State Of Louisiana v. Justin P. Craighead

Supreme Court of Louisiana
February 05, 2025
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
JUSTIN P. CRAIGHEAD
No. 2024-KK-01219
_ _
_ _ _ _
IN
RE: Justin P. Craighead - Applicant Defendant; Applying For Supervisory Writ,
Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Number(s) 21-WLFN-956, 21-
WLFN-957 & 21-WMSD-958, Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Number(s) 2024 KW
0683;
_ _ _ _ _ _
February 05, 2025
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., would grant and docket.
Knoll, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., dissents.
Guidry, J., concurs in the result.
JDH
PDG
02/05/2025 "See News Release 003 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

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SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2024-KK-01219
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
JUSTIN P. CRAIGHEAD
On Supervisory Writ to the 20th Judicial District Court, Parish of West Feliciana
PER CURIAM
Writ granted. For killing his own dog and being held at gunpoint after
becoming stuck in the doggie door of the home of a former police officer, this
intoxicated and potentially mentally ill first -time-offender was sentenced to 32
years’ imprisonment at hard labor, 5 years’ active supervised probation, and a $5,000
fine.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, §20
of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive
punishment. In determining whether a sentence is excessive, a reviewing court must
first determine whether the record shows that the trial court took cognizance of the
sentencing criteria set forth in LSA-La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. Thereafter, the court must
determine whether the sentence imposed is too severe , which depends on the
circumstances of the case and the background of the defendant. A sentence violates
LSA-La. Const. Art. 1, § 20 if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the
offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and
suffering. State v. Dorthey , 623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno , 384
So.2d 355 (La. 1980). Specifically, a sentence is considered grossly
disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm
done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Hogan, 480 So.2d 288 (La.
1985). A trial judge has broad discretion when imposing a sentence, and a reviewing
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court may not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the
sentence imposed. State v. Pearson, 07-332 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/07), 975 So.2d
646, 656. Nevertheless, even a sentence that falls within statutory guidelines can be
excessive if the punishment is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime
that it shocks the sense of justice and serves no purpose other than to inflict pain and
suffering. State v. Fatheree, 46,686 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/2/11), 77 So.3d 1047. In
that vein, the jurisprudence holds that maximum sentences permitted under statute
may be imposed only for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders, State v.
Easley, 432 So.2d 910, 914 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1983), or when the offender poses an
unusual risk to public safety due to his past conduct of repeated criminality. See
State v. Chaney, 537 So.2d 313, 318 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 541 So.2d
870 (La. 1989). A trial court's reasons for imposing sentence, as required by L SA-
C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, are an important aid to this court when reviewing a sentence
alleged to be excessive. State v. McKnight, 98-1790, 739 So.2d 343, 349 (La. App.
1 Cir. 1999).
The defendant was sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment
permitted by statute for both convictions, consecutively.1 According to the record,
however, at the time of the offenses, the defendant was a middle-aged husband and
father with no prior criminal history and an ability to maintain steady employment.
The record further establishes that the defendant suffers with mental health and
substance abuse issues, and that , while on methamphetamine and after killing his
dog, the defendant attempted to enter the home of a former police officer. While
attempting to get through the doggie door the defendant became stuck and the victim,

1 Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 14:60(B), “[w]hoever commits the crime of aggravated burglary shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one nor more than thirty years.” For the aggravated
burglary conviction, the defendant was given the maximum sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment
albeit with five years suspended. Further, p ursuant to LSA -R.S. 14:102.1(B)(6), a person
convicted of aggravated cruelty to animals shall be “imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for
not less than one year nor more than ten years,” and the defendant was sentenced to the maximum
term of ten years’ imprisonment at hard labor, albeit with three years suspended.

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having already armed himself, fired a warning shot into the floor . The defendant
remained frozen until police arrived. Thereafter, the defendant fully complied with
the officers, facilitating his arrest without incident. While the victim testified at the
sentencing hearing that the incident scared him, the defendant did not reach a
position from which he could threaten or inflict actual physical harm to the victim,
nor did the defendant damage the victim’s home or steal his property. The record
fails to support a determination that this defendant is the worst type of offender, or
that the offenses herein are the most serious offenses. As such, the trial court appears
to have abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to the maximum allowable
sentences for his offenses.
The trial court l ikewise appears to have misinterpreted and/or misapplied
several of the sentencing factors set forth in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 insofar as it
concluded that said factors weigh in favor of a more severe punishment in this case.
Specifically, although the trial court recognized that the defendant had no prior
criminal history and suffered from mental health and substance abuse issues, it
nevertheless found that there were no mitigating factors in this case, and that the
defendant would not likely respond affirmatively to probationary treatment .
Additionally, even though the victim was alone in his home, the trial court found
that the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily injury to more
than one person. Further, despite that the victim was a former police officer capable
of defending himself with firearms and who was able to surprise the defendant, fire
a warning shot, and then hold the defendant at gunpoint , all before the defendant
could fully enter the house, the trial court determined that the victim was particularly
vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age and that this was known
to the defendant. And although there was no physical injury to the victim, the trial
court found that the victim suffered significant and permanent injuries. Finally,
based apparently on the defendant having punched his attorney after the verdict was

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read (and thus, after the trial was over), the trial court found that the defendant used
force or violence with the intent to influence the outcome of the trial. Weighing all
of these factors in order to support the need for a more severe penalty, the trial court
determined that the defendant should be sentenced to a total of 32 years’
imprisonment at hard labor, followed by 5 years ’ probation, and the payment of a
$5,000 fine.
It appears the trial court did not properly apply the sentencing criteria required
under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. The sentences imposed on the defendant, Justin P.
Craighead, are therefore vacated and the matter is remanded to the trial court with
instructions to reconsider the sentencing criteria under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1.
WRIT GRANTED; SENTENCES VACATED; and REMANDED.