State of Louisiana v. Jkari Campbell

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-KA-0240

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL

J’KARI CAMPBELL * FOURTH CIRCUIT

* STATE OF LOUISIANA

*******

APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 557-317, SECTION “D”
Judge Kimya M. Holmes
******
Judge Karen K. Herman
******
(Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Karen K.
Herman)

Jason R. Williams
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
Brad Scott
CHIEF OF APPEALS
Peter Vesich
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
619 South White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLEE

Sherry Watters
LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT
P. O. Box 58769
New Orleans, LA 70158

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED
FEBRUARY 5, 2025

KKH
DLD
DNA
Defendant, J’Kari Campbell (“Defendant”), appeals his conviction

and sentence for second degree murder. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

STATEMENT OF CASE

On March 9, 2023, Defendant was charged by grand jury indictment

with committing the second degree murder of Keyron Travis on November

26, 2022, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. On March 23, 2023, Defendant

pled not guilty to the charge.

Trial commenced on December 4, 2023 with voir dire proceedings.

On December 7, 2023, the jury found Defendant guilty as charged of second

degree murder.

On January 18, 2024, a hearing was conducted at which time the trial

court denied Defendant’s motion for post-verdict modification to guilty of

manslaughter; denied Defendant’s motion for new trial and request for an

evidentiary hearing; granted Defendant’s motion to file an affidavit under

seal; and denied Defendant’s motion for a downward departure from the

mandatory minimum sentence established under La. R.S. 15:574.4(F)(1).

1

After defense counsel “waive[d] delays as to sentencing,” the trial court

imposed a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor with the possibility of

parole after twenty-five years, with credit for time served.

On February 5, 2024, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to

reconsider his sentence. On that same date, the trial court granted

defendant’s motion for appeal. Defendant’s timely appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Matthew Patin

Matthew Patin (“Mr. Patin”) testified that he was “the Chief of

Operations for the city’s Real Time Crime Center.” He explained that the

Real Time Crime Center is a city agency which monitors a network of

cameras around the city and reports information to pertinent city entities,

such as the police and fire departments. Mr. Patin stated that his agency

possessed videos pertinent to the case at hand. On cross-examination, Mr.

Patin confirmed that the videos commence at approximately 8:40 p.m.

because that was the time that police officers were interested in viewing. He

further confirmed that any footage depicting what transpired before that time

was not requested and, as such, was not preserved.

Officer Cody O’Dell

Officer Cody O’Dell (“Off. O’Dell”) of the New Orleans Police

Department (“NOPD”) testified that he was on duty on November 26, 2022,

which was when the Bayou Classic was taking place in New Orleans. At

approximately 8:42 p.m., Off. O’Dell was stationed at the intersection of

Bourbon Street and Canal Street. At that time, he, along with approximately

six other officers, heard “two shots fired in a close vicinity, … under the

overhang in front of the Crown Plaza [Hotel]” located “at the end of the 700

block of Canal Street.” At that point, he immediately started searching for

2

suspects, specifically persons carrying concealed weapons. He saw a

suspect (Defendant) who looked like he was concealing a firearm. Upon

approaching him, Defendant “attempted to stop” and then “fell to the

ground.” Ultimately, a gun fell from his jacket and hit the ground.

Defendant attempted “to get up and run,” but Off. O’Dell “grabbed a hold

[sic] of him, ended up taking him to the ground … and getting on top of his

back.” Thereafter, Off. O’Dell secured the handgun and placed Defendant

in handcuffs.

Off. O’Dell’s body-worn camera footage was introduced into

evidence and published to the jury. The camera footage depicted Off.

O’Dell apprehending Defendant as he was attempting to flee the scene.

Upon being detained, Defendant denied possessing a gun. Off. O’Dell

retrieved the gun from the ground and Defendant again denied the gun was

his. Defendant was placed in handcuffs and put in the police cruiser. In

securing the firearm, Off. O’Dell stated “this b*tch [the gun] is still hot.”

Off. O’Dell explained in testimony that the warmth of the gun indicated that

“it was just fired.” Defendant stated several times in the video he did not do

anything and that someone had shot at him.

Off. O’Dell testified that after Defendant was placed in the police car,

he was taken to Children’s Hospital due to his complaint that his head was

hurting. Off. O’Dell admitted to using force to take Defendant down to the

ground.

Kimberly Musall

Ms. Kimberly Musall (“Ms. Musall”) testified that she worked for the

New Orleans Police Department Crime Lab as a crime scene investigator.

She was called to the crime scene, arriving at 9:33 p.m.

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Following her investigation of the scene, Ms. Musall issued a report

which included a series of photographs of the crime scene, along with

photographs of the deceased victim at University Medical Center, which was

introduced into evidence and shown to the jury. Ms. Musall testified that she

collected two spent casings from the sidewalk in the 700 block of Canal

Street. She also swabbed two firearms to collect DNA evidence.

Officer Edrius Brown

Officer Edrius Brown (“Off. Brown”) of the NOPD testified that on

the evening of the shooting, he and his partner were “doing proactive patrols

around the CBD [Central Business District].” While on patrol, he received a

radio report that “two shots” had been fired on Canal Street and that “an

apprehension was made by one of my partners, Cody O’Dell.” Upon

hearing the report, he and another officer relocated to the area.

Off. Brown activated his body-worn camera and the footage from his

camera was introduced into evidence and played for the jury. The camera

footage reflected that Off. Brown and his partner reached the victim and the

officers and EMS attempted to give aid. Off. Brown stated that they found a

firearm on the victim and two wounds – “[t]here was an entry wound and an

exit wound in his arm [a]nd an entry wound into the upper torso, left side.”

Shortly thereafter, an ambulance arrived and transported the victim to

receive medical care.

Dr. Cynthia Gardner

Dr. Cynthia Gardner (“Dr. Gardner”), an expert in the field of forensic

pathology, of the Orleans Parish Coroner’s Office, performed an autopsy on

the victim, Keyron Travis. Dr. Gardner stated that the victim suffered two

gunshot wounds of “[i]ndeterminate range,” meaning that the gun was fired

“from [a distance] greater than two feet away.” One gunshot entered the

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victim’s left upper arm and exited the inner upper arm. The other gunshot,

which did not exit the body, entered on the left side of the victim’s torso.

This was the gunshot that caused extensive damage to several of the victim’s

internal organs. The victim’s death was classified as a homicide.

Sergeant Brian Elsensohn

Sergeant Brian Elsensohn (“Sgt. Elsensohn”) testified that on

Saturday, November 26, 2022, he was assigned to patrol the intersection of

Canal and Bourbon Streets. On that evening, he, along with fellow officers,

heard the “sound of gunfire erupt.” He and several other officers quickly

moved to the area where they heard the shots and he was told by Off. O’Dell

that a suspect fleeing from the scene had been apprehended. Off. O’Dell

further stated that the suspect possessed a firearm that “was still warm to the

touch.”

Because force was used during the apprehension of Defendant, Sgt.

Elsensohn investigated the matter to ensure it was commensurate. As part of

his investigation, Sgt. Elsensohn interviewed Defendant. The interview was

recorded on his body-worn camera and the footage was introduced into

evidence and played for the jury. In the video, Defendant stated that before

he came in contact with Off. O’Dell, he was running but fell and people

“trampled” him. Thereafter, when Off. O’Dell apprehended him, he hit his

head “on a pole,” causing him to suffer a bump on his forehead. Defendant

was brought to the hospital where he was given pain medication. Defendant

complained that his head hurt where he sustained his injury.

Sean McElrath

Sean McElrath (“Mr. McElrath”), an expert in firearm and tool mark

examinations, testified that he was the head for the forensic firearm section

of the New Orleans Police Department’s Crime Lab.

5

Mr. McElrath tested two fired cartridge cases and a Smith and Wesson

firearm. Based on his testing, Mr. McElrath was able to conclude that both

“cartridge cases were fired [from] this weapon,” i.e., the Smith and Wesson

firearm that was recovered from the 700 block of Canal Street.

Detective Alex Reiter

Detective Alex Reiter (“Det. Reiter”) testified that he had been a

detective for approximately four years and it was his duty to investigate

violent crimes including homicide investigations, attempted murder

investigations, shootings, stabbings, aggravated assaults and armed

robberies. At the time of the homicide at issue, Det. Reiter was located at

the Eighth District Station in the French Quarter and was notified of the

shooting which occurred in the 700 block of Canal Street. Upon receiving

notification, he, along with Detective Donald Williard, relocated to the scene

of the shooting. When they arrived, Det. Reiter stated that Defendant was

still at the scene. Det. Reiter obtained the video footage from the Astor

Crown Hotel’s three exterior cameras. The hotel cameras’ video footage

was then introduced into evidence.

Detective Walter Edmond

Detective Walter Edmond (“Det. Edmond”) testified that he was the

lead detective assigned to investigate the homicide of the victim. He was

notified that a suspect was in custody and that there was surveillance footage

of the shooting which caused the victim’s death. The surveillance footage

from the three cameras at the Astor Crown Plaza Hotel was then published

to the jury. Det. Edmond stated that the “top left” camera footage captured

the shooting. The surveillance footage reflected, and Det. Edmond testified,

that Defendant entered the picture from the bottom of the footage; he was

wearing a black hood over his head with a mask covering the lower portion

6

of his face and he was walking with an individual wearing a cream-colored

hooded sweatshirt. Then, Defendant stopped for a few minutes while on the

sidewalk near where a truck was parked. Defendant suddenly raised his

arm, firing shots, and everyone in the crowded area scattered. Defendant

then fled.

After watching the surveillance video and speaking with Off. O’Dell

about his apprehension of Defendant, Det. Edmond applied for an arrest

warrant for Defendant on the charge of second degree murder. The warrant

was subsequently signed by a juvenile court judge.

In connection with Det. Edmond’s testimony, a second video, the Real

Time Camera footage showing a view of the corner of Canal Street and

Bourbon Street was published to the jury. The footage reflected the victim,

wearing a black jacket, running across Canal Street and, after crossing the

street, collapsing.

Additional Real Time Crime Camera video footage, showing a view

of the corner of Canal Street and Carondelet Street was published to the jury.

This footage depicted the crowd fleeing from the scene of the shooting and

numerous police officers heading toward where the shots were fired.

On cross-examination, Det. Edmond confirmed that he did not speak

with any individual who was with the victim on the night he was shot and,

therefore, did not know what transpired prior to the shooting. The same was

true with respect to Defendant; because Det. Edmond did not question

Defendant, he did not know what occurred before the shooting took place.

J’kari Campbell

Defendant testified that at the time of the shooting, he was fifteen

years old. He had traveled from Baton Rouge to New Orleans to attend the

Bayou Classic. He explained that he brought a gun with him because earlier

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that year, he had been shot following football tryouts. He carried the

weapon “for … protection.”

Following the game, he and his friend, Daryl, along with others,

“ended up” in a hotel room. Thereafter, they decided to go to Bourbon Street

and “ended up walking around Bourbon, and I think Canal Street.” Once

they arrived in the Bourbon Street area, Defendant saw several people he

knew including two girls, Coreyanna and Nana, and stopped to speak with

them. While they were talking, the victim, who Defendant had never met

before, came up to speak with Nana. At some point thereafter, the victim

looked at Defendant, who was standing nearby, and told Nana – “Y’all got

this b*tch-a** n*gga around y’all.” When Defendant asked if the insult was

directed at him, the victim responded affirmatively. Defendant told the

victim he was not going “to play … like that” and thereafter, they “just got

to fussing….” As the verbal argument escalated, the victim “reach[ed] inside

his pants … flashed his gun” and stated: “I’ll use this b*tch, I’ll use this

b*tch.” At that point, the victim’s friends pulled him away, advising, “No

bro, there [are] too many people. Not right here.”

Defendant testified that following the victim’s threat, he was scared;

he thought the victim was going to shoot him. He noted that he had been

shot before and “still had trauma from that situation.” Thereafter, Defendant

went to a hotel lobby for a few minutes to charge his cell phone. Before he

left the hotel, “I put a ski mask on … because I didn’t want anybody else to

… see me” and “didn’t want to get into any more altercations.” Once

outside, he and his friends tried to decide where to go next. Defendant

stated that he was ready to leave, but his friends wanted to stay in the area.

Approximately ten minutes after his verbal altercation with the victim,

he saw the victim walking in his direction. Defendant testified: “I thought

8

he was looking for me. I was scared…. I panicked.” Defendant stated that

he could see the victim and his friends getting closer and “I felt like I was

trapped … like I was surrounded…. So that’s when I blacked out, and I

shot.” Defendant said he thought he was “either going to get jumped, or

potentially shot.” He stated that he “just pulled the gun out, and I shot

twice.” Defendant testified that when he shot, he was not aiming at the

victim; he was not trying to “hit” the victim. It was not until the following

day that he learned he had shot someone.

After the shooting, Defendant “took off running.” However, he only

“made it, like, a couple [of] feet” before he slipped. After a few seconds, he

“got back up and … began to run again” and that was when a police officer

“tackled” him. Defendant explained that the officer “ended up slamming me,

and my head hit [a] pole.” At that point, his gun fell to the ground and the

officer “placed his knee on my back, and he got the gun.” As a result of this

interaction, Defendant sustained “a knot on [his] head.”

The officer arrested Defendant at which point, he said “I just got to

saying all type[s] of things that weren’t true.” Defendant explained that he

started lying because he “was scared to go to jail.” At that time, Defendant

did not know that he would ultimately be charged with murder; he did not

know that anyone had been hurt. When he learned that he had been charged

with second degree murder, he “felt like a bad person … [b]ecause I never

wanted to do that.” Defendant stated that he regretted firing his gun; he

“made a mistake” and was “sorry to everybody who I hurt….” It was not his

intent to kill the victim.

On cross-examination, Defendant confirmed that after firing his gun

twice, he fled the scene. Further, he admitted that when the police officer

“grabbed” him, he “struggled,” attempting to resist apprehension.

9

Additionally, Defendant admitted that he initially lied, telling the police

officer that he did not have a gun. Defendant also admitted lying to police

when he told them that he thought “somebody shot at me.” Defendant also

falsely told police that “people [were] out here shooting, I ran. What was I

supposed to do?” Defendant admitted that he was the only person who fired

shots.

Defendant estimated that he was “like a foot or two away” from the

victim when he raised his arm and fired his gun. Defendant also confirmed

that the victim was not looking at him when he fired his weapon; the victim

was walking away from him. Defendant admitted that the victim did not see

him fire his gun.

Although the surveillance video showed Defendant raising his arm

and pointing the gun in a forward direction, Defendant maintained that he

blacked out and was not intentionally aiming the gun at anyone. Defendant

was asked: “[I]f you’re not intentionally trying [to] point the gun at anyone

and just happened to point it at [the victim], why not just point the gun up in

the sky? Or at the ground? Just to scare everybody.” Defendant responded:

“Like I said, I blacked out. I wasn’t thinking.”

Christin Wagner

Christin Wagner (“Ms. Wagner”) testified that she worked at the

Louisiana Center for Children’s Rights as a staff investigator. She stated that

she was initially assigned to investigate the instant matter and as part of that

investigation, on December 5, 2022, she searched for surveillance footage

reflecting the initial confrontation between Defendant and the victim, when

the victim allegedly “flashed” a gun at defendant. Ms. Wagner, however,

was unable to find any pertinent footage, explaining that one of the places

she visited, the New Orleans Tourism Center, “dumps” its surveillance every

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six days so, by the time she visited, the surveillance from November 26,

2022, the night of the shooting, no longer existed. The other places she

visited either did not have surveillance cameras on the exterior or did not

have cameras directed toward the location where the initial encounter

between Defendant and the victim occurred.

ERRORS PATENT

A review of the record pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920 indicates no

errors patent.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error No. 1

As his first assignment of error, Defendant argues that the evidence

was insufficient to prove he committed second degree murder; instead,

Defendant claims the evidence supported only the responsive verdict of

manslaughter.

Generally, when assessing the sufficiency of evidence to support a

conviction, the reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact finder

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

This review must include the whole record, as a rational fact finder does.

State v. Gibson, 2015-0682, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 186 So.3d 772,

780 (citing State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La. 1988)). “It is not the

function of the appellate court to assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh the evidence.” State v. Johnson, 619 So.2d 1102, 1109 (La. App. 4

Cir. 1993) (citing State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 968 (La. 1986); see also

State v. Gibson, 2015-0682, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 186 So.3d 772,

780 (“[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes

11

the witnesses or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the

evidence.” (quoting State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319, 1324 (La. 1992)).

Credibility determinations, as well as the weight to be attributed to the

evidence, fall soundly within the province of the fact finder. State v.

Brumfield, 1993-2404, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/15/94), 639 So.2d 312,

316.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the

offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.

14:30.1(A)(1). When a defendant commits a homicide that would be first or

second degree murder “in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately

caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-

control and cool reflection[,]” it is manslaughter. La. R.S. 14:31(A).

“Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds

that the offender’s blood had actually cooled, or that an average person’s

blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]” Id.

“Sudden passion” and “heat of blood” are not elements of manslaughter.

State v. Snyder, 1998-1078, p. 4 (La. 4/14/99), 750 So.2d 832, 837. Rather,

“they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense . . . .” Id. A defendant

bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence that he acted in

“sudden passion” or “heat of blood” in order to be entitled to a manslaughter

verdict. State v. Bowens, 2014-0416, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/10/14), 156

So.3d 770, 774. In reviewing a claim that a homicide was committed in

“sudden passion” or “heat of blood,” a reviewing court “must determine

whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, could have found that these mitigating factors

were not established by a preponderance of the evidence by the defendant.”

Id. (citing State v. Lombard, 486 So.2d 106, 110-11 (La. 1986).

12

Defendant asserts that the state failed to show that he possessed the

specific intent to kill the victim. According to Defendant, “during the

commission of a negligent discharge of a firearm, [the victim] was killed

without any intent.”

“Specific intent is a state of mind that need not be proven as fact but

may be inferred from circumstances and the actions of the defendant.” State

v. Smith, 2006-0318, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/21/06), 946 So.2d 218, 221

(citing State v. Bailey, 2000-1398 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/14/01), 782 So.2d 22,

24). “Whether a criminal defendant possesses the requisite intent is for the

trier of fact, and a review of the correctness of that determination is guided

by the Jackson standard.” State v. Handy, 2014-1015, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir.

12/10/14), 156 So.3d 785, 790 (citations omitted). “Both the Louisiana

Supreme Court and this Court [the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of

Appeal] have held that specific intent to kill can be inferred by pointing and

firing a gun at a person.” State v. Cooks, 2011-0342, p. 16 (La. App. 4 Cir.

12/14/11), 81 So.3d 932, 942 (citing [State v.] Bridgewater, on rehearing,

2000-1529, p. 3 [(La. 1/15/02)], 823 So.2d [877], 910; State v. Seals, 1995-

0305, p. 6 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 368, 373; State v. Scott, 2009-0138, p.

8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/18/09), 26 So.3d 283, 289, writ denied, 2009-2773 (La.

6/18/10), 38 So.3d 320; State v. Collor, 99-0175, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir.

4/26/00), 762 So.2d 96, 102).

Here, Defendant admitted that he shot at the victim two times as the

victim was walking away from him. The video also shows Defendant raise

his arm, point the gun, and open fire. Therefore, a rational finder of fact

could have determined that that the shooting was intentional and not a

negligent discharge of a firearm.

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In an effort to show on appeal that he acted in sudden passion or the

heat of blood, Defendant argues that he and the victim crossed paths again

“only a few minutes” after he and the victim exchanged harsh words and the

victim allegedly threatened him. However, a review of Defendant’s trial

testimony reflected that more than a few minutes passed. In fact, Defendant

stated that following his first encounter with the victim, he went to a hotel to

charge his cellphone. Defendant estimated that ten minutes elapsed between

their first encounter and when Defendant saw the victim walking in his

direction -- sufficient time for a rational juror to conclude that an average

person’s blood would have cooled before Defendant shot and killed the

victim. See State v. Dozier, 553 So.2d 911, 914 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989)

(citing State v. Landry, 499 So.2d 1320 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (After the

victim struck the defendant once, the victim “turned his attention away from

[the defendant], and several minutes passed before [the defendant] shot the

victim. A rational trier of fact could have believed that this was sufficient

time for [the defendant’s] blood to cool.” Thus, viewing the evidence in a

light most favorable to the prosecution, “we find that a rational trier of fact

could have found that the mitigating factors were not established by a

preponderance of the evidence” so as to warrant the reduction on appeal of a

second degree murder conviction to manslaughter).

Moreover, the cases cited by Defendant in support of his argument

that he should have been convicted of manslaughter rather than second

degree murder are distinguishable from the matter at hand. Defendant first

cites to State v. Lombard, 486 So.2d 106 (La. 1986), wherein the Louisiana

Supreme Court found that the evidence established sudden passion or heat of

blood sufficient to require a reduction of the jury’s verdict of second degree

murder to manslaughter. However, in Lombard, the defendant killed the

14

victim while they were engaged in a physical fight. As the Louisiana

Supreme Court explained:

Defendant did not unsheathe his knife (the weapon used to kill
the victim) until after he had been punched, thrown against a
metal rail, knocked onto the cement ground, and put into a
stranglehold with his left arm wrenched behind his back. After
being placed in this position, in a panic, he lashed out with his
knife.

Id., 486 So.2d at 111.

Here, Defendant and the victim were not engaged in a physical

altercation when Defendant shot and killed the victim. As noted above,

Defendant testified the victim was not looking at him and had walked passed

Defendant when he fired the weapon. Defendant therefore was not in

immediate danger at the time.

Another case, State v. Hawkins, 631 So.2d 1288 (La. App. 4 Cir.

1/27/94), cited by Defendant, wherein this Court vacated a verdict of

attempted second degree murder, is also distinguishable from the instant

case. In Hawkins, at the time of the shooting, the victim and the defendant

were actively engaged in a verbal altercation stemming from a vehicular

collision. Hawkins did not point his gun and fire at the victim. Instead, he

“chose to shoot bullets into and around the victim’s van.” Id., 631 So.2d at

1290. This Court concluded that such action “was indicative of [an] intent

to damage the victim’s property, not kill the victim.” Id. As such, the

Hawkins Court found the evidence sufficient to support only a guilty verdict

to the responsive verdict of aggravated battery, rather than attempted second

degree murder or attempted manslaughter. Id. at 1291.

In the case at hand, contrary to Hawkins, Defendant shot directly at

the victim. While Defendant claimed he had no intent to kill the victim, he

was asked that if that was not his intent, why did he fire the weapon in the

15

victim’s direction; “why not just point the gun up in the sky? Or at the

ground? Just to scare everybody.” Defendant could provide no explanation;

he simply stated that he “blacked out.”

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a

rational fact finder could have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of second degree murder. Accordingly, Defendant’s claim that the

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder

lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 2

As his second assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial

court erred in denying his motion for a new trial or, alternatively, failing to

conduct an evidentiary hearing, based on the affidavit of alternate juror, J.S.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 858 limits appellate review of the trial court’s ruling

on a motion for new trial. State v. McKinnies, 2013-1412, p. 9 (La.

10/15/14), 171 So.3d 861, 869. Therefore, appellate courts “review the trial

court's ruling on the new trial motion only for legal error.” Id. Additionally,

the decision on a motion for new trial rests within the sound discretion of the

trial court. State v. Brisban, 2000-3437, p. 12 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So. 2d 923,

931.

This Court in State v. Riley, 2023-0040, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir.

8/31/23), 372 So.3d 77, 90, recently summarized the standard and burden of

proof on a motion for new trial as follows:

“Neither the appellate nor supervisory jurisdiction of the
supreme court may be invoked to review the granting or the
refusal to grant a new trial, except for error of law.” La. C.Cr.P.
art. 858. “[T]he trial judge has much discretion in ruling on a
motion for a new trial and, upon review, an appellate court may
only set aside the judgment upon a finding that the trial judge
exercised his discretion in an arbitrary manner.” State v.
Williams, [20]17-0544, p. 29 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/14/18), 240
So.3d 355, 371 (quoting State v. Chambers, [20]16-0712, p. 12

16

(La. App. 4 Cir. 2/15/17), 212 So.3d 643, 650). Thus, legal
determinations such as the denial of a motion for new trial, are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v.
Guillory, [20]10-1231, p. 4 (La. 10/8/10), 45 So.3d 612, 615.
“A defendant bears the burden of proof when seeking a new
trial as a result of his conviction, previously obtained by the
prosecution.” State v. Armstead, [20]14-0036, p. 25 (La. App. 4
Cir. 1/28/15), 159 So.3d 502, 519. “When the allegations of a
motion for new trial are not supported by proof, a [district]
judge properly overrules the motion.” State v. McKinnies,
[20]13-1412, p. 11 (La. 10/15/14), 171 So.3d 861, 870 (citing
State v. Bueche, 243 La. 160, 186, 142 So.2d 381, 390 (La.
1962); State v. Slack, 227 La. 598, 602, 80 So.2d 89, 90 (La.
1955); State v. Roberson, 159 La. 562, 568, 105 So. 621, 623
(La. 1925)). “Allegations raised in the motion alone are not
sufficient, as a defendant has the burden to show that an
injustice has been done to him.” Id. (citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 851).

Id.

In her affidavit, filed under seal, alternate juror J.S. swore that some

of the jurors may have observed the computer screen located on the

prosecutor’s table which displayed an Instagram account of a black teenage

boy. J.S. stated that no social media evidence was ever admitted into

evidence.

J.S. also attested that one of the jurors fell asleep during the trial and

specifically had slept through jury instructions. J.S. further swore that

several of the jurors, contrary to the trial court’s instructions, were

conversing about the case during breaks and that some jurors, including the

foreperson, reached a decision regarding Defendant’s guilt before the close

of trial.

Defendant argues that the above allegations of jury misconduct in

J.S.’s affidavit show that Defendant was deprived of the fundamental rights

to due process and a trial by a fair and impartial jury. Defendant notes that

J.S.’s statement regarding the Instagram account shows that some jurors

were potentially exposed to inadmissible prejudicial information.

17

In its brief, however the State argues that all of Defendant’s claims

related to the alternate juror’s affidavit should be dismissed on appeal as the

issues are not a part of the trial record. The State instead asserts that post-

conviction relief would be the more appropriate avenue to review

Defendant’s claims as a full evidentiary hearing could be conducted.

With regard to J.S.’s first allegation of jury misconduct pertaining to

the social media evidence, the affidavit does not specify what the Instagram

photo/profile of the “black teenage boy” actually depicted. However,

Defendant’s brief suggests that Instagram photo was of Defendant “posing

with guns.”

The United States Supreme Court, generally, has provided that

evidence “against a Defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public

courtroom….” Turner v. State of La., 379 U.S. 466, 473, 85 S.Ct. 546, 550,

13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965). Also, “[i]f a defendant is able to demonstrate, by

preponderance of credible evidence, through juror testimony, that [a] juror

was exposed to extrinsic evidence, a presumption of prejudice becomes

operative that can be overcome by showing that the error was harmless.”

State v. Turner, 2016-1841, p. 85 (La. 12/5/18), 263 So.3d 337, 393 (citation

omitted); see also State v. Celestine, 2000-2173, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir.

2/13/02), 811 So.2d 44, 49.

Here, there is no evidence that actually shows that any other juror

aside from the alternate saw the allegedly prejudicial information on the

prosecution’s laptop.1 Moreover, even if a juror did observe an Instagram

1 Defendant suggests that based on the affidavit of J.S. that the exposure of the jurors to

the Instagram account occurred prior to a bench conference where the State attempted to
get the picture of Defendant into evidence. The transcript reflects that on cross-
examination, the State asked Defendant about whether the gun he used to shoot the
victim was the first gun he had ever had and whether he had ever possessed a gun prior to
the shooting. The defense objected to both lines of questioning and the trial court
sustained the objections. After an off-the-record bench conference was conducted, no

18

post of Defendant in possession of a gun, Defendant did not refute that he

had a gun; testified that he obtained a gun sometime prior to the incident;

and conceded in his brief that the evidence at trial proved manslaughter.

Thus, whether or not the social media evidence was improperly viewed by

members of the jury, it was established that Defendant had possession of and

had access to a gun. Moreover, Defendant admitted to firing the shots that

ultimately killed the victim. Accordingly, the guilty verdict was surely

unattributable to the alleged viewing of the social media evidence. As such,

any error on part of the trial court was harmless in this regard.

Furthermore, as argued by the State, Defendant’s complaints about

jury misconduct are more suitably addressed in post-conviction proceedings.

An application for post-conviction relief “allows for the presentation of

claims that could not be addressed on direct review, including … juror

misconduct, or any other cognizable ground that relies on evidence outside

the trial record.” State v. Ballard, 2020-0617, p. 2, n. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir.

7/21/21), 325 So.3d 450, 456 (quoting State v. Harris, 2018-1012, p. 17 (La.

7/9/20), 340 So.3d 845, 857). “This is because post-conviction relief creates

the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.”

State v. Sims, 2017-0101, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/15/17), 231 So.3d 742,

753 (citing State v. Ellis, 42,520, p. 19 (La. App. 2d Cir. 9/26/07), 966 So.2d

139, 150). Thus, the jurors could arguably be questioned as to whether they

saw the extraneous social media evidence in post-conviction proceedings.

As to the second issue of jury misconduct of a sleeping juror during

trial, the “leading case on the issue” is State v. Cass, 356 So.2d 396 (La.

further questions were posed regarding Defendant’s alleged prior possession of guns.
However, this colloquy does not necessarily establish that the State at that time was
attempting to introduce the Instagram photo or that other jurors had observed the photo.

19

1977). See State v. Brown, 2023-01715, p. 8 (La. 12/13/24), --- So.3d ----, --

-- 2024 WL 5102920, *5. In Cass, the trial court noted the “juror’s head

was hanging low, often-times bobbing or nodding, and his eyes were

closed.” Cass, 356 So.2d at 397. After a few minutes, the trial court

ordered the removal of the juror and replaced him with an alternate. The

juror, before exiting the courtroom, stated twice he had not been sleeping.

The Louisiana Supreme Court, found that the trial court erred in removing a

juror who “briefly doze[d] off,” finding that such evidence was not “per se

proof of inability to perform, or any character of disqualification.” Id. at 398;

see also La. C.Cr.P. art. 789 (providing that alternate jurors shall replace

jurors who become “unable to perform or disqualified from performing their

duties.”).

However, the Cass Court observed that “[h]ad the juror been shown to

have been sleeping through a substantial part of the trial or had he been

unable to stay awake despite warnings or efforts to arouse him … we would

be presented with a substantially different question for review.” Cass, 356

So.2d at 398.

Here, aside from the allegations of J.S., there is no evidence to show

that a juror was asleep during a substantial portion of the trial nor evidence

of persistent inability of the juror to stay awake despite several efforts of the

trial court.2 Moreover, evidence of a sleeping juror would not automatically

2 There is one point during the testimony of Mr. McElrath, where the trial court took a

short recess after conversing with a juror but it is not clear that that juror was actually
asleep. The transcript provides:

THE COURT: You okay?
JUROR: Yeah.
THE COURT: You need a cup of coffee? All right we can take a five
minute break and stretch our legs. Anyone need to break? All right. Five
minute break. You know stretch our legs.

Additionally, there was no mention of a sleeping juror by the State, the defense,
or the trial court during the trial proceedings.

20

call for a removal of said juror nor mandate the reversal of Defendant’s

conviction. Defendant’s allegations of misconduct do not warrant a remedy

on his direct appeal. However, Defendant is permitted to raise this argument

in his post-conviction application.

Finally, J.S. asserted that some of the jurors reached their

determination that Defendant was guilty after seeing the video footage of the

shooting prior to deliberations and that some jurors discussed the evidence

during breaks.

In State v. McKemie, unpub., 2008-2093 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/11/09),

2009 WL 3030743, *8, defense counsel, following trial, “received a letter

from one of the jurors informing him that during a trial recess, in the

deliberation room, an unnamed juror expressed her belief that the defendant

was guilty.” Similarly, in State v. Quiambao, 36,587, p. 10 (La. App. 2 Cir.

12/11/02), 833 So.2d 1103, 1109, after trial defense counsel “received a

letter from [the jury foreman] alleging, inter alia, that individual jurors were

discussing the facts of the case during breaks in the trial, contrary to the

court’s instructions and before they received the case for deliberation.”

In both McKemie and Quiambao, the appellate courts, relying on the

“jury shield law” found in La. C.E. art. 606(B), determined that an

evidentiary hearing was not warranted as the jurors were prohibited from

offering testimony. In their analyses, both courts cited La. C.E. art. 606(B),

which provides:

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or
emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether any outside influence was improperly brought
to bear upon any juror, and, in criminal cases only, whether

21

extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the jury’s attention. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any
statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be
precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

McKemie, 2009 WL 3030743 at *9; Quiambao, 36,587, pp.10-11, 833 So.2d

at 1109-1110.

Based upon the above provision, the McKemie Court reasoned:

The prohibition contained in Article 606B … is intended to
preserve the finality of jury verdicts and the confidentiality of
discussions among jurors. See State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123,
136 (La. 1982). Only well-pleaded allegations of prejudicial
juror misconduct violating a defendant’s constitutional rights
will require an evidentiary hearing at which jurors shall testify.
Unless such pleadings are made with particularity, jury
members are not competent to testify. See State v. Duncan, 563
So.2d 1269, 1272 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1990) (Defendant’s well-
pleaded allegation of prejudicial juror misconduct was
sufficient to overcome the prohibition against a juror
testifying).

The language of Article 606B permits a juror to testify
regarding whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to the jury’s attention. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding evidence of alleged misconduct in this
case. Communications among jurors, although violating the
trial court’s instruction, do not amount to “outside influences”
or “extraneous” information…. [The defendant] argues that
one or more of the jurors might have improperly influenced
other jurors by expressing his opinion at an inappropriate time
and that the jurors were not diligent in deliberating. The factors
that lead a juror to his decision are squarely within the
prohibition of Article 606B against juror testimony: “a juror
may not testify ... to the effect of anything upon his or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or
dissent from the verdict ... or concerning his mental processes
... therewith....”

McKemie, 2009 WL 3030743, *9.

Similarly, in Quiambao, the Second Circuit stated:

The jurors’ discussion of the facts among themselves,
although in violation of the trial court’s instructions, was not
shown to inject into the proceedings any outside influence or
extraneous prejudicial information. The district court was not
plainly wrong to find that the jury foreman’s letter does not
meet the exception of art. 606B and to exclude his testimony.
State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123 (La. 1982), cert. dismissed,
461 U.S. 950, 103 S.Ct. 2419, 77 L.Ed.2d 1309; State v. Horne,

22

28,327 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/21/96), 679 So.2d 953, writ denied,
96-2345 (La. 2/21/97), 688 So.2d 521.

Quiambao, 36,587, p. 11, 833 So.2d at 1110.

Because conversation among jurors, while violating the trial court’s

instruction, does not amount to extraneous prejudicial information or outside

influence, Defendant’s argument regarding J.S’s attestations of intra-juror

communication discussing evidence/opinions do not warrant this Court’s

intervention.

In summary, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion for new trial and in declining the alternative request for hearing.

There is no proof that a sitting juror was exposed to the alleged extraneous

social medial evidence (the Instagram photograph of Defendant allegedly in

possession of weapons) and any error in that regard is harmless. Further,

there is no record of a juror sleeping through a substantial part of the trial in

the transcript. Further, J.S.’s allegations of a prejudicial Instagram

photograph and the sleeping juror are more appropriately addressed in post-

conviction proceedings wherein Defendant could obtain a full evidentiary

hearing. Moreover, with regard to J.S.’s attestation of juror

communications, such communications, though violative of the trial court’s

instruction, do not fall within the exception set forth in La. C.E. art. 606(B).

As such, Defendant’s second assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 3

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State, in

voir dire and in closing argument, to “emphasize and mischaracterize the

possibility of parole as a sentencing option for second degree murder,” and

by “instructing the jury on the possibility of parole and the possible

sentences for lesser verdicts.”

23

The record provides that prior to the commencement of trial, the trial

court ruled that the jury could be instructed regarding the sentence faced by

Defendant if convicted of second degree murder -- a mandatory life sentence

with parole eligibility after twenty-five years.3 On December 5, 2023,

Defendant renewed his motion to prohibit the State from informing the jury

of his parole eligibility, the trial court denied his renewed motion and

Defendant noted his objection.

Defendant is presently challenging the trial court’s ruling, claiming he

was prejudiced because it suggested he would only serve twenty-five years if

convicted. According to Defendant, his potential parole eligibility (and

possible release on parole) was too attenuated a consideration for jurors to

3 La. R.S. 14:30.1(B) provides: “Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder

shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence.” However, the punishment provision set forth in La. R.S.
14:30.1(B) is modified by La. R.S. 15:574.4(F)(1) when the person found guilty of
second degree murder is a juvenile. La. R.S. 15:574.4(F)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary … any person
serving a sentence of life imprisonment for a conviction of second degree
murder (R.S. 14:30.1) who was under the age of eighteen years at the time
of the commission of the offense and whose indictment for the offense is
on or after August 1, 2017, shall be eligible for parole consideration if all
of the following conditions have been met:
(a) The offender has served twenty-five years of the sentence imposed.
(b) The offender has not committed any major disciplinary offenses in
the twelve consecutive months prior to the parole hearing date. A major
disciplinary offense is an offense identified as a Schedule B offense by the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections in the Disciplinary Rules and
Procedures for Adult Offenders.
(c) The offender has completed the mandatory minimum of one
hundred hours of pre-release programming in accordance with R.S.
15:827.1.
(d) The offender has completed substance abuse treatment as
applicable.
(e) The offender has obtained or completed at least one of the
following:
(i) A literacy program.
(ii) An adult basic education program.
(iii) A job skills training program.
(iv) A high school equivalency certificate.
(f) The offender has obtained a low-risk level designation determined
by a validated risk assessment instrument approved by the secretary of the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
(g) The offender has completed a reentry program to be determined by
the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.

24

be permitted to hear about it. Instead, the jurors should have been concerned

only with whether or not Defendant was guilty.

In support of his argument, Defendant asserts that a jury may be

informed of a defendant’s mandatory sentence only at the request of the

defendant and since Defendant made no such request, such information was

not permitted. However, the case cited by Defendant, State v. Jackson, 450

So.2d 621 (La. 1984), does not support that assertion. Instead, the Jackson

Court provided: “When the penalty imposed by the statute is a mandatory

one, the trial judge must inform the jury of the penalty on request of the

defendant and must permit the defense to argue the penalty to the jury.”

Jackson, 450 So.2d at 633 (citing State v. Hooks, 421 So.2d 880 (La. 1982);

State v. Washington, 367 So.2d 4 (La. 1978)) (emphasis added). However,

the Jackson Court added that in other situations, where the statutory penalty

is not mandatory and no request is made by the defendant, information

regarding the penalty faced by the defendant if convicted is not prohibited.

Instead, “the decision to permit or deny an instruction or argument on an

offense’s penalty is within the discretion of the trial judge.” Jackson, 450

So.2d at 633-634 (citing State v. Williams, 420 So.2d 1116 (La. 1982); State

v. Dawson, 392 So.2d 445 (La. 1980); State v. Carthan, 377 So.2d 308 (La.

1979); State v. Blackwell, 298 So.2d 798 (La. 1974) (on rehearing), cert.

denied, 420 U.S. 976, 95 S.Ct. 1401, 43 L.Ed.2d 656 (1975)). It was thus

within the trial court’s discretion to allow an instruction on the sentence

faced by Defendant in the present case.

Next, Defendant cites State v. Jones, 639 So.2d 1144 (La. 7/5/94), to

support his claim that he was denied due process as a result of the jury being

informed that if convicted, he faced a mandatory life sentence with the

possibility of parole after serving twenty-five years.

25

However, Jones was a capital case and the issue was whether the jury

should be informed of the governor’s power to grant reprieve, pardon or

commutation of the defendant’s sentence and is thus distinguishable from

the present case. The Jones Court held that La. C.C.P. art. 905.2(B), which

required the trial court to instruct the jury in a capital trial on the

commutation powers of the governor, unconstitutional. Jones, 1994-0459, p.

13, 639 So.2d at 1153. Moreover, Jones was subsequently superseded by

Constitutional Amendment and La. C.Cr.P. art. 905.2(B) was reintroduced

and is now law. See State v. Loyd, 1996-1805, pp. 3-4 (La. 2/13/97), 689 So.

2d 1321, 1324; see also La. Const. art. I, § 16.

Additionally, as argued by the State, the governor’s power of

clemency is more speculative than the requirements necessary for parole

eligibility under La. R.S. 15:574.4(F)(1). The Jones Court observed: “The

executive clemency power can be and, admittedly, has been misused by the

granting or denying of pardons, commutations and reprieves based on

political motivations or favoritism.” Jones, 639 So.2d at 1150. Parole

eligibility under La R.S. 15:574.4, on the other hand, is specifically linked to

the offender’s age and the conviction of second degree murder. As such,

Defendant’s reliance on Jones is therefore misplaced and is inapplicable to

the case at bar.

Defendant also cites State v. Guidry, 2016-1412 (La. 3/15/17), 221

So.3d 815, to support his claim that the jury being informed of his parole

eligibility was improper. In Guidry, the State filed a motion in limine to

exclude the dissemination of information to the jury of the possible sentence

the defendant could face as a habitual offender. The trial court denied the

State’s motion and the court of appeal denied the State’s writ application.

The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, granted writs and held that the trial

26

court could not allow the defendant to inform the jury in argument of “the

mandatory minimum sentence the defendant could be subject to under the

Habitual Offender Law should the State seek to enhance his sentence under

that law and should the court find the State has proved all of the elements to

warrant enhancement of the sentence.” Guidry, 2016-1412, p. 1, 221 So.3d

at 816. The Court found such information “too attenuated from the guilt

phase of trial to be discussed before a jury….” Id.

Guidry, however, like Jones, is distinguishable because in the instant

case a defendant’s parole eligibility is clear should the defendant meet the

enumerated conditions set forth in La. R.S. 574.4(F)(1). The same cannot be

said with respect to a defendant’s sentencing under the multiple offender

statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1. As the Guidry Court reasoned:

A multiple offender bill is generally not filed until after
conviction, such that it does not logically constitute the “law of
the case” for the subject offense at trial as it pertains to the
scope of the jury’s duty as the factfinder. The jury has no role
in the enhancement of a sentence under the Habitual Offender
Law, because once the multiple offender bill is filed after
conviction, the adversarial hearing is conducted before the
judge and the State must prove to the judge the allegations in
the multiple offender bill. The principle that legal matters
irrelevant to guilt should not be pressed upon the jury …
applies even more forcefully in the context of the Habitual
Offender Law. It is axiomatic that, if the trial court has not yet
conducted a sentencing hearing, any sentence as a multiple
offender is speculative and indeterminate. As the Guillard
court noted, “a possible adjudication as a habitual offender is a
separate proceeding that punishes one for his status as a
recidivist, not for the most recent conviction. [State v.
Guillard,] [19]98-0594, p. 9 [(La. App. 4 Cir. 4/7/99),] 736
So.2d [273,] 278-79. Thus, the defendant’s status as a putative
multiple offender is irrelevant to the determination of guilt or
innocence of the tried offense. Allowing the jury to be
informed of the potential mandatory minimum sentences if and
when the defendant is proven to be a second, third, or fourth
felony offender has the potential to shift the focus of the jury
from a determination of guilt or innocence to issues regarding
sentencing. Such a shift would likely confuse the issues for
which the jury is responsible and invite jurors to speculate
about sentencing, including why a particular defendant is facing
such a term of imprisonment. In sum, the issue of possible

27

mandatory minimum sentences that could be imposed if the
State successfully pursues enhancement through a multiple
offender bill is too far attenuated from the guilt phase of trial to
be discussed before a jury.

Guidry, 2016-1412, pp. 14-15, 221 So.3d at 824.

Accordingly, the cases Defendant relies upon to support his argument

are inapplicable. The trial court in the instant case was entitled in its

discretion to instruct the jury on the mandatory sentence imposed by a guilty

verdict. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. 4

Lastly, Defendant claims that the mandatory minimum sentence he

received of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving

twenty-five years was excessive.

In State v. Green, 2017-0520, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/15/17), 231

So.3d 756, 758, this Court addressed an excessive sentence claim in the

context of the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, stating:

The Louisiana Constitution guarantees that “[n]o law
shall subject any person to ... cruel, excessive or unusual
punishment.” That protection allows the judicial branch to
determine whether the range of sentences authorized by a
criminal statute is excessive for a particular defendant. The
court must start with the presumption that a mandatory
minimum sentence is constitutional. In order to rebut that
presumption, a defendant must clearly and convincingly prove
that he is exceptional. This Court has articulated that
exceptional “means that because of unusual circumstances he is
a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are
meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the
gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.”

If the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutionally
excessive then a downward departure is required under [State
v.] Dorthey, [623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993)]. “A punishment is
constitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and is nothing
more than the purposeless imposition of pain and suffering and
is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” A
sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and
punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society,
it shocks the sense of justice.

28

(footnotes omitted).

A trial court is afforded broad discretion in making sentencing

decisions and an appellate court will not set aside an imposed sentence if the

record supports the sentence imposed. State v. Bradley, 2018-0734, p. 8 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 5/15/19), 272 So.3d 94, 99-100. Thus, “[t]he relevant question

is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether

another sentence might have been more appropriate.” State v. Mathieu,

2018-964, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/6/19), 283 So.3d 1041, 1045 (citing State

v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957).

In reviewing a claim that a sentence is excessive, an appellate court

generally must determine whether the trial judge has adequately complied

with statutory guidelines in La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and whether the sentence

is warranted under the facts established by the record. State v. Wiltz, 2008-

1441, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/09) 28 So.3d 554, 561. However, even

where there has not been full compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1,

resentencing is unnecessary where the record shows an adequate factual

basis for the sentence imposed. State v. Stukes, 2008-1217, p. 25 (La. App.

4 Cir. 9/9/09), 19 So.3d 1233, 1250 (citing State v. Major, 1996-1214, p. 10

(La. App. 4 Cir. 3/4/98), 708 So.2d 813, 819). Further, La. C.Cr.P. art.

881.4(D) expressly states that an “appellate court shall not set aside a

sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed.”

Defendant argues that the trial court “despite the mandatory sentence,

should [have] consider[ed] the [La. C.Cr.P. art.] 894.1 guidelines and the

circumstances of the case to determine whether a downward departure [was]

appropriate.”

29

However, the record supports Defendant’s mandatory minimum

sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole after twenty-five

years. The video evidence showed and Defendant testified the victim

merely walked past when Defendant fired two shots, killing him. The record

thus reflects an intentional shooting of the victim.

Moreover, a review of the January 18, 2024 hearing reflects that the

trial court took into consideration mitigating factors. The trial court

considered written material submitted in support of Defendant and heard

testimony from Lee Reisman (“Ms. Reisman”), the superintendent of the

Juvenile Justice Intervention Center (“JJIC”) where Defendant was

incarcerated. Ms. Reisman stated that she had known Defendant for “a little

over a year” and described him as “quiet, very smart, very well spoken and

really grounded in faith and spirituality, humble.” She further stated that

Defendant, unlike most of the youths incarcerated in JJIC, “participated in

almost all of the activities that [JJIC] offer[ed].” Additionally, the trial court

heard testimony from Kenneth Dorsey (“Mr. Dorsey”), the “Transition

Coordinator and Justice Coordinator for Travis Hill NOLA.” Mr. Dorsey

explained that he interacts with juveniles who have “adult charge[s]” lodged

against them. Upon meeting Defendant, Mr. Dorsey wondered how he could

be incarcerated; how did he get into trouble. Mr. Dorsey, like Ms. Reisman,

testified that Defendant expressed remorse over the shooting. Further, like

Ms. Reisman, Mr. Dorsey testified that since his incarceration, Defendant

has been involved in several activities at Travis Hill, as well as at JJIC.

After listening to the testimony of Ms. Reisman and Mr. Dorsey about

Defendant’s participation in activities offered at JJIC and Travis Hill, the

trial court questioned defense counsel as to why Defendant would be unable

to participate in comparable programs following his conviction in this case.

30

In response, defense counsel explained that she was not stating that

Defendant could not participate in such programs while incarcerated; that

she was not seeking a sentence that did not require a period of incarceration,

but rather sought a sentence “that will ensure that he is able to return to the

community someday.”

The trial court then listened to defense counsel’s argument regarding

how Defendant “was not the same child who pulled the trigger on November

27, 2022” as well as a written statement by Defendant. After which, the trial

court announced that it was ready to impose a sentence. The trial court stated

it found no reason that would warrant a downward departure from the

mandatory minimum sentence, reasoning:

When I listen to what the [d]efense has said and what
their witnesses said and I hear things like “that offense” or “that
incident” or “that awful situation” or “a mistake” or that “this
incident caused a lot of harm,” in my mind that minimalizes
what actually happened. It wasn’t “that offense,” it wasn’t “an
[i]ncident,” it wasn’t “an awful situation,” it wasn’t “a
mistake,” it wasn’t “something that caused a lot of harm.” It
was second degree murder, and that’s what the jury found. I
think that the courts and the legislature contemplated the
possibility of rehabilitation as it relates to juveniles, hence the
parole eligibility after a 25 year sentence. When we think about
Dorthey, it’s always about the exceptionality. I would have to
have found that this sentence is constitutionally excessive.
After hearing the evidence provided by the [d]efense I disagree
that a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole is unconstitutionally excessive. Therefore, I’m denying
the [d]efense’s motion under State versus Dorthey…. While I
do find that it’s true that the defendant is bright, he’s studious
and I think he can be rehabilitated, I believe the state
legislature…has accounted for this opportunity by creating
parole if it is merited. The Parole Board is the best body to
decide whether reintegration into society is appropriate after
serving the requisite 25 years. Again, I’m finding that under
[the] Dorthey standard that the sentence of life with the
possibility of parole is not constitutionally excessive.

As reflected above, the trial court considered Defendant’s

circumstances when imposing the mandatory minimum sentence but in light

of the specifics of the crime, found the mitigating factors unconvincing.

31

We cannot say that Defendant’s sentence shocks our sense of justice or

makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals. As such, the

trial court did not abuse its broad discretion when failing to depart from the

sentence prescribed by law.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

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