Ronald Bias v. Carl J. Foster and John B. Wells

R! ! 0 ', * :

STATE OF LOUISIANA

1; 14 IX 1- Iff

2024 CA 0776

RONALD BIAS

Judgment Rendered:

On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Docket No. 687496

Honorable Richard " Chip" Moore, Judge Presiding

zars Plaintiff/Appellant
01151 Pro se

John B. Wells Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee
Slidell, Louisiana Carl J. Foster

Robert D. McMillin Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee
Slidell, Louisiana Military -Veteran Advocacy, Inc.

Connell L. Archey Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee
Allena W. McCain John B. Wells

Madaline King Rabalais
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

BEFORE: McCLENDON, WELCH, AND LANIER,. 33.

McCLENDON,, J.

The plaintiff sought leave to file a fifth amended and supplemental petition in order

to re -name a defendant previously dismissed from the underlying litigation with prejudice;
and to
to add two previously unnamed defendants; to plead a supplemental claim;

remove a previously pled and dismissed claim. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion
for leave to amend. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The pro se plaintiff, Ronald Bias, initiated this suit in the 19th Judicial District Court

on September 6, 2019 against Carl Foster, a former colleague with whom Bias has a long-

standing conflict, and John B. Wells, an attorney who represented Foster in prior litigation
between Bias and Foster ( collusion suit). In Bias's collusion suit, he alleged that, in

connection with the long- standing conflict between Bias and Foster, Wells and Foster
conspired to harm Bias in retaliation for complaints he initiated against Wells and for the

prior litigation involving Foster. As the convoluted and lengthy history of the dispute
between the parties underlying the collusion suit is pertinent to the appeal before us, we

begin by reviewing same.

The dispute between Bias and Foster arose while they were both employed at

Amite High School in Tangipahoa Parish as Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC)

instructors for the United States Marine Corps ( USMC) and United States Navy ( Navy).

Foster was Bias' s subordinate. In 2009, Bias was recalled to active duty due to a

miscalculation regarding his retirement eligibility, but was permitted to keep his position
as a JROTC instructor. Foster voiced concerns about Bias holding the two positions

simultaneously. Subsequently, in 2009 and 2010, Bias reported Foster to the JROTC

Regional Director and the Amite High principal for alleged misconduct. In 2010, as a result

of Bias"s misconduct allegations, the Navy and the USMC both decertified Foster as a

I Portions of the facts and procedural history presented herein are borrowed and summarized from this
court's previous opinion in this matter, Bias v. Foster, 2022- 0408 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 4/ 22), 356 So -3d 49,
writ denied, 2023- 00007 ( La. 3/ 28/ 23), 358 So. 3d 515, and from this court's opinion in the related case of
Foster v. Bias, 2022- 0329 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 22), 358 So. 3d 520, writ denied 2023- 00090 ( La.
3/ 28/ 23), 358 So. 3d 503.

2

JROTC instructor, and Foster's employment at Amite High School was terminated. In the

aftermath, both Bias and Foster flied multiple lawsuits.

Foster' s Decertification Suit

In November 2011, represented by Wells, Foster flied suit in the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia seeking review of his decertification as a JROTC

instructor ( decertification suit). Named as defendants in the decertification suit were the

Secretary of the Navy and the Commanding General of the USMC Training and Education

Command. See Foster v. Mabus, 895 F. Supp. 2d 135 ( D. D. C. 2012); Foster v. Mabus,

103 F. Supp. 3d 95 ( D. D. C. 2015). The District of Columbia dismissed the decertification

suit with prejudice in June 2015 pursuant to a " Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal"

stipulation), in exchange for a $ 12, 000. 00 settlement payment to Foster and Foster's

recertification as a JROTC instructor. The stipulation also included terms providing that

Foster would not sue former employees of the Marine Corps regarding events complained

of in the decertification suit ( waiver of claims). Pertinent to the litigation that followed,

the waiver of claims was limited by language stating that nothing in the stipulation " Shall

affect: ( i) any rights or claims that may arise after the date [ Foster] signs this Stipulation;

and ( ii) any right or claims against third parties not covered by this agreement."

Bias' s False Claims Act Suit

While Foster's decertification suit was pending, Bias filed suit in the United Stated

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in September 2012 asserting claims

arising under state and federal law, including the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. 3729, et

seq. ( false claims suit), against Foster, the Tangipahoa Parish School Board, and the

principal of Amite High School. See U. S. ex rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish School

Board, 2012- 2202, 2014 WL 1512001 ( E. D. La. Mar. 26, 2014); United States ex rel.

Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 2012- 2202, 2014 WL 12675261, at * 2 ( E. D.

La. May 15, 2014). Wells did not represent Foster in the false claims suit. Ultimately, the

Eastern District dismissed Bias' s 31 U. S. C. 3729 claim on the basis of judicial estoppel,

because Bias had not disclosed the false claims suit in pending bankruptcy proceedings

as required. Bias's other claims were also dismissed as untimely. See United States ex

rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 2012- 2202, 2017 WL 4049596 ( E. D.

3

La. 2017), affd sub nom. United States ex rel. Bias v. Tangipahoa Parish School

Board, 766 F. Appx 38 ( 5th Cir. 2019).

Bias's Complaints against Wells

In September 2013, Bias filed complaints against Wells with two separate entities

collectively, " Bias' s complaints against Wells` ). Bias's first complaint, which was filed with

the United States Department of Defense, Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office

DPCLO), alleged Wells illegally gained access to Bias's military records and disclosed
contents of same. In an April 2015 letter, DPCLO confirmed both that Bias's personally

identifiable information was released without authorization, and that Bias's personally

identifiable information was in the possession of a staff investigator for Wells prior to an

authorized release. However, DPCLO was unable to determine the source or

circumstances of the unauthorized release. Bias's second complaint against Wells, which

was filed with the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board, asserted that Wells violated the

Rules of Professional Conduct in connection with his representation of Foster. The

Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board dismissed Bias' s complaint in April 2014.
Foster's Defamation Suit

While Bias' s false claims suit remained pending, Foster, again represented by

Wells, sued Bias for defamation in the 19th Judicial District Court ( defamation suit) in

November 2015. Therein, Foster alleged that Bias made defamatory statements about

Foster during a deposition taken in connection with Bias's false claims suit. In response,
Bias filed a special motion to strike pursuant to LSA-C. C. P. art. 971( F)( 1)( a). The trial

court denied Bias' s special motion to strike, and Bias sought this court's review. On

December 28, 2016, this court granted Bias's writ application, reversed the district court's

judgment, and granted Bias' s special motion to strike. This court explained that Bias was

afforded absolute immunity from civil defamation liability regardless of malice or falsity"

because the alleged defamatory statements were made during a deposition and were

directly related to Bias's false claims suit. See Foster v. Bias, 2016- 1376 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
12/ 28/ 16), 2016 WL- 7470012 ( unpublished writ action), writ denied, 2017- 0181 ( La.

3/ 24/ 17), 216 So. 3d 793.

0

Foster's Abuse of Process Suit

After learning that Bias' s false claims suit had been dismissed on the basis of

judicial estoppel, Foster, again represented by Wells, filed a second suit against Bias in

the 19th Judicial District Court in August 2018. Therein, Foster sought damages for abuse

of process based on Bias's failure to disclose his false claims suit to the bankruptcy trustee

exceptionS2
abuse of process suit). Bias filed peremptory raising the objections of no

cause of action, no right of action, and prescription, which the district court sustained.

On appeal, this court in Foster v. Bias, 2022- 0329 ( La.App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 22), 358 So. 3d

520, writ denied, 2023- 00090 ( La. 3/ 28/ 23), 358 So. 3d 503, affirmed that portion of the

trial court's judgment that sustained Bias' s peremptory exception of no cause of action

and dismissed Foster's abuse of process suit with prejudice. Id. at 527- 528.

Bias' s Collusion Suit

As set forth above, Bias flied this pro se suit alleging that Wells and Foster colluded

to retaliate against Bias for his complaints against Wells and the prior litigation between

Bias and Foster. Bias' s initial allegations against Wells included claims for: abuse of

process; breach of the stipulation; malicious prosecution; intentional infliction of

emotional distress; violating Bias's constitutional right of free speech; and aiding and

abetting Foster in the commission of tortious acts. Wells removed Bias's collusion suit to

federal court, and Bias apparently amended the suit to remove the sole federal claim.

The collusion suit was then remanded to state court, where Bias filed his second amended

petition. See Bias v. Foster, 2022-0408 ( La. App. I Cir. 11/ 4/ 22), 356 So. 3d 49, 55 n. 2,

writ denied, 2023- 00007 ( La. 3/ 28/ 23), 358 So. 3d 515. As amended, the collusion suit

alleged that Wells and Foster conspired to file the defamation suit and abuse of process

suit in order to retaliate against Bias; that Bias was a third -party beneficiary of the

stipulation in Foster's decertification suit, and therefore, Foster's waiver of claims against

former Marine Corps employees precluded Foster's suits against Bias, as a former Marine

2 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 922 recognizes only three exceptions: the declinatory exception,
the dilatory exception, and the peremptory exception. In this case, numerous peremptory exceptions
pleading the objections of prescription, no cause of action, and no right of action are referenced. See LSA-
C. C. P. art. 927. Subsequently herein, for brevity, we sometimes refer to said exceptions as exceptions of
prescription, exceptions of no cause of action, or exceptions of no right of action.

9

Corp employee; that Wells admitted Foster's claims against Bias arose out of Foster's
decertification suit and Bias's FCA Suit; that Wells's representation to Foster in his suits

against Bias exceeded the scope of Wells's position as an attorney, and was done

intentionally and with malice for the purpose of retaliation; that because Wells knew of
the stipulation and Foster' s waiver of claims, Wells was acting as a co- conspirator rather

than an attorney and attempted to use his status as an attorney to avoid liability; that
Wells's actions constituted negligence; and that Wells and Foster conspired to violate 42

U. S. C. § 1985( 2) by attempting to intimidate Bias from testifying.

In response to Bias's second amended petition, Wells filed an exception asserting

that Bias failed to state a cause of action based solely on Wells's representation of Foster.

The trial court denied the exception, and Bias sought supervisory writs. On review, this

court issued the following:

WRIT GRANTED WITH ORDER. The trial court's January 21, 2021
judgment denying the peremptory exception of no cause of action filed by
the relator, John B. Wells, is reversed. The original and amending petitions
filed by the plaintiff, Ronald Bias, fail to state a cause of action against
Wells, the attorney of Bias[ s] adversary, Carl J. Foster. In particular, Bias
fails to state a cause of action against Wells for breach of the '"Stipulation
of Settlement and Dismissal" because Wells was not a party to that
agreement.

Bias fails to state a cause of action against Wells for negligence
because Wells, the attorney for Bias[ s] adversary, owed no legal duty to
Bias. See Penalber v. Blount, 550 So. 2d 577, 581 ( La. 1989); Montalvo
v. Sondes, 637 So. 2d 127, 130 ( La. 1994). The remainder of the
allegations contained in Bias[ s] petitions refers to Wells'[ s] representation
of Foster in a defamation suit and an abuse of process suit filed by Wells
on Foster' s behalf. In bringing a cause of action against an attorney based
on intentional tort, it is essential for the petition to allege facts showing
specific malice or an intent to harm on the part of the attorney. Montalvo,
637 So. 2d at 130 ( La. 1994). Legal or factual conclusions, absent facts
which support such conclusions, are insufficient. See Id. at 131. We find
that Bias[ s] original and amending petitions fail to allege specific actions
evidencing Wells'[ s] malice or intent to inflict direct harm. Additionally, Bias
fails to state a cause of action against Wells based on the filing of the abuse
of process suit because there has been no " bona fide termination" of the
abuse of process suit in Bias'[ s] favor. See Id. Accordingly, the exception
of no cause of action filed by Wells is granted, and this matter is remanded
to the district court with instructions to afford Bias an opportunity to amend
his petition, if he can, to state a cause of action against Wells. See La. Code
Civ. P. art. 934.

See Bias v. Foster, 2021- 0172 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 12/ 2021), 2021 WL 1910987

unpublished writ action) ( Bias I).

R

After this court's order in Bias I Bias amended the collusion suit 8 third tj0M2.

Wells filed an exception Of OO C8U88 Of BCti0M BS to the third amended petition. Bias

sought leave tOfile a fourth amended and supplemental petition in the collusion SUML

which was.]

Following a November 29, 2021 hearing, the trial court signed a December 20,

2021 written ' nHnmeOƒ granting VVells' s exception of OO C8USe of action as to the third

amended petition and dismissing "' all claims by DlaiOtiff, ROOak1 Bias, against ] OhO B.

Wells," with prejudice. Bias appealed.

Oappeal, this court found its rulings iOBias I—specifically, that° BiaU3fail[ pd] to

state a G3US2 of action 8g@iMSƒ Wells for breach Of the [ stipulation] hpraU88 Wells was

not @ D8M« to that agreement" and that " Bias fail[ ed] to state a CBUSe of action against

Wells for negligence because Wells, the attorney for owed no legal

duty to Bias"— were law of the case. Thus, the only issue remaining for review NBS

whether Bias ha[ d] alleged specific facts evidencing Wells'[ s] malice or intent to inflict

direct harm sufficient to state 8 C2U88 of action against Wells based OO an intentional

tort." Bias v. ( L8Ann^ 1 Cir. 1 356 x o. 3d 49/ writ

denied, 2023- 00007 y[ 8, l, 358 Sn, 3H 515 / Bias 11l. This court agreed with the

trial court' s conclusion that Bias had failed to state a G3USe of action against Wells in

intentional tort, and further found:

Based UO our thorough ReV8VV Of the record before US we CaOOOt

DDMt2O0[ l8{£ any amendment that Bias could make to his petition to remove
the grounds of the objection as it relates to his intentional tort claim against

For the above and foregoing F8GSDMS we affirm the district court's
December 20, 2021 judgment, sustaining the peremptory exception raising

Initially, Bias flied apleading captioned " Plaintiff's ExParte Motion toFile Plaintiffs Fourth Amended and
Supplemental Petition[ l" which did not include a request for leave to file the fourth amended and
supplemental petition or an order to seta contradictory hearing dote. In response, Wells filed a motion to
strike the fourth amended and supplemental petition. Bias then sought towithdraw his erparte motion
and filed a pleading captioned " Plaintiff; Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff's Fourth Amended and
Supplemental Petition[ J "According to the November 29, 2021 hearing transcript, while certain allegations
contained in Bias's fourth amended and supplemental petition were discussed, the trial court explicitly noted
that Bias did not provide facts supporting those allegations. The November 29, 2021 hearing transcript also
contained mention of Wells' s motion to strike Bias' s fourth amended and supplemental petition. However,
the December 20, 2O21judgment did not mention either the motion for leave orthe motion to strike.
Silence in ajudgmmnt as to any issue, claim, or demand placed before the court is generally deemed a
rejection of the claim, and the relief sought is presumed to be denied; thus, Bias' s motion for leave to file
the fourth amended and supplemental petition was deemed denied. See Bias v. Foster, 2022- 0408
La. App. 1Cir. 11/ 4/ 32), 356So. 3d49, 57 n. 4, writ denied, 2023- 00007 ( La. 3/ 28/ 23), 358So. 3d 515.

the objection nfOOcause Of action filed h« John B' Wells, and dismissing,
mith' nd' | C Ol flkud hm ODBk1 B 8iME John B. Wells.. ~ . . -

Bias U, 356 Sn, 3d at 61- 62.

On March 28, 2023, the supreme court denied writs in both Bias's C011USioKl suit

and abuse of process suit. See Bias v. ([ a' ), 358

So^3H515and Foster v, Bias, 2023 / L8. 3l/ 358 SO. 3d 503'

Giving rise to this 8DO83L Bias SOUghf | 88Ve to 8D0em1 the collusion suit for the
fifth time DMDecember 21/ 2027| over nine months after the trial court denied writs in

Bis H and abuse of process qi+1The fifth amended and supplemental petition

sought tDre-name Wells 8S@defendant; hOadd 8S defendantsthe "[ aVV Offices of John

B. \ A/ ei| s" ( VUp| ls' s LBVV , B SOl8 proprietorship owned and operated by Wells, and

MilOS ( MVA Inc.), a non- profit law firm operated

by Wells; to remove claims for breach of the stipulation; and to add claims for abuse of
process " haspdOOthe recent, final dismissal ofFoster's lawsuit against Bias." Bias argued

he should be permitted tOfile the fifth @[ DeOdpd and SUDD|eD1enfal petition heraUS8 his

claims for D1BlijOUS prosecution and abuse of process BO8iDSt Foster and Wells based

4W note that shortly before Bias moved for leave tofile the fifth amended and supplemental petition,
LSA- C. C. P. art. 1153, which governs supplemental pleadings, was amended by 2023 La. Acts No. 5, § 1
eff. Aug. 1, 2023). Prior to the amendment, LSA- C. C. P. art. 1153 provided:
The court, on motion of a party, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
may permit mover tofile a supplemental petition oxanswer setting forth items of
causes ofaction ordefenses which have become exigible since the date offiling the original
petition or answer, and which are related to or connected with the causes of action or
defenses asserted therein.

As amended, LSA- C. C. P. a± 1153 provides:

The court, upon written consent ofthe parties, may permit the mover tofile a supplemental
petition or answer setting forth items of damage, causes of action or defenses that have
become exigible since the date of filing the original petition or answer, and that are related
to or connected with the causes of action or defenses asserted therein. If the parties do
not consent, the court may grant leave to file a supplemental petition or answer only upon
contradictory motion.

The 2023 comments to LGA- C. C. P. art. 1153 :

a) This Article changes procedural law by providing that party who wishes Uofile a
supplemental pleading must either have the consent of all parties or file a contradictory
motion. Previously, a party was permitted to file supplemental pleading after obtaining
leave of court and providing " reasonable notice," the meaning of which was uncertain. The
filing ofacontradictory motion will guarantee that other parties are afforded anopportunity
to object to the filing of a supplemental pleading and will therefore alleviate concerns with
respect bowhat constitutes " reasonable noLica."

b) With this change to Article 1155, the practice of filing an " Amending and Supplemental
Petition" should be avoided unless the petition contains causes of action that have become
exigible since the filing of the original petition. Whereas the filing of an amending petition
under Article 1152 requires only leave of court, the filing of a supplemental petition under
this Article will require acontradictory hearing ifall parties donot consent.

K.

on their filing of the dismissed Abuse of Process Lawsuit against Bias [ became] ripe for
adjudication" upon the supreme court's March 28, 2023 denial of writs in Foster's abuse

of process suit.

Wells opposed Bias' s motion for leave to file the fifth amended and supplemental

petition. Wells argued that because this court entered a final judgment dismissing " all" of

Bias' s claims against Wells with prejudice, and the supreme court denied writs, the

judgment in Bias Il had become final and definitive, and was not subject to amendment

by any court. Wells further argued that Bias was precluded from filing the fifth amended

and supplemental petition by resjudicata, because the claims asserted therein arose from

the same transaction or occurrence as the claims previously asserted in the collusion suit

and dismissed with prejudice in Bias 11.

Bias' s motion for leave to file the fifth amended and supplemental petition was

heard on March 11, 2024. During the hearing, Bias argued that the only claims he sought

to assert against Wells in the fifth amended and supplemental petition were those " based

on Foster's abuse of process lawsuit," which he maintained " became ripe for adjudication

as of the Supreme Court decision [ in] March of last year." In support of this position, Bias

cited this court's finding in Bias I that he " fail[ ed] to state a cause of action against Wells

based on the filing of the abuse of process suit because there has been no ' bona fide

termination' of the abuse of process suit in Bias'[ s] favor." Thus, Bias contended that his

claims against Wells based on Foster' s abuse of process suit were not before the court at

the time the judgment in Bias U was rendered, and consequently, Bias 11 did not

preclude him from asserting claims against Wells based on Foster' s abuse of process suit.

After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court orally denied Bias's motion for

leave, stating, in pertinent part:

I] t's my feeling, sir, that these claims that you've asserted against Mr. John
Wells, they are final. They are over. I think the First Circuit spoke - -
affirmed me. The Supreme Court didn't need to talk about it. They thought
it was correct. And so your motion to amend and supplement the fifth
petition is denied.

Es

The trial court memorialized its oral ruling in a written judgment dated March 25,

2024, which provided, in pertinent part:

Considering the pleadings, law, and arguments, and upon finding that the
dismissal of the claims against John B. Wells was with prejudice, final and
definitive;

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Motion to File
Plaintiff's Fifth Amended and Supplemental Petition be and is hereby
DENIED, with Plaintiff bearing costs.

From this judgment, Bias appealed. 5

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Appellate courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte,

even when the parties do not raise the issue. This court' s appellate jurisdiction extends

only to final judgments, which determine the merits in whole or in part, and to

interlocutory judgments made expressly appealable by law. See LSA-C. C. P. arts. 1841

and 2083; Bias v. Haley, 2023- 0281 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 11/ 3/ 23), 383 So. 3d 175, 181.

On August 26, 2024, this court issued an ex proprio motu order noting that the

March 25, 2024 judgment before us on appeal appeared to be a non -appealable ruling.

Thus, the order directed the parties to show cause by briefs whether the appeal should

or should not be dismissed. Upon receipt and review of the parties' briefs, we referred

the matter to the merits panel. Accordingly, we now consider whether our appellate

jurisdiction extends to the March 25, 2024 judgment at issue before us.

This court has previously found that a judgment denying leave to file a

supplemental and amending petition constitutes an interlocutory judgment that is

generally not appealable. See Barringer v. Robertson, 2015- 0698 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

12/ 2/ 15), 216 So. 3d 919, 926 n. 7, writ denied, 2016- 0010 ( La. 2/ 26/ 16), 187 So. 3d 1004.

However, such an interlocutory judgment is subject to review by an appellate court when

an appealable judgment is rendered in the same case. Id. In this matter, the March 25,

2024 ruling denying Bias leave to file a fifth amended and supplemental petition

5 On March 20, 2024, Bias filed a pleading captioned " Petition for Devolutive Appeal and to Stay
Proceedings" and which sought review of the trial court's " March 11, 2024" judgment. Although we note
that Bias's motion for appeal referenced the date of the trial court's oral ruling, rather than the date on
which the written judgment was signed, it is clear from Bias' s motion for appeal that he sought to appeal
the March 11, 2024 judgment which was later memorialized in the March 25, 2024 judgment. See Wilson
v. Whitfield, 2022- 0488 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 24/ 23), 361 So. 3d 512, 515 n. 2.

I

maintained the previous dismissal of all of Bias's claims against Wells. Thus, there are

presently no unresolved or pending issues between Bias and Wells. Accordingly, we find
that the March 25, 2024 judgment is final for purposes of appeal, and we maintain the

appeal. 6

LAW AND DISCUSSION

At the outset of this discussion, we note several well- settled points of law regarding

prose litigants such as Bias: first, that pro se litigants are accorded greater leeway in the

interpretation of their pleadings, see Kling v. Hebert, 2023- 00257 ( La. 1/ 26/ 24), 378

So. 3d 54, 59; and second, that pro se litigants nevertheless assume responsibility for

their own inadequacy and lack of knowledge of both procedural and substantive law.
Clark v. Byers Engineering Company Contractors, 2016- 0907 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

4/ 20/ 17) 2017 WL 1424069, * 3 n. 4 ( unpublished), titin Rader v. Department of

Health and Hospitals.,Office of Public Health,, Engineering Services, 94- 0763 ( La

App. 1 Cir. 3/ 3/ 95), 652 So. 2d 644, 646. We further note that, in all cases, Louisiana

courts are obligated to look through the caption of pleadings in order to ascertain their

substance and to construe every pleading so as to do substantial justice. LSA- C. C. P. art.

865; see Armstrong v. ARCCO Company Services,, Inc., 2021- 0131 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

10/ 18/ 21), 331 So. 3d 939, 945. Thus, while it is sometimes difficult to discern Bias' s

arguments from his prose pleadings, and although we do not address each assignment

of error or issue for review individually, we consider all of the substantive issues Bias

raises on appeal with these legal precepts in mind.'

6 We further note that Bias sought his appeal within the supervisory writ delays. Thus, even if we had found
that the March 25, 2024 judgment was not final for purposes of appeal, we could have converted the
appeal to a supervisory writ application and address the merits. See Stelluto v. Stelluto, 2005- 0074 ( La.
6/ 29/ 05), 914 So. 2d 34, 39 ("[ T] he decision to convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writs is
within the discretion of the appellate courts.").

7 On appeal, Bias assigns three errors: ( 1) the trial court abused its discretion by ruling on claims where it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the claims were not ripe for judicial determination; ( 2) the trial
court abused its discretion by denying Bias an opportunity to amend his petition; ( 3) the trial court
committed legal error in its application of the standard set forth in Montalvo v. Sondes, 637 So. 2d 127
La. 1994), in an unconstitutional manner to deny Bias his constitutional right to petition the court for
redress of wrongs. Bias also identifies five issues for review: ( 1) Is LSA- C. C. P. art. 2083 constitutional? ( 2)
Did the trial court have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on premature claims? ( 3) If the trial court had
jurisdiction to rule on premature claims, should the premature claims have been dismissed without
prejudice? ( 4) As applied to the facts of this case by the trial court, is the standard set forth in Montalvo,

637 So. 2d 127, for stating tort claims against an adversary' s attorney constitutional? ( 5) Should judicial
estoppel apply to bar the argument that Bias' s claims were previously dismissed with prejudice?

11

The judgment before us on appeal is the trial court's March 25, 2024 judgment

denying Bias's motion for leave to file the fifth amended and supplemental petition. An

amended pleading either restates the allegations of a claim or defense which were

imperfectly stated, or adds a new claim or defense which existed, but was not pleaded,

when the original pleading was flied. In contrast, a supplemental pleading sets forth a
new claim or defense, or an item of damages, which arose after the filing of the original

pleading. Harris v. Union National Fire Insurance Company, 2014- 1603 ( La. App. 1
Cir. 6/ 18/ 15), 175 So. 3d 1008, 1012, dtft 1 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Procedure § 6: 10

2d ed.). Amendment of pleadings should be liberally allowed provided that the movant

is acting in good faith, the amendment is not sought as a delaying tactic, the opponent

will not be unduly prejudiced, and trial on the issues will not be unduly delayed.

Pallowsky v. Cork, 2019- 0148 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 20/ 20), 304 So. 3d 867, 875. In contrast,

supplementation of pleadings is permissible only if there is sufficient connexity with the

claim or defense initially asserted, and only after a contradictory hearing against the

opposing party. Harris, 175 So. 3d at 1012, gWng 1 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Procedure
6: 10 ( 2d ed.). The decision whether to grant leave to amend or supplement a pleading

is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on

appeal except where an abuse of discretion has occurred and indicates a possibility of

resulting injustice. Pallowsky, 304 So. 3d at 875.

Having carefully considered the record before us and the applicable law, we find

the trial court properly denied Bias' s motion for leave to file the fifth amended and

supplemental petition. As set forth above, the judgment rendered in Bias II explicitly

dismissed " all" of Bias's claims against Wells. A judgment that decides the merits of the

case in whole or in part is a final judgment. LSA-C. C. P. art. 1841; Batson v. South

Louisiana Medical Center, 2006- 1998 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 13/ 07), 965 So. 2d 890, 895-

96, writ denied, 2007- 1479 ( La. 10/ 5/ 07), 964 So. 2d 945. A final judgment becomes final

and definitive and acquires the authority of the thing adjudged if no further review is

sought within the time fixed by law, if the supreme court denies an application for

certiorari, or if the judgment is confirmed on further review. LSA- C. C. P. arts. 2166( E) &

2167; Batson, 965 So. 2d at 895- 896. Once a final judgment becomes final and definitive

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and acquires the authority of the thing adjudged, no court has jurisdiction, in the sense

of power and authority, to modify, revise, or reverse the judgment, regardless of the

magnitude of the error in the final judgment. Id. at 896.

Because this court affirmed the trial court's December 20, 2021 judgment and the

supreme court denied writs, the December 20, 2021 judgment has acquired the authority

of a thing adjudged. Therefore, no court has the power or authority to modify, revise, or

reverse the dismissal of "all" of Bias' s claims against Wells. This is true regardless of the

magnitude of any alleged or actual error in the final judgment.8 See Batson, 965 So. 2d

While we note Bias's argument that the only claims he sought to assert against

Wells in the fifth amended and supplemental petition were his claims based on Foster's

abuse of process suit, the record plainly reflects that Bias asserted claims for abuse of

process in his original petition in the collusion suit, in his second amended petition in the

collusion suit, and in his third amended petition in the collusion suit, which was the

petition before the court in Bias U. See Bias U, 356 So. 3d at 55- 56. As set forth above,

in Bias U, this court explicitly considered " whether Bias ha[ d] alleged specific facts

evidencing Wells'[ s] malice or intent to inflict direct harm sufficient to state a cause of

action against Wells based on an intentional tort[,]" and found that he had not. We further

stated, " we cannot contemplate any amendment that Bias could make to his petition to

remove the grounds of the objection as it relates to his intentional tort claim against

Wells[,]" and affirmed the dismissal, with prejudice, of all claims filed by Bias against

Wells. Bias U, 356 So. 3d at 60- 62. Consequently, the judgment dismissing all of Bias' s

claims against Wells in Bias U dismissed Bias' s claims against Wells based on Foster' s

abuse of process suit, and the finality of that judgment, now precludes Bias from reviving

8 We note Bias' s argument that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss his claims against
Wells based on the abuse of process suit. However, the Louisiana Constitution, Article V, § 16( A), states
that except as otherwise authorized by this constitution, a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil and criminal matters. Bovia v. Ledig, 2009- 0900 ( La. App. I Cir. 3/ 2/ 10), 36 So. 3d 287, 288. Bias' s
collusion suit against Wells and Foster asserted causes of action in contract and tort, which are classified
as civil matters traditionally adjudicated by district courts in Louisiana. See Woolley v. AmCare Health
Plans of Louisiana, Inc., 2005- 2025 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 10/ 25/ 06), 944 So. 2d 668, 676. Accordingly, the 19th
Judicial District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

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claims based on Foster's abuse of process suit against Wells.9 Likewise, Bias 11 precludes

Bias from amending his petition in the collusion suit to remove the claims based on breach

of the stipulation, as they have already been dismissed.

We further find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

proposed amendment to name Wells's Law Office and MVA, Inc. as additional defendants

at this late stage in the litigation. The fifth amended and supplemental petition alleged

that it concerned " two malicious and retaliatory lawsuits filed in abuse of legal process

against Bias by [ Foster], in collusion with [ Wells] through his law firm, Law Offices of

John B. Wells," and was related to Foster' s decertification suit, which was " used to

retaliate against Bias" and was " filed through the nonprofit law firm, [ MVA, Inc., which]

has as its attorney [ Wells]." However, the third amended petition identified Wells as " a

natural person and Louisiana attorney domiciled in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana and

sole member of the Law Offices of John B. Wells[.]" Additionally, Bias attached a copy

of the stipulation flied in the decertification suit to the third amended petition, and the

signature page of the stipulation identified Wells, through Military -Veterans Advocacy,

Inc., as Foster' s counsel in that matter. This court considered similar facts in Carter v.

Safeco Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d 1076, 1081 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1983), wherein a personal injury

plaintiff sought to name the insured as a defendant two and one- half years after the

accident. The trial court rejected the amendment, and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal,

this court wrote:

T] his is not a case of a closely related but incorrectly identified
defendant, nor is this a case of a suit brought in the wrong capacity. Rather,
the] plaintiff knew who [ the insured] was, he knew where to find him, and
he knew [ the insured' s] daughter was involved in the accident. In short, the
search for the truth ... would not be furthered by allowing [ the] plaintiff to
amend to name [ the insured]. Amendment at this time would not serve any
legitimate purpose other than to give [ the] plaintiff access to an additional
source of funds that [ the] plaintiff delayed seeking from the beginning.

Under the facts in this case, we feel that permitting [ the plaintiff] to
amend to name [ the insured] after final judgment, in a situation where he
could have been cited since the inception of the case, would work

9 Moreover, with respect to Bias' s proposed amendment to re -name Wells as a defendant in the fifth
amended and supplemental petition, this court's jurisprudence does not permit a party to " bring [ a
previously dismissed party] back" into litigation by filing an amended or supplemental petition. See
Templet v. Johns, 417 So. 2d 433, 435 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1982), writ denied, 420 So. 2d 981 ( La. 1982);
Meadows v. Cross Gates, Inc., 2003- 1408 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 2/ 04), 878 So. 2d 674, 676, writ denied
2004- 1060 ( La. 6/ 18/ 04), 876 So. 2d 813; and Vance v. Edwards, 2023- 0016 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 10/ 30/ 23),
377 So. 3d 710, 715, writ denied, 2024- 00005 ( La. 2/ 27/ 24), 379 So. 3d 1266.

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substantial prejudice to [ the insured]. Thus, we feel the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in rejecting the amendment and we therefore affirm
his decision.

Carter, 435 So. 2d at 1081.

In this matter, as in Carter, it is clear that Bias knew the identity of the two entities

he now seeks to add as defendants, and knew of their involvement in the events

underlying the instant suit, years before he sought to name them as defendants herein.

Consequently, granting Bias leave to amend his petition to name Wells's Law Office and

MVA, Inc. as defendants at this stage of the proceedings would not further the search for

the truth, nor would it serve any legitimate purpose other than to give Bias access to an

additional source of funds that he delayed seeking from the beginning. See Carter, 435

So. 2d at 1081. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's judgment

rejecting the amendment to the extent it sought to add Wells's Law Office and MVA, Inc.,

as defendants.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's March 25, 2024 judgment denying

Ronald Bias' s motion for leave to file the fifth amended and supplemental petition is

affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Ronald Bias.

M-
1

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