Jamar A. Flowers v. Adrienne D. Tasker

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2024 CU 0690

JAMAR A. FLOWERS

VERSUS

F-11 6911 ALIILI1: 161M

Judgment Rendered:

On Appeal from the Family Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Docket No. 223397

Honorable Ronald D. Cox, Judge Pro Tempore Presiding
Honorable Charlene C. Day, Presiding Judge

Veronica " Vicky" Jones Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Jamar A. Flowers

Jamar A. Flowers Plaintiff/ Appellee
Zachary, Louisiana Pro Se

NaTashia Carter Benoit Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Adrienne D. Tasker

BEFORE: McCLENDON, C.J.., LANIER AND BALFOUR, 33.

McCLENDON.. C.J.

In this child custody case, the mother appeals a judgment that granted sole

custody to the father, suspended the mother's supervised visitation until approved by the

minor child' s medical providers, continued a previously -issued protective order against

the mother for an additional eighteen months, and ordered the mother to pay child

support. The mother also appeals the judgment denying her motion for new trial. We

vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand.

Jamar A. Flowers and Adrienne D. Tasker are the parents of J. T.T., born on July

2, 2013. The parties did not have a formal custody agreement until Flowers instituted this

litigation by filing a petition to establish paternity, custody, and visitation on October 14,

2020. Subsequently, the parties stipulated that Flowers is J. T.T.'s biological father, agreed

to a week -to -week physical custody schedule, and agreed to abide by certain co -

parenting guidelines. The trial court signed the interim stipulated judgment on November

20, 2020. Extensive and contentious litigation followed.

On December 7, 2020, Flowers filed a petition seeking immediate temporary

custody and a rule for contempt. Flowers alleged that Tasker denied his physical custody

period beginning on December 5, 2020, because she claimed that J. T.T. was quarantined

pursuant to doctor's orders following a Covid- 19 exposure; however, Tasker refused to

provide corroborative medical documentation. During a December 7, 2020 hearing, the

trial court denied Flowers' request for immediate temporary custody and ordered Tasker

to advise Flowers of I.T.T.'s Covid- 19 test results. Flowers filed a second rule for contempt

on December 23, 2020. Therein, Flowers alleged that Tasker submitted falsified

documents to the trial court in support of her claims that J. T.T. was under doctor's orders

to quarantine during the December 7, 2020 hearing. Flowers' rules for contempt were

ultimately resolved pursuant to a court -approved stipulated consent judgment on March

3, 2021. Said judgment found Tasker in contempt of court for denying Flowers' physical

custody period beginning on December 5, 2020, and for submitting falsified medical

documents to the trial court.

PJ

Following a January 12, 2021 hearing, the parties stipulated to a " 2- 2- 5" physical

custody schedule. The stipulation further prohibited " excessive corporal punishment by

either party or a third party[.]"

However, on March 5, 2021, Flowers, on his own behalf and on behalf of I.T.T,

filed a petition for protection from abuse against Tasker pursuant to the Domestic Abuse

Assistance Statutes, LSA- R. S. 46: 2131, etseq. (Flowers' petition for protection). Flowers

alleged that on or about February 12, 2021, his wife, Krystal Flowers, and her co- worker,

Orlean Wilkinson,' noticed marks on I.T.T.'s face. According to Flowers, when the women

asked J. T.T. what happened, he disclosed that Tasker slapped him and hit him in the

head with a belt buckle. Flowers further alleged he had reported the abuse to law

enforcement and to the Department of Children and Family Services ( DCFS). The trial

court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ( TRO) and granted Flowers temporary

custody of J. T.T.2 Although the TRO was initially in effect through March 24, 2021, it was

repeatedly extended and remained in effect until the parties resolved Flowers' petition

for protection pursuant to a court -approved stipulated consent judgment on July 21,
2021.

On April 16, 2021, the parties stipulated to Tasker having supervised visitation with

I.T.T. Tasker's sister, Claudia Tasker, agreed to serve as the supervisor. The trial court

signed a written judgment confirming the stipulation the same day.

On May 7, 2021, Tasker filed a petition for protection from abuse against Krystal

Tasker's petition for protection against Krystal), pursuant to LSA- R. S. 46: 2131, etseq.

The trial court issued the requested TRO. On May 26, 2021, Krystal filed a peremptory
exception pleading the objection of no cause of action, arguing that Tasker lacked

standing under LSA- R. S. 46: 2133( D) to file the petition. The trial court ultimately

1 The record contains various spellings of Ms. Wilkinson' s name. We use Orlean Wilkinson throughout for
consistency.

2 Louisiana law mandates that trial courts use a uniform form for the issuance of any TRO or protective
order, called the " Uniform Abuse Prevention Order." See LSA- R. S. 46: 2136. 2( C); Head v. Robichaux,
2018- 0366 ( La. App 1 Cir. 11/ 2/ 18), 265 So. 3d 813, 816. The trial court checks off one of the following
boxes provided on the uniform form to indicate under which law it issues the TRO and/ or protective order:
1) LSA- R.S. 46: 2131, et seq. ( Domestic Abuse); ( 2) LSA- R. S. 46: 2151 ( Dating Violence); ( 3) LSA- R. S.
46: 2171, etseq. (Non -intimate stalking); ( 4) LSA- R. S. 2181, etseq. (Non -intimate sexual assault); ( 5) LSA-
Ch. C. art. 1564, et seq. ( Children' s Code Domestic Abuse); or, ( 6) a court approved consent agreement.
Head, 265 So. 3d at 816- 17.

3

dismissed Tasker's petition for protection against Krystal because it was transferred to

civil court.

Giving rise to the instant appeal, on May 26, 2021, Flowers filed a petition seeking

permanent sole custody of J. T.T. and other relief, including child support ( petition for

permanent sole custody). Therein, Flowers alleged that DCFS had completed an

investigation into the allegations of abuse by Tasker and found " that the reported abuse

was justified/ valid." Accordingly, Flowers requested permanent sole custody of J. T.T.

Alternatively, Flowers requested that the trial court designate him as domiciliary parent

and maintain Tasker' s supervised visitation. Flowers additionally requested that the trial

court order Tasker to pay child support and provide him with a copy of I.T.T.'s insurance

cards; prohibit discussion of the legal proceedings with J. T.T. or in his presence; permit

Flowers to claim I.T.T. for tax purposes; and issue a TRO enjoining Tasker from "harming,

harassing, or bothering [ Flowers] in any way, including going to his place of residence or

employment without his consent." The matter was set for hearing on June 21, 2021.

On June 14, 2021, Tasker filed a petition for protection from abuse on her own

behalf and on behalf of I.T.T. against Flowers pursuant to LSA- R. S. 46: 2131, et seq.

Tasker's petition for protection against Flowers). The trial court issued a TRO on June

14, 2021 as requested, but specified that custody would continue as previously set.

The following day, on June 15, 2021, Flowers filed a petition seeking an ex parte

interim order of sole custody. Therein, Flowers alleged he had learned that I.T.T. was

being left alone with Tasker in violation of the April 16, 2021 stipulated judgment

requiring supervised visitation. Flowers further alleged that on or about May 31, 2021,

J. T.T. reported that his thirteen -year-old half brother, B. W., had sexually abused him

while unsupervised at Tasker's home. Flowers alleged that he relayed IT.T.'s disclosure

to Tasker' s sister Claudia, and Claudia relayed the disclosure to Tasker, who punished

J. T.T. and instructed him to recant. When I.T.T. refused to recant, Tasker struck him

with a belt and forced him to kneel for a long period of time. Flowers also asserted that

DCFS and law enforcement were investigating these additional allegations of abuse.

Flowers requested that during the pendency of the investigations, the trial court issue an

interim order of sole custody, terminate Tasker's supervised visitation, remove Claudia as

G!

the visitation supervisor, and issue a finding of contempt against Tasker. Following a June

15, 2021 hearing, the trial court granted Flowers interim sole custody, suspended Tasker's

visitation until June 21, 2021, and set the matter for hearing on June 21, 2021.

On June 21, 2021, Flowers' petition for protection against Tasker came for trial.

The trial court heard evidence from Flowers, Krystal, and Orlean Wilkinson, before

continuing the trial of the petition for protection, as well as the TRO and all other

outstanding matters, to June 21, 2021.

The second day of trial of Flowers' petition for protection against Tasker resumed

on July 21, 2021. The parties resolved the matter pursuant to a court -approved consent

judgment, which issued a six- month protective order against Tasker in favor of I.T.T. and

Flowers, in effect until January 21, 2022; granted Flowers temporary custody of J. T.T.;

granted Tasker two hours of supervised visitation each week; and ordered Tasker to

complete a twenty -six-week domestic abuse intervention program through Baton Rouge

City Court, after which she could request that the trial court remove the supervision

requirement. The petition for permanent sole custody, which had been set for trial on

October 1, 2021, was re -set for January 21 and January 24, 2022. 3

The petition for permanent sole custody came for trial on January 21, 2022. At

that time, I.T.T. was eight years old.

The trial court heard testimony from Flowers, his wife Krystal, and Tasker.4 Flowers

and Krystal testified that I.T.T. disclosed multiple instances in which Tasker physically

abused him. Flowers testified that Tasker hit I.T.T. in the head with a belt buckle, leading
Flowers to file his March 5, 2021 petition for protection. Flowers further testified that

when J. T.T. was removed from Tasker's custody on the basis of the petition for

protection, J. T.T. disclosed that Tasker had whipped him with an extension cord and

revealed marks on his arm. According to Flowers and Krystal, DCFS found J. T.T.'s

allegation regarding being struck with the belt buckle * valid[.] Tasker disputed this

testimony, claiming that DCFS had found the allegations " invalid[.]"

3 We note that the July 21, 2021 minutes state the new trial dates were set in January of 2021, rather than
2022. However, this was plainly a typographical error.
4 Neither Flowers nor Tasker objected to the other's testimony regarding out-of-court statements made by
I.T.T., and Tasker does not raise this issue on appeal.

61

Regarding the allegations of sexual abuse, Flowers testified that J. T.T. ultimately

disclosed that he had been raped by three different males while left unsupervised in

Tasker's custody. According to Flowers, around Memorial Day of 2021, J. T.T. told him

that B.T., Tasker's oldest son and IT.T."s half brother, taught J. T.T. " how to watch

porn[,]" which " led to ... [ B. T.] playing with [ J. T.T."s] private areas" when Tasker left

the boys unsupervised. According to Flowers, he reported the allegations to DCFS and

law enforcement, and B.T. was interviewed, but the investigation did not proceed further.

Flowers also testified that when he told Claudia about IT.T.'s allegations, she shared

them with Tasker, who pressured J. T.T. to recant and forced him to kneel for " hours"

when he refused. At the time of trial, B.T. was thirteen years old and still lived with

Tasker. Later, J. T.T. disclosed that he was also sexually abused by Tasker's cousin, D.T.,

whom Tasker identified as being thirteen years old at the time of trial, and " Big A[ J" who

Tasker identified as Albert York, a man who helped Tasker move. Flowers and Krystal

also testified that I.T.T. had attempted to report the sexual abuse to Tasker, but she told

him to " get the ' F' out of her room."

Flowers testified that J. T.T. had an established relationship with a counselor

named Myeisha Spears, who he began seeing in " September or November," and whom

he saw twice a month. Flowers stated he had seen progress in J. T.T., but " the regress

came when he did what he did at school." Regarding the incident at school, Krystal

testified that on December 15, 2021, another student reported that he and J. T.T. had

gone to the bathroom, and J. T.T. " had him against the wall ... was trying to tickle him

on the stomach and then below the waist and would not let him off the wall." The student

felt uncomfortable and went to the office crying. Krystal clarified that the contact was

described to her as " below the waist in a sexual way[ jWhen Krystal and Flowers spoke

to I.T.T. later that day, he " admitted" to the other child' s report. Krystal testified that she

explained to [ J. T.T.] that children don't do things like that and a lot of times when that

happens, that means someone - - you know there - - they have done that to you." Flowers

then gave I.T.T. a book and told him to write down what had happened to him. After

reading IT.T.'s account, Krystal suggested that J. T.T. see a psychiatrist. Krystal further

testified that because the school was aware of IT.T.'s prior allegations of physical and

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sexual abuse, J. T.T. was not suspended, " because they understood that he was possibly

going through something."

Subsequently, Krystal took J. T.T. to see Dr. Carol Smothers, a pediatrician. Krystal

testified that J. T.T. told Dr. Smothers " all of the things that he had written down[.]"

According to Krystal, Dr. Smothers did not see evidence of abuse during her physical

examination of J. T.T., though she explained that was common if the abuse was not

recent. However, when Dr. Smothers received I.T.T.' s bloodwork, she called Flowers and

told him to bring J. T.T. back for urinalysis. When the urinalysis results came in, Dr.

Smothers called Flowers and told him to bring I.T.T. to the Our Lady of the Lake Children' s

Hospital emergency room to be further evaluated. After the emergency room visit, a

S. A. F. E. clinic visit was set. Krystal explained the " safe clinic" was for individuals who

were sexually abused, though she was not sure if it was just for children.

Flowers testified that J. T.T. began seeing a psychiatrist the day before trial. The

morning of trial, Flowers and Krystal brought J. T.T. to the safe clinic visit, then left him

with his godmother so they could attend trial.

Flowers offered Exhibit 2, which he identified as a report containing the allegations

of abuse as conveyed by J. T.T. to a social worker. The trial court admitted Exhibit 2 into

evidence. Upon review, Exhibit 2 appears to be a printout of an initial written report made

to DCFS through a DCFS Online Reporter Portal, dated January 6, 2022 ( Exhibit 2). Exhibit

2 reflects that Ashlyn Hindrichs, a " Pediatric ER Social Worker" employed by Our Lady of
the Lake Children' s Hospital ( OLOL Children' s Hospital), reported that I.T.T. was

evaluated at OLOL Children' s Hospital. Exhibit 2 documented that Flowers reported that

I.T.T. had been " sexually assaulted by 3 different males[,]" all of whom ` have raped him

anally." The report further stated, "[ 3. T.T.] had a physical exam performed on him by Dr.

Saucier. It was found he did show scarring to his anus." Tasker did not object to the
admission of Exhibit 2.

Flowers testified that it was previously difficult for him to build a relationship with
I.T.T. because Tasker " want[ ed] to dominate" his interactions with J. T.T. He testified that

after he saw J. T.T., Tasker would " snatch him" for months. Flowers also testified that

I.T.T. had missed nineteen days of school and had seventeen " tardies" when he lived

7

with Tasker. In contrast, Flowers testified that since I.T.T. had been in his care, he was

into sports[,]" played video games, attended school regularly, and was a " straight A"

student. Flowers stated, " But the biggest thing is he [ is] happy." Krystal testified that her

relationship with J. T.T. was " great" and " he's like one of my other children."

Flowers asked that the trial court suspend all physical and telephone contact

between J. T.T. and Tasker until medical professionals advised otherwise. Flowers testified

that J. T.T. had not communicated a desire to speak to Tasker. Krystal testified that "after

every visit [ Tasker] has with J. T.T., there's an allegation ... CPS has been to not only

our home, but they have gone to [ I.T.T. s] school" on numerous occasions. Krystal

clarified that she believed Tasker was trying to coach J. T.T., and it made him " sad[.]"

Krystal testified that she felt Tasker was a danger to I.T.T. and did not think he should

have contact with her.

Tasker admitted to whipping her children with a belt and cursing at them.

However, she denied whipping her children with a belt buckle or an extension cord.

According to Tasker, B.T. hit I.T.T. with the extension cord while the two were fighting,

and when she " jerked" the cord from the boys, it " popped back" and hit I.T.T.' s arm and

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Flowers also submitted an audio recording as Exhibit 4.5 Tasker was asked to

explain the contents of the recording. She confirmed that the recording captured an

altercation she had with B.T., while her two younger children were in the home. The

audio recording includes Tasker making numerous statements and threats to I.T.T.'s

thirteen -year-old half brother B.T., such as: " you bust my mother fucking baby's lip"; " the

longer you walk from me the worse it's gonna be when I get you"; " I take the spray and

I spray [ your] fucking eyes to blind you"; " wear yo ass out bitch"; " two seconds I' m about

to make your mouth bleed"; " get the fuck outta here bitch"; " punk ass bitch"; and " you

kicked him because yo gay ass was mad I told you [ to get something from the truck.]"

5 We note that Exhibit 4 is a video recording. However, most of the image is obscured, and the transcript
reflects that Exhibit 4 was offered for its audio content, as the trial court stated, in pertinent part:

The two attorneys played it in my chambers, and I couldn' t see. I saw one person' s face,
your face - - or the kid recording you - - but I - - it's not like a video that you could see a
video.... They want to offer it for the voice.

Thus, we refer to Exhibit 4 as " the audio recording" herein.

In addition to Tasker's voice, the recording captured sounds of repeated slapping, heavy

thuds, and Tasker's two younger children crying in the background.

At one point while the audio recording was playing, the trial court interrupted to

ask, " So that was you saying you would blind your own child? You called him out his

name multiple - - you told him you would bloody his mouth." Tasker responded, " Yes it

was."

After the audio recording concluded, Tasker was asked if "that was your thirteen -

year -old son [ B. T.]?" She replied, " That was my thirteen -year-old son being very

rebellious. Yes it was." When asked whether the audio recording depicted the first and

only time Tasker acted that way, she replied, " Thats the first time I have ever - - ever

called my child that many bitches or cut up like that to that extent to calling him a punk."

At one point, Tasker stated, " I think that my child was being disrespectful, and he just

kept - - kept just fighting me back - - blocking the licks actually. So, he wasn't really

getting hit cause he was blocking the licks."

Tasker testified that she "' broke" when she learned of J. T.T.'s allegation against

her thirteen -year-old son B. T., and she was frustrated with B.T. because he had hit I.T.T.

with the extension cord, contributing to her custody problems. Tasker also claimed that

Flowers and B.T.'s father were engaged in a " plot" against her in order to avoid paying

child support and had been blackmailing her with the audio recording. Tasker testified

that she put herself and B.T. in counseling following the events depicted in Exhibit 4. She

also testified she does not think she would act that way again, because she is now in

counseling and takes medication for her nerves.

Nevertheless, Tasker admitted she had not completed the twenty -six- week

program for domestic violence as ordered by the July 21, 2021 protective order. She

stated she was unable to afford that program and had instead participated in other

programs available through DCFS.

Regarding the allegations of sexual abuse, Tasker testified that J. T.T. had never

told her he had been sexually abused, and that she did not believe he had been sexually
abused. Tasker stated, " I believe I.T.T. is being coached and coerced." When asked if

she had seen the report that indicates that J. T.T." has anal trauma[,]" Tasker responded,

0

Yes. I' m a medical assistant. I graduated 2015. [ J. T.T.] had, they won't know because

they wasn't active in [ J. T.T.'s] life - - but [ J. T.T.] suffers from hemorrhoids, and on top

of that, they have never asked me if [ J. T.T.] can eat hot stuff." When asked if she was

suggesting that the trauma was caused by hemorrhoids or hot food, Tasker answered

negatively, saying, " I' m not suggesting anything. I' m just pointing it out. Because they

don' t know [ J. T.T.]"

Tasker also argued that the initial investigation did not reveal any physical

evidence, and therefore, any subsequent finding of trauma must be from something that

happened while J. T.T. was in Flowers' custody. Tasker testified that she does not believe

J. T.T. is safe with Flowers and Krystal. She claimed J. T.T. told her Flowers and Krystal

made him " run laps until he said that his brother [ B.T.] touched him." Tasker further

explicitly testified she did not believe B.T. assaulted J. T.T., did not believe D. T. assaulted

J. T.T., and did not believe Albert York assaulted J. T.T. and B.T. When asked how she

could help J. T.T. if she does not believe him, Tasker stated that she would bring him to

the doctor.

Following trial, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

The court is going to continue the sole custody with Jamar Flowers
of [ J. T.T.] I' m glad that he' s seeing a counselor and psychiatrist, and the
court would like for there to be visitation with his mother, but not until that
would be approved by those medical experts the child is right now seeing.
I guess saw today.

So, there will be no supervised visitations until it's been okayed by
the medical experts and the psychological experts.

The court sets the child support at $ 249. 00 a month, paid by
Tasker]. Tasker is to pay all costs of supervision, if there are any, in the
future, and all costs of this hearing and the court's going to continue the
protective order for an additional eighteen months.

When asked to further clarify the ruling, the trial court specified that child support

was to be paid retroactive to the date of filing; ordered Tasker to pay attorneys fees in

the amount of $ 1, 000. 00; set a court cost review for April 4, 2022; set a compliance

review for April 5, 2022; and cast Tasker with all costs of the proceedings. The trial court

signed a written judgment consistent with these oral rulings on February 22, 2022.

On February 8, 2022, Tasker filed a motion for new trial and/ or motion to dismiss

the protective order ( motion for new trial). Following an April 5, 2022 hearing, the trial

10

court d8OiedTasker's ( OOtoM for new trial. The trial court signed a written judgment in

conformity with its ruling On August 24/ 2022.

On appeal, Tasker contends that the trial court: erred in denying her motion for

new trial; erred in permitting F] OVV8[ s to Offer inadmissible hearsay testimony and

unauthenticated dOCUyAeOfa[ V evidence; erred in taiUMQ to 8pDk/ the " best interest"

fa[ƒD[ G in granting FlOVVe[ S sole custody and denying Tasker visitation; and erred in

rendering a child support order in the absence of evidence of the parties' income.

Appellate courts have 8 duty to examine SUbi8{ƒ matte[ jurisdiction sUa

eV8O when the parties do not raise the issue. Hill International, Inc. v. JTS Realty

Corporation, 2021- 0157 ( LB, Amn^ 1 Cir. 12/ 30/ 21)/ 342 S»^ 3d 322, 325. TOTa8ker' s first

88siOMO02Ot of error, which challenges the trial court's judgment denying her motion for

new trial, she argues that the custody judgment was iM0pF0pe[| Y p8OdePBH after a two-

day trial before two different judges. Specifically, Tasker claims that the custody trial

heOBM on June 21/ 2021/ before Judge Charlene Charlet Day, and was P8SUm8d and

completed on January 21, 2022/ hefn78 ] UMQe RDO8lH Cox, pP8SiHiOQ ad6/ C7

Having thoroughly reviewed the [ 8COn1 in its entirety, it is plain that this asS8d[iOO

is iOCO[ P2[ƒ. Rather, Judge [] 8y presided over the June 21/ 2021 and July 21, 2021 trial

of Flowers' petition for DFOteCtiV8 order, and Judge COX presided over the ] @nU8FV 21/

o The established rule inthis circuit is that the denial ofamotion for new trial is an interlocutory and non -
appealable judgment. However, the court may consider interlocutory judgments as part of an unrestricted
appeal from o final judgment. BacauoeTayker's challenge of the trial court's denial of her motion for new
trial is part of the appeal from the final judgment, we may consider the issue on appeal. Succession of
Coon, 2020- 0673 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 30/ 20), 310 So.] d 947, 949 n. 1, writ denied sub nom. In me
Succession of Coon, 2021- 00126 ( La. 3V16J21), 312 5o. 3d 1101.

rSpecifically, Tasker asserted that aJune 21, 2021minute entry reference toa" Day 2" oftrial establishes
that the custody trial began on June 21, 2021, before Judge Day, and was resumed and completed on
January 21, 2U22, before Judge Cox. However, this conflicts with Tasker'sJune 9, 2021pre-trial order. The
pre-trial order explicitly referenced Flowers' petition for protection against Tasker, set for trial on June 21,
2021. Further, under the heading of "[ contested issues,]" it identified the questions of whether the trial
court should issue protective order infavor ofFlowers and J. T.T. and whether the temporary order of
sole custody in favor ofFlowers should be extended. In addition toToaker' s own pleading reflecting that
the June 21, 3021 trial date pertained to Flowers' petition for protection rather than the petition for
permanent sole custody, the record contains a written judgment signed on August 4, 2021, which states
that the matter before the trial court on June 21, 2021, was a "[ TRO] filed by Mr. Jamar A. Flowers[,]" as

well as a June 14, 2021 minute entry which states that the " DOMESTIC VIOLENCE" matter was set for trial
on June 21, 2021. Thus, it is clear that the " Day 2" note in the June 21, 2021 minute entry referenced the
second day of trial of Flowers' petition for protection, to be held July 21, 2021.

11

2022 custody trial and the April 5, 2022 hearing of Tasker's motion for new trial.8

Nevertheless, Tasker's argument raises an issue we must address with respect to our

appellate jurisdiction.

Although Judge Cox issued oral rulings in favor of Flowers at the conclusion of the

custody trial and the hearing of the motion for new trial, Judge Day signed the written

judgments presently on appeal. Generally, the judge who presided over the case must

sign the judgment, and a judgment signed by a judge who did not preside over the

hearing does not constitute a final judgment subject to this court's appellate jurisdiction.
See LSA- C. C. P. art. 1911; In re M. L. M., 2019- 1030 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 23/ 20), 300 So. 3d

902, 905- 906. However, exceptions exist allowing a judge who did not hear a matter to

sign a judgment. See LSA- C. C. P. art. 253. 3, LSA- C. C. P. art. 194, and LSA- R. S. 13: 4209;

In re M. L. M., 300 So. 3d at 905. In relevant part, LSA- R.S. 13: 4209( B)( 2) provides, "[ i] f

a prior judge has stated an affirmative intent to sign a judgment and failed to do so for

whatever reason, the successor judge is empowered to sign the judgment." In both

Henry v. Sullivan, 2016- 1867 ( La. 11/ 18/ 16), 206 So. 3d 858 ( per curiam), and

Donahue v. Donahue, 2016- 1853 ( La. 11/ 18/ 16), 206 So. 3d 858 ( per curiam), the

original trial judge recused herself after issuing oral reasons but before signing the final

judgments. The cases were re -allotted to Judge Devereux, who signed the written

judgments. The supreme court held that Judge Devereux, " in her capacity as successor

judge, [ was] empowered to sign the judgment[ s]" because the original trial judge,

through her oral reasons, clearly manifested an affirmative intent to sign [ the]

judgment[ s.]" The supreme court reasoned, " Any other result would be contrary to the

statutory intent as well as the interests of judicial economy." Additionally, in Prejean v.

McMillan, 2018- 0919 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 28/ 19), 274 So. 3d 575, 578 n. 4, this court found:

Although the grant of summary judgment was rendered by Judge
Dupont, we find that Judge Janice Clark's signing of the judgment in
conformity with Judge Dupont's ruling was within the ambit of the Louisiana
Supreme Court's November 14, 2017 order assigning Judge Dupont to sit
pro tempore for Judge Clark.

8 Once properly appointed, an ad hoc or pro tempore judge is vested with the same powers and authority
as the elected judges of the same court. Englade v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, 2021- 0132
La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 30/ 21), 340 So. 3d 952, 956, writ denied, 2022- 00209 ( La. 4/ 12/ 22), 336 So. 3d 82.

12

In this matter, the transcript plainly reflects Judge Cox's oral rulings in favor of

Flowers regarding both the custody judgment and the judgment denying the motion for
new trial. Thus, because Judge Cox indicated his intent to sign the judgments in favor of

Flowers, Judge Day, in her capacity as successor judge, was empowered to sign the

judgments in conformity with Judge Cox's rulings. See Cooper v. Theard, 2021- 1574

La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 11/ 22), 348 So. 3d 829, 832 n. 1; see also Prejean, 274 So. 3d at 578

n. 4. Accordingly, the February 22, 2022 custody judgment before us on appeal constitutes

a valid final judgment over which this court can exercise appellate jurisdiction. See LSA-

C. C. P. art. 2083( C); Donahue, 206 So. 3d at 858- 59; Preston v. Southern University

Through Board of Supervisors of Southern University Agricultural &

Mechanical College, 2020- 0035 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 13/ 21), 328 So. 3d 1194, 1197 n. 2,

writ not considered, 2021- 01217 ( La. 11/ 17/ 21), 327 So. 3d 510 n. 2.

Generally, the court shall award custody to the parents jointly; however, if custody

in one parent is shown by clear and convincing evidence to serve the best interest of the

child, the court shall award custody to that parent. LSA-C. C. art. 132; Ehlinger v.

Ehlinger, 2017- 1120 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 29/ 18), 251 So. 3d 418, 422. Every child custody

case is to be viewed on its own peculiar set of facts and the relationships involved, with

the paramount goal of reaching a decision which is in the best interest of the child.

Ehlinger, 251 So. 3d at 422. The best interest of the child standard is a fact -intensive

inquiry, requiring the weighing and balancing of factors favoring or opposing custody in

the competing parties on the basis of the evidence presented. Hains v. Hains, 2009-

1337 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 10/ 10), 36 So. 3d 289, 300. Because of the trial court's better

opportunity to evaluate witnesses, and taking into account the proper allocation of trial

and appellate court functions, great deference is accorded to the decision of the trial

court. Hains, 36 So. 3d at 300. Accordingly, the trial court's determination regarding child

custody is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear

abuse of discretion. Harang v. Ponder, 2009- 2182 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3/ 26/ 10), 36 So. 3d

954, 960, writ denied, 2010- 0926 ( La. 5/ 19/ 10), 36 So. 3d 219.

13

Evidentiary Challenges ( Second Assignment of Error)

We first address Tasker's second assignment of error, wherein she argues that the

trial court erred in permitting Flowers to offer inadmissible hearsay evidence and

unauthenticated documentary evidence at the custody trial. Tasker contends she was

unaware of the complained -of evidence prior to the custody trial, and the trial court's

erroneous admission of the complained -of evidence resulted in an impermissible

expansion of the pleadings and " trial by ambush[.]"

The trial court is granted broad discretion on its evidentiary rulings, and its

determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.

Henry v. Sullivan, 2016- 0564 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 12/ 17), 223 So. 3d 1263, 1264. The

party challenging the trial court's evidentiary ruling bears the burden of proving that the

error had a substantial effect on the outcome of the case when compared to the record

in its totality. If the error did not prejudice the complaining party, a reversal is not

warranted. See City of Baton Rouge v. Mucciacciaro, 2021- 0656 ( La. App. I Cir.

5/ 25/ 22), 342 So. 3d 955, 964, writ denied, 2022- 01172 ( La. 11/ 1/ 22), 349 So. 3d 2.

However, if a trial court commits an evidentiary error that interdicts its factfinding

process, this court must conduct a de novo review. Thus, any alleged evidentiary errors

must be addressed first on appeal, inasmuch as a finding of error may affect the

applicable standard of review. Marshall v. Marshall, 2023- 0193 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

9/ 28/ 23), 376 So. 3d 891, 894- 895.

Tasker argues that the trial court erred in permitting Flowers and Krystal to provide

testimonial evidence recounting I.T.T."s medical treatment for the alleged sexual abuse,

because said testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay.9 Tasker also argues that the
O
trial court erred in admitting two unauthenticated' documentary exhibits, namely Exhibit

1, which Flowers identified as a print-out from J. T.T.'s "" MyChart" online medical record

9 Hearsay is " a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." LSA- C. E. art. 801( Q. Hearsay is
inadmissible " except as otherwise provided by this Code or other legislation." LSA- C. E. art. 802; Trascher
v. Territo, 2011- 2093 ( La. 5/ 8/ 12), 89 So. 3d 357, 364.

10 Authentication is a process whereby something is shown to be what it purports to be. See LSA- C. E. art.
901. In order for evidence to be admissible at trial, it must either be authenticated as provided in LSA- C. E.
art. 901 or be self -authenticating. An exhibit that is not authenticated does not constitute competent
evidence. See LSA- C. E. art. 901; Wolfe Washauer Construction, LLC v. Dart, 2022- 1241 ( La. App. I
Cir. 12/ 4/ 23), 383 So. 3d 193, 198.

M

portal, and Exhibit 3, which Flowers identified as an after -visit summary issued following

one of J. T.T.'s medical appointments. Exhibit 3 also contained a " Diagnosis" of " Sexual

assault of child[.]"

Upon review, it does not appear that Flowers' and Krystal' s testimonial hearsay

regarding their communications with I.T.T.'s medical providers was admissible pursuant

to any hearsay exceptions, nor does it appear that Exhibits 1 and 3 were properly

authenticated or self -authenticating. However, in the context of child custody cases,

where the best interest of the child standard is the fundamental inquiry, the legislature

has expressly allowed for relaxed evidentiary rules. See LSA-C. C. art. 131; LSA- C. E. art.
1101( 6)( 2); see also C. M. J. v. L. M. C., 2014- 1119 ( La. 10/ 15/ 14), 156 So. 3d 16, 29.

Further, the admission of hearsay testimony or unauthenticated documentary evidence

is subject to the harmless error analysis on appeal.

Generally, the admission of evidence that is merely cumulative or corroborative of

other evidence is held to be harmless error. See Clement v. Graves, 2004- 1831 ( La.App.

I Cir. 9/ 28/ 05), 924 So. 2d 196, 204- 205. In her testimony at trial, Tasker conceded both

that I.T.T. had made allegations of sexual abuse, and that Tasker had personally seen

the reports from Our Lady of the Lake[,]" presumably referencing Exhibit 2, reflecting

that J. T.T. had anal trauma. Consequently, the complained -of evidence was cumulative

of Tasker's own testimony acknowledging that I.T.T. had made allegations of sexual

abuse and that she was aware of medical findings of anal trauma." Additionally, both

Exhibit 1 and 3 were cumulative of Flowers' and Krystal' s testimony that they sought

medical treatment for J. T.T. following his disclosures of sexual abuse and that I.T.T. was

referred for a follow- up with the OLOL Children' s Hospital " S. A. F. E. Clinic[,]" which was

scheduled to begin at 8: 00 a. m. the morning of trial. Considering the cumulative nature

of the complained -of evidence, and that the rules of evidence are relaxed in child custody

11 It is well known and documented that sexual abuse of children is extremely difficult to detect because
the offense often takes place in secret, the victim is young, vulnerable, and reluctant to testify, and there
is often no physical or other evidence the abuse took place. The evidence is rarely direct, but is
circumstantial. Moreover, reports of family violence are exceedingly lower than their actual occurrence.
Follse v. False, 98- 1976 ( La. 6/ 29/ 99), 738 So. 2d 1040, 1047. In short, it is not uncommon to find an
absence of physical evidence in long term sexual abuse of children. See State v. Mullen, 2018- 0643
La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 21/ 18), 269 So. 3d 772, 785, writ denied, 2020- 00408 ( La. 10/ 6/ 20), 302 So. 3d 529.
Thus, physical evidence was not required in order to find that I.T.T. was sexually abused.

15

cases, we find that any error in the admission of Exhibits 1 and 3 was harmless. See LSA-
C. E. art. 1101( B)( 2); C. M.]., 156 So. 3d at 29; Clement, 924 So. 2d at 204- 205.

Tasker also argues on appeal that the trial court erred by permitting Flowers to

offer evidence relevant to events subsequent to the date he filed his petition for

permanent sole custody, and thereby improperly enlarging the pleadings and allowing

trial by ambush[.]" However, Tasker failed to raise this specific objection at trial. In order

to preserve an evidentiary issue for appellate review, it is essential that the complaining

party enter a contemporaneous objection to the evidence or testimony and state the

reasons for the objection. Wilson v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation &

Development, 2011- 0007 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 25/ 11), 77 So. 3d 34, 39, writ denied, 2011-

2083 ( La. 11/ 18/ 11), 75 So. 3d 467. Thus, Tasker waived the right to contest this issue

on appeal. See LSA- C. E. art. 103. Additionally, even had Tasker raised the objection at

trial, this court has consistently declined to find error in the trial court's expansion of the

pleadings, even over an objection, to include events subsequent to the date of filing of

the motion to modify custody but relevant to the best interest of the child. See LSA- C. C. P.

art. 1154; Morgan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 2016- 1065 ( La. App.

1 Cir. 2/ 17/ 17), 215 So. 3d 442, 445, writ denied, 2017- 0457 ( La. 5/ 1/ 17), 219 So. 3d 330;

Ramirez v. Hite, 2015- 1179 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 23/ 15) 2015 WL 9466920, * 2 n. 3

unpublished). This argument lacks merit.

Challenge on the Merits ( Third Assignment of Error)

In her third assignment of error, Tasker challenges the trial court's judgment on

the merits, arguing that the trial court erred in awarding Flowers sole custody and denying

Tasker any visitation and/ or access to J. T.T. until approved by J. T.T.'s medical providers.

Tasker argues that the record does not support the trial court's judgment and that the

trial court failed to apply the best interest of the child factors. We disagree.

16

The paramount consideration in any determination of child custody is the best

interest of the child. LSA- C. C. art. 131; C. M.]., 156 So. 3d at 28. Louisiana Civil Code

article 134 sets forth the factors a court is to consider in determining a child' s best

interest:

A. Except as provided in Paragraph B of this Article, the court shall consider
all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child, including:
1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children' s Code
Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration.

2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and
the child.

3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love,
affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing
of the child.

4) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food,
clothing, medical care, and other material needs.

5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment,
and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.

6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes.

7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the
child.

8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any
party.

9) The mental and physical health of each party. Evidence that an abused
parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other parent shall not
be grounds for denying that parent custody.

10) The home, school, and community history of the child.

11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to
be of sufficient age to express a preference.

12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a
close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party,
except when objectively substantial evidence of specific abusive, reckless,
or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reasonable concerns for the
child' s safety or well- being while in the care of the other party.

13) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.

14)
The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously
exercised by each party.

B. In cases involving a history of committing family violence, as defined in
R. S. 9: 362, or domestic abuse, as defined in R. S. 46: 2132, including sexual
abuse, as defined in R. S. 14: 403, whether or not a party has sought relief
under any applicable law, the court shall determine an award of custody or
visitation in accordance with R. S. 9: 341 and 364. The court may only find
a history of committing family violence if the court finds that one incident

17

of family violence has resulted in serious bodily injury or the court finds
more than one incident of family violence.

This list of factors provided in LSA-C. C. art. 134 is illustrative, rather than exclusive, and

the trial court has discretion to determine the weight to give each factor in light of the

totality of the facts and circumstances of the individual case. See LSA-C.C. art. 134, 1993
Revision Comments ( b) and ( c); Hodges v. Hodges, 2015- 0585 ( La. 11/ 23/ 15), 181

So. 3d 700, 703.

Every child custody case must be viewed in light of its own particular set of facts
and circumstances. Thus, the trial court is in the best position to ascertain the best

interest of the child given each unique set of circumstances. Accordingly, a trial court's

determination of custody is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed on appeal

unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. Tinsley v. Tinsley, 2016- 0891 ( La. App.

1 Cir. 1/ 18/ 17), 211 So. 3d 405, 411.

As set forth in LSA- C. C. P. art. 134( A)( 1), the potential for the child to be abused

is the primary consideration in determining the best interest of the child. In this regard,

Tasker's testimony regarding the audio recording established her verbal abuse of B.T.

and, at the very least, raised a serious concern as to her possible physical abuse of B.T.

Further, Tasker admitted she had failed to complete the twenty -six-week domestic

violence prevention training she was previously ordered to undergo in connection with

the protective order; repeatedly stated that she did not believe J. T.T. had been sexually

abused; and confirmed that B.T., one of I.T.T.'s alleged abusers, still lived in her home.

Additionally, Flowers and Krystal testified that DCFS found I.T.T.'s prior allegation of

physical abuse against Tasker to be valid; that J. T.T. had disclosed that numerous

instances of sexual abuse occurred when he was left unsupervised in Tasker' s care; and

that they believed Tasker should not have contact or visitation with I.T.T.

The transcript reflects that, at the conclusion of trial, the trial court expressed a

clear concern for J. T.T.'s safety with Tasker. The trial court indicated that I.T.T.'s

counselor and psychiatrist should " make [ a report] to the court," and stated, in pertinent

part, " I' m not going to grant visitation until they say its safe for [ J. T.T.] to be with his

mom." In light of the record before us, we do not find that the trial court abused its great

IM]

discretion in awarding sole custody to Flowers and suspending Tasker's contact and

visitation with J. T.T. until such contact or visitation is approved by his medical providers.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

Child Support Award ( Fourth Assignment of Error)

In her fourth assignment of error, Tasker argues that the trial court erred in

rendering a child support order in favor of Flowers " when it received no actual evidence

and no actual evidence was introduced at the trial." The determination or modification of

child support is governed by the guidelines contained in LSA- R.S. 9: 315, et seq. As set

forth in LSA- R. S. 9: 315. 1( A), a trial court must consider the Louisiana child support

guidelines in any proceeding to establish or modify child support. See Stogner v.

Stogner, 98- 3044, ( La. 7/ 7/ 99), 739 So. 2d 762, 767 ( emphasis in original). Here, there

is no evidence that the trial court considered the child support guidelines or that any

documentation was introduced regarding the parties' income or the expenses of the minor

child. Accordingly, this assignment of error has merit.

Documentation is essential to the setting of child support. Drury v. Drury, 2001-

0877 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 8/ 21/ 02), 835 So. 2d 533, 539. Louisiana Revised Statute 9: 315. 2( A)

addresses the appropriate documentation for determining a child support obligation and

provides:

Each party shall provide to the court a verified income statement showing
gross income and adjusted gross income, together with documentation of
current and past earnings.... Suitable documentation of current earnings
shall include but not be limited to pay stubs or employer statements. The
documentation shall include a copy of the party's most recent federal tax
return. A copy of the statement and documentation shall be provided to the
other party. When an obligor has an ownership interest in a business,
suitable documentation shall include but is not limited to the last three
personal and business state and federal income tax returns, including all
attachments and all schedules, specifically Schedule K- 1 and W- 2 forms,
1099 forms, and amendments, the most recent profit and loss statements,
balance sheets, financial statements, quarterly sales tax reports, personal
and business bank account statements, receipts, and expenses. A copy of
all statements and documentation shall be provided to the other party.

Under LSA- R. S. 9: 315. 2( A), it is each party' s duty to introduce accurate and complete

evidence of his or her current income. See Millican v. Wade, 2023- 1050 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

2/ 23/ 24), 384 So. 3d 1011, 1016. When the income of an obligor cannot be sufficiently

established, LSA- R. S. 9: 315. 1. 1( B) provides that '"*
evidence of wage and earnings surveys

19

distributed by government agencies for the OU[ DOse of 3tt7hnMMg income to the obligor
is admissible. "12 PU[ SUaOt to LSA- R. S. 9: 315. 1/ p0( 1), @ COUyf is permitted to deviate from

the Child SUDDOrt guidelines if their application VVDWld not be in the best interest of the

child or would be inequitable to the parties. TOpermitting Bdeviation, the court must

D[ OViMe specific [ 8B5OOs therefor, including 8 finding of the @mOUMt Dfsupport that would
have been required under the guidelines and the facts and circumstances warranting the

M8ViBtiOO. [ SA- R. S. 9: 315. 1( B)/ 1\| Bell v~Jackson, 2018- 1075 / La,/\ Dp. 1 (_ i[, 5/ 31/ 19\/

278 So. 3d 3R2, 388^

The trial court has great discretion in establishing and modifying Child SUDDOyf

aVV8n1S and its ' UdgOO8nf will not be HiEtU[ h8d OD appeal @hS2Ot a C| 88[ 8hUS8 Of

e/ 2022- 0094 ( La. ApD^ I Cir. 11/ 4/ 22), 355 So. 3d 16/ 19, Where
discretion. Mize v. M^%%

the P2DOrd lacks adequate iOf»[ O18tiOO and documentation OeOe5Ga[ V to make @ child

8UDDOrt determination, @ P8[ OaOd to the trial O3U[[ is necessary. However, if there is

sufficient eVi6eOC8 in the record to r8OM8r a decision, remand is UOM2CeSS8[ Y/ 8V2D if

some of the P8qUi' pd documentation is lacking. Millican, 384 So. 3d at 1015. TO light Of

the important policy considerations associated with the setting of child support, an obligor

parent should not be @llOVV8M to benefit from his OVVO recalcitrance. Thus, when B party

fails to introduce 8CCU[ Bh2 and complete evidence of his or her current iDCOMMe/ 8 [ DUyt

may nonetheless find that the record contains sufficient evidence with which hJcalculate

the child support obligation. 13 See Millican, 384 So3d at 1016.

oPursuant to LSA -R. 8. 13: 3712. 1, whenever a copy of report from the Louisiana
offered in evidence in any child
Workforce Commission, or from any state orfederal reporting agency, isfh
orspousal support U prima facie proof ofits contents.

a In MiUUican, 384 So. 3d at 1016, this court noted, " For over a year, [ the father] repeatedly ignored the
trial court's orders to produce evidence ofhis current income and now seeks to use his contemptuous
behavior in his favor to reverse the trial court' s child support order." Continuing, this court concluded that
the father's income was " conclusively established" by the mother's introduction of the father's unanswered
requests for admissions. See MiU0ican, 384So. 3dat1O16- 1U17.

Similarly, in St. Philip v. MontmUbanm\ 2016- 0254 / La. App. 1 Cir. 10/ 31/ 16\, 206 5o. 3d 909, 913,
yy[ hdenied, 2016- 2110 ( La. 1/ 13/ 17), 215 So. 3d 255, though the parties did not introduce verified income
statements, the mnothe, introduced financial documentation for both parties dating back three years.
Specifically, the mother offered her last three federal income tax returns, along with her testimony, as well
as the father's most recent personal tax return, W2 Wage and Tax Statements for the two preceding years,
several corporate tax returns for an entity owned bvthe father, and several years ufmonthly statements
for bank accounts and a brokerage account for the father. This court found the there was sufficient
documentary evidence to support the trial court's determination of the respective incomes of the parties.
St. Philip, 2O6So.] dat913.
In contrast, in Bell v. Jackson, 2018- 1075 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 31/ 19), 278 So. 3d 382, 380, this
court found it was unable to determine the propriety of the trial court's ruling based on the record. The
record did not contain the father's verified income statement, but rather various bank statements, copies

We note that the order that originally set Flowers' petition for sole custody for

hearing on June 21, 2021, included a provision directing Tasker to produce her last two
years of tax returns, her last six payroll checks, and all other documentation necessary

to determine her income. Here, however, neither party produced verified income

statements, or any other documentation of their income, at the January 21, 2022 trial.

Rather, the only evidence adduced at trial relevant to the determination of child support

was the testimony of the parties. The parties both testified that a prior child support order

directed Flowers to pay child support to Tasker. Flowers testified the prior child support

order was suspended after he obtained sole custody of J. T.T. The transcript reflects the

following colloquy:

Flowers' counsel: [ You are] asking the court to set the, what, at the time
that your child support was set, were y'all in the same
financial circumstances that you are now? Meaning
you' re not working. She' s not working, and child
support was set using y'all' s imputed income?

Flowers: Yes, ma' am.

Flowers' counsel: Okay, and so you' re asking the court to issue an order
ordering her to pay the same amount that you were
paying?

Flowers: Yes, ma' am.

Flowers' counsel: And what is that amount?

Flowers: I think like $ 249 or something like that. But I pay $ 300
a month just to - - just to keep up with it. Stay on time.

Flowers' counsel: Okay, but you' re asking the court to set the child
support in the amount of $249 - -

Flowers: Yes, ma' am.

Flowers' counsel: Per month?

Flowers: Yes, ma' am.

Thus, the only evidence that the trial court could have relied on in reaching its

child support order was Flowers' testimony that the previous child support order directed

him to pay approximately $ 249. 00 per month to Tasker, and that the parties had not

experienced a change in circumstances because both remained unemployed. In this

of checks and cash withdrawal receipts from the father's business, and " an in globe exhibit containing
various documents[.]" This court summarized, " the indiscernible evidence as to [the father's] past earnings.
render[ ed] the determination of his actual earnings virtually impossible on the record as presently
constituted."

21

matter, a review of the propriety of the trial court's order is virtually impossible on the

record as presently constituted. See Bell, 278 So. 3d at 388. Due to the insufficiency of

the evidence, we must vacate the trial court's order and remand the matter to the trial

court for a determination of child support in accordance with LSA- R.S. 9: 315, etseq.

The Motion for New Trial ( First Assignment of Error)

In Tasker's first assignment of error, she contends that the trial court erred in

denying the motion for new trial and refusing to dismiss the protective order. A new trial

shall be granted, upon contradictory motion of any party, in the following cases: ( 1) When

the verdict or judgment appears clearly contrary to the law and the evidence; ( 2) When

the party has discovered, since the trial, evidence important to the cause, which he could

not, with due diligence, have obtained before or during the trial; or ( 3) When the jury

was bribed or has behaved improperly so that impartial justice has not been done. 14 LSA-

C. C. P. art. 1972. A new trial may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor,

except as otherwise provided by law. LSA- C. C. P. art. 1973. On a motion for new trial, it

is the mover's burden to prove to the trial court that she is entitled to a new trial for one

of the grounds listed in the Code of Civil Procedure. The standard of review of a denial

of a motion for new trial, whether based on peremptory or discretionary grounds, is that

of abuse of discretion. Jackson v. Wise, 2017- 1062 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 13/ 18), 249 So. 3d

845, 856, writ denied, 2018- 0785 ( La. 9/ 21/ 18), 252 So. 3d 914.

On appeal, Tasker argues that she was entitled to a new trial based on newly

discovered evidence pursuant to LSA- C. C. P. art. 1972( 2). To prevail on a motion for new

trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a party is required to show that the

evidence in question: ( 1) was not merely cumulative; ( 2) would tend to change the result

of the case; ( 3) was discovered after trial; and ( 4) could not, with due diligence, have

been obtained before or during trial. See Slaughter v. Board of Supervisors of

Southern University & Agricultural & Mechanical College, 2010- 1049 ( La. App. 1

Cir. 8/ 2/ 11), 76 So. 3d 438, 460, writ denied, 2011- 2110 ( La. 1/ 13/ 12), 77 So. 3d 970. In

14 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1972( 3) is inapplicable to this case. Therefore, we do not
consider it herein.

22

addition, LSA- C. C. P. art. 1975 requires that the allegations of fact set forth in a motion

for new trial based on LSA- C. C. P. art. 1972( 2) be " verified by the affidavit of the

applicant."

In this matter, Tasker claims that prior to the custody trial, she " was never made

aware that [ J. T.T.] had received any treatment or care for any alleged sexual abuse nor

was she aware that [ J. T.T.] was seeing any medical professionals relating to same[.]"

Therefore, Tasker contends she was unable to acquire I.T.T.'s medical or counseling

records prior to trial. She also claims that when she acquired the relevant records after

trial, she discovered that the records were " blatantly false and/ or contrary" to " the

allegations testified to and evidence submitted[.]" Tasker claims that, had she been able

to present this evidence at trial, it " would have clearly and unequivocally show[ n] that

J. T.T.] had sustained no sexual abuse/ assault as was falsely testified to" by Flowers and

Krystal. However, Tasker did not verify the allegations in her motion for new trial with an

affidavit as required by LSA- C. C. P. art. 1975, 15 nor did she offer the newly alleged

evidence in support of her motion for new trial. Thus, Tasker's motion for new trial

pursuant to LSA- C. C. P. art. 1972( 2) and her brief on appeal contain only unsubstantiated

arguments. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its great discretion in denying the

motion for new trial pursuant to LSA- C. C. P. art. 1972( 2). See Freneaux v. Shelton,

2016- 0694 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 7/ 19/ 17), 2017 WL 3083662, * 10 ( unpublished), writ denied,

2017- 1433 ( La. 11/ 6/ 17), 229 So. 3d 471.

Tasker further contends that she was entitled to a new trial pursuant to LSA- C. C. P.

art. 1972( 1), because the judgment was clearly contrary to the law and the evidence, or

pursuant to LSA- C. C. P. art. 1973, because there is good ground therefor. Having

thoroughly reviewed the record in its entirety and concluded that it adequately supports
the trial court's judgment on the issues of custody and visitation, we do not find that the

judgment was contrary to the law and evidence, nor do we find good ground for a new

11 See Charpentier v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 415 So. 2d 452, 455 ( La. App. I Cir. 1982)
It has been held a trial court acts correctly when it refuses to grant a new trial because of the failure to
include the verifying affidavit").

23

trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its great discretion in denying Tasker's

motion for new trial pursuant to LSA- C. C. P. arts. 1972( 1) and 1973. 16

Finally, Tasker argues the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial as

to the eighteen -month continuation of the protective order, because the protective order

was not before the trial court on January 21, 2022. However, the judgment continuing

the protective order was rendered on January 21, 2022 and signed on February 22, 2022;

thus, it expired more than a year before the instant appeal was lodged with this court on

July 30, 2024. This court has dismissed direct appeals of protective orders for lack of

jurisdiction when the protective orders expired while the appeal was pending, reasoning

that the issues were moot because a judgment or decree could serve no useful purpose

and give no practical relief or effect. 17 Garside v. Laird, 2021- 0512 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

12/ 22/ 21), 340 So. 3d 13, 17, citing Watson v. Banguell, 2020- 0799 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

9/ 30/ 21), 2021 WL 4465839, * 2 ( unpublished); McKee v. McKee, 2020- 1314 ( La. App.

1 Cir. 6/ 16/ 21), 2021 WL 2451440, * 2 ( unpublished), writ denied, 2021- 00984 ( La.

11/ 3/ 21), 326 So.3d 879. Thus, after a protective order expires, a decision reversing,

setting aside, or modifying the order can have no practical relief or effect. Garside, 340

So. 3d at 17. Consequently, Tasker's arguments challenging the judgment continuing the

protective order and the judgment denying the motion for new trial are moot. See

Garside, 340 So. 3d at 17, dtog Pontchartrain Natural Gas System v. Texas Brine

Co.,, LLC, 2018- 0001 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 4/ 18), 253 So. 3d 156, writ denied, 2018- 1124 ( La.

9/ 28/ 18), 253 So. 3d 147.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the portion of the February 22, 2022

judgment ordering Adrienne Tasker to pay $ 249. 00 per month in child support. In all

other respects, the February 22, 2022 and August 24, 2022 judgments are affirmed. This

16
Concerning the evidentiary issues as they relate to Tasker's motion for new trial, we have already
addressed the merits of these arguments above, and need not do so again.

17 It is well settled that courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot controversies, or render
advisory opinions with respect to such controversies. An issue is moot when a judgment or decree on that
issue has been deprived of practical significance or made abstract or purely academic; a case is moot when
a rendered judgment or decree can serve no useful purpose and give no practical relief or effect. Garside
v. Laird, 2021- 0512 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 21), 340 So. 3d 13, 16. If the case is moot, there is no subject
matter on which the judgment of the court can operate. Garside, 340 So. 3d at 16- 17.

24

matter is remanded to the trial court to determine the parties' income, set child support,

and to determine any arrearages owed for child support retroactive to the date of judicial

demand. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Adrienne Tasker.

VACATED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.

Ng