State of Louisiana v. Pernell D. Smith

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-K-0782

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
PERNELL D. SMITH *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
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APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 551-281, SECTION “H”
Honorable Camille Buras, Judge
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Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano
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(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins,
Judge Karen K. Herman)

JENKINS, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS

Jason R. Williams
District Attorney
Brad Scott
Chief of Appeals
Zachary M. Phillips
Assistant District Attorney
ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
619 South White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/RELATOR

Addie Maguire
Orleans Public Defenders
2601 Tulane Avenue, Seventh Floor
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT

WRIT GRANTED;
REVERSED

JANUARY 15, 2025

JCL This is a criminal case. Relator, the State of Louisiana (“State”), seeks

KKH review of the district court’s November 6, 2024 ruling granting the defendant’s

motion to suppress statement. For the reasons set forth below, we grant the State’s

writ and reverse the district court’s ruling.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 4, 2021, the defendant, Pernell Smith (“Defendant”), was

charged by bill of information with one count of sexual battery, a violation of La.

R.S. 14:43.1(C)(1), and one count of indecent behavior with a juvenile, a violation

of La. R.S. 14:81(H)(1). Defendant appeared for arraignment on July 9, 2024 and

entered a plea of not guilty.

On August 5, 2024, Defense counsel filed omnibus motions, including a

motion to suppress statement, evidence, and identification and a motion for a

preliminary examination. A motions hearing was conducted on November 6, 2024.

The State called as its only witness New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”)

Sergeant Corey Lymous, and the defense played a video recording of the police

interview of Defendant.

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Sergeant Lymous was the supervisor over NOPD’s child abuse and sex

crime units. He testified that in June 2020, NOPD responded to a sexual assault

dispatch in the Seventh District. Because of the age of the victim, the child abuse

unit was notified. Upon learning of the dispatch, Sergeant Lymous assigned

Detective Kierra Moore to the case. Sergeant Lymous assisted with and supervised

the investigation. Thereafter, Defendant was taken to the Seventh District station

for an interview.

Defendant was interviewed by Detective Moore. Sergeant Lymous admitted

that Defendant was in custody for purposes of the interview. Before the interview

began, Detective Moore read Defendant his Miranda rights from a form and asked

whether Defendant understood those rights. In response to being asked whether he

understood his rights, Defendant immediately asked, “One question to that. You

said I’m being asked any kind of questions. As of this moment, if I needed a

lawyer, in this situation, would y’all be able to provide me with one if I can’t

afford one?” Detective Moore responded, “[w]e can’t provide you with one at this

moment. No.” Defendant then stated, “[t]hat’s what I was trying to figure out.”

Detective Moore then asked Defendant if he wished to make a statement. In

response to Detective Moore’s question, Defendant stated, “I’m going to talk,

ma’am—but I have another question. Never mind, go ahead, I’m alright. I

understand. I’m going to talk.” Following this colloquy, Defendant signed a waiver

form and proceeded with the interview.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied Defendant’s

motion to suppress evidence and found probable cause to substantiate the charges

against Defendant. Further, the court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress

statement, finding that his Miranda rights were violated because he was not fully

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advised of his Miranda rights and he was questioned by police after he invoked his

right to counsel. The State subsequently filed its writ application, seeking review

of the district court’s ruling granting Defendant’s motion to suppress statement.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

As its only assignment of error, the State asserts that the district court abused

its discretion in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress statement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court set forth the standard to be applied by the reviewing court when

the issue is the district court’s granting or denial of a motion to suppress in State v.

Debose, 24-0217, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/24), 390 So.3d 971, 977:

District courts have great discretion when ruling
on motions to suppress, and an appellate court will not
disturb a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
unless the district court abused its discretion. State v.
Willis, [ ]22-0452, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/22), 348
So.3d 167, 172 (quoting State v. Polkey, [ ]20-0482, p. 3
(La. App. 4 Cir. 11/25/20), 310 So.3d 605, 608). The
reason the district court’s decision “on a motion to
suppress ... is entitled to great weight” is “because the
[district] court has the opportunity to observe the
witnesses and weigh the credibility of their testimony.”
Id. at p. 7, 348 So.3d at 172 (alteration in original)
(quoting State ex rel. J.S., [ ]08-1401, p. 4 (La. App. 4
Cir. 2/18/09), 6 So.3d 904, 908). As this Court has
previously explained though, “a motion to suppress
presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. (citing
Polkey, [ ]20-0482, p. 4, 310 So.3d at 608). Thus, the
appellate court reviews the underlying facts for an abuse
of discretion “but reviews conclusions to be drawn from
those facts de novo.” Id. When the facts are not disputed,
however, then the appellate court need only “consider
whether the trial court came to the proper legal
determination under the undisputed facts.” Id.

DISCUSSION

This Court is tasked with determining whether the district court erred in

suppressing Defendant’s statement due to a purported violation of Miranda v.

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Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Specifically, the

issue revolves around whether Defendant was properly informed of his

constitutional rights, and whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived those

rights. After review, this Court finds that the district court erred in its conclusions.

We grant the writ, reverse the district court’s findings, and hold that Defendant’s

Miranda rights were properly conveyed and waived.

The Sufficiency of the Miranda Warnings

The State has the burden of proving that a defendant was adequately

informed of his rights under Miranda. State v. Sterling, 441 So.2d 798, 799 (La.

App. 4th Cir. 1983) (citing State v. Harper, 430 So.2d 627, 634 (La. 1983)). This

includes the right to remain silent and the right to the presence of an attorney,

either retained or appointed. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.

In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that Detective Moore read the

Miranda warnings verbatim from a form before questioning Defendant. The record

reflects that Defendant was informed of his right to counsel and acknowledged that

he understood those rights. The district court nonetheless found the warnings

insufficient based on the detective’s response to Defendant’s question about the

provision of counsel during questioning. Specifically, the detective stated, “We

can’t provide you with one at this moment.” While this response might lack clarity,

it does not misstate the law. Defendant was informed of his right to counsel, and

the detective’s statement did not explicitly deny him access to counsel or place a

limitation on his rights. Courts have consistently held that warnings do not need to

follow a specific script as long as they reasonably convey the essential rights

guaranteed by Miranda. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-60, 101

S.Ct. 2806, 2809-10, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,

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202-03, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2880, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989); State v. King, 19-01332, p.

3 (La. 4/3/20), 340 So.3d 754, 756. Moreover, the record shows that Defendant

expressed his intent to continue speaking after the detective’s response. His

statement, “I’m alright. I understand. I’m going to talk,” demonstrates that he

understood his rights and chose to proceed voluntarily. Thus, the Miranda

warnings given were sufficient.

Defendant’s Waiver of Miranda Rights

For a waiver of Miranda rights to be valid, it must be both knowing and

voluntary. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1140-41, 89

L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). This requires that the waiver be the product of a free and

deliberate choice and that the defendant understand the nature of the rights being

abandoned and the consequences of the waiver. Id. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141. The

evidence in this case supports a finding that Defendant’s waiver was valid.

As to the voluntary nature of the waiver, the record contains no evidence of

coercion, intimidation, or deception by law enforcement. The interrogation

environment, as described by testimony and evidenced by the video recording of

the interview, was calm, professional, and devoid of improper tactics. Defendant

signed a waiver form and explicitly stated that he understood his rights and wished

to proceed.

As to the knowing nature of the waiver, Defendant’s question about the

provision of counsel demonstrates an awareness of his rights, not a

misunderstanding. The detective’s response, while imperfect, did not negate or

limit the rights conveyed during the initial Miranda warnings. Defendant’s

subsequent statements, including his decision to proceed, confirm that he

knowingly waived his rights.

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The district court’s finding that Defendant did not knowingly waive his

rights is inconsistent with the evidence. Defendant’s acknowledgment of

understanding his rights and his signed waiver form provide sufficient evidence of

a valid waiver.

Invocation of the Right to Counsel

The district court also found that Defendant invoked his right to counsel

when he asked whether an attorney would be provided during questioning.

However, an invocation of the right to counsel must be clear and unambiguous. See

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362

(1994); State v. Payne, 01-3196, p. 12 (La. 12/4/02), 833 So.2d 927, 937. An

ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney does not require law enforcement

to cease questioning. Id.

Here, Defendant’s question—“If I needed a lawyer, in this situation, would

y’all be able to provide me with one if I can’t afford one?”—does not constitute an

unequivocal request for counsel. Instead, it reflects a request for clarification about

his rights, which was appropriately addressed by the detective. Following the

detective’s response, Defendant explicitly stated his intention to proceed with the

interview, further confirming that he did not invoke his right to counsel.

CONCLUSION

The district court erred in finding that Defendant’s Miranda rights were

violated. The warnings provided by law enforcement were sufficient, and

Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. Additionally, Defendant

did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. For these reasons, the writ is

granted, and the district court’s ruling suppressing Defendant’s statements is

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reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

WRIT GRANTED;
REVERSED

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