State of Louisiana v. Jared Crowther

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-K-0625

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
JARED CROWTHER *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 483-748 & 488-356, SECTION “J”
Honorable Darryl A. Derbigny, Judge
******
Judge Dale N. Atkins
******
(Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Daniel L. Dysart,
Judge Dale N. Atkins)

Liz Murrill, Attorney General
J. Bryant Clark Jr.
J. Taylor Gray
Stephanie May Bruno
Louisiana Department of Justice
Post Office Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, the Louisiana Attorney General

Robert Hjortsberg
1555 Poydras Street, Suite 1600
New Orleans, LA 70112

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT, Jared Crowther

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART; JUDGMENT
VACATED IN PART; SENTENCES VACATED; ORIGINAL SENTENCES
REINSTATED
JANUARY 31, 2025

DNA

RLB

DLD

The two criminal cases underlying this writ application concern convictions

for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and armed robbery. Relator, the

Attorney General, seeks review of the district court’s recent actions in the two

criminal cases (Nos. 488-356 and 483-748) in which Respondent, Jared Crowther

(“Mr. Crowther”), pled guilty and was sentenced in 2010. Specifically, the district

court granted Mr. Crowther’s “Motion to Recuse the District Attorney,” which he

filed only in No. 488-356; granted Mr. Crowther’s “Motion to Appoint Special

Prosecutor,” which he filed only in No. 488-356; appointed R. Judson Mitchell

(“Mr. Mitchell”) as special prosecutor in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748; granted a

“Joint Motion to Dismiss the Multiple Bill and Reconsider Sentence” filed by Mr.

Mitchell and counsel for Mr. Crowther in No. 488-356; resentenced Mr. Crowther

in No. 488-356 to fifteen years at hard labor with credit for time served and with

the sentence to run concurrently with any others; granted a “Joint Motion to

Dismiss the Multiple Bill and Reconsider Sentence” filed by Mr. Mitchell and

counsel for Mr. Crowther in No. 483-748; resentenced Mr. Crowther in No. 483-

748 to fifteen years at hard labor with credit for time served and with the sentence

to run concurrently with any others; and denied a “Motion to Intervene and Vacate

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Reconsideration of Sentence” filed by the Attorney General, whereby the Attorney

General sought to intervene and vacate Mr. Crowther’s new sentences in Nos. 488-

356 and 483-748. For the following reasons, we grant the Attorney General’s writ

application; reverse the district court’s grant of Mr. Crowther’s Motion to Appoint

Special Prosecutor filed in No. 488-356; vacate the district court’s appointment of

Mr. Mitchell as special prosecutor in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748; vacate the district

court’s grant of the Joint Motions to Dismiss the Multiple Bill and Reconsider

Sentence filed in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748; reverse the district court’s denial of

the Attorney General’s Motion to Intervene and Vacate Reconsideration of

Sentence; vacate the district court’s new sentences issued in Nos. 488-356 and

483-748; and reinstate Mr. Crowther’s original sentence of thirty years’

imprisonment at hard labor in No. 488-356 and thirty years’ imprisonment at hard

labor in No. 483-748, with the sentences in each of those cases to run concurrently

with any of Mr. Crowther’s other sentences and with credit for time served.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

On April 14, 2010, Mr. Crowther pled guilty as charged to possession with

intent to distribute cocaine in No. 483-748. On the same day, Mr. Crowther also

pled guilty as charged for armed robbery and possession with intent to distribute

cocaine in No. 488-356. Additionally, in No. 488-356, Mr. Crowther pled guilty to

being a second felony offender regarding the possession with intent to distribute

cocaine charge.

On the same day as his guilty pleas, April 14, 2010, the district court

sentenced Mr. Crowther. In No. 483-748, the district sentenced Mr. Crowther for

1 The facts of the underlying offenses are not pertinent to the issues raised in the Attorney

General’s writ application.

2

the possession with intent to distribute charge to thirty years’ imprisonment at hard

labor with the sentence to run concurrently with any other sentences and with

credit for time served. Likewise, in No. 488-356, the district court sentenced Mr.

Crowther for the armed robbery and possession with intent to distribute charges to

thirty years’ imprisonment at hard labor with the sentence to run concurrently with

any other sentences and with credit for time served. In No. 488-356, the district

court sentenced Mr. Crowther as a multiple offender for the possession with intent

to distribute cocaine charge.

Subsequent Proceedings in Case No. 488-356

On December 13, 2023, counsel for Mr. Crowther, Robert Hjortsberg (“Mr.

Hjortsberg”), filed a Motion to Recuse the District Attorney, and the district court

granted the motion that same day. Thereafter, on March 13, 2024, Mr. Hjortsberg

filed a Motion to Appoint Special Prosecutor. Minute entries dated March 13,

2024, and March 26, 2024, in the Docket Master for No. 488-356, attached as an

exhibit to the Attorney General’s writ application, both stated:

Defendant, Jared A[.] Crowther[,] did not appear for post[-]conviction
hearing. Defendant in [Department of Corrections] custody. Defense
Counsel did not appear. No one from the Attorney General[’s] Office
appeared. Post[-]conviction hearing set for 05/29/24 >Send notice to
defense counsel [Mr.] Hjortsberg. Send notice to the Attorney General
at: []400 Poydras St, Suite 1600, NOLA 70130.

According to the Attorney General’s writ application, however, 400 Poydras Street

was not a valid address for the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office, such that the

Attorney General did not receive notice regarding the Motion to Recuse the

District Attorney and the Motion to Appoint Special Prosecutor.

On May 21, 2024, the district court granted Mr. Crowther’s Motion to

Appoint Special Prosecutor and appointed Mr. Mitchell as special prosecutor.

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According to the Attorney General’s writ application and not disputed by Mr.

Crowther, at the time of the appointment, Mr. Mitchell was the pro bono

coordinator and clinic professor for the Stuart H. Smith Law Clinic & Center for

Social Justice at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law (“clinic work”).

A June 12, 2024 minute entry in the Docket Master for No. 488-356 stated:

“Special Prosecutor, [Mr.] Mitchell[,] is currently in jury trial in another . . .

section.” On June 13, 2024, Mr. Mitchell accepted his appointment as special

prosecutor.

On the same day Mr. Mitchell accepted his appointment, he and Mr.

Hjortsberg filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the Multiple Bill and Reconsideration of

Sentence, which the district court granted. The district court then resentenced Mr.

Crowther in No. 488-356 to fifteen years at hard labor with credit for time served

and with the sentence to run concurrently with any others.

Subsequent Proceedings in Case No. 483-748

On July 11, 2024, Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Hjortsberg filed a Joint Motion to

Dismiss the Multiple Bill and Reconsideration of Sentence, which the district court

granted that same day. The district court then resentenced Mr. Crowther in No.

483-748 to fifteen years at hard labor with credit for time served and with the

sentence to run concurrently with any others.

Motion to Intervene and Vacate Reconsideration of Sentence

On August 9, 2024, the Attorney General filed her Motion to Intervene and

Vacate Reconsideration of Sentence. Therein, she contended “[t]he appointment of

a special prosecutor in this matter, in lieu of the appointment of the attorney

general, was error as a matter of law.” To this end, the Attorney General argued

“[t]he plain language of [La. C.Cr.P. arts. 61 and 62] is clear; in the event that the

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district attorney is not the prosecuting authority, the attorney general becomes the

legal prosecuting authority.” Additionally, the Attorney General argued the district

court’s appointment of Mr. Mitchell as special prosecutor violated La. Const. art.

V, § 26(C) and La. C.Cr.P. art. 65 because “[u]pon information and belief,” Mr.

Mitchell continued to represent criminal defendants in his clinic work during the

course of his appointment in the same parish in which the district court appointed

him special prosecutor (Orleans Parish). Further, the Attorney General contended

she “has the authority to intervene in cases, such as the instant case, in order to

protect the rights and interest[s] of the State of Louisiana against illegal sentences.”

In this regard, the Attorney General observed the district court issued Mr.

Crowther’s original sentences fourteen years before Mr. Mitchell and Mr.

Hjortsberg filed the Joint Motions to Dismiss the Multiple Bill and Reconsider

Sentence in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748. She further noted there was “no indication

that the [district] court, at sentencing, set a period of time longer than 30 days to

seek a reconsideration of sentence.” Accordingly, the Attorney General asserted

the Joint Motions to Dismiss the Multiple Bill and Reconsideration of Sentence

were untimely per the deadline established in La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1, such that the

district court’s reconsideration of Mr. Crowther’s sentences and issuance of new

sentences resulted in illegal sentences. The Attorney General sought intervention

“to fairly and faithfully uphold the laws of Louisiana.”

Without providing reasons for doing so, the district court denied the

Attorney General’s Motion to Intervene and Vacate Reconsideration of Sentence

on August 28, 2024. The Attorney General’s timely writ application to this Court

followed.

5

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

In her writ application, the Attorney General asserts four assignments of

error:

(1) The District Court appointed [Mr.] Mitchell as “special
prosecutor” in docket number 488-356, in violation of the
Louisiana Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure;

(2) The District Court permitted [Mr.] Mitchell to act as special
prosecutor in docket number 483-748, when the District
Attorney had never been recused in that case;

(3) The District Court entertained and granted reconsideration of
the sentences in both cases, violating the Louisiana Constitution
and the Code of Criminal Procedure; and

(4) The District Court erroneously denied the Attorney General’s
Motion to Intervene and Vacate.

We discuss each of these in turn.

DISCUSSION

Assignments of Error Numbers One and Two: Whether the District Court
Erred in Appointing Mr. Mitchell as Special Prosecutor

In her first and second assignments of error, the Attorney General contends

the district court erred in appointing Mr. Mitchell as special prosecutor in Nos.

488-356 and 483-748. In terms of Mr. Mitchell’s appointment in No. 488-356, the

Attorney General asserts the district court violated the Louisiana Constitution and

the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure because Mr. Mitchell continued to

represent criminal defendants in Orleans Parish pursuant to his clinic work during

his appointment in No. 488-356. Turning to Mr. Mitchell’s appointment in No.

483-748, the Attorney General contends it was improper because the district

attorney had never recused or been recused in that case, such that the district court

should not have even permitted someone to replace him. Because both assignments

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of error concern Mr. Mitchell’s appointment as special prosecutor, we combine

them for purposes of our discussion.

As discussed previously, the district court appointed Mr. Mitchell after

granting Mr. Crowther’s Motion to Recuse the District Attorney and Motion to

Appoint Special Prosecutor, both of which he filed only in No. 488-356. Regarding

the recusal of a district attorney, La. C.Cr.P. art. 682 provides, in pertinent part:

When a district attorney is recused, or recuses himself [or
herself], the [district] judge shall either appoint an attorney at law,
who has the qualifications of a district attorney and is not an assistant
to the recused district attorney, to act in the place of the district
attorney in the case, or shall notify the attorney general in writing of
the recusation.

Because the underlying facts surrounding Mr. Mitchell’s appointment are not

disputed, resolution of the Attorney General’s first and second assignments of error

requires us to determine whether the district court properly interpreted and applied

La. C.Cr.P. art. 682 in appointing Mr. Mitchell as special prosecutor in No. 488-

356 and in permitting him to serve as special prosecutor in No. 483-748.

When there is no dispute as to the facts, an appellate court’s application of a

statute or code article to the facts of a case presents a question of law to be

reviewed under the de novo standard of review. Lepine v. Dep’t of Wildlife &

Fisheries, 2022-0160, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/5/22), 350 So.3d 988, 991 (citing

Brown v. Chesson, 2020-00730, p. 3 (La. 3/24/21), 315 So.3d 834, 836). Likewise,

as this Court has previously held, an appellate court reviews a question of law,

including the proper interpretation of a statute, under the de novo standard of

review, thereby giving no deference to the trial court’s interpretation of same.

Commodore v. City of New Orleans, 2019-0127, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/20/19),

275 So.3d 457, 465-66 (first citing Carver v. La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2017-1340,

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p. 4 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So.3d 226, 230; and then citing St. Bernard Port, Harbor &

Terminal Dist. v. Guy Hopkins Constr. Co., 2016-0907, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir.

4/5/17), 220 So.3d 6, 10). In interpreting statutes, courts are to be mindful that

“[w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd

consequences, the law shall be applied as written.” La. C.C. art. 9. Courts are also

supposed to “give effect to all parts of a statute and should not give a statute an

interpretation that makes any part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be

avoided.” Commodore, 2019-0127, pp. 13-14, 275 So.3d at 469 (quoting

Pumphrey v. City of New Orleans, 2005-979, p. 11 (La. 4/4/06), 925 So.2d 12012,

1210). Additionally, when courts interpret statutes, courts are to “presume[] the

Legislature’s actions in crafting a law were knowing and intentional” and to

presume the Legislature “enacted each statute with deliberation and with full

knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject.” Richards Clearview City Ctr.,

LLC v. Starr Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2024-104, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/5/24), 391

So.3d 101, 107 (first citing La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v.

La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2009-0023, p. 10 (La. 6/26/09), 17 So.3d 350, 356; and then

citing Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 1995-2895, p. 4 (La. 5/20/97), 694 So.2d

184, 186). Accordingly, we review the Attorney General’s first and second

assignments of error de novo with these statutory interpretation precepts in mind.

No. 488-356

The Attorney General contends Mr. Mitchell’s appointment in No. 488-356

violated La. Const. art. V, § 26(C), and La. C.Cr.P. art. 65. Specifically, she

contends Mr. Mitchell did not meet “the qualifications of a district attorney” as

required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 682 because he continued his clinic work during his

appointment. We agree.

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Louisiana Constitution Article V, Section 26 is titled “District Attorneys,”

and it states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o district attorney or assistant district

attorney shall appear, plead, or in any way defend or assist in defending any

criminal prosecution or charge. A violation of this Paragraph shall be cause for

removal.” La. Const. art. V, § 26(C) (emphasis added). Louisiana Code of

Criminal Procedure Article 65(1) provides “[i]t is unlawful for” a district attorney

or assistant district attorney “to defend or assist in the defense of any person

charged with an offense in any parish of the state.” (Emphasis added). Based on

the foregoing constitution and code articles, it is clear that to be a district attorney

or an assistant district attorney one cannot be involved in any criminal defense

work while serving as a district attorney or an assistant district attorney. In fact, the

Louisiana Supreme Court has specifically held that an attorney “violate[s] both

constitutional and statutory prohibitions by serving as an assistant district attorney

in” a parish “while continuing to represent defendants in criminal cases in that

same parish.” In re Smith, 2009-2447, p. 7 (La. 3/5/10), 29 So.3d 1232, 1236.

Because La. C.Cr.P. art. 682 permits the district court to appoint an attorney as a

substitute for a recused district attorney only if that attorney “has the qualifications

of a district attorney,” it axiomatically follows that an attorney appointed as a

substitute for a recused district attorney is also prohibited from having any

involvement in criminal defense work during the course of his or her appointment

as special prosecutor.

As observed by the Attorney General, supported by her writ application, and

undisputed by Mr. Crowther, Mr. Mitchell continued to perform his clinic work

during his appointment as special prosecutor. In particular, a June 12, 2024 docket

entry in No. 488-356 stated, “Special prosecutor, [Mr.] Mitchell[,] is currently in

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jury trial in another . . . section.” This was after the district court had already

appointed Mr. Mitchell as special prosecutor in No. 488-356; and it was only one

day before Mr. Mitchell officially accepted his appointment. This was also only

one day before Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Hjortsberg filed the Join Motion to Dismiss

the Multiple Bill and Reconsider Sentence in No. 488-356. The record contains no

evidence demonstrating Mr. Mitchell discontinued his clinic work upon being

appointed special prosecutor on May 21, 2024, or upon accepting his appointment

as special prosecutor on June 13, 2024, nor does Mr. Crowther contend as much.

Instead, Mr. Crowther counters in his brief to this Court that Mr. Mitchell’s

appointment in No. 488-356 was proper and was not in violation of La. Const. art.

V, § 26(C), or La. C.Cr.P. art. 682 because he had no conflicts of interest in this

matter that “would have prevented him legally or ethically from serving as special

prosecutor.” However, we disagree with this argument. Louisiana Constitution

Article V, Section 26 (C), and La. C.Cr.P. art. 65, respectively, prohibit a district

attorney or an assist district attorney—and, by extension, a special prosecutor

based on our above holding—from “defending any criminal prosecution or charge”

and from defending “any person charged with an offense in any parish of the

state.” (Emphasis added.) Use of the word “any” in these articles plainly

demonstrates an outright prohibition on district attorneys, assistant district

attorneys, and special prosecutors participating in criminal defense work while

serving in the capacity of district attorney, assistant district attorney, or special

prosecutor. Neither La. Const. art. V, § 26(C), nor La. C.Cr.P. art. 65 contain a

provision to the effect that this prohibition is conditional or a caveat that criminal

defense representation in some cases is permissible so long as there is no conflict

of interest with any cases on which the district attorney, assistant district attorney,

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or special prosecutor serves as the prosecutor. If the Legislature wanted to provide

such a caveat, particularly for special prosecutors, it would have chosen to do so in

La. C.Cr.P. art. 682, having acted with full knowledge of the criminal defense

work prohibition found in La. Const. art. V, § 26(C), and La. C.Cr.P. art. 65. See

Richards Clearview City Ctr., LLC, 2024-104, p. 7, 391 So.3d at 107 (citations

omitted) (holding courts are to “presume[] the Legislature’s actions in crafting a

law were knowing and intentional” and to presume the Legislature “enacted each

statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same

subject”). Rather, the prohibition exists because there would be an inherent conflict

of interest if an attorney were to serve as district attorney, assistant district

attorney, or special prosecutor in some cases and as defense attorney in others

merely because of the competing and opposing natures of these types of

representation.

By simultaneously serving as special prosecutor and performing his clinic

work, Mr. Mitchell contravened the prohibition against criminal defense work for

district attorneys, assistant district attorneys, and special prosecutors as found in

La. Const. art. V, § 26(C), and La. C.Cr.P. art. 65. Accordingly, he failed to meet

“the qualifications of a district attorney” as required by La. C.Cr.P. art. 682 for an

attorney to substitute for a recused district attorney. We thus agree with the

Attorney General that the district court erred in appointing Mr. Mitchell to serve as

special prosecutor in No. 488-356 and permitting him to continue serving in that

role when he failed to discontinue his clinic work.

No. 483-748

Turning to No. 483-748, the district court not only erred in allowing Mr.

Mitchell to act as special prosecutor in this case for the reasons discussed above

11

but also for another reason. As noted by the Attorney General and outlined in the

procedural history of this case, Mr. Crowther never filed a Motion to Recuse the

District Attorney in No. 483-748 nor did the district attorney recuse himself. As

quoted previously, La. C.Cr.P. art. 682 states, “[w]hen a district attorney is

recused, or recuses himself [or herself], the [district] judge shall either appoint an

attorney at law . . . to act in the place of the district attorney in the case, or shall

notify the attorney general in writing of the recusation.” (Emphasis added.) A plain

reading of La. C.Cr.P. art. 682 reveals the district court’s duty and ability to

appoint and allow an attorney to act in the place of the district attorney or to send

notice to the attorney general about the recusation of a district attorney is

conditioned upon the district attorney first being recused or having recused himself

or herself. That is, the district court cannot appoint a special prosecutor or notify

the attorney general about a district attorney’s recusation unless and until the

district attorney is in fact already recused or has recused himself or herself.

Because La. C.Cr.P. art. 682 is “clear and unambiguous,” we are to apply it as

written. La. C.C. art. 9. Applying it as written, we find the district court should not

have permitted Mr. Mitchell to act as special prosecutor in No. 483-748 because

the district attorney had neither been recused nor recused himself at the time of the

appointment. To apply La. C.Cr.P. art. 682 otherwise (as the district court did)

would render the opening phrase of the article—“[w]hen a district attorney is

recused, or recuses himself [or herself]”—superfluous and meaningless. This

would be in contravention of the rule that courts are supposed to “give effect to all

parts of a statute and should not give a statute an interpretation that makes any part

superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be avoided.” Commodore, 2019-

12

0127, pp. 13-14, 275 So.3d at 469 (quoting Pumphrey, 2005-979, p. 11, 925 So.2d

at 1210).

For the foregoing reasons, the Attorney General’s first and second

assignments of error have merit. We conclude the district court erred in appointing

Mr. Mitchell as special prosecutor in No. 488-356 and in permitting him to act as

special prosecutor in 483-748. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s

appointment of Mr. Mitchell as special prosecutor in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748.

Assignment of Error Number Three: Whether the District Court Erred in
“[E]ntertain[ing]” and Granting Reconsideration of Mr. Crowther’s
Sentences in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748

In her third assignment of error, the Attorney General asserts, “[t]he

[d]istrict [c]ourt entertained and granted reconsideration of the sentences in both

cases, violating the Louisiana Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

In particular, she contends the district court violated La. Const. art. II, § 2;2 La.

Const. art. IV, § 5;3 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1. We begin our consideration of the

Attorney General’s argument with La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1. Because resolution of

this assignment of error calls on us to interpret and apply La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1, we

again apply the de novo standard of review.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1(A)(1) states, “In felony

cases, within thirty days following the imposition of sentence or within such longer

period as the trial court may set at sentence, the state or the defendant may make or

2 Louisiana Constitution Article II, Section 2 states, “Except as otherwise provided by

this constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall
exercise power belonging to either of the others.”
3 Louisiana Constitution Article IV, Section 5(E)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he

governor may grant reprieves to persons convicted of offenses against the state and, upon
favorable recommendation of the Board of Pardons, may commute sentences.” (Footnote
omitted.)

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file a motion to reconsider sentence.” According to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(A)(1), a

motion to reconsider sentence is untimely if it is filed more than thirty days after

sentencing if the sentencing transcript does not reflect that the district court

extended the time for filing the motion to reconsider during the defendant’s

sentencing. State v. Jones, 41,449, p. 30 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/20/06), 940 So.2d 61,

78 (citing State v. Neville, 1995-0547, pp. 2-3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/16/95), 655 So.2d

785, 787). A district court has no authority to consider a motion to reconsider

sentence that is untimely per La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1. State v. Wade, 53,311, p. 4 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/15/20), 289 So.3d 1158, 1162 (citing Jones, 41,449, p. 30, 940 So.2d

at 78). See also State v. Caliste, 2012-0533, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/4/13), 125

So.3d 8, 14 (holding “[t]he failure to file a motion to consider within the time

delays required prevents the [district] court from considering the motion”

(emphasis added) (citing State v. Williams, 1996-1587, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir.

4/16/97), 693 So.2d 249, 255)). In fact, a district court errs in simply considering

an untimely motion to reconsider sentence, let alone in granting an untimely

motion. Wade, 53,311, p. 4, 289 So.3d at 1162.

Moreover, if a defendant fails to file a motion for appeal within the time

period allowed by La. C.Cr.P. art. 914, the defendant’s conviction and sentence

subsequently become final. State v. Smith, 2005-1355, p. 2 (La. App. 3 Cir.

3/1/06), 926 So.2d 28, 29. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 914

provides, in pertinent part:

B. The motion for an appeal must be made no later than:

(1) Thirty days after the rendition of the judgment or ruling
from which the appeal is taken.

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(2) Thirty days from the ruling on a motion to reconsider
sentence filed pursuant to Article 881.1, should such a motion be
filed.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 914(B). Thereafter, “[t]he Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure

does not provide a procedural vehicle with which to modify a sentence that has

become final.” State v. Perkins, 2008-0078, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/25/08), 988

So.2d 793, 799.

Turning to the matter sub judice, Mr. Crowther did not file his motion to

reconsider sentence in No. 488-356 until June 17, 2024, and did not file his motion

to reconsider sentence in No. 483-748 until July 11, 2024, both of which were over

fourteen years after the district court originally sentenced him on April 14, 2010.

Thus, Mr. Crowther filed his motions to reconsider sentence beyond the thirty-day

deadline established in La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1. The minute entries for the date of

Mr. Crowther’s original sentencing in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748 do not state that

the district court set a longer period for Mr. Crowther to file a motion to reconsider

sentence during the sentencing hearing. If “there is a discrepancy between a minute

entry and the transcript, the transcript prevails,” but in this instance we do not even

have the sentencing transcript to consult to determine whether the district court set

a longer period of time for Mr. Crowther to file a motion to reconsider sentence.

State v. Budd, 2023-0594, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/26/24), ___ So.3d ___, ___,

2024 WL 3548644, at *9 (quoting State v. Lawrence, 2012-1026, p. 5 (La. App. 4

Cir. 7/3/13), 120 So.3d 812, 816). “[A]s an appellate court, we are ‘a court of

record and can only review what is contained in the record on review.’” JoAnn

Place v. Ricard, 2022-0456, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/27/22), 356 So.3d 518, 527

(quoting NOLA 180 v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 2012-0072, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir.

5/16/12), 94 So.3d 886, 888). Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the

15

transcript of Mr. Crowther’s sentencing hearing reflected that the district court

provided additional time for Mr. Crowther to file a motion to reconsider sentence,

the transcript is not before us for our consideration. Moreover, we note Mr.

Crowther has not contended the district court provided him with additional time,

let alone with an additional fourteen-plus years, nor has he attempted to

supplement the record with the sentencing transcript to reflect such an extension of

time. Therefore, we hold “La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1 [did] not provide a procedural

vehicle to the [district] court’s action[s]” of granting the Joint Motions to Dismiss

the Multiple Bill and Reconsider Sentence and issuing new sentences because: 1)

Mr. Crowther’s June and July 2024 motions to reconsider sentences were filed

more than thirty days after the April 14, 2010 imposition of his sentences; and 2)

the record does not reflect that the district court set a longer period within which

Mr. Crowther could file a motion to reconsider sentence. Perkins, 2008-0078, p.

11, 988 So.2d at 800.

Additionally, the record before this Court does not reflect that Mr. Crowther

filed a motion for appeal after his guilty plea and sentencing within the time period

allowed by La. C.Cr.P. art. 914 (nor does Mr. Crowther contend that he did); so his

sentence became final upon the expiration of the delay for so filing. Smith, 2005-

1355, p. 2, 926 So.2d at 29; La. C.Cr.P. art. 914. The Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure does not contain a provision allowing a court to modify a sentence that

has become final. Perkins, 2008-0078, p. 10, 988 So.2d at 799. Thus, the district

court’s action in changing Mr. Crowther’s sentences in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748

from thirty to fifteen years was not legally permissible.

Because the trial court legally erred in even considering Mr. Crowther’s

untimely motions to reconsider sentence and did not have the legal authority to

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modify Mr. Crowther’s sentences, we vacate the trial court’s grant of the Joint

Motions to Dismiss the Multiple Bill and Reconsider Sentence filed in Nos. 488-

356 and 483-748; reverse the district court’s August 28, 2024 ruling, which denied

the Attorney General’s Motion to Vacate Reconsideration of Sentence; vacate the

district court’s new sentences issued in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748; and reinstate

Mr. Crowther’s original sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment at hard labor in No.

488-356 and thirty years’ imprisonment at hard labor in No. 483-748, with the

sentences in each of those cases to run concurrently with any of Mr. Crowther’s

other sentences and with credit for time served. Having so held, we pretermit

discussion of the Attorney General’s argument that the district court’s

consideration of Mr. Crowther’s motions to reconsider sentence also violated the

separation of powers as delineated in La. Const. art. II, § 2, and La. Const. art. IV,

§ 5.

Assignment of Error Number Four: The District Court Erroneously Denied
the Attorney General’s Motion to Intervene

In her fourth and final assignment of error, the Attorney General asserts the

district court erroneously denied her Motion to Intervene. Louisiana Constitution

Article IV, § 8, is titled “Attorney General; Powers and Duties.” It provides:

There shall be a Department of Justice, headed by the attorney
general, who shall be the chief legal officer of the state. . . .

As necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or
interest of the state, the attorney general shall have authority . . . for
cause, when authorized by the court which would have original
jurisdiction and subject to judicial review, (a) to institute, prosecute,
or intervene in any criminal action or proceeding, or (b) to supersede
any attorney representing the state in any civil or criminal action.

La. Const. art. IV, § 8. As delineated in the above quote, the district court’s

decision on the Attorney General’s Motion to Intervene is subject to review. When,

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as in the matter sub judice, the district court made no factual findings in ruling on

the Attorney General’s Motion to Intervene, the parties do not dispute the relevant

facts, and the Attorney General seeks to intervene on the basis of the purported

legal invalidity of certain actions, then we find “the only issue is a question or

finding of law,” which is reviewed de novo. State in Interest of S.F., 2024-0383, p.

4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/7/24), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 4432247, at *4 (quoting

State in Interest of G.S., 2019-0605, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/4/19), 287 So.3d 752,

756). Thus, we must consider whether the Attorney General demonstrated cause

for her intervention per La. Const. art. IV, § 8, such that the trial court erred in

denying her Motion to Intervene.

In interpreting La. Const. art. IV, § 8, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held,

“[t]he ‘cause’ requirement refers to a showing that the district attorney is not

adequately asserting some right or interest of the state.” Plaquemines Par. Comm’n

Council v. Perez, 379 So.2d 1373, 1377 (La. 1980) (citing Hargrave, The Judiciary

Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 LA.L.REV. 765, 835 (1977)). See,

e.g., State v. Lee, 2022-01827, pp. 2, 5 (La. 9/1/23), 370 So.3d 408, 410-412

(wherein the Attorney General intervened on the basis of challenging the

constitutionality of La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.10 and sought the vacatur of a

postconviction plea agreement by which a murder conviction and sentence of life

without parole were vacated). Additionally, La. C.Cr.P. art. 62 is titled “Authority

of attorney general; supervision of district attorney.” It provides:

A. The attorney general shall exercise supervision over all
district attorneys in the state.

B. The attorney general has authority to institute and prosecute,
or to intervene in any proceeding, as he [or she] may deem necessary
for the assertion or protection of the rights and interests of the state.

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See also Walmsley v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 144 So.2d 627, 630 (La. App. 4th

Cir. 1962) (citations omitted). For example, in Lee, the Louisiana Supreme Court

noted that, in light of the “unique, non-adversarial nature of the code article” at

issue, “there was, in effect, no dispute between the parties as to the

constitutionality of the law,” such that “[i]f the Attorney General was barred from

making [the constitutional] challenge,” which was the basis for seeking to

intervene in the case, then “the validity of the code article would be beyond

judicial review.” 2022-01827, p. 5, 370 So.3d at 412 n.5.

In the matter sub judice, the Attorney General argued in her Motion to

Intervene and argues in her writ application to this Court that cause for her

intervention existed because the special prosecutor and the district court failed to

uphold multiple laws. As previously discussed, La. Const. art. V, § 26, and La.

C.Cr.P. art. 65 prohibit a district attorney, an assistant district attorney, or a special

prosecutor from participating in criminal defense work while simultaneously

serving as a district attorney, assistant district attorney, or a special prosecutor. In

contravention of these laws, the district court permitted Mr. Mitchell to serve as

special prosecutor in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748 while continuing his clinic work.

As also previously discussed, Mr. Mitchell’s appointment as special prosecutor in

No. 483-748 violated La. C.Cr.P. art. 682, by which a district court can only

appoint and permit someone to act as a special prosecutor when a district attorney

has already been recused or recused himself or herself. Further, in the previous

section, we explained how the district court’s mere consideration of the Joint

Motions to Reconsider Sentence in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748 violated La. C.Cr.P.

art. 881.1 because those motions were untimely. Not only did the district court

entertain the Joint Motions to Reconsider Sentence, the district court went even

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further and actually granted those motions; instituted new, fifteen-year sentences in

Nos. 488-356 and 483-748; and denied the Attorney General’s Motion to Vacate

Reconsideration of Sentence. The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure does not

provide authority for any of those actions taken by the district court. All of this

occurred while Mr. Mitchell served in the place of the district attorney. Moreover,

considering Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Hjortsberg filed Joint Motions to Reconsider

Sentence, we find that as in Lee, “there was, in effect, no dispute between the

parties as to the” validity of the actions taken, such that to not permit the Attorney

General to intervene to challenge those actions rendered the validity of the actions

taken by Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Hjortsberg beyond judicial review. 2022-01827, p.

5, 370 So.3d at 412 n.5.

In light of the foregoing, we find the Attorney General established cause for

her intervention because the special prosecutor acting in place of “the district

attorney [was] not adequately asserting some right or interest of the state.”

Plaquemines Par. Comm’n Council, 379 So.2d at 1377 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the Attorney General’s fourth assignment of error has merit, and we

reverse the district court’s denial of her Motion to Intervene.

CONCLUSION

For the following reasons, we grant the Attorney General’s writ application;

reverse the district court’s grant of Mr. Crowther’s Motion to Appoint Special

Prosecutor filed in No. 488-356; vacate the district court’s appointment of Mr.

Mitchell as special prosecutor in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748; vacate the district

court’s grant of the Joint Motions to Dismiss the Multiple Bill and Reconsider

Sentence filed in Nos. 488-356 and 483-748; reverse the district court’s denial of

the Attorney General’s Motion to Intervene and Vacate Reconsideration of

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Sentence; vacate the district court’s new sentences issued in Nos. 488-356 and

483-748; and reinstate Mr. Crowther’s original sentence of thirty years’

imprisonment at hard labor in No. 488-356 and thirty years’ imprisonment at hard

labor in No. 483-748, with the sentences in each of those cases to run concurrently

with any of Mr. Crowther’s other sentences and with credit for time served.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART; JUDGMENT
VACATED IN PART; SENTENCES VACATED; ORIGINAL SENTENCES
REINSTATED

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