Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
JOHN KITE, ADMINISTRATOR OF
SUCCESSION OF JOHNNIE KETCHUN KITE
AND O
N BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN,
JA'LA WANYA BOYD,
JA'MARSHA DEON
BOYD, AND TAURIEZ KITE VS. RAPIDES
PARISH SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND
SHERIFF WILLIAM EARL HILTON, CITY
OF ALEXANDRIA UTILITY DEPARTMENT
AND MAYOR JACQUES ROY
C/W
LEON BOYD, ON BEHALF OF MINOR
CHILDREN JA'LA WANYA BOYD, AND
JA'MARSHA DEON BOYD, AND ALINE
CRAFT O
N BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD
TAURIEZ KITE AN
D RAPIDES PARISH
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND SHERIFF
WILLIAM EARL HILTON, CITY OF
ALEXANDRIA UTILITY DEPARTMENT AN
D
MAYOR JACQUES ROY
No. 2024-CC-01351
_ _ _ _ _ _
IN RE: City of
Alexandria - Applicant Defendant; Earl Williams, Sr. - Applicant
Defendant; Henry Jacobs - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Supervisory Writ,
Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Number(s) 252,993 A C/W 253,035
G, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Number(s) CW 24-00376;
_ _ _ _ _ _
February 28, 2025
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Hughes, J., dissents.
Crain, J., concurs.
Griffin, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Guidry, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Supreme Court of Louisiana
February 28, 2025
JLW
JTK
JBM
02/28/2025 "See News Release 008 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2024 -CC-01351
JOHN KITE, ADMINISTRATOR OF SUCCESSION OFJOHNNIE
KETCHUN KITE AND ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN, JA'LA
WANYA BOYD, JA'MARSHA DEON BOYD, AND TAURIEZ KITE
VS.
RAPIDES PARISH SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND SHERIFF WILLIAM
EARL HILTON, CITY OF ALEXANDRIA UTILITY DEPARTMENT AND
MAYOR JACQUES ROY
C/W
LEON BOYD, ON BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN JA'LA WANYA
BOYD, AND JA'MARSHA DEON BOYD, AND ALINE CRAFT ON
BEHALF OF MINOR CHILD TAURIEZ KITE
AND
RAPIDES PARISH SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND SHERIFF WILLIAM
EARL HILTON, CITY OF ALEXANDRIA UTILITY DEPARTMENT AND
MAYOR JACQUES ROY
On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides
PER CURIAM
We ordered briefing in this matter for the purpose of considering whether
the City of Alexandria is entitled to summary judgment on the ground that it
was not liable to plaintiffs for injuries caused by an escaped inmate . For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the district court and grant
summary judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
McKennedy Armstead was an inmate serving a sentence for a narcotics
conviction at the Rapides Parish Detention Center in Alexandria. While on a work
detail for the City of Alexandria’s Lights Department , Mr. Armstead stole a City
truck. He went to his mother’s house (abandoning the truck two blocks away) and

2

took a gun. At that time, Mr. Armstead’s cousin, Antonio Calhoun, drove him to the
Grant Parish home of his former girlfriend, Johnnie Ketchun Kite .
Mr. Calhoun subsequently encountered law enforcement officers who were
searching for Mr. Armstead . He informed them Mr. Armstead and Ms. Kite were
dating and that he believed the two were inside her home. Based on this information,
law enforcement officers arrived at Ms. Kite’s home with a search warrant. They
entered the home and found Mr. Armstead and Ms. Kite dead from gunshot wounds
in an apparent murder-suicide.1
Thereafter, plaintiffs, on behalf of Ms. Kite’s minor children, filed the instant
wrongful death action against several parties, including the City of Alexandria and
its employ ees, Earl Williams, Sr. and Henry Jacobs (collectively refer red to
hereinafter as “City”). Plaintiffs alleged, in part, that the City’s negligence caused
Ms. Kite’s death as Mr. Armstead was under its supervision.
The City moved for summary judgment. It argued Mr. Armstead was not in
the process of escaping when the murder-suicide occurred, and it was not an integral
part of the escape process. R ather, it claims Mr. Armstead completed his escape
when he reached the safe haven of his mother’s home, and the murder-suicide was
a purely personal decision unrelated to the escape. Therefore, the City maintained
the risk of harm encountered by Ms. Kite did not fall within the scope of the duty
owed by the City.
After a hearing, the district court denied the City’s motion for summary
judgment. The City a pplied for supervisory review. The court of appeal denied
writs, with one ju dge voting to grant and docket.
Upon the City ’s application, we ordered written briefing pursuant to the
provisions of La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(H). Having received briefs from both parties,

1 The bodies of both individuals were found nude, but Mr. Armstead still wearing his prison issued
armband

3

we now review the district court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment on
the merits. 2

DISCUSSION
A ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed under a de novo
standard, with the appellate court using the same criteria that govern the district
court’s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate, i.e., whether
there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Diaz-Molina v. Flower, 2023 -01135 (La. 12/19/23),
374 So. 3d 950, 952; Catzen v. Toney, 2022-01261 (La. 1/18/23), 352 So. 3d 972,
974; Jones v. Whips Elec., LLC, 2022-01035 (La. 11/22/22), 350 So. 3d 846, 848;
Guidry v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 2019-1999 (La. 2/26/20), 289 So. 3d 1026, 1027.
Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(D)(1), the burden on the party moving for
summary judgment “does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party ’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the
absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s
claim, action, or defense.” See Reynolds v. Bordelon, 2014-2371 (La. 6/30/15), 172
So. 3d 607, 610–11. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported,
an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but
his response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. La. Code Civ. P. art. 967(B); Bufkin v. Felipe's
Louisiana, LLC, 2014-0288 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So. 3d 851, 858. Once a motion for
summary judgment has been properly supported by the moving party, the failure of

2 Plaintiffs and the City filed motions for oral argument After careful consideration, we deny the
motions.

4

the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the
granting of the motion. Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging Inc ., 2008 -0528 (La.
12/2/08), 995 So. 2d 1184, 1187 (citing Babin v. Winn–Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-
0078 (La. 6/30/00), 764 So. 2d 37, 40).
The leading case addressing the scope of the duty to protect the public from
escaped inmates is Wilson v. State Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 576 So.
2d 490 (La. 1991) . In that opinion, we explained that although prison authorities
have a duty to prevent inmates from escaping, that duty is intended to protect persons
from being harmed by escaping inmates while they are in the process of escaping.
Id. at. 493. We emphasized that t he duty is not intended to protect persons from
harm inflicted by inmates who have already escaped and who subsequently commit
tortious acts in the furtherance of their own pursuits . Id. Rather than looking to
foreseeability or the proximity of time and distance between the escape and the
escapee's offense that caused the injury to his victim , w e reasoned the proper
question to be answered in determining the scope of the duty is whether the offense
occurred during, or as an integral part of, the process of escaping . Id.
In the case sub judice, the evidence produced by t he City establishes Mr.
Armstead left his designated worksite by stealing a City truck. He then went to his
mother’s house where he retrieved a gun and had his cousin take him to Ms. Kite’s
house. On its face, this evidence indicates the escape was complete befor e Mr.
Armst ead entered Ms. Kite ’s house.
Because the City properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the
burden shifted to plaintiffs to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue
for trial. Plaintiffs assert issues of fact exist regarding whether Mr. Armstead and
Ms. Kite had an ongoing relationship , whether Ms. Kite’s death was “the result of
an interpersonal conflict” with Mr. Armstead and whether Mr. Armstead escaped for
the purpose of killing Ms. Kite . Plaintiffs contend there may be multiple

5

explanations for Mr. Armstead’s actions and speculate it is possible Ms. Kite may
have refused to give Mr. Armstead money to further his escape or told him he was
not welcome to stay at her home because he was wanted by the police.
We have long recognized that mere speculation “falls far short of the factual
support required to establish that plaintiff will be able to satisfy his evidentiary
burden of proof at trial.” Babin v. Winn -Dixie Louisiana, Inc ., 2000 -0078 (La.
6/30/00), 764 So.2d 37, 40. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence which would
suggest Mr. Armstead ’s decision to have his cousin drive him to Ms. Kite’s home
was integral to the process of escape. Rather, the fact that Mr. Armstead left the
worksite and retrieved a gun from his mother ’s home demonstrates he had
successfully escaped custody and had freedom of action at the time he chose to enter
Ms. Kite’s home. The harm in this case falls outside of the scope of the City’s duty
to prevent inmates from escaping .
In sum, we find the City has satisfied its burden on summary judgment by
establishing the absence of factual support for an essential element of plaintiff s’
claim. Plaintiff s have not produced any evidence of a material factual dispute.
Summary judgment in favor of the City is therefore mandated.

DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the writ is granted and made peremptory. The
judgment of the district court is reversed. Summary judgment is granted, dismissing
the claims of plaintiffs against the City of Alexandria, Earl Williams, Sr. and Henry
Jacobs with prejudice.