With regard to the unreasonableness, Mr. Murray

stated, “it would be unreasonable to force two Louisiana residents to litigate this

matter in Atlanta.” Further, Mr. Murray explained that an entity wholly owned by

Universal—Royal Parking, LLC—had a pending lawsuit against Mr. Murray in

Louisiana, such that “[i]t would be patently unreasonable and unjust to force [him]

to prosecute this lawsuit against [Universal] in Atlanta while having to defend a

lawsuit filed by [Universal] in Louisiana.”

With regard to the alleged public policy violation, Mr. Murray reiterated that

not only was he an Operator Member of Universal but also an employee. In this

latter regard, Mr. Murray explained he signed a “Confidentiality and Restrictive

Covenant Agreement (“Confidentiality Agreement”) and he identified it as his

employment agreement with Universal.7 According to Mr. Murray, however, the

LLC Agreement actually required him to sign the Confidentiality Agreement to be

an Operator Member of Universal, i.e., he could not enjoy the benefits of the LLC

Agreement without signing the Confidentiality Agreement. Because of this

requirement, Mr. Murray described the Confidentiality Agreement as “part and

7 In his Opposition, Mr. Murray stated his “status as an employee was established by the

express language of the” Confidentiality Agreement, and he described the Confidentiality
Agreement as containing non-compete and non-solicitation provisions.

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parcel of the” LLC Agreement, such that they must be read together. As argued by

Mr. Murray, “any provision in an employment contract or agreement that includes

a forum selection clause is null and void under L[a.] R.S. 23:921.”8 Thus, reading

the LLC Agreement and the Confidentiality Agreement in conjunction with each

other, Mr. Murray described Provision 14.15 of the LLC Agreement as “nothing

more than a back-door attempt to enforce a forum selection clause against an

employee” by tying it to an employment agreement (the Confidentiality

Agreement) contrary to the public policy of Louisiana. Mr. Murray attached the

Confidentiality Agreement as an exhibit to his Opposition, but the Confidentiality

Agreement is not in the record before this Court.

Hearing and Judgment

On August 8, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on Universal’s

Exceptions, at which neither party introduced evidence. Counsel for Universal

argued that the basis of Mr. Murray’s lawsuit was not his employment but rather

his rights as an Operator Member of Universal, such that Provision 14.15 applied

to his case as a valid forum selection clause. Conversely, counsel for Mr. Murray

asserted that Mr. Murray was both an Operator Member and an employee because

he had to sign both the LLC Agreement and the Confidentiality Agreement. As

such, counsel for Mr. Murray argued that Provision 14.15 could not be enforced

8 Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:921(A)(2) provides:

The provisions of every employment contract or agreement, or provisions
thereof, by which any foreign or domestic employer or any other person or entity
includes a choice of forum clause or choice of law clause in an employee’s
contract of employment or collective bargaining agreement, or attempts to enforce
either a choice of forum clause or choice of law clause in any civil or
administrative action involving an employee, shall be null and void except where
the choice of forum clause or choice of law clause is expressly, knowingly, and
voluntarily agreed to and ratified by the employee after the occurrence of the
incident which is the subject of the civil or administrative action.

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against Mr. Murray as an employee of Universal because it contravened Louisiana

public policy. No live testimony was taken at the hearing.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court agreed with Universal that,

pursuant to Provision 14.15, it was an improper venue for Mr. Murray’s suit and

lacked personal jurisdiction over Universal. Therefore, the trial court orally

sustained Universal’s Exceptions. On August 28, 2024, the trial court issued its

judgment, which granted Universal’s Exceptions and dismissed Mr. Murray’s

Petition without prejudice. Mr. Murray’s timely appeal to this Court followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In his brief to this Court, Mr. Murray asserts four assignments of error.

Specifically, he contends:

1. The Trial Court erred in sustaining the Exception of Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction because Universal Parking and
Transportation, LLC, is a Louisiana limited liability company
formed under Louisiana law and, therefore subject to personal
jurisdiction in the courts of this state.

2. The Trial Court erred in erred in [sic] sustaining the Exception
of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction because Universal Parking and
Transportation, LLC, regularly conducts business in the State of
Louisiana and is, therefore, subject to personal jurisdiction in
the courts of this state.

3. The Trial Court erred in sustaining the Exception of Improper
Venue where that exception is based entirely on a forum
selection clause in a contract between an employer and
employee.

4. The Trial Court erred in sustaining the Exception of Improper
Venue based upon a contractual provision that violates the
stated public policy of this state.

Instead of addressing each of Mr. Murray’s assignments of error in the four

separate sections he has delineated, our discussion will instead focus on: 1) the

correctness of the trial court’s grant of Universal’s Venue Exception; 2) the

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correctness of the trial court’s grant of Universal’s Jurisdiction Exception; and 3)

the correctness of the trial court’s decision to dismiss Mr. Murray’s suit without

prejudice.

DISCUSSION

Venue Exception

Applicable Standard of Review and Principles

We begin our analysis of the trial court’s grant of Universal’s Venue

Exception with the applicable standard of review and principles. “Venue means the

parish where an action or proceeding may properly be brought and tried under the

rules regulating the subject.” La. C.C.P. art. 41. Appellate courts review a ruling on

an exception of improper venue under the de novo standard of review because it

presents a question of law. Senior v. Overlog, 2024-0541, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir.

4/21/25), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *4 (citing Deaville v. Exxon

Mobil Corp., 2021-0240, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/3/21), 319 So.3d 381, 385). That

is, the “appellate court affords no special weight to the findings of the [trial] court,

but exercises its constitutional duty to review questions of law and renders

judgment on the record . . . . without deference to the legal conclusions of the [trial

court].” Id. at pp. 7-8, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *4 (first and third

alterations in original) (first quoting Deaville, 2021-0240, pp. 5-6, 319 So.3d at

385; and then quoting Bruno v. CDC Auto Transp., Inc., 2019-1065, pp. 7-8 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 6/3/20), 302 So.3d 8, 12). The appellate court’s task is to resolve

whether “the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect.” Id. at p. 8, ___

So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *4 (quoting Deaville, 2021-0240, p. 6, 319

So.3d at 385). Though the overall standard of review on an exception of improper

venue is de novo, if the trial court made any factual findings, then the appellate

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court considers whether the trial court manifestly erred in these determinations. Id.

(first citing Scott Vicknair, LLC v. Robinson, 2024-0512, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir.

3/13/25), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 798593, at *4; and then citing Chumley v.

White, 46,479, 46,707, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/9/11), 80 So.3d 39, 42).

Improper venue is one of the objections that a party raises by way of a

declinatory exception. La. C.C.P. art. 925(A)(4). When the trial court considers if

venue is proper, it must “accept[] the allegations of the plaintiff’s petition as true.”

Senior, 2024-0541, p. 8, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *4 (quoting Scott

Vicknair, LLC, 2024-0512, p. 9, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 798593, at *5).

However, “[i]t is only when no evidence is introduced by the moving party on the

trial of an exception [of improper venue] that the allegations of the petition are

accepted as true.” Price v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., 2004-0227, p. 13 (La. App.

1 Cir. 4/27/05), 915 So.2d 816, 825 (citing Vital v. State of La., 522 So.2d 151, 152

(La. App. 4th Cir.1988)). That is, as stated in La. C.C.P. art. 930, “[o]n the trial of

the declinatory exception, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert [a

declinatory exception], when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition,

the citation, or return thereon.” Thus, when the grounds for the objection of

improper venue do not appear on the face of the plaintiff’s petition, then the

defendant-exceptor must support the exception with evidence in order to carry his

burden of proof. Senior, 2024-0541, pp. 8-9, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1155979,

at *4 (citing Chumley, 46,479, 46,707, pp. 5-6, 80 So.3d at 42). “If evidence is

admitted at” the hearing on an exception of improper venue, then “the exception[]

must be resolved on the evidence presented, rather than on the allegations in the

[plaintiff’s] petition.” Price, 2004-0227, p. 13, 915 So.2d at 825 (quoting

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Exposition Partner, L.L.P. v. King, LeBlanc & Bland, L.L.P., 2003-0580, p. 10

(La. App. 4 Cir. 3/10/04), 869 So.2d 934, 941).

If, however, the parties do not introduce evidence at the hearing on the

exception of improper venue, then “the court is restricted to the allegations of the

petition, which for purposes of the exception are to be accepted as true.” Jackson v.

Greenwich Ins. Co., 2019-0377, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/19), 363 So.3d 396, 401

(quoting Matthews v. United Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. Doctor Pipe, Inc., 2016-0389, p.

4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/8/17), 213 So.3d 502, 505). This is true even if the parties

attached documents to their memoranda in support of or in contravention of the

exception of improper venue because “[d]ocuments attached to memoranda do not

constitute evidence and cannot be considered as such on appeal.” Alost v. Lawler,

2018-1271, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/8/19), 277 So.3d 329, 334 n.4 (quoting Denoux

v. Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2007-2143, p. 6 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88).

Thus, if the parties’ documents in support of or in contravention of an exception of

improper venue were “not properly and officially offered and introduced,” they

“cannot be considered, even if . . . physically placed in the record.” Id.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 42 establishes the general rules of

venue. It provides:

The general rules of venue are that an action against:

(1) An individual who is domiciled in the state shall be brought
in the parish of his domicile; or if he resides but is not domiciled in
the state, in the parish of his residence.

(2) A domestic corporation, a domestic insurer, or a domestic
limited liability company shall be brought in the parish where its
registered office is located.

(3) A domestic partnership, or a domestic unincorporated
association, shall be brought in the parish where its principal business
establishment is located.

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(4) A foreign corporation or foreign limited liability company
licensed to do business in this state shall be brought in the parish
where its principal business establishment is located as designated in
its application to do business in the state, or, if no such designation is
made, then in the parish where its primary place of business in the
state is located.

(5) A foreign corporation or a foreign limited liability company
not licensed to do business in the state, or a nonresident who has not
appointed an agent for the service of process in the manner provided
by law, shall be brought in the parish of the plaintiff’s domicile or in a
parish where the process may be, and subsequently is, served on the
defendant except when service is made pursuant to [La.] R.S. 22:335.

(6) A nonresident, other than a foreign corporation, who has
appointed an agent for the service of process in the manner provided
by law, shall be brought in the parish of the designated post office
address of an agent for the service of process.

La. C.C.P. art. 42. These “general rules of venue” delineated “in La. C.C.P. art. 42”

establish that “venue is proper at the ‘home base’ of the entity sued.” Senior, 2024-

0541, p. 10, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *5 (quoting Jackson, 2019-

0377, p. 4, 363 So.3d at 400). Among others, one exception to the general rules of

venue occurs when the parties have an agreement containing a valid forum

selection clause. Id. Additionally, a more specific venue rule is found in the

LWPA. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:639 provides that “[i]n addition to all other

locations and courts in which such suit may be appropriate, workmen, laborers,

clerks, and all other employees may sue their employers or hirers for any wages or

salary due and owing in the district court of the parish where the work was

performed.”

Whether the Trial Court is the Proper Venue for Mr. Murray’s Suit

Reviewing Universal’s Venue Exception de novo, we find the grounds for

the objection of improper venue did not appear on the face of Mr. Murray’s

Petition, so Universal bore the burden of proving its exception by introducing

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evidence to support its objection to the Orleans Parish Civil District Court being

the proper forum for Mr. Murray’s lawsuit. See Senior, 2024-0541, pp. 11-12, ___

So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *6 (citing Chumley, 46,479, 46,707, pp. 5-6,

80 So.3d at 42). Universal attached the LLC Agreement to its Venue Exception

and pointed to Provision 14.15 as a valid and enforceable forum selection clause.

However, while the LLC Agreement appears in the record, Universal did not

properly and officially offer and introduce it at the hearing on its exception.

Additionally, Mr. Murray did not offer and introduce any documents into evidence

at the hearing. Accordingly, the trial court should not have considered the parties’

exhibits in ruling on Universal’s Venue Exception and legally erred in doing so.9

Because the trial court legally erred, we conduct a de novo review.

Like the trial court, we are not to consider the parties’ exhibits. Instead, we

can only consider the allegations of Mr. Murray’s Petition, which must be accepted

as true. In terms of Mr. Murray’s mandamus claim, Mr. Murray alleged in his

Petition that Universal was a Louisiana limited liability company with its

registered office in Orleans Parish. Because La. C.C.P. art. 42 establishes that

“venue is proper at the ‘home base’ of the entity sued,” Orleans Parish is the

proper venue for Mr. Murray’s mandamus claim based on his Petition. In terms of

Mr. Murray’s unpaid wages claim, as quoted above, La. R.S. 23:639 provides that

venue in an unpaid wages case is proper where the employee performed his work;

and Mr. Murray alleged in his Petition that he performed his work for Universal in

Orleans Parish and that this is the “work [that] gives rise to the claim for unpaid

wages being asserted.” Reading Mr. Murray’s Petition and La. R.S. 23:639 in pari

9 Based on the transcript of the hearing, the trial court considered the LLC Agreement in

arriving at its decision to sustain Universal’s Venue Exception.

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materia, we find Orleans Parish is also the proper venue for Mr. Murray’s unpaid

wages claim.

Accepting as true the allegations of Mr. Murray’s Petition, the trial court

(Orleans Parish Civil District Court) is the proper venue for Mr. Murray’s

mandamus and unpaid wages claims. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in

granting Universal’s Venue Exception and we reverse the trial court’s judgment in

this regard.

Jurisdiction Exception

Standard of Review, Documents that Can be Considered, and Burden of Proof

Next, we consider the trial court’s grant of Universal’s Jurisdiction

Exception. “The court’s lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant” is

one of the objections that a party raises by way of a declinatory exception. La.

C.C.P. art. 925(A)(5). Regarding any factual findings underlying the trial court’s

ruling on an exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, an appellate court applies

the manifest error standard of review. Kel-Sea Adventures, LLC v. Contender

Boats, Inc., 2024-0208, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 799, 805.

However, “[t]he application of established rules of law to the facts” constitutes “a

legal question, and thus, the legal issue of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

by a Louisiana court is subject to de novo review.” Id. (citing Bridges v. Mosaic

Global Holdings, Inc., 2008-0113 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/24/08), 23 So.3d 305, 314).

See also Jones v. St. Augustine High Sch., 2021-0474, 0475, pp. 2-3 (La. App. 4

Cir. 2/16/22), 336 So.3d 470, 473 (citing Loeb v. Vergara, 2020-0261, p. 78 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 1/27/21), 313 So.3d 346, 392).

For the exception of a lack of personal jurisdiction, jurisprudence establishes

that what the courts can consider in ruling on the exception and the plaintiff’s

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burden of proof depend on whether the trial court conducted a contradictory

hearing. A hearing constitutes a contradictory one only if “live testimony is taken.”

Jacobsen v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 2012-655, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/13), 119

So.3d 770, 776 (quoting de Reyes v. Marine Mgmt. & Consulting, Ltd., 586 So.2d

103, 109 (La. 9/9/91)). Even if the parties orally argued the exception of lack of

personal jurisdiction, without live testimony, this was not a contradictory hearing.

Id. (first citing Dahmes v. Champagne Elevators, Inc., 2003-0807, 0983 (La. App.

4 Cir. 3/3/04), 869 So.2d 904, 906; and then citing Ruppert v. George Kellett &

Sons, Inc., 2008-182 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/30/08), 996 So.2d 501).

When the trial court does not conduct a contradictory hearing, “the court will

decide the matter on a record comprised of ‘pleadings, memoranda, and discovery

depositions taken’ in the matter.’” Jacobsen, 2012-655, pp. 6-7, 119 So.3d at 775-

76 (quoting de Reyes, 586 So.2d at 109). See also Johnson v. B&B Elec.

Contractors, 1996-0159, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/19/97), 689 So.2d 728, 730

(holding that “submission of a jurisdictional exception on briefs, affidavits and

depositions is permissible” (citing de Reyes, 586 So.2d at 109)). Therefore, when

no contradictory hearing takes place on the exception of lack of personal

jurisdiction, it is permissible for the courts to consider the documents attached to

the parties’ memoranda in support of or in contravention of the exception even if

the parties did not formally introduce the documents into evidence at the hearing.

See, e.g., Loeb v. Vergara, 2020-0261, p. 81, 313 So.3d at 394 (considering a

declaration and deposition testimony attached to the defendant-exceptor’s

exception); Ohle v. Uhalt, 2016-0569, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/1/17), 213 So.3d

1, 7-8 (considering an affidavit attached to the defendant-exceptor’s exception);

Jacobsen, 2012-655, pp. 20-21, 119 So.3d at 783-84 (considering documents from

16

a research facility, a memo, and depositions attached to the plaintiff’s opposition to

the exception); Broussard v. Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc., 2010-1611, pp. 3, 7-8

(La. App. 1 Cir. 5/3/11), 65 So.3d 187, 189-91 (considering an affidavit submitted

with the defendant-exceptor’s exception); Ruppert v. George Kellett & Sons, Inc.,

2008-182, p. 11 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/30/08), 996 So.2d 501, 508 (considering the

entire “record” as established by what the parties filed in support of and in

opposition to the exception, including an affidavit attached to the defendant-

exceptor’s exception); Gazzier v. Columbia Transp. Co., 1995-1755, pp. 2-3 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 5/29/96), 675 So.2d 826, 828-29 (considering documents attached to

the plaintiffs’ opposition).10

In terms of the burden of proof when the trial court does not conduct a

contradictory hearing, “the burden o[n] the non-moving party is relatively slight

and [the] allegations of the complaint and all reasonable inferences from the record

are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Ohle v. Uhalt, 2022-0818, p. 5

(La. App. 4 Cir. 7/6/23), 370 So.3d 1088, 1092 (quoting de Reyes, 586 So.2d at

109). See also Loeb, 2020-0261, p. 79, 313 So.3d at 393; Jacobsen, 2012-655, p. 7,

119 So.3d at 775-76; Ruppert, 2008-182, p. 11, 996 So.2d at 508; Johnson, 1996-

0159, p. 5, 689 So.2d at 730; Gazzier, 1995-1755, p. 7, 675 So.2d at 830; Hunt v.

10 We note that in Park West Children’s Fund, Inc. v. Trinity Broadcasting Network, Inc.,

the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal held the trial court legally erred in considering
exhibits attached to the parties’ memoranda in support of and in opposition to the exception of
lack of personal jurisdiction because the exhibits were not filed into evidence. 2013-444, pp. 4-5
(La. App. 3 Cir. 10/16/13), 156 So.3d 682, 686-87. Moreover, in Witter v. Sanibel v. Yacht &
Slip, LLC, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal cited to Park West Children’s Fund, Inc.,
when holding that if “no evidence is presented at the hearing on a jurisdictional objection, the
objection must be decided on the facts alleged in the petition.” 2019-1031, p. 8 (La. App. 1 Cir.
6/24/20), 307 So.3d 1053, 1059. However, in light of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in
de Reyes and its progeny listed in this Opinion, including some decisions rendered by this Court,
we have determined that courts can consider documents attached to memoranda in support of or
in opposition to an exception of lack of personal jurisdiction even if the parties did not formally
offer those documents into evidence at the hearing on the exception.

17

Schult Homes Grp., 1994-1592, p. 6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/3/95), 657 So.2d 124,

127.11 In that instance, the “plaintiff only needs to make a prima facie showing that

the court has jurisdiction under . . . Louisiana’s long-arm statute.” Ohle, 2022-

0818, pp. 5-6, 370 So.3d at 1093 (citing Ohle, 2016-0569, p. 4, 213 So.3d at 5 n.4).

See also Moses v. Universal Ogden Servs., 16 F. Supp. 2d 680, 681 (E.D. La.

1998). “[T]he non-moving party is entitled to a reasonable inference in favor of

finding jurisdiction.” Moses, 16 F.Supp.2d at 681 (citing de Reyes, 586 So.2d at

109).

Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction over a Nonresident Defendant

“Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and

determine an action or proceeding involving the legal relations of the parties, and

to grant the relief to which they are entitled.” La. C.C.P. art. 1. Personal

jurisdiction is one type of jurisdiction. Senior, 2024-0541, p. 17, ___ So.3d at ___,

2025 WL 1155979, at *8 (quoting Tillis v. McNeil, 2017-0673, p. 5 (La. App. 5

Cir. 5/30/18), 249 So.3d 303, 307). It “is the legal power and authority of a court to

render a personal judgment against a party to an action or proceeding.” La. C.C.P.

art. 6(A).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3201 delineates when a Louisiana Court has

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. It states, in pertinent part:

A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action
arising from any one of the following activities performed by the
nonresident:

(1) Transacting any business in this state.

(2) Contracting to supply services or things in this state.

11 Each of these cases also cites to de Reyes for this proposition.

18

....

B. In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this
state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any
basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the
Constitution of the United States.

La. R.S. 13:3201. In discussing La. R.S. 13:3201, this Court has explained that

“Louisiana’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents is

limited by the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.” Jones, 2021-0474, 0475, p. 4, 336 So.3d at 474 (first

citing U.S. Const. Amend. 14; and then citing La. R.S. 13:3201).

A two-prong due process test “must be satisfied before personal jurisdiction

can be exercised.” Id. (quoting BioClin, BV v. MultiGyn USA, LLC, 2012-0962, pp.

4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/5/13), 129 So.3d 633, 637). The first prong of the test is a

consideration of whether the nonresident defendant has “minimum contacts with

the forum state.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The minimum contacts

prong of the test “is satisfied by a single act or actions by which the defendant

purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum

state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, such that the

nonresident should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state.”

Kel-Sea Adventures LLC, 2024-0208, pp. 6-7, 405 So.3d at 805 (citing Bridges,

2008-0113, pp. 14-15, 23 So.3d at 315). This “‘purposeful availment’ requirement”

guarantees “that the nonresident defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction

solely as a result of a random, fortuitous, or attenuated contact, or by the unilateral

activity of another party or a third person other than the defendant.” Id. (citing

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94

L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)). In considering whether a nonresident defendant company has

19

minimum contacts, Louisiana courts consider whether the company is registered to

do business in Louisiana; whether the company has any employees and customers

in Louisiana; and whether the company conducts business in Louisiana. Lewis v.

Pine Belt Multipurpose Cmty. Action Acquisition Agency, Inc., 48,827, p. 14 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 138 So.3d 776, 784; Broussard, 2010-1611, pp. 6-7, 65 So.3d

at 191; Lifecare Hosps., Inc. v. B & W Quality Growers, Inc., 39,065, p. 4 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 10/27/04), 887 So.2d 624, 628; Bodden v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp.,

1995-2743, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/15/96), 673 So.2d 206, 209.

Under the minimum contacts prong of the due process test, jurisprudence

differentiates “between general or all-purpose jurisdiction and specific or case-

linked jurisdiction.” Jacobsen, 2012-655, p. 13, 119 So.3d at 779 (quoting

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct.

2846, 2851, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011)). That is, for the purpose of determining

whether the nonresident defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state,

Louisiana law “divide[s]” personal jurisdiction “into two categories: general and

specific.” Jones, 2021-0474, 0475, p. 4, 336 So.3d at 474 (citing Ohle, 2016-0569,

p. 6, 213 So.3d at 6). “General jurisdiction applies when the defendant’s contacts

with the state are unrelated to the lawsuit,” yet “the defendant has engaged in

continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum state.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Swoboda v. Hero Decks, 2009-

1303, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/10), 36 So.3d 994, 997; and then quoting Babcock

& Wilcox v. Babcock Mexico, 597 So.2d 110, 112 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992)).

“[S]pecific jurisdiction” exists “when the cause of action is related to or arises out

of the defendant’s contact with the state.” Id. (quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 597

So.2d at 112).

20

The second prong of the due process test is whether the exercise of personal

jurisdiction by the forum state would “violate the basic notions of fair play and

substantial justice.” Jones, 2021-0474, 0475, p. 4, 336 So.3d at 464 (quoting

BioClin, BV, 2012-0962, pp. 4-5, 129 So.3d at 637). After “the plaintiff meets the

burden of proving minimum contacts, a presumption of reasonableness of

jurisdiction arises.” Kel-Sea Adventures LLC, 2024-0208, p. 7, 405 So.3d at 806.

Thereafter, “[t]he burden then shifts to the” nonresident defendant “to prove the

assertion of jurisdiction would be so unreasonable in light of traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice as to overcome the presumption of reasonableness

created by the defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum.” Id. (citing Bridges,

2008-0113, p. 15, 23 So.3d at 315). Relevant considerations under the fundamental

fairness issue include: “(1) the defendant’s burden; (2) the forum state’s interest;

(3) the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; (4) the judicial

system’s interest in efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the state’s shared

interest in furthering fundamental social policies.” Bridges, 2008-0113, pp. 15-16,

23 So.3d at 315 (citing Se. Wireless Network, Inc. v. U.S. Telemetry Corp., 2006-

1736, pp. 5-6 (La. 4/11/07), 954 So.2d 120, 125).

Effect of Certain Contractual Provisions on Jurisdiction

If they so choose, parties can contractually “agree in advance to submit to

the [personal] jurisdiction of a given court” within a forum selection clause.

Senior, 2024-0541, p. 17, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *8 (quoting

Lewis v. Townsend, 47,536, p. 3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/12/12), 108 So.3d 184, 186;

citing Nat’l Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354

(1964)). When parties do so, this does not necessarily limit causes of action arising

out of the contract to the court therein specified. The effect of the provision

21

depends upon the wording. For example, even if the contract uses mandatory

language like the word “shall” (e.g., “any court of competent jurisdiction situated

in Chicago, Illinois, shall have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant”), such

a provision “actually broadens the possible choice of forums by giving the parties

another court in which they may pursue litigation,” so “that it remains

‘conceivable’ that the action can be brought in a court other than the one(s)

specified in the contract as having personal jurisdiction.” Senior, 2024-0541, p. 18,

___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *8 (quoting Am. Standard Leasing Co. v.

Plant Specialties, Inc., 427 So.2d 555, 558 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983)). That is, such

wording does not specify that the listed court is the only one with jurisdiction. By

contrast, “[a] forum-selection clause designating a foreign state’s court as the

exclusive forum for any contractual dispute between the parties essentially amounts

to the conventional elimination or mutual waiver of such jurisdiction in all courts

other than those designated.” Vallejo Enter., L.LC. v. Boulder Image, Inc., 2005-

2649, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/06), 950 So.2d 832, 835 n.1 (emphasis added).

Jurisprudence establishes that a forum selection clause is “a provision in a

contract that mandates a particular state, county, parish, or court as the proper

venue in which the parties to an action must litigate any future disputes regarding

their contractual relationship.” Senior, 2024-0541, p. 10, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025

WL 1155979, at *5 (quoting Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc.

of La., 2013-1977, p. 4 (La. 7/1/14), 148 So.3d 871, 873). The Louisiana Supreme

Court has held “contractual ‘forum selection clauses are generally enforceable and

are not per se violative of public policy in Louisiana.’” Id. (quoting Shelter Mut.

Ins. Co., 2013-1977, p. 12, 148 So.3d at 878). The reason “[f]orum selection

clauses are favored” is “because the elimination of uncertainties relative to the

22

location of litigation by agreement in advance [i]n an acceptable forum to both

parties is an indispensable element of trade, commerce, and contracting.” Id. at p.

11, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *5 (quoting Ameriprint, LLC v. Canon

Sols. Am., Inc., 2021-0094, p. 3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/21), 2021 WL 2093283, at

*2). Therefore, Louisiana courts should enforce forum selection clauses “unless the

resisting party can clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and

unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching or

that enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which

the suit is brought.” Id. Thus, the party who challenges a forum selection clause

bears a heavy burden of proof. Id. (quoting Barcelona v. Sea Victory Mar., Inc.,

619 So.2d 741, 745 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993). See also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.

v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 1528, 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991)). In

light of the foregoing, Louisiana courts deem “forum selection clauses

unenforceable and against public policy only” in “very limited circumstances.” Id.

(quoting Ameriprint, LLC, 2021-0094, p. 3, 2021 WL 2093283, at *2). Louisiana

Revised Statutes 23:921(A)(2) constitutes one such circumstance. It provides:

The provisions of every employment contract or agreement, or
provisions thereof, by which any foreign or domestic employer or any
other person or entity includes a choice of forum clause or choice of
law clause in an employee’s contract of employment or collective
bargaining agreement, or attempts to enforce either a choice of forum
clause or choice of law clause in any civil or administrative action
involving an employee, shall be null and void except where the choice
of forum clause or choice of law clause is expressly, knowingly, and
voluntarily agreed to and ratified by the employee after the occurrence
of the incident which is the subject of the civil or administrative
action.

La. R.S. 23:921(A)(2). Thus, La. R.S. 23:921(A)(2) prohibits forum selection

clauses in employment contracts.

23

Whether the Trial Court Has Personal Jurisdiction over Mr. Murray’s Suit

As explained earlier in this Opinion, the trial court held a hearing on

Universal’s Jurisdiction Exception, at which the parties orally argued but no live

testimony was taken. Because no live testimony was taken, this was not a

contradictory hearing. Thus, while the parties did not introduce any documents into

evidence at the hearing, we can nonetheless consider the documents the parties

attached to their memoranda in support of or in opposition to Universal’s

Jurisdiction Exception. Moreover, because the hearing was not a contradictory one,

Mr. Murray’s burden of proof was “relatively slight,” and he had only to make a

prima facie showing that the trial court had personal jurisdiction. In addition, he

was entitled to a reasonable inference in favor of finding jurisdiction, with the

allegations of his Petition and all rational interpretations from the record to be

drawn in his favor.

Because we find it has bearing on the trajectory of our discussion and the

outcome of this appeal, we now separate Mr. Murray’s unpaid wages claim from

his mandamus claim. In our analysis, we will first determine the effect, if any, of

Provision 14.15 of the LLC Agreement. Provision 14.15 states that the parties to

the LLC Agreement “expressly submit[] to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal

and state courts located in the City of Atlanta, State of Georgia.” Per Vallejo, if

Provision 14.15 is valid and enforceable, this would render the courts of Atlanta as

the only courts with jurisdiction over Mr. Murray’s suit, thereby eliminating the

need for us to perform the two-prong due process analysis to determine if the trial

court has personal jurisdiction.

24

Unpaid Wages Claim

As it did before the trial court, Universal urges to this Court that Provision

14.15 of the LLC Agreement is a valid and enforceable forum selection clause

applicable to all of Mr. Murray’s claims. That is, Universal asserts that Mr. Murray

is merely an Operator Member “suing for rights he was allegedly entitled to under

the [LLC] Agreement” and that his “claims are not based on an

employer/employee relationship.” Countering, Mr. Murray’s brief focuses on his

unpaid wages claim and, to this end, states his “Petition clearly present[ed] claims

based upon [his] status as an employee.” In his Opposition filed with the trial

court, Mr. Murray asserted that because the LLC Agreement required him to sign

the Confidentiality Agreement, this meant the agreements were “part and parcel”

of each other, such that Provision 14.15 (of the LLC Agreement) constituted a

forum selection clause in his employment agreement (the Confidentiality

Agreement). In his brief to this Court, Mr. Murray maintains his contention that

Louisiana law prohibits a forum selection clause in an employment contract, but

his description of the Agreements differs. Mr. Murray still alleges the

Confidentiality Agreement was an employment agreement (he states it

“specifically identifies [him] as an employee”), but he now contends the

Confidentiality Agreement “contains a forum selection clause identical to

[Provision 14.15] of the” LLC Agreement.

As previously stated and as Mr. Murray correctly argues, Louisiana law,

specifically La. R.S. 23:921(A)(2), prohibits forum selection clauses in

employment contracts. It constitutes one of the “very limited circumstances” in

which forum selection clauses are deemed unenforceable and against public policy

in Louisiana. Thus, if Mr. Murray’s contentions are correct that the Confidentiality

25

Agreement was his employment agreement and that it contains a section identical

to Provision 14.15, then his argument against enforcing it would have merit. The

problem is that the Confidentiality Agreement does not appear in the record before

this Court. As recently explained by this Court, as an appellate court, we are “a

court[] of record and may not review evidence that is not in the appellate record.”

Bombace v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co., 2025-0037, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/24/25),

___ So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 1742593, at *6 (quoting Kimball v. Kamenitz, 2021-

0101, p. 22 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/21), 331 So.3d 474, 489). Without the

Confidentiality Agreement, we cannot consider the merits of Mr. Murray’s

argument that it was his employment agreement and that it contains a prohibited

forum selection clause.

Turning to Universal’s assertions, we find the LLC Agreement has no

bearing on Mr. Murray’s unpaid wages claim. Though Mr. Murray stated in his

Petition that he—as an Operator Member of Universal—agreed to defer his wages

during a time of financial stress for the company, his entitlement to said wages was

based on his status as an employee, not as an Operator Member. His salary was a

right owed to him as an employee. Therefore, any legal recourse he may have for

not timely receiving his past due wages was based on his employment relationship

with Universal. Because the LLC Agreement established Mr. Murray’s status as an

Operator Member of Universal, not his status as an employee entitled to wages, we

find it is wholly inapplicable to his unpaid wages claim. The LLC Agreement does

not refer to Mr. Murray’s employment with Universal or any of his rights or

obligations stemming from his employment. Thus, we disagree with Universal’s

contention that Provision 14.15 of the LLC Agreement applies to Mr. Murray’s

26

unpaid wages claim so as to establish whether the trial court has personal

jurisdiction.

Without the Confidentiality Agreement and with the LLC Agreement

inapplicable, we consider whether Mr. Murray met his relatively slight burden of

proving the trial court has personal jurisdiction. The LLC Agreement stated that

Universal was “formed as a limited liability company under the laws of the State of

Delaware . . . by the filing of the Company’s Certificate of Formation . . . with the

Delaware Secretary of State.” For the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction

over Universal—a Delaware company per the LLC Agreement—it would have to

do so under Louisiana’s Long Arm Statute, and the exercise of personal

jurisdiction would have to comport with the two-prong due process test. In terms

of whether Universal had minimum contacts with Louisiana, Mr. Murray

submitted the certificate from the Louisiana Secretary of State, which delineated

that Universal is registered to do business in Louisiana, specifically in New

Orleans which is in Orleans Parish. In his Petition, Mr. Murray alleged that he was

an employee of Universal and performed his work in Orleans Parish in Louisiana.

As to whether the company conducts business or provides services in Louisiana,

Mr. Murray alleged in his Opposition that Universal operates parking lots in New

Orleans and thus has customers here. In light of the foregoing we find Mr. Murray

established that Universal has minimum contacts with Louisiana, particularly

Orleans Parish, for the exercise of general jurisdiction by the trial court: Universal

has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities there and

should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court there.

Because Mr. Murray met the burden of proving minimum contacts, a

presumption of reasonableness of jurisdiction arose; and the burden shifted to

27

Universal to prove the assertion of jurisdiction would be so unreasonable in light of

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice as to overcome the

presumption of reasonableness created by its minimum contacts with the forum.

We find Universal failed to meet this burden. In fact, Universal has not pointed to

any reason why the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the trial court would be

unreasonable in light of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Rather, Universal’s focus in its Jurisdiction Exception, at the hearing, and in its

brief to this Court was that Provision 14.15 constitutes a valid forum selection

clause that should be enforced thereby rendering the grant of the exception of lack

of personal jurisdiction the proper result. However, as determined above, Provision

14.15 has no bearing on whether the trial court has personal jurisdiction over Mr.

Murray’s unpaid wages claim.

In sum, we find the trial court erred in granting Universal’s Jurisdiction

Exception regarding Mr. Murray’s unpaid wages claim and we reverse that part of

its judgment.

Mandamus Claim

In considering the trial court’s grant of Universal’s Jurisdiction Exception

with regard to Mr. Murray’s mandamus claim, we do so mindful of the fact that we

have already held the trial court erred in granting Universal’s Venue Exception

regarding this claim because Mr. Murray’s Petition—the allegations of which had

to be accepted as true because the parties did not offer any exhibits into evidence—

established Orleans Parish as the proper venue. As recently explained by this

Court, “Jurisdiction is a separate and distinct legal concept from venue.” Senior,

2024-0541, p. 16, ___ So.3d ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *8 (quoting Luffey ex rel.

Fredricksburg Props. of Tx., LP v. Fredericksburg Props. of Tx., LP, 37,591, p. 5

28

(La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 403, 406). Venue is “the place where judicial

authority may be exercised,” while “jurisdiction relate[s] to ‘the [court’s] power to

adjudicate.” Id. at p. 18, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 1155979, at *8 (second

alteration in original) (quoting Luffey, 37,591, p. 6, 862 So.2d at 406 n.3). A court

of proper venue must also have jurisdiction to adjudicate a case. See generally

Tillis, 2017-0673, 249 So.3d 303.

As with the unpaid wages claim, we first consider the effect, if any, of

Provision 14.15 of the LLC Agreement. Provision 14.15 of the LLC Agreement

constituted a forum selection clause because it was “a provision in a contract that

mandate[d] a particular state, county, parish, or court [namely, the federal and state

courts located in the City of Atlanta, State of Georgia] as the proper venue in

which” Mr. Murray and Universal had to “litigate any . . . disputes regarding their

contractual relationship.” Senior, 2024-0541, p. 12, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL

1155979, at *6 (quoting Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2013-1977, p. 4, 148 So.3d at 873).

Mr. Murray, had to demonstrate that Provision 14.15 was invalid or unenforceable

for some reason. He argued before the trial court and reiterates in his brief to this

Court that the forum selection clause was unenforceable as a violation of Louisiana

public policy, specifically La. R.S. 23:921(A)(2) which prohibits forum selection

clauses in employment contracts, as discussed in the previous section. While Mr.

Murray is correct that La. R.S. 23:921(A)(2) prohibits forum selection clauses in

employment contracts, his argument is nonetheless without merit regarding his

mandamus claim. Any right Mr. Murray may have to a mandamus to access

Universal’s financial records is based on Provision 11.3 of the LLC Agreement.

Thus, his potential right to a mandamus comes from his status as a signatory to the

LLC Agreement as an Operator Member of Universal, not his (prior) employment

29

status with Universal. Not only did Mr. Murray sign the LLC Agreement in his

capacity as an Operator Member, but, having reviewed the LLC Agreement in its

entirety, we find no way it can or should be construed as an employment

agreement. Rather, it constitutes the organizational and operating agreement

amongst the various Operator Members of Universal and delineates matters such as

their ownership interests, rights to distributions, capital contributions, and taxes.

Moreover, we find nothing in the record that demonstrates Provision 14.15 was

unreasonable, unjust, or invalid, and we find nothing establishing that it

contravenes the public policy of this state. Therefore, we find it should be enforced

as written.

As written, Provision 14.15 designates the courts of Atlanta as the only

courts with personal jurisdiction over Mr. Murray’s mandamus claim; and it

eliminates such jurisdiction in all other courts, including the trial court.

Accordingly, we find the trial court correctly granted Universal’s Jurisdiction

Exception with respect to Mr. Murray’s mandamus claim, and we affirm its

judgment in that regard. However, as stated previously, a court of proper venue

must also have jurisdiction to adjudicate a case. See generally Tillis, 2017-0673,

249 So.3d 303. Thus, our holding that the trial court was a proper venue for Mr.

Murray’s mandamus claim but does not have personal jurisdiction over his

mandamus claim means the trial court is not the appropriate court to adjudicate that

claim.

Dismissal Without Prejudice of Mr. Murray’s Petition

Finally, we consider that part of the trial court’s judgment that dismissed

with prejudice Mr. Murray’s Petition. At this juncture, we have thus far held the

trial court is a court of proper venue for Mr. Murray’s mandamus claim based on

30

his Petition but does not have personal jurisdiction over Mr. Murray’s mandamus

claim because of Provision 14.15 of the LLC Agreement. Without jurisdiction, the

trial court is not the appropriate court to adjudicate that claim. With regard to Mr.

Murray’s unpaid wages claim, we have thus far held the trial court is a court of

proper venue and has personal jurisdiction. It is the appropriate court to adjudicate

that claim. We reversed the trial court’s grant of Universal’s Venue Exception with

regard to Mr. Murray’s mandamus and unpaid wages claims; reversed the trial

court’s grant of Universal’s Jurisdiction Exception with regard to Mr. Murray’s

unpaid wages claim; and affirmed the trial court’s grant of Universal’s Jurisdiction

Exception with regard to Mr. Murray’s mandamus claim.

In this latter regard, we must determine how to proceed in light of our

affirmation of the grant of Universal’s Jurisdiction Exception concerning Mr.

Murray’s mandamus claim and conclusion that the trial court is not the appropriate

court to rule on that claim. Regarding the “[e]ffect of sustaining [a] declinatory

exception,” La. C.C.P. art. 932(A) provides:

When the grounds of the objections pleaded in the declinatory
exception may be removed by amendment of the petition or other
action of plaintiff, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order
the plaintiff to remove them within the delay allowed by the court; if
the court finds, on sustaining the objection that service of citation on
the defendant was not requested timely, it may either dismiss the
action as to that defendant without prejudice or, on the additional
finding that service could not have been timely requested, order that
service be effected within a specified time.

In the matter sub judice, because our basis for sustaining Universal’s Jurisdiction

Exception only had bearing on Mr. Murray’s mandamus claim, not his unpaid

wages claim, the grounds can be removed by amendment of Mr. Murray’s Petition.

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court should have allowed Mr. Murray to

amend his Petition to remove the mandamus claim rather than dismissing his

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Petition outright. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Murray’s

Petition and remand this matter with instructions to the trial court to provide Mr.

Murray with the opportunity to amend his Petition.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s August 28, 2024

judgment insofar as it granted Universal’s Venue Exception; reverse the trial

court’s judgment insofar as it granted Universal’s Jurisdiction Exception

concerning Mr. Murray’s unpaid wages claim; and affirm the trial court’s

judgment insofar as it granted Universal’s Jurisdiction Exception regarding Mr.

Murray’s mandamus claim. Further, we vacate the trial court’s dismissal with

prejudice of Mr. Murray’s Petition and remand this matter with instructions.

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

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