State of Louisiana v. Wilbert D. Jefferson, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-KA-0724

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
WILBERT D. JEFFERSON, JR. *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*******

APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 553-339, SECTION “K”
Judge Marcus DeLarge
******
Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase
******
(Court composed of Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge
Rachael D. Johnson)

Jason R. Williams
District Attorney
Parish of Orleans
Brad Scott
Chief of Appeals
Patricia Amos
Assistant District Attorney
619 South White Street
New Orleans, Louisiana
70119

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

Mary Constance Hanes
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 4015
New Orleans, Louisiana
70178-4015

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED;
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED;
SENTENCES AFFIRMED IN PART;
REMANDED IN PART FOR RE-SENTENCING
JUNE 30, 2025

TGC
DNA
RDJ

Defendant/Appellant, Wilbert Jefferson, Jr. (hereinafter “Mr. Jefferson”),

seeks review of his convictions and sentences for manslaughter, felon in

possession of a firearm and obstruction of justice. After consideration of the record

before this Court and the applicable law, we deny the motion to dismiss Mr.

Jefferson’s appeal filed by Appellee, the State of Louisiana (hereinafter “the

State”), and affirm Mr. Jefferson’s convictions. However, finding his sentence for

felon in possession of a firearm fails to include the statutorily mandated fine, we

remand this matter to the district court to set the mandated fine. The remaining

three sentences imposed by the district court are affirmed.

Statement of the Case

On February 24, 2022, Mr. Jefferson was charged by a grand jury indictment

with the following: (i) second degree murder committed with a firearm, in

violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (Count 1); (ii) attempted second degree murder with a

firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:(27)30.1 (Count 2); (iii) felon in possession of a

firearm, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1(Count 3); and (iv) obstruction of justice in

a homicide investigation, in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1 (Count 4).

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After a three-day jury trial, the jury found Mr. Jefferson guilty of the

responsive verdicts of manslaughter as to Count 1 and aggravated battery as to

Count 2. He was also found guilty of the crimes of felon in possession of a firearm

and obstruction of justice. Mr. Jefferson’s sentencing hearing occurred on January

4, 2024, where he was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment, without the

benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence for his manslaughter

conviction; ten-years without probation, parole or suspension of sentence for his

aggravated battery conviction; twenty-years for his felon in possession of firearm

conviction; and twenty-years for his obstruction of justice conviction.1 The district

court ordered each of Mr. Jefferson’s sentences run concurrently and that he

receive credit for time served. This appeal followed.

Relevant Facts and Testimony

On August 9, 2021, Devante Jefferson (hereinafter “Devante”) and his sister,

Destiny Jefferson (hereinafter “Destiny”), were shot at a residence in the 2200

block of Allen Street in New Orleans, Louisiana. Both were transported to

University Medical Center where Devante later died as a result of his gunshot

wounds. Detective Walter Edmond (hereinafter “Detective Edmond”), with the

New Orleans Police Department, was assigned to investigate the shootings and

Devante’s death.

Detective Edmond’s investigation revealed that Devante and Destiny,

cousins of Mr. Jefferson, were shot at a family gathering on August 9, 2021. As

part of his investigation, he spoke with numerous family members who were

present at the gathering. He discovered that Mr. Jefferson and Devante were

1 The State of Louisiana and Mr. Jefferson objected to the district court’s sentences, but failed to

articulate reasons for their objections.

2

involved in three separate physical altercations on the day of the shooting. After

the last altercation, Mr. Jefferson left the gathering, returned shortly thereafter, shot

Devante and Destiny and then fled the scene. According to the ballistics evidence

and eye-witness accounts, he determined that Mr. Jefferson used his brother’s gun

to shoot Devante and Destiny. Although Detective Edmond did not locate a firearm

during the investigation; he concluded that Mr. Jefferson was the shooter. At some

point after the shooting, Mr. Jefferson traveled to Texas, returned to Louisiana and

was found living in a motel in Jefferson Parish. 2 He was arrested, pursuant to a

warrant, on October 12, 2021.

Detective Edmond was the first to testify for the State at Mr. Jefferson’s

trial. His testimony included a full account of his investigation of the shootings and

Devante’s death. Sean McElrath, the forensic firearm specialist with the New

Orleans Police Department, testified that his investigation led him to conclude that

the shell casings found at the residence were all fired from the same firearm. The

State also submitted a video, which was viewed by the jury, of Mr. Jefferson’s

interrogation following his arrest. Mr. Jefferson stated that he did not recall

shooting Devante nor did he remember possessing a gun on the day of the

shooting.

Dr. Cynthia Gardner (hereinafter “Dr. Gardner”), a pathologist with the

Orleans Parish Coroner’s Office, testified as an expert in forensic pathology. She

stated that she performed Devante’s autopsy and determined that his death was

caused by multiple gunshot wounds. Dr. Gardner explained that Devante was shot

2 When found in the motel room, Mr. Jefferson was in possession of a firearm and narcotics. It

was determined that the firearm found in his motel room was not the one used to shoot Devante
and Destiny.

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twice and that both of the bullets entered and exited his body. She opined that

Devante was shot while his back was facing the shooter.

Devante’s mother, Keyoka Jefferson (hereinafter “Keyoka”) testified for the

State. She described Mr. Jefferson and Devante as having a very close relationship

and “were more like brothers” than cousins. She testified that the two were co-

defendants in an aggravated robbery, with a deadly weapon, in the state of Texas.

Keyoka testified that on the day of the shooting, several family members spent the

day celebrating the birthday of Mr. Jefferson’s deceased mother and the family

chartered a party bus to celebrate. All of the adults on the party bus, including

Devante and Mr. Jefferson, were consuming alcohol. Keyoka explained that after

exiting the party bus, Devante and Mr. Jefferson began fighting and were separated

by other family members. She acknowledged that Devante and Mr. Jefferson often

fought as it was a normal part of their relationship. Keyoka recounted that Devante

and Mr. Jefferson were involved in three separate physical altercations on the day

of the shooting. At first, she let Devante and Mr. Jefferson “fight it out” because it

was a common occurrence. Keyoka explained that Mr. Jefferson initiated the

physical altercations and provoked Devante to continue fighting. After the third

fight, she testified that Mr. Jefferson left the house in a vehicle with several

women. Keyoka stated that Mr. Jefferson returned to the residence, pulled a gun

from his brother’s waistband and shot Devante. When asked if Devante had a gun

on him at any time during the day of the shooting, Keyoka answered in the

negative. She testified that Devante and Destiny were transported to the hospital in

a personal vehicle.

Devante’s younger sisters, Destiny and Taiteona Jefferson (hereinafter

“Taiteona”), also testified at trial. Their collective testimony echoed Keyoka’s

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testimony regarding the sequence of events that lead to Devante’s death. Both

sisters also acknowledged that Mr. Jefferson and Devante had a very close bond

and that their relationship often involved physical and verbal altercations.

Specifically, on August 9, 2021, Taiteona and Destiny stated that it was Mr.

Jefferson who began the altercations by punching Devante after exiting the party

bus. Devante’s sisters also denied seeing Devante with a gun and stated that they

traveled to the hospital in a personal vehicle in which Devante’s body laid across

their laps in the back seat. Taiteona also testified that she witnessed Mr. Jefferson

shout Devante’s name, pull the gun out of his brother’s waistband and shoot her

brother. After the shooting, the scene was very chaotic and Taiteona recalled her

mother, Keyoka, punching Mr. Jefferson in the face after he shot Devante. On

cross-examination, Taiteona conceded that all of the adults on the party bus were

consuming alcohol and noted that Devante and Mr. Jefferson drank alcohol heavily

throughout the day. Destiny also testified that she was hit by a stray bullet in her

leg and fell to the ground near Devante.

Larry Crockett (hereinafter “Mr. Crockett”), a friend of Mr. Jefferson,

testified for the defense.3 He explained that he had known Mr. Jefferson for

approximately six years and had only met Devante once prior to the day of the

shooting. At trial, Mr. Crockett stated that he was on the party-bus with Mr.

Jefferson, Devante and other family members. He explained that the majority of

the adults were consuming alcohol, including Mr. Jefferson and Devante. He

explained how Devante and Mr. Jefferson “got into” a verbal altercation when the

party bus stopped at a convenience store. Mr. Crockett testified that Devante was

upset with Mr. Jefferson “for not having his back” with the clerk and police at the

3 Mr. Crockett testified by Zoom.

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store. When asked about the physical altercations once they returned to the

residence, Mr. Crockett testified that there were three separate altercations that

were each “broken-up” by family members. He testified that the first altercation

began when Mr. Jefferson interjected himself into a fight between Devante and a

younger cousin, Brandon Allen. After the last altercation with Devante, Mr.

Crockett stated that he saw Mr. Jefferson attempt to end the fight amicably, but

Devante refused. He then testified that he saw Mr. Jefferson leave the gathering.

When Mr. Jefferson returned, Mr. Crockett explained that Devante was packing his

belongings in a black duffle bag. He then witnessed Mr. Jefferson grab his

brother’s gun and shoot Devante. Mr. Crockett testified that Mr. Jefferson “must

have thought … [Devante] was going for a gun” in the black duffle bag.

Nonetheless, when asked if he ever saw Devante with a gun on the day of the

shooting, Mr. Crockett responded in the negative.

A younger cousin of Mr. Jefferson and Devante, Brandon Allen (hereinafter

“Brandon”), also testified for the defense.4 Brandon testified that after exiting the

party bus, Devante accused him of making vulgar statements about Mr. Jefferson’s

deceased mother. He stated that Devante then slapped him in the face and the two

began to fight. Brandon explained that Mr. Jefferson got involved to “break-up”

the altercation. Brandon further testified that Mr. Jefferson and Devante were then

involved in two subsequent physical altercations as a result of Devante slapping

Brandon in the face. When asked if he saw Devante with a gun on the day of the

shooting, Brandon responded in the negative.

4 Brandon also testified by Zoom.

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Assignments of Error

On appeal, Mr. Jefferson asserts the following two assignments of error:

1. The evidence is insufficient to support Wilbert D. Jefferson, Jr.’s
convictions for manslaughter (Count 1); felon in possession of a
firearm (Count 3); and obstruction of justice (Count 4); [and]

2. The Court should consider the merits of Mr. Jefferson’s
aforementioned claims and deny the pending Unopposed Motion to
Dismiss Appeal Without Prejudice; in the alternative, if the Court
concludes it lacks jurisdiction, the Court should dismiss the appeal
without prejudice in order to allow Mr. Jefferson to pursue an out-
of-time appeal in the district court in accordance with State v.
Counterman.
Prior to addressing Mr. Jefferson’s first assignment of error, we address his second

assignment of error as it relates to the motion to dismiss filed in this Court by the

State.

Assignment of Error Number Two

On December 27, 2024, the State filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Jefferson’s

appeal. This Court ordered that the State’s motion to dismiss be determined in

conjunction with the merits of Mr. Jefferson’s appeal. The State argues that Mr.

Jefferson’s motion for appeal was filed outside the thirty-day deadline set forth in

La. C.Cr.P. art. 914.5 It further argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction to

consider the merits of the appeal. Conversely, Mr. Jefferson’s second assignment

of error contends that although the motion for appeal was untimely filed, the record

fails to indicate that he intentionally waived his constitutional right to appeal. We

agree.

“The motion for an appeal must be made no later than:…[t]hirty days after

the rendition of the judgment or ruling from which the appeal is taken.” La. C.Cr.P.

art. 914(B)(1). “The appropriate procedural remedy for a defendant seeking to

5 La. C.Cr.P. art. 914 sets forth the delays for filing a motion for appeal.

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exercise his right to appeal after his conviction and sentence become final is a

timely-filed application for post-conviction relief seeking an out-of-time appeal

pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art[s]. 924-930.[8].” State v. Harrison, 2017-0054, pp. 28-

29 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/21/18), 239 So.3d 406, 424 (citation omitted); State v.

Counterman, 475 So.2d 336, 339 (La. 1985). “There is a constitutional right to

appeal (or to other review on the record) in criminal cases in Louisiana when the

defendant is to be subjected to imprisonment or fine.” Counterman, 475 So.2d at

339 (citing La. Const. art. I § 19 (1974)). “[T]he court arguably has the inherent

authority to grant the limited relief of an out-of-time appeal (as opposed to the

usual relief of a new trial in successful post-conviction applications).”

Counterman, 475 So.2d at 340. There is no “precise statutory authority for

providing relief to convicts who have suffered a deprivation of their right to

appeal.” Harrison, 2017-0054, p. 29, 239 So.3d at 424 (citation omitted).

Nonetheless, in some cases when “[t]here is no indication in the record that [a]

defendant ever intended to waive his constitutionally protected right to appeal his

convictions and sentences . . . he would be entitled to an out-of-time appeal… .”

Id.

On January 4, 2024, the district court sentenced Mr. Jefferson and his

motion for appeal was filed on August 29, 2024. It is undisputed that Mr.

Jefferson’s motion was filed outside of the thirty-day deadline set forth in La.

C.Cr.P. art. 914. Nonetheless, his motion for appeal was filed within the two-year

period set forth in La. C.Cr.P. arts. 924-930.8 for the filing of an application for

post-conviction relief. Furthermore, our review of the record does not suggest that

Mr. Jefferson intended to waive his constitutionally protected right to appeal his

convictions and sentences. Harrison, 2017-0054, p. 29, 239 So.3d at 424. Our

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jurisprudence affords great latitude to an appellate court’s consideration of an out-

of-time appeal. See Counterman, 475 So.2d at 339; Harrison, 2017-0054, p. 29,

239 So.3d at 424. We therefore find that delaying this matter to remand to the

district court “would only prolong the delay without serving any useful purpose.”

State v. S.J.I., 2006-2649, p. 1 (La. 6/22/07), 959 So.2d 483; Harrison, 2017-0054,

p. 29, 239 So.3d at 424 (finding that remanding such a matter would be a waste of

time and judicial resources). As such, we will consider the merits of Mr.

Jefferson’s appeal and the State’s motion to dismiss is denied.

Assignment of Error Number One

Mr. Jefferson’s first assignment of error maintains that the evidence

presented by the State was insufficient to support his manslaughter, felon in

possession of a firearm and obstruction of justice convictions.

In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, this Court is required to

determine whether the evidence is sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that

all the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, when

viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Lightfoot, 2018-0336, p. 4

(La.App. 4 Cir. 12/12/18), 318 So.3d 1033, 1038. As an appellate court, we must

review the record as a whole just as the trier of fact would do. State v. Wilson,

2022-0346, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/22), 353 So.3d 389, 393 (citation omitted).

“[A] reviewing court is not called upon to decide whether it believes the witnesses

or whether the conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.” State v.

Huckabay, 2000-1082, p. 32 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/6/02), 809 So.2d 1093, 1111

(quoting State v. Smith, 600 So.2d 1319, 1324 (La. 1992)). If conflicting testimony

is presented, the conflict of testimony regarding factual matters affects the weight

9

of evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Sterling, 2024-0160, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir.

7/17/24), 398 So.3d 80, 88 (citation omitted). “[S]uch a determination rests solely

with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of

any witness.” Wilson, 2022-0346, p. 5, 353 So.3d at 393 (quoting State v.

McGinnis, 2019-0381, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/11/20), 364 So.3d 172, 180). If

believed by the trier of fact, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to

support a conviction absent internal contradiction or a conflict with physical

evidence. State v. Marshall, 2004-3139, p. 9 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 362, 369

(citation omitted). As such, “[c]redibility determinations are entitled to great

weight and will not be disturbed unless contrary to the evidence.” State v. Rainey,

2015-0892, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/27/16), 189 So.3d 439, 444 (citation omitted).

With these principles in mind, we now address each of Mr. Jefferson’s sufficiency

of evidence arguments as it relates to his manslaughter, felon in possession of a

firearm and obstruction of justice convictions.

Manslaughter and Self-Defense

Mr. Jefferson asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his

manslaughter conviction and that the State failed to prove that he did not act in

self-defense.

The State charged Mr. Jefferson with second degree murder, a violation of

La R.S. 14:30.1, which is defined as “the killing of a human being…[w]hen the

offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.” However, the

jury found Mr. Jefferson guilty of the responsive verdict of manslaughter, a

violation of La. R.S. 14:31, which defines manslaughter as:

(1) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first
degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the
offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood

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immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an
average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation
shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that
the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average
person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was
committed… .

La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1). “‘Sudden passion’ and ‘heat of blood’ are mitigating factors,

which demonstrate less culpability than if a murder is committed without those

factors.” State v. Bethley, 2022-0849, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/21/23), 368 So.3d

1148, 1155, writ denied, 2023-00965, p. 1 (La. 1/17/24), 377 So.3d 242, 243

(citation omitted). “A homicide is justifiable . . . [w]hen committed in self-defense

by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or

receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from

that danger.” La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1). “In a homicide case in which the defendant

asserts he acted in self-defense, the State has the burden of establishing beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” Bethley, 2022-

0849, p. 5, 368 So.3d at 1154 (quoting State v. Kirk, 2011-1218, pp 6-7 (La.App. 4

Cir. 8/8/12), 98 So.3d 934, 939-40) (citation omitted). “A person who is the

aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense

unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his

adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the

conflict.” La. R.S. 14:21.

Mr. Jefferson argues that Mr. Crockett’s testimony proves that he acted in

self-defense. Three witnesses for the State and two defense witnesses testified that

Mr. Jefferson and Devante were in three separate physical altercations on the day

of the shooting. Mr. Crockett, Brandon, Keyoka, Destiny and Taiteona testified

that both Devante and Mr. Jefferson were consuming alcohol and engaging in

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physical and verbal altercations throughout the day. Keyoka, Destiny and Taiteona

acknowledged that Mr. Jefferson and Devante had a close bond and that the pair

often engaged in physical fights. While Keyoka, Destiny and Taiteona maintained

that Mr. Jefferson began the fights, Brandon’s testimony suggests that Devante

initiated the first fight when he slapped Brandon in the face, forcing Mr. Jefferson

to come to his defense. Mr. Crockett also testified that the first fight began when

Mr. Jefferson attempted to defend Brandon. Nonetheless, the collective testimony

supports the jury’s finding that Devante and Mr. Jefferson were engaged in

“sudden passion” and/or “heat of blood” altercations “immediately caused by

provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool

reflection.” La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1).

As stated above, “a homicide is justifiable…[w]hen committed in self-

defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his

life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself

from that danger.” La. R.S. 14:20(A)(1). The State bears the burden of proof that

Mr. Jefferson was not acting in self-defense when he shot Devante. There is no

physical evidence or testimony to indicate that Devante had a weapon when Mr.

Jefferson shot him. See La. R.S. 14:21. Mr. Crockett was the sole witness to

maintain that Devante was reaching towards a black bag that could have contained

a gun, prior to Mr. Jefferson shooting Devante. Moreover, the testimony of

Keyoka, Destiny and Taiteona suggests that Mr. Jefferson was the aggressor,

initiating the fights. Taiteona testified that Devante’s back was to Mr. Jefferson

when he was shot and Dr. Gardner’s examination supports that testimony. While

Mr. Jefferson left the residence after the third fight, the testimony indicates he

quickly returned and shot Devante and Destiny. “The determination of credibility

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is a question of fact within the sound discretion of the trier of fact and will not be

disturbed unless contrary to the evidence.” State v. Mahogany, 2017-0377, p. 18

(La.App. 4 Cir. 7/26/17), 225 So.3d 489, 503 (citation omitted). “Absent internal

contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, a single

witness’ testimony, if believed by the fact finder, is sufficient to support a factual

conclusion.” Id. (quoting State v. Rapp, 2014-0633, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 4 Cir.

2/18/15), 161 So.3d 103, 108 (citation omitted). Mr. Jefferson retreated after the

last altercation but quickly returned to the scene and shot Devante. Based on the

evidence, a rational juror could have concluded that the State satisfied its burden of

proof that Mr. Jefferson was the aggressor and did not act in self-defense. We

therefore find the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Jefferson’s manslaughter

conviction.

Felon in Possession of a Firearm

Mr. Jefferson next contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his

conviction for felon in possession of a firearm. He asserts that he was justified in

taking possession of the gun to defend himself.

Mr. Jefferson was convicted for violating La. R.S. 14:95.1, which provides

that it is unlawful for any persons who has been convicted of a felony to possess a

firearm or carry a concealed weapon. In order to obtain a conviction for felon in

possession of a firearm, the State must prove that the defendant: “(1) possessed a

firearm; (2) was previously convicted of an enumerated felony; (3) possessed the

firearm within ten years of the previous conviction; [and] (4) had the general intent

to commit the crime.” State v. Gabriel, 2018-0169, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/26/18),

262 So.3d 345, 351 (citation omitted). However, “[w]hen a felon is in imminent

peril of great bodily harm, or reasonably believes himself or others to be in such

13

danger, he may take possession of a weapon for a period no longer than is

necessary or apparently necessary to use it in self-defense, or in defense of others.

In such [a] situation justification is a defense to the charge of felon in possession of

a firearm.” State v. Blache, 480 So.2d 304, 308 (La. 1985).

As we have concluded above, the evidence is insufficient to prove that Mr.

Jefferson was acting in self-defense. Keyoka, Destiny, Taiteona, Mr. Crockett and

Brandon testified that they did not see Devante with a gun on the day of the

shooting. Furthermore, Dr. Gardner’s testimony reflects that Devante suffered

multiple gunshot wounds which entered through his back. Mr. Jefferson failed to

submit any evidence to indicate that he was in imminent peril or in danger of

receiving great bodily harm when he took possession of his brother’s gun. Thus, he

is unable to avail himself of this defense. The collective testimony at trial reveals

that Mr. Jefferson possessed a gun and shot Devante and Destiny. Additionally, the

State submitted evidence at trial to establish Mr. Jefferson’s 2013 felony

conviction of aggravated robbery, with a deadly weapon, from Texas. Viewing the

evidence, in a light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could have

concluded that Mr. Jefferson was guilty of the crime of felon in possession of a

firearm. We therefore find the evidence sufficient to support his conviction for

felon in possession of a firearm.

Obstruction of Justice

Lastly, Mr. Jefferson argues the evidence is insufficient to convict him of

obstruction of justice because the State failed to prove that he (1) removed the gun

from the residence and/or (2) disposed of the gun. Obstruction of justice is defined

in La. R.S. 14:130.1 as follows:

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A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following when
committed with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may,
or will affect an actual or potential present, past, or future criminal
proceeding as described in this Section:

(1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the
results of any criminal investigation or proceeding which may
reasonably prove relevant to a criminal investigation or
proceeding. Tampering with evidence shall include the intentional
alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or
substance either:

(a) At the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows
or has good reason to believe will be the subject of any
investigation by state, local, or U.S. law enforcement
officers … .

La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1)(a). “Specific intent [to commit obstruction of justice] need

not be proven as fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction

and the actions of defendant.” Bethley, 2022-0849, p. 9, 368 So.3d at 1156

(quoting State v. Harvey, 2021-0730, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/25/22), 345 So.3d

1043, 1050).

Mr. Jefferson contends there is no evidence to show that he removed the gun

from the crime scene. However, the evidence and testimony indicate that Mr.

Jefferson took possession of a gun, shot Devante and Destiny and fled the scene.

Although Mr. Jefferson stated that he did not remember possessing a firearm, four

witnesses testified that Mr. Jefferson had a firearm and fled after shooting Devante

and Destiny. It is therefore reasonable to infer that Mr. Jefferson fled the scene,

with the firearm, knowing that he might be the subject of a criminal investigation.

We find that a rational trier of fact could have found that he obstructed justice by

tampering with evidence. Bethley, 2022-0849, p. 10, 368 So.3d at 1156 (citing

State v. Powell, 2015-0218, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/28/15), 179 So.3d 721, 728)

(finding that removal of a weapon from the scene of the shooting is sufficient to

15

support an obstruction of justice conviction). The evidence is therefore sufficient to

support Mr. Jefferson’s obstruction of justice conviction.

For the reasons more fully articulated above, we find the State presented

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of guilt for the crimes of

manslaughter, felon in possession of a firearm and obstruction of justice.

Accordingly, Mr. Jefferson’s first assignment of error is without merit.

Errors Patent

The record reveals one error patent. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 920. The jury found

Mr. Jefferson guilty of felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of La. R.S.

14:95.1, which provides in pertinent part:

Whoever is found guilty of violating the provisions of this Section
shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more than
twenty years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of
sentence and be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than
five thousand dollars.

La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1). In imposing Mr. Jefferson’s sentence – as it relates to his

conviction for felon in possession of a firearm – the district court failed to include

the statutorily mandated fine in accordance with La. R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1). Rather,

the district court only imposed a twenty-year sentence. When a district court fails

to impose a statutorily mandated fine, this Court shall remand the case to the

district court. State v. Williams, 2024-0105, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/9/2024), 400

So.3d 1194, 1199 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we remand this matter to the

district court for the sole purpose of imposing the statutorily mandated fine for Mr.

Jefferson’s sentence related to his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm.

Decree

Based on the foregoing, we deny the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal

and affirm Mr. Jefferson’s convictions. However, this matter is remanded for the

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sole purpose of imposing the statutorily mandated fine for Mr. Jefferson’s

conviction for felon in possession of a firearm. The remaining three sentences

imposed by the district court are affirmed.

MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED;
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED;
SENTENCES AFFIRMED IN PART;
REMANDED IN PART FOR RE-SENTENCING

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