Elizabeth LeBlanc Schroeder v. Alan Conrad Schroeder

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

2024 CU 1135

ELIZABETH LEBLANC SCHROEDER

VERSUS

ALAN CONRAD SCHROEDER

Judgment Rendered.

The Family Court
In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge
State of Louisiana
Case No. 224,653

The Honorable Charlene Charlet Day, Judge Presiding

Mary E. Roper Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Elizabeth LeBlanc Schroeder

Lorraine A. McCormick Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant
Robin V. Cazayoux Alan Conrad Schroeder
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
and

Wendy L. Edwards
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Julie B. Distefano Counsel for Minor Children
Baton Rouge, Louisiana JES, JPS, and GMS

BEFORE: McCLENDON, C.J., LANIER, AND BALFOUR, JJ.

C

LANIER, J.

In this custody dispute, the father challenges the trial court's January 22,

2024 judgment, which modified a prior custody agreement. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment and issue this memorandum opinion in

compliance with Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2- 16. 1( B).

90M4TX" W1 m11

This custody dispute has been before the trial court several times since 2021

for hearings, motions, and a ten- day trial on the merits. According to the records,

the parties, Elizabeth LeBlanc Schroeder and Alan Schroeder, were married in

January 2000; five children were born during the marriage! Elizabeth filed a

petition for divorce in February 2021; the parties divorced in May 2022. Pursuant

to a stipulated judgment signed by the parties on May 14, 2021, the trial court

awarded the parties joint custody with Elizabeth named as domiciliary parent. The

judgment provided that the minor children would live primarily with Elizabeth,

with Alan having physical custodial periods as agreed to by the parties or based

upon recommendations of the parties' and/ or children' s counselors or therapists.

Moreover, the judgment ordered the parties and the children to participate in

family counseling with Marcia A. Cox, LCSW, while continuing their own

individual mental health counseling.

In September 2021, Alan filed an answer and reconventional demand to the

petition for divorce, arguing that Elizabeth was thwarting the reunification

counseling process and his relationship with the minor children. He requested that

the trial court order a custody evaluation and establish a joint custody

1 When Elizabeth initiated these legal proceedings in February 2021, all five of the parties'
children were minors. Since then, the two oldest children have become majors. Thus, the

remaining minor children at issue in this case are JES ( DOB 9/ 12/ 07); JPS ( DOB 10/ 8/ 08); and
GMS ( DOB 11/ 9/ 11).

2

implementation plan granting him physical custody as deemed appropriate by the
trial court and the various mental health professionals involved in the case.

Thereafter, Elizabeth filed a " Petition For Temporary Restraining Order,

along with Rule To Show Cause Why 'Reunification' Counseling Sessions Should

Not Be Immediately Terminated, and Services Of The Reunification Counselor
Should Not Be Dismissed." Elizabeth also filed a motion to have counsel

appointed to represent the minor children pursuant to La. R.S. 9: 345( B)2 and a

hearing prior to any further proceedings. The trial court
Watermeier3
request for a

denied the motion for a temporary restraining order but set the rule to show cause

for a hearing. Over the next several months, the trial court heard from numerous

mental health professionals and medical doctors and intermittingly interviewed the

four oldest Schroeder children.

On December 10, 2021, Elizabeth filed an ex parte petition for temporary

sole custody, arguing that Alan was refusing to allow the children to receive

psychological treatment as recommended by the family's long-time pediatrician. In

an order signed on December 14, 2021, the trial court denied the motion.

However, the trial court ordered that JES and JPS be evaluated by a court-

appointed psychologist and that JPS begin treatment with a court- appointed

psychiatrist. The trial court also appointed counsel for the minor children.

Thereafter, the trial court signed two judgments on February 22 and 23, 2022,

2 As set forth in La. R.S. 9: 345( B), an attorney shall be appointed to represent a child " if, in the
contradictory hearing, any party presents a prima facie case that a parent or other person caring
for the child has sexually, physically, or emotionally abused the child or knew or should have
known that the child was being abused." La. R.S. 9: 345( B).
3 See Watermeier v. Watermeier, 462 So. 2d 1272, 1275 ( La. App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 464
So. 2d 301 ( La. 1985). A Watermeier hearing is a hearing in chambers, outside the presence of
the parents, but in the presence of their attorneys, with a record of the hearing to be made by the
court reporter, to inquire as to the competency of a child to testify as to custody. State in
Interest of M.N., 2023- 0174 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 23/ 23), 370 So. 3d 744, 747, n.3, writ denied,
2023- 00947 ( La. 9/ 6/ 23), 369 So. 3d 1269.

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appointing Danny Roussel, Ph.D., as a court- appointed expert to perform a custody

evaluation and naming various mental health and medical professionals.

The trial court signed an " Interim Judgment" on May 3, 2022, denying

Elizabeth's request to terminate reunification counseling. The trial court further

ordered that reunification counseling sessions for Alan and the minor children

continue with Ms. Cox until further order of the court. In a separate " Interim

Judgment" also signed on May 3, 2022, the trial court awarded the parties joint

custody of the then four minor children, with the children residing primarily with
Elizabeth. The trial court further awarded Alan physical custody every other

weekend from Friday after school until Monday morning; a weekly, two-hour

dinner date with the minor children; certain holiday physical custody periods; and

physical custody of the minor children for three weeks in the summer. In a June

28, 2022 " Stipulated Judgment," the trial court appointed Dr. Brandon Romano to

perform psychological evaluations of JES and JPS.

On August 22, 2022, Alan filed a rule for contempt arguing that Elizabeth

had violated the May 14, 2021 " Stipulated Judgment" by failing to encourage and

foster a relationship between him and the minor children. Over the next two

months, Alan filed rules to expand his visitation with the minor children such that

the parties be awarded equal physical custody of the minor children pending the
custody evaluation and/or further order of the court.

After Dr. Roussel' s custody evaluation was complete, the parties entered into
a " Written Stipulation" on March 28, 2023,
agreeing to several issues including

that Alan's physical custody would increase to every other weekend from Thursday
until Monday and every other Wednesday after school until Thursday morning;
that the parties would begin sessions with Renee McCarthy, a
parenting

coordinator; and that Alan and the children would continue in therapy with Ms.

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Cox until further order of the court. The trial court signed an " Interim Stipulated

Judgment" on May 1, 2023, in accordance with the parties' stipulation.

The custody trial began on June 26, 2023, and continued for ten, non-

consecutive days, after which the trial court heard closing arguments, requested

post -trial memoranda, and took the matter under advisement. The trial court

signed a judgment' on January 22, 2024, ordering, among other things, that the

parties maintain joint custody of the minor children with neither parent designated

as domiciliary parent; that physical custody be modified by awarding equally

shared periods to both parties with Alan exercising physical custody every Monday

through Wednesday and Elizabeth exercising physical custody every Wednesday

through Friday, with the parties rotating weekends; that the parties exercise

physical custody of the minor children during the holidays and the summer as set

forth in the judgment; that the parties continue to meet with the parenting

coordinator, Renee McCarthy, and communicate through Our Family Wizard; that

the parties and the minor children undergo individual counseling, as well as

continue in reunification counseling with Ms. Cox; that Alan have final decision-

making authority for all health and education issues involving the minor children;

and that Elizabeth have final decision-making authority concerning all

extracurricular activities involving the children.

4 The trial court provided written reasons for judgment on February 8, 2024. On appeal, the
parties place much focus on the trial court's reasons for judgment. However, we note that a trial
court' s oral or written reasons for judgment form no part of the judgment, and we are mindful
that appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment. Bellard v. American Cent.
Ins. Co., 2007- 1335 ( La. 4/ 18/ 08), 980 So. 2d 654, 671; see also Greater New Orleans
Expressway Com' n v. Olivier, 2002- 2795 ( La. 11/ 18/ 03), 860 So. 2d 22, 24 (" Appeals are taken
from the judgment, not the written reasons for judgment."). Judgments are often upheld on
appeal for reasons different than those assigned by the trial court. The written reasons for
judgment are merely an explication of the trial court's determinations. They do not alter, amend,
or affect the final judgment being appealed. State in the Interest of Mason, 356 So. 2d 530, 532
La. App. I Cir. 1977). Thus, our review of whether the record offers a reasonable basis to
support the judgment of the trial court is not solely dependent on the written reasons given by the
trial court in this matter.

5

From this judgment, Alan has appealed. On appeal, Alan asserts the trial

court erred in: ( 1) not awarding him sole custody despite finding that all relevant

factors under La. Code Civ. P. art. 134 weighed in his favor; ( 2) not awarding him

primary physical custody and limiting Elizabeth's custodial time; ( 3) failing to

designate him domiciliary parent, thereby allowing Elizabeth to continue to co -

parent, which, considering the trial court's analysis of the Article 134 factors is not

in the children' s best interests; and ( 4) awarding Elizabeth decision-making

authority over the minor children's extracurricular activities.

Each child custody case must be viewed in light of its own particular set of

facts and circumstances, with the paramount consideration being the best interest

of the child. See La. Civ. Code art. 131; Leger v. Leger, 2022- 1113 ( La. App. I

Cir. 3/ 13/ 23), 363 So. 3d 519, 528, writ denied, 2023- 00512 ( La. 6/ 26/ 23), 363

So. 3d 1231. The best interest of the child standard governs all child custody

determinations, including the determination of whether to modify the domiciliary
parent designation. Id. The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the best

interest of the child Riven the unique circumstances of the particular case; thus, the

trial court's custody determination is entitled to great weight and will not be

disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. Moore v.

Prater, 2021- 1430 ( La. App. I Cir. 6/ 3/ 22), 342 So. 3d 994, 998.

Article 134( A) provides the following non-exclusive list of factors that the

trial court shall consider, along with any other relevant factors, in determining the
best interest of the child:

1)
The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children's
Code Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration.
2)
The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party
and the child.

0

3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love,
affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and

rearing of the child.

4) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.

5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate

environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that
environment.

6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.

7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of
the child.

8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of
any party.

9) The mental and physical health of each party. Evidence that an

abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other
parent shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody.

10) The home, school, and community history of the child.

11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.

12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and
the other party, except when objectively substantial evidence of
specific abusive, reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to
have reasonable concerns for the child' s safety or well-being while in
the care of the other party.

13) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.

14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously
exercised by each party.

The weight to be given each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court.

Moore, 342 So. 3d at 1000. In making its determination, the trial court is not

bound to make a mechanical evaluation of all statutory factors listed in Article 134,

but should decide each case on its own facts and circumstances in light of Article

134 and all other relevant factors. Underwood v. Underwood, 2021- 0277 ( La.

App. 1 Cir. 10/ 21/ 21), 332 So. 3d 128, 140. One court has observed:

7

In child custody cases where two parents are fervently
competing for custody domiciliary
and status of the
children,

frequently the trial court must determine the best interest of the
children solely from the testimony of the parents and their respective
relatives or friends. This naturally passionate and self-interested
testimony is rarely objective, leaving it to the trial court, who is in the
best position to view firsthand the demeanor and tone of the

witnesses, to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and decide how
much weight to give the testimony in light of the factors in La. C. C.
art. 134.

Fuller v. Fuller, 54, 098 ( La. App. 2 Cir. 7/ 21/ 21), 324 So. 3d 1103, 1114, writ

denied, 2021- 01223 ( La. 9/ 27/ 21), 324 So. 3d 621.

In the instant case, as in most child custody cases, the trial court' s

determination is based heavily on factual findings. Yepez v. Yepez, 2021- 0477

La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 21), 340 So. 3d 36, 41. As an appellate court, we cannot set

aside the trial court's factual findings unless we determine that there is no

reasonable factual basis for the findings and the findings are clearly wrong

manifestly erroneous). Stobart v. State, Department of Transportation and

Development, 617 So. 2d 880, 882 ( La. 1993). If the findings are reasonable in

light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an appellate court may not reverse even

though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed

the evidence differently. Furthermore, when factual findings are based on the

credibility of witnesses, the fact finder's decision to credit a witness's testimony
must be given " great deference" by the appellate court. Rosell v. ESCO, 549

So. 2d 840, 844 ( La. 1989). Thus, when there is a conflict in the testimony,

reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not

be disturbed upon review, although the appellate court may feel its own

evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Id. Nevertheless, when the court of

appeal finds that a reversible error of law or manifest error of material fact was

made in the trial court, it is required to redetermine the facts de novo from the

entire record and render a judgment on the merits. Rosell, 549 So. 2d at 844, n.2;

see also Evans v. Lungrin, 97- 541 ( La. 2/ 6/ 98), 708 So. 2d 731, 735 ( where one or

more trial court legal errors interdicts the fact-finding process and the record is

otherwise complete, the appellate court should make its own independent de novo

review of the record).

In support of his contention that de novo review is warranted in this case,

Alan argues that the trial court committed legal error in applying its factual

findings to this case. Alan contends that the trial court's " misapplication of the

evidence to the law is so egregious" that this court should conduct a de novo. He

further argues that " the evidence and testimony, especially by the multiple expert

witnesses who all opined drastic family system changes were needed, clearly

shows an extreme modification was necessary." He maintains that this error

materially affected the trial court' s ruling and prejudiced Alan by failing to protect

the minor children's best interests. Similarly, Elizabeth asserts that the trial court's

appreciation" of the factual evidence presented in this case is not supported by a

review of the actual evidence presented and that this erroneous assessment of the

evidence caused the trial court to make erroneous conclusions of law. Elizabeth

notes that a de novo review " will reveal the true picture and show the manifest

error" committed in this case.

Following our review of the record in this case, we find no basis to invoke a

de novo standard of review. Simply put, the parties seek a proverbial second bite

of the apple following a very long, contentious custody hearing during which the

trial court heard from over twenty- five witnesses, including the parties and three of

the children; numerous medical and mental health care providers; family members;

babysitters; co- workers; and other lay witnesses. The trial court also had the

benefit of numerous documents introduced into evidence by the parties, including

the parties' and the children's medical records; the children's school records; posts

from Our Family Wizard; the custody evaluation; transcripts from numerous prior

0

hearings that included testimony of medical and mental health care providers and

Watermeier examinations of four of the Schroeder children; and exhibits that

were introduced at the prior hearings. The trial court was in the best position to

observe, firsthand, the witnesses and consider the evidence. Therefore, as is

required by our long-standing jurisprudence, we will accord all due discretion and

deference in our review of the trial court' s ruling.

DISCUSSION

Concerning the trial court's modification of custody, Alan argues that the

record overwhelmingly supports his request for sole custody. In the alternative, he

asserts that he should have been designated domiciliary parent, with Elizabeth

afforded limited physical custodial periods. Alan further contends that the trial

court erred by splitting the allocation of decision-making authority between the

parties. Based on our review of the record before us, we find no merit to Alan's

arguments on appeal.

By the time this ten- day custody trial occurred in 2023, the trial court was

very familiar with the parties and much of the relevant history of the case. In

November and December 2021 and March 2022, the trial court heard testimony

from numerous witnesses and conducted interviews of four of the Schroeder

children. Dr. A. James Klein, a clinical psychologist, performed psychological

evaluations on the parties in conjunction with the custody evaluation being

conducted by Dr. Roussel, a licensed professional counselor. According to Dr.

Klein's clinical interviews and psychological testing, there were no " serious

clinical syndromes with either parent that would impact parenting and management

of the minor children."
He found that in some respects, the parties had very similar

personality traits that had appeared to fuel their conflict and that the dynamics

between the parties had " generated significant parenting issues that, by history

obtained, has dramatically impacted [ the] children."

10

In Dr. Roussel' s February 2023 custody evaluation, he noted that " the

Schroeder family's ' truths' were clearly in the eye of the beholder." Dr. Roussel

opined that the parties had a marriage that was both highly functional and

moderately dysfunctional at the same time. He described Alan as an " exceptional

and successful orthopedic surgeon who works hard and has supported the family

financially." Concerning Elizabeth, Dr. Roussel noted she was an " exceptional

mother who has performed the task of parenting excellently." However, at the

same time the parties failed to effectively communicate with each other regarding

modification of roles and the rules of relationships among family members.

Alan told Dr. Roussel that Elizabeth wants to eliminate him so the children

can heal. Alan also indicated that the children are fearful of their mother's

rejection since she has eliminated him and most of her own family. Alan described

himself as steady, patient, calm, consistent, genuine, pleasant, and able to provide

economically. Alan indicated he talks to children with respect and maturity.

Concerning Elizabeth, he said she was nurturing, affectionate, prayerful, and

always available to the children.

Elizabeth told Dr. Roussel that Alan has no parenting strengths but is a great
teacher. She indicated the children were afraid of their father because when

something goes wrong, he ridicules and laughs at them, calls them names, and

insults them.
Elizabeth stated that when they were together as a family, she would
intervene as a " buffer."
Elizabeth noted that Alan was emotionally abusive and

very controlling with the children and not empathetic to anything they feel or
experience.
She maintained that she wants the children to have a relationship with
their father;
she wants them to have good memories and healthy positive
experiences.
However, she added that her parenting has required more patience

and left her with a sense of helplessness because she does not see Alan improving,
only getting worse. Elizabeth stated she has struggled to parent when she cannot

11

protect the children and " the people who are supposed to protect them in the

system are choosing to allow them to be abused."

Dr. Roussel categorized the family as " high -conflict" as evident by the

parties " exhibiting extremely derogatory attitudes toward one another, ... merging

their own feelings with those of their children and, at times, demonstrating very

poor boundaries with their children." Dr. Roussel noted four characteristic patterns

that were described by the parties, i.e., enmeshment, overprotectiveness, rigidity,

and lack of conflict resolution. Dr. Roussel' s report contained the following

description of these characteristic patterns and the effect on the family:

Elizabeth] reported that [ Alan]
was emotionally abusive to the
children. Her logical response was to protect the children .... [ Her]
protection of her children eventually developed into the characteristic
pattern of enmeshment: referring to a relative lack of effective
boundaries between individuals or generations .... In enmeshed
families, members consistently speak and think for each other.
Alan's] response to the children' s psychosomatic symptoms and
Elizabeth' s] enmeshment developed into the characteristic pattern of
rigidity:referring to an excessive commitment to maintaining the
family's status quo. On the surface, rigid families appear stable and
untroubled.

Dr. Roussel noted further that finding a solution to this situation would not be easy.

He concluded that the children' s anger toward their father and " over -idealization of

their mother" has resulted in the children's " chronic externalization of blame

toward their father."

At that time, based on his very thorough evaluation of the parties and all of

the information provided to him, Dr. Roussel recommended that the parties split

custody ( Elizabeth 70 percent and Alan 30 percent), with no domiciliary parent.

He also recommended that a parenting coordinator be appointed to assist the

parties in resolving their disputes and that the parties begin the process of engaging
with counselors to assist the children with transition, modification, and adaptation.

During the custody trial, the parties testified in detail about their

acrimonious relationship and the effects of their relationship on the children.

12

Moreover, the record is replete with testimony of lay witnesses who corroborated

the many allegations, complaints, and stories put forth by the parties concerning

each other. The trial court also had the benefit of hearing from numerous other

mental health and health care providers who detailed their involvement in this case

through treatment of either the parties and/ or the children. The trial court had the

benefit of direct observation of the parties and the difficult task of weighing

credibility and the weight of all the evidence over the course of several years.

Following our exhaustive review in this case, we find that the trial court's findings

are reasonably supported by the record and that said findings are not manifestly

erroneous. Given the record evidence and the discretion that is owed to the trial

court, we cannot presume to second- guess the trial court' s judgment that the minor

children's best interests would be served by a modification of custody. Moreover,

we find no support in the record for Alan's claim that he met his burden of proving

that an award of sole custody in his favor is in the best interest of the minor

children.
Rather, the overwhelming testimony and evidence presented supports the

trial court's judgment, maintaining joint custody, modified by awarding equally

shared physical custody periods.

Also included in the judgment is language removing the designation of

Elizabeth as domiciliary parent by specifically allocating the legal authority and
responsibility of the parties. Physical custody is a separate matter from legal

authority and responsibility over a child. Hodges v. Hodges, 2015- 0585 ( La.

11/ 23/ 15), 181 So. 3d 700, 705. The term " custody" is usually broken down into

two components: physical or actual custody and legal custody. Id. Once a trial

court awards legal joint custody, La. R. S. 9: 335 governs the details of that

custodial arrangement, including physical custody, as well as the legal authority
and responsibility of the parents. See Hodges, 181 So. 3d at 703.

13

Louisiana Revised Statutes 9: 335 provides, in pertinent part:

A. ( 1) In a proceeding in which joint custody is decreed, the court
shall render a joint custody implementation order except for good
cause shown.

2)( a) The implementation order shall allocate the time periods during

which each parent shall have physical custody of the child so that the
child is assured of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.

b) To the extent it is feasible and in the best interest of the child,
physical custody of the children should be shared equally.

c) The implementation order shall include a provision that when
either party is required to evacuate this state with a minor child
because of an emergency or disaster declared under the provisions of
R.S. 29: 721 et seq., or declared by federal authority and it becomes
impossible for the parties to exercise custody as provided in the
judgment, the parties shall engage in continuous communication
regarding the safe evacuation of the child, the location of the child
during and after the emergency or disaster, and an interim custody
plan for the child until the custody provisions of the judgment can be
resumed.

3) The implementation order shall allocate the legal authority and
responsibility of the parents.

B. ( 1) In a decree of joint custody the court shall designate a
domiciliary parent except when there is an implementation order to
the contrary or for other good cause shown.

2) The domiciliary parent is the parent with whom the child shall
primarily reside, but the other parent shall have physical custody
during time periods that assure that the child has frequent and
continuing contact with both parents.

3) The domiciliary parent shall have authority to make all decisions
affecting the child unless an implementation order provides otherwise.
All major decisions made by the domiciliary parent concerning the
child shall be subject to review by the court upon motion of the other
parent.
It shall be presumed that all major decisions made by the
domiciliary parent are in the best interest of the child.

In addition, La. R.S. 9: 336 provides that " U] oint custody obligates the parents to

exchange information concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child

and to confer with one another in exercising decision-making authority."

In reaching its decision that a modification of decision-making authority was
warranted, the trial court noted that despite Alan's attempts to strengthen his

14

relationship with the minor children, his efforts were met with animosity and

opposition, specifically pointing to negative comments made by Elizabeth directly

to the minor children about their father. The trial court removed Elizabeth as

domiciliary parent but noted the strong bond between her and the minor children.

To " prevent further disturbance of the minor children's current sense of normalcy,"

the trial court elected to bifurcate the decision-making authority regarding the

minor children. Noting that Alan is a healthcare professional with a medical

degree and clinical experience, the trial court allocated final decision-making

authority for all health and education issues involving the minor children to Alan.

Moreover, acknowledging Elizabeth' s familiarity with the minor children's daily

lives and activities, the trial court awarded final decision-making authority

concerning all extracurricular activities involving the minor children to Elizabeth.

As noted, each custody case must be viewed based on the particular facts

and circumstances of the case, with the overriding consideration being the best

interest of the child. See La. Civ. Code art. 131; Leger, 363 So. 3d at 528. The

trial court was required to make credibility determinations in this case and confect

a custody arrangement in the best interest of the minor children. Moreover, it is

evident from the record that in crafting this judgment, the trial court sought to

encourage more effective communication between the parties and implicitly

concluded that the minor children's best interests would be served by the modified

custodial arrangement, including but not limited to allowing the minor children

time to foster a more stable relationship with both parents. Alan has not

demonstrated that these findings are manifestly erroneous. Thus, we find no abuse

of discretion by the trial court in the modified joint custody arrangement.

Lastly, in answer to this appeal, Elizabeth argued that the January 22, 2024

judgment of the trial court granting Alan more custodial time was " contrary to the

law" and " adverse to the best interest of the minor children." She asserted that the

15

judgment was manifestly erroneous as it was not supported by the evidence and

that trial court erred by failing to find a change in circumstances sufficient to

warrant a modification of the custody agreement and remove her as domiciliary

parent. As noted above, we have reviewed the entirety of the record before us and

find no abuse of discretion in any of the trial court' s rulings in this case. Thus, we

deny the relief requested by Elizabeth in her answer to appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the January 22, 2024

judgment of the trial court. All costs associated with this appeal are assessed

equally between Alan Conrad Schroeder and Elizabeth LeBlanc Schroeder.

AFFIRMED; ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED.

16

2024 CU 1135

t

TTT TTTT

McClendon, J., concurring in part.

Although I would have found the split of physical custody ( 70% to Ms. Schroeder

and 30%
to Dr. Schroeder) recommended by the court-appointed custody evaluator to
be in the best interest of the minor children, given the vast discretion of the trial court, I
concur with the result reached by the majority.