Glenn E. Diaz v. State of Louisiana, through the Board of Trustees of the Louisiana District Attorney's Retirement System

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2024 CA 0340

GLENN E. DIAZ

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS RETIREMENT SYSTEM

I
Judgment Rendered;

Appealed from the
19th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Docket No. 650070

The Honorable Tiffany Foxworth- Roberts, Judge Presiding

Walter R. Woodruff, Jr. Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Metairie, Louisiana Glenn E. Diaz

Robert E. Tarcza Counsel for Defendant/Appellee,
New Orleans, Louisiana State of Louisiana, Through the Board of
Trustees of the District
Attorney' s Retirement System

BEFORE: WOLFE, MILLER, AND GREENE, JJ.

MILLER, J.

Plaintiff/Appellant, Glenn E. Diaz, appeals a summary judgment dismissing
his claims against Defendant/Appellee, State of Louisiana, through the Board of

Trustees of the District Attorney' s Retirement System (" DARS"). For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Diaz worked as an Assistant District Attorney (" ADA") in St. Bernard

Parish for more than thirty years. During that time, Mr. Diaz contributed to and

participated in DARS. 1 Mr. Diaz retired on November 11, 2014. More than sixteen

months later, on March 22, 2016, Mr. Diaz submitted his application for

retirement, and DARS made payments from that date.2 Mr. Diaz requested that

DARS pay him retirement benefits retroactive to November 11, 2014, but DARS

indicated that it would only make payments from the date of Mr. Diaz' s
application.'

On July 22, 2016, Mr. Diaz filed a petition against the State of Louisiana,

through the Board of Trustees of DARS (" the Board"). Mr. Diaz alleged DARS' s

decision to deny him vested retirement benefits based on its interpretation of La.

R. S. 11: 1631( D) was arbitrary and capricious. Mr. Diaz further alleged DARS

illegally took property that belonged to him. He sought a judgment in his favor and

I DARS is a retirement system that provides retirement allowances and other benefits for
district attorneys and their assistants in each parish. See La. R.S. 11: 1582( A).

2 Pursuant to DARS' s recommendation, Mr. Diaz submitted a revised retirement
application on April 11, 2016, wherein he selected " Back -DROP Benefit." Mr. Diaz then
received a Back -DROP lump sum payment of $241, 793. 28 from DARS.

3 We note that on November 6, 2014, Mr. Diaz sent a letter to the State of Louisiana,
Employee' s Administration, Office of Human Resources in the Division of Administration,
notifying the State that he was going to retire from his position as an ADA on November 11,
2014. After Mr. Diaz retired, DARS did not make retirement payments as Mr. Diaz requested in
his November 6th letter. However, DARS did notify Mr. Diaz that it had not received his
application for retirement. On September 23, 2015, DARS again notified Mr. Diaz that it had not
received his application for retirement. In response, Mr. Diaz indicated he sent a notice of
retirement and requested DARS make monthly retirement payments along with retroactive
payments. On September 25, 2015, DARS indicated it still had not received a completed and
signed application for retirement and it had no authority to pay benefits for any time before
receipt of a completed and signed application.

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against DABS in the amount of $ 120, 000. 00, together with legal interest from

November 11, 2014 until paid; attorney fees; a declaratory judgment declaring La.
R. S. 11: 1631, as applied by DARS, unconstitutional; and all other general and

equitable relief.

DARS filed a motion for summary judgment on August 15, 2023, asserting

that Mr. Diaz' s first application for retirement was received by the Board on March

22, 2016 and that he was paid his retirement allowance retroactive to that date.

DARS further alleged Mr. Diaz was not entitled to a retirement allowance before

his application was received by the Board pursuant to La. R.S. 11: 1631( D). In

support of its motion, DARS filed the affidavit of the Director of DARS, Philip
Qualls; Mr. Diaz' s first application for retirement dated March 22, 2016; Mr.

Diaz' s revised application for retirement dated April 11, 2016; Mr. Diaz' s DARS

Benefit History; DARS' s Summary of Principal Plan Provisions; a letter from

DARS along with a copy of a check for Mr. Diaz' s Back -DROP balance; and a

Separation Notice dated November 18, 2014 along with emails between DARS and
Mr. Diaz.

Thereafter, Mr. Diaz filed an opposition to DARS' s motion. Mr. Diaz

contended that DARS was not required to send him payments before the Board

received his application for retirement on March 22, 2016, but he did not abandon,

forfeit, surrender, waive, or otherwise give up the right to collect his retirement
allowance from November 11, 2014 through March 21, 2016. In support of his

opposition, Mr. Diaz filed a letter dated November 6, 2014 addressed to the

Division of Administration; the petition; DARS' s memorandum on its exception of

no cause of action with attachments; Mr. Diaz' s opposition to DARS' s exception

of no cause of action; and trial court minutes. DARS filed its reply on October 18,
2023.

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A hearing was held on October 26, 2023, and the trial court granted

summary judgment in favor of DARS and against Mr. Diaz, and dismissed Mr.

Diaz' s claims against DARS. A judgment to that effect was signed by the trial

court on November 9, 2023. Mr. Diaz appealed.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment may be granted in the context of statutory interpretation

when there are no material issues of fact in dispute and the sole issue before the

court is a question of law as to the correct interpretation of the statute at issue.4

Langsford v. Firefighters Retirement System, 2017- 0719 ( La. App. Pt Cir.

3/ 29/ 18), 247 So. 3d 728, 730. Such is the case here. Relevant hereto, Louisiana

Revised Statutes 11: 1631( D) provides:

The retirement allowance shall begin as of the date specified by the
member in his application for retirement or the date that the member' s
application for retirement is received by the board, whichever is later;
however, in no event shall the allowance begin before the member' s
withdrawal from service.

On appeal,
Mr. Diaz contends the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of DARS. Mr. Diaz argues the trial court erred in its

interpretation of La. R. S. 11: 1631( D) and its finding that Mr. Diaz was not entitled

to recover retirement benefits that he contends accrued between the date of his

retirement and the date his application was received by the Board. Specifically, Mr.
Diaz maintains that even though he submitted his retirement application over

sixteen months after his retirement date, he did not forfeit the retirement benefit he

argues vested during that time. Mr. Diaz further argues that DARS' s interpretation

of the statute is incorrect, would lead to absurd consequences by depriving him of
his fully vested retirement benefit, and is unconstitutional.

The interpretation of any statutory provision starts with the language of the

statute itself. Oubre v. Louisiana Citizens Fair Plan, 2011- 0097 ( La. 12/ 16/ 11), 79
4 La. C. C. P. art. 966 was amended and reenacted by La. Acts 2023, No. 317, § I and La.
Acts 2023, No. 368, § 1, effective August 1, 2023.

M

So. 3d 987, 997, cert denied, 567 U.S. 935, 113 S. Ct. 30, 183 L.Ed.2d 677 ( 2012).

When the provision is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to

absurd consequences, its language must be given effect, and its provisions must be

construed so as to give effect to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the

language used. La. C. C. art. 9; La. R.S. 1: 4; Oubre, 79 So. 3d at 997. Unequivocal

provisions are not subject to judicial construction and should be applied by giving

words their generally understood meaning. La. C. C. art. 11; La. R.S. 1: 3. Laws on

the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other. La. C. C. art.

13.

Further, the meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the

law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and placing a
construction on the provision in question that is consistent with the express terms

of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting it. Lan s
ford,

247 So. 3d at 732. The statute must therefore be applied and interpreted in a

manner which is consistent with logic and the presumed fair purpose and intention

of the legislature in passing it. Id. Courts should give effect to all parts of a statute

and should not give a statute an interpretation that makes any part superfluous or

meaningless, if that result can be avoided. Id.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 11: 1631( D) provides for the date when a

member' s retirement allowance is to begin. " Retirement allowance" means the sum

of the " annuity" and the "
employers' annuity", or any optional benefit payable in

lieu thereof. La. R.S.
11: 1581( 19). 5 The statute clearly and unambiguously
provides that the retirement allowance is to begin as of the date specified by the

member in his application for retirement or the date that the member' s application

for retirement is received by the Board, whichever is later. See La. R.S.
5"
Annuity" means payments for life derived from the " accumulated contributions" of a
member. All annuities shall be payable in equal monthly installments. La. R.S. 11: 1581( 3).
Employers' annuity" means payments for life derived from money provided by the employer or
employing agency, or the parishes of Louisiana, or the state of Louisiana. La. R.S. 11: 1581( 12).

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11: 1631( D). In this case, applying the clear and unambiguous language of La. R.S.

11: 1631( D), Mr. Diaz' s retirement allowance was to begin on March 22, 2016,

which is the date his retirement application was received by the Board. The

consequence of the clear and unambiguous application of La. R.S. 11: 1631( D) is

that Mr. Diaz will not receive a retirement allowance for the time period between

November 11, 2014 and March 21, 2016. We find that this consequence is not

absurd or illogical, thus La. R.S. 11: 1631( D) must be construed so as to give effect

to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used. Further, if

retirees were allowed to file their application anytime and collect retroactive

payments, La. R.S. 11: 1631( D) would be unnecessary and superfluous.

While Mr. Diaz argues that this interpretation of La. R.S. 11: 1631( D) is

incorrect, would lead to absurd consequences, and is unconstitutional, many State
Systems and Statewide Systems6 under Title 11 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes

require the submission of an application for payment to begin.' See La. R.S.

11: 442, 761, 1141, 1306, 1453, 1529, and 1756. Further, some retirement systems

provide for retroactive payments and some do not. For example, the Assessors'

Retirement Fund, the Clerks' of Court Retirement and Relief Fund, and the

Municipal Employees' Retirement System provide for retroactive payments if

certain conditions are met. The Assessors' Retirement Fund and the Clerks' of

6 The public retirement systems are classified as either a " state retirement system" or a
statewide retirement system." La. R.S. 11: 4. The state retirement system includes Louisiana
State Employees' Retirement System; Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana; Louisiana
School Employees' Retirement System; and Louisiana State Police Retirement System. La. R.S.
11: 4( A)( 1)( a)-( d). 4n the other hand, the statewide retirement system includes Assessors'
Retirement Fund; Clerks' of Court Retirement and Relief Fund; DARS; Firefighters' Retirement
System; Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Louisiana; Municipal Police Employees'
Retirement System of Louisiana; Parochial Employees' Retirement System of Louisiana;
Registrars of Voters Employees' Retirement System; and Sheriffs' Pension and Relief Fund. La.
R.S. 11: 4( B)( 1)( a)-( i).

7 Some retirement systems that require a retirement application include Louisiana State
Employees' Retirement System, the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana, the Louisiana
School Employees' Retirement System, the Louisiana State Police Pension and Retirement
System, the Assessors' Retirement Fund, the Clerks' of Court Retirement and Relief Fund, and
the Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Louisiana. See La. R.S. 11: 442, 761, 1141,
1306, 1453, 1529, and 1756.

2

Court Retirement and Relief Fund allow for retroactive benefits if the application

is received within ninety days of the date the applicant became eligible for the

benefit. However, if the application is received by the board after ninety days of
the date the applicant became eligible therefor, benefits are paid from the date the

application is received by the board. See La. R.S. 11: 1453( B) and 1529. Similarly,
the Municipal Employees' Retirement System permits retroactive payments of

benefits if a written application is received by the board sixty or fewer days after

the date the applicant became eligible for the benefit. However, if an application is

received by the board more than sixty days after the date the applicant attained

eligibility, retroactive benefits are paid only for the sixty days prior to the date the

application is received by the board. See La. R.S. 11: 1756( D).

On the other hand, several retirement systems, including DARS, do not

provide for the retroactive payment of benefits. For example, the Louisiana State

Employees' Retirement System, the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana,

and the Louisiana School Employees' Retirement System provide that retirement

benefits become effective as of the date the application for retirement is filed with

the retirement system as required by that system, or the day after the member

terminates from the state service, whichever is later. See La. R.S. 11: 442( A) and

B), 761( A)( 5)( a), 1141( A).
and These retirement application provisions are

similar to those found in DARE.

After de novo review, we find La. R.S. 11: 1631( D) is clear and

unambiguous, its application does not lead to absurd consequences, and its

language must be given effect. See La. C. C. art. 9; see also La. R.S. 1: 4. The trial

court correctly found that DARS did not owe Mr. Diaz retroactive payments for

the period of time between his retirement and when his application for retirement

was received by the Board under La. R.S. 11: 1631( D). We find no support for Mr.

Diaz' s assertion that during the period of time between his retirement and his

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application, benefits were accruing even though his allowance had not yet begun.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of

DARS and against Mr. Diaz. This assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the November 9, 2023 judgment of the

trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the

Plaintiff/Appellant, Glenn E. Diaz.

AFFIRMED.

H.'

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT

GLENN E. DIAZ

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LOUISIANA
DISTRICT ATTORNEY' S RETIREMENT SYSTEM

GREENE, I...dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Louisiana Revised Statutes 11: 1631 fails to notify a

retirement system member that any delay in submitting an application will cause the

forfeiture of the benefits accruing from the date of retirement to the date of the receipt

of the application for retirement benefits. Louisiana Revised Statutes 11: 1631( C) uses

the term " actual retirement benefit" when discussing what is owed and states that it "shall

not exceed one hundred percent of his average final compensation." Subsection E also

uses the term " benefit" to describe what will be suspended should the retired member

be retained by any district attorney's office. Subsection F also uses the term " retirement

benefit" to discuss what is suspended if the retirement system member is reemployed by
any district attorney's office.

Mr. Diaz lost approximately $ 120, 000 in benefits when DARS failed to pay him

from the date of his retirement. DARS knew that Mr. Diaz had retired and that his

employer, the St. Bernard Parish District Attorney's Office, was no longer making monthly
contributions to DARS on his behalf. Nothing in La. R.S. 11: 1631 prohibits DARS from

setting aside ( or escrowing) the maximum amount that may be due to Mr. Diaz from the

date of his retirement until the receipt of his application for retirement. I find that DARS,

or any other person or entity) should not benefit financially from Mr. Diaz's delayed

application for retirement benefits. Notably, Louisiana Constitution Article 10, § 29( E)( 5)

provides that the accrued benefits of members of any state or statewide public retirement

system shall not be diminished or impaired.

To have a result where a retired system member loses all rights to this benefit

because of a delay in filling out an application is not only an unconstitutional diminishment

of accrued benefits, but also immoral and just plain wrong. If subsequent to Mr. Diazs

retirement, he suffered some sudden medical trauma preventing him from executing an

application and he had not executed a power of attorney before this unfortunate medical

event, would DARS have the same attitude toward Mr. Diaz? Would DARS require Mr.

Diaz to be interdicted to allow his curator to execute the application? I realize that in this

case, that did not happen. It appears clear that Mr. Diaz was aware what DARS' position

was, yet he held steadfast in his position. Stubborn? Possibly. Hardheaded? Maybe.

However, after 16 months, he did succumb to the demands of DARS. I certainly don' t

condone failure to follow rules, but I do not think that Mr. Diaz' s stubbornness should

result in the drastic diminishment of his retirement benefits which also results in a windfall

to DARS.

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