Linda Wessinger v. John Morris in his Official Capacity as Mayor of Town and Official Capacity as of Whitecastle

STATE OF LOUISIANA

FIRST CIRCUIT

2025 CA 0019

LINDA WESSINGER

41-1
VERSUS

JOHN MORRIS IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS MAYOR OF TOWN OF WHITE CASTLE
AND THE TOWN OF WHITE CASTLE,
LOUISIANA, AND MARIO BROWN IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF
POLICE OF THE TOWN OF WHITE CASTLE
AND SHARMEL LEWIS AND KADARIUS FOSTER

Judgment Rendered.
OCT2920

18th Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Iherville
State of Louisiana
Suit No. 79786

The Honorable Elizabeth A. Engolio, Judge Presiding

Charlotte C. McDaniel Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Linda Wessinger

Keith M. Detweiler Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees
Metairie, Louisiana The Town of White Castle, Mayor
John Morris, and Chief of Police
Mario Brown

BEFORE: McCLENDON, C.J., LANIER, WOLFE,
BALFOUR, AND FIELDS, JJ.

LANIER, J.

Plaintiff, Linda Wessinger,. appeals a judgment of the trial court that granted

a motion for summary judgment filed by three defendants, John Morris, in his

official capacity as Mayor of the Town of White Castle (" Mayor Morris"); the Town

of White Castle (" the Town"); and Mario Brown, in his official capacity as the duly

elected Chief of Police of White Castle (" Chief Brown"). For the reasons that

follow, we affirm as to the Town and Mayor Morris, and we reverse as to Chief

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Wessinger filed suit against the defendants, Mayor Morris, the Town,

Chief Brown, Sharmel Lewis, and Kadarius Foster, seeking damages arising out of

a physical altercation that took place in the parking lot of the White Castle

Community Center (" Community Center"). The Town is the owner of the

Community Center and collects rental payments for the use of the facility.
According to the petition, Ms. Wessinger and her daughter, Catelynn Williams,

attended an " All White Party" at the Community Center with other invited guests in

August 2019.
Ms. Wessinger alleged that as she and Catelynn were attempting to
leave the party, she was confronted by Ms. Lewis. Ms. Wessinger asserted that when

Catelynn intervened on her, an altercation ensued between Catelynn and Ms. Lewis.

When Ms. Wessinger attempted to stop the fight, Mr. Foster stepped in and pushed

Ms. Wessinger to the ground, causing her to sustain injuries.' Ms. Wessinger alleged

that her injuries were caused by the intentional acts of Ms. Lewis and Mr. Foster and

by a breach of duty owed by Mayor Morris, Chief Brown, and the Town (sometimes

collectively referred to as the " White Castle defendants") in failing to provide

security for the party as was required by the rental agreement in place for the event.

i
According to the record, Ms. Lewis is Mr. Foster's aunt.

2

In response to Ms. Wessinger's petition, the White Castle defendants filed a

motion for summary judgment, asserting there was no genuine issue of material fact

with respect to liability because of Ms. Wessinger' s inability to prove that the White

Castle defendants owed a duty to protect her from the unforeseeable acts of Ms.

Lewis and Mr. Foster. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on March 28,

2024, following which it granted summary judgment in favor of the White Castle

defendants. The trial court signed a judgment on April 10, 2024, granting the motion

and dismissing, with prejudice, all of Ms. Wessinger's claims against the White

Castle defendants.2 Ms. Wessinger filed a timely motion for new trial, which was

denied by the trial court on July 10, 2024. Ms. Wessinger appealed that judgment

on July 22, 2024.

We consider an appeal of the denial of a motion for new trial as an appeal of

the judgment on the merits when it is clear from the appellant's brief that she intended

to appeal the underlying judgment. Miller v. Albertson' s Companies, LLC, 2023-

0527 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 27/ 23), 381 So. 3d 84, 88. It is obvious from Ms.

Wessinger's brief that she intended to appeal the summary judgment. Thus, we will

treat this appeal as an appeal of the April 10, 2024 summary judgment.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Appellate courts review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo

under the same criteria governing the trial court's consideration of whether summary

judgment is appropriate. Robinson v. Cheng, LLC, 2022- 1130 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

7/ 10/ 23), 372 So. 3d 7, 9. A court shall grant summary judgment if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show there is no genuine issue of material

2
According to the record, Ms. Wessinger filed a motion for preliminary default against the
remaining defendants, Ms. Lewis and Mr. Foster, on December 4, 2020. There is no default
judgment in the record before us. However, at the end of the summary judgment hearing, counsel
for Ms. Wessinger advised the trial court as follows: "[ T] here are two defendants that are left ...
who have both been served, never answered. I took a preliminary default. I did not have a final
default." Nonetheless, this appeal does not pertain to the claims against either of these defendants.

3

fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See La. Code

Civ. P. art. 966( A)( 3).

The summary judgment movant maintains the burden of proof. Nevertheless,

if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court

on the motion, his burden is satisfied by pointing out an absence of factual support

for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense.

See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966( D)( 1). Thereafter, the adverse party must produce

factual support sufficient to establish he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden

at trial. If the adverse party fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of

material fact, and if appropriate, the court shall render summary judgment against

him. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 966( D)( 1) and 967( B); Robinson, 372 So. 3d at 9.

A fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's

ultimate success, or determines the outcome of a legal dispute. Smith v. Our Lady

of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93- 2512 ( La. 7/ 5/ 94), 639 So. 2d 730, 751. A genuine issue

is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could

reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary

judgment is appropriate. Id. Because it is the applicable substantive law that

determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen

only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Johnson v. Knight, 2023-

1267 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 14/ 24), 391 So. 3d 1126, 1129.

The claims by Ms. Wessinger in this case are based, in part, on the White

Castle defendants' alleged negligence. Ms. Wessinger alleges the White Castle

defendants owed her a duty to protect her from the injuries she sustained during the

altercation.
She asserts that the rental agreement entered into by the Town and

Ursula Smith, the person who hosted the party on the night in question, resulted in

an assumed duty on the part of the White Castle defendants to provide security. Ms.

Wessinger maintained this was a duty created by contract.

11

Louisiana courts have adopted a duty -risk analysis in determining whether to

impose liability under general negligence principles. See Lemann v. Essen Lane

Daiquiris, Inc., 2005- 1095 ( La. 3/ 10/ 06), 923 So. 2d 627, 632- 633. For liability to

attach under a duty -risk analysis, a plaintiff must prove: ( 1) the defendant had a duty

to conform his conduct to a specific standard ( the duty element); ( 2) the defendant

failed to conform his conduct to the appropriate standard ( the breach of duty

element); ( 3) the defendant' s substandard conduct was a cause -in -fact of the

plaintiffs injuries ( the cause -in -fact element); ( 4) the defendant' s substandard

conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiffs injuries (the scope of liability or scope of

protection element); and ( 5) actual damages ( the damages element). Bass v. Disa

Global Solutions, Inc., 2019- 1145 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 12/ 20), 305 So. 3d 903, 907,

writ denied, 2020- 01025 ( La. 11/ 4/ 20), 303 So. 3d 651. A negative answer to any of

the inquiries of the duty -risk analysis results in a determination of no liability.

Cantrelle v. Lafourche Parish Council, 2021- 0678 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 1/ 22), 340

So. 3d 1059, 1073.

Summary Judiement Evidence

In support of the motion for summary judgment, the White Castle defendants

submitted Mayor Morris' affidavit, along with copies of receipts issued by the Town

to Ms. Smith in connection with her rental of the Community Center. Also attached

to Mayor Morris' affidavit was an unverified copy of a blank rental agreement with

the words " REVISED DECEMBER 2019" typed in the top left-hand corner of the

document (" rental agreement"). The White Castle defendants also submitted the

depositions of Mayor Morris and Ms. Wessinger in support of their motion.'

3 In addition to this evidence, the White Castle defendants attempted to introduce a video that
purported to show the altercation in question. However, the trial court excluded the video
following an objection by Ms. Wessinger.

5

The only documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to the

motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, certified medical records, certified copies of public documents or

public records, certified copies of insurance policies, authentic acts, private acts duly

acknowledged, promissory notes and assignments thereof, written stipulations, and

admissions. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966( A)(4). Documents that are not included in

the exclusive list, such as photographs, pictures, video images, or contracts, are not

allowed to be filed unless they are properly authenticated in a deposition or affidavit

to which they are attached. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966, Comments -2015,

comment ( c); Loupe v. Roman Catholic Church of Diocese of Baton Rouge,

2022- 1153 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 14/ 23), 365 So. 3d 844, 848, writ denied, 2023- 00758

La. 10/ 10/ 23), 371 So. 3d 458. Nevertheless, it has been recognized that although

Articles 966 and 967 do not permit a party to use unsworn and unverified documents

as summary judgment evidence, if both parties offer identical copies of documents,

indicating that there is agreement between them as to their authenticity, the court

may accept them. See Boland v. West Feliciana Parish Police Jury, 2003- 1297

La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 25/ 04), 878 So. 2d 808, 814, writ denied, 2004- 2286 ( La.

11/ 24/ 04), 888 So. 2d 231.

While the rental agreement attached to Mayor Morris' affidavit was not a

certified copy as is required by Article 966 and would normally not be allowed to be

considered as competent summary judgment evidence, we note that Ms. Wessinger

submitted a copy of the identical rental agreement in opposition to the motion for

summary judgment. Thus, the authenticity of the document is admitted by the

parties and properly considered in this case.

The rental agreement provides as follows with regard to security for events at

the Community Center:

0

Security
4- At least one Police
attendance is required to provide of

o by the Chief of Police is required for any function where
alcohol will be served. Security for other' t by
with the permission of Chief of Police. It shall be the sole
responsibility of the Lessee to obtain and bear the additional costs for
proper security and law enforcement personnel for crowd control.

The fee for s

Dollars and 00/ 100 ( { ii)/hour per t

hours.

t { l#° tom

In another section entitled " Adult Functions," the rental agreement provides

that "[ a] t least one ( 1) White Castle Police Officer, appointed by the Chief of Police,

is required to provide security for events." Moreover, there is a signature page at the

end of the agreement for the Chief of Police, which appears in the rental agreement

as follows:

Proof of required Licenses/ Permits provided? 0 Yes 0 No

rt°Occupancy

Cast per hour One Hundred Doflars and 00/ 100) x hours (per 153
atterdees) T talcost$
Officer

C( st hour $ s hours (per 150 uttendea) r'otut C`
Officer

arse per hour $
hours per 154 uttendecsj notal
Officer

Fatal Security Cost S
BY
Mario Brown, ChiefofPolice

In his deposition testimony, Mayor Morris acknowledged that he had seen the

original agreement signed by Ms. Smith in connection with the party in question.
He noted that although he did not have the original agreement with him at the time,

it was " not missing." Mayor Morris further explained that there had been some

reorganization and renovation, but they were " looking for [the original agreement]."

When asked if he would produce the original agreement to his attorney, Mayor
Morris replied, " Yes, I will. There's nothing to hide." Mayor Morris acknowledged

19

the rental agreement contains signature pages. However, he indicated that in

response to past inquiries as to whether the agreement was to be signed by the mayor

or by a council member, his reply was " It's either/ or." Concerning Ms. Smith's

rental, Mayor Morris further indicated that everything had been done properly to

secure the Community Center for the party in question and that all funds had been

paid.

Subsequently, in his December 4, 2023 affidavit, Mayor Morris maintained

that the Town was unable to locate the agreement signed by Ms. Smith. However,

he attested that the rental agreement attached to his affidavit was identical to the

agreement used in this case and further referenced the receipts issued to Ms. Smith,

which reflected the payments she made for the rental of the Community Center.

Mayor Morris explained that in order to rent the Community Center, an

interested party would have to meet with either the Town clerk or an assistant clerk

to get a contract in place and pay a deposit for the building. Mayor Morris noted

further that pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Smith was required to pay a fee for one

security guard to be furnished by the White Castle Police Department.

According to Mayor Morris, he attended the party at the Community Center.

When asked if he saw a police officer on duty that night, Mayor Morris stated, " Yes,

I saw when one walk in, and then walk right back out." Mayor Morris explained

that when on duty, the officers are not required to stay inside the Community Center

the entire time; rather, they are to stay on the premises and can at times be in "their

unit or making circles in the parking lot as well." Mayor Morris was unaware of the

name of the officer who was assigned as security, stating, " We're not responsible for

the name of that officer.
We get the security deposit, but then that's at the ability of
the [ Chief of Police] who he provides." Mayor Morris testified further that security

is there " to make sure everything stays in order inside that building." He agreed that
an altercation would be a breach of order. When asked if alcohol was served at the

party in question, Mayor Morris responded, " I believe it was a bring your own bottle

affair." He added that upon rental, the Town inquires about alcohol service/ selling,

noting that a permit from the state is required for such activity.

Concerning the altercation, Mayor Morris stated that he was inside the

building as the altercation occurred outside. He was asked if he knew " whether a

security officer or security detail had to be called or dispatched to that location
because of an altercation," to which he replied, " Not at that moment." It was only

after Mayor Morris " saw [ police unit] lights outside" that he realized the police had

been called. When asked if he went outside to get a status as to why the police were

there, Mayor Morris responded, " Not my job." Prior to leaving the Community

Center that evening, Mayor Morris did speak with Officer Ronald K. Jones, the

investigating officer.

When questioned during her deposition about the altercation, Ms. Wessinger

stated that at some time prior to the night in question, she and Ms. Lewis had

exchanged words over the phone about Ms. Lewis' boyfriend. They had not seen

each other in person since that phone call until the night in question when she was

confronted by Ms. Lewis. Ms. Wessinger indicated she did not speak with either

Ms. Lewis or Mr. Foster at the party and denied knowing of "any bad blood" between

them at the time.

Ms. Wessinger explained that just prior to the altercation, she and Catelynn

were leaving the party and Della Lewis, Ms. Lewis' sister, was walking them to the

door. According to Ms. Wessinger, Catelynn told her to " walk up" because Ms.

Lewis was approaching quickly from behind. When Ms. Wessinger turned around,

Ms. Lewis said to her, " What's up, B? You got something to say?" Not wanting "any

drama," Ms. Wessinger replied, " I'm not here for foolishness." Ms. Wessinger

explained that as they were walking out of the building, Ms. Lewis used a different

W

door to exit the building so that she would be in front of Ms. Wessinger. Ms.

Wessinger further described the events as follows:

S] o I turned around and I was walking away. So when I walked away,
she was coming behind me, and my daughter saw her and my daughter
was like, " Oh, I can't let you fight my mama. I'm not about to let you
fight my mama." So that' s when [ Ms. Lewis] told her, " B, if you don't
get out my way," and that's when [ Ms. Lewis] ran into my daughter.
She just started fighting my daughter.

When asked what happened next, Ms. Wessinger stated, " I run over there to ... try

and break them up, and as soon as I get over there, I hadn't even got [ sic] a chance

to stop them. [ Mr. Foster] said, 'No, B, get away from my auntie,' and he pushes me

and] I go flying across the street."

After the altercation was over, Ms. Wessinger and Catelynn headed towards

their vehicle to leave. At some point before they left the premises, Ms. Wessinger

got out of the vehicle to talk to a police officer who was there. Ms. Wessinger did

not know the officer or his name. According to Ms. Wessinger, she told the officer

her version of the events after which the officer went in the Community Center to

find Ms. Lewis. When the officer came back, he indicated that Ms. Lewis was no

longer there and that he would need to talk to Ms. Lewis before he could do anything

else. Ms. Wessinger noted that Della was also trying to tell the officer about the

altercation, but he was not listening to her. Ms. Wessinger indicated she was never

asked by the officer to give a statement, nor was she ever contacted by the police

again.

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Ms. Wessinger asserted

that the White Castle defendants could not establish with sufficient evidence that

they complied with the obligation to provide security. She alleged that the duty to

provide security was assumed by the White Castle defendants through the rental

agreement and that summary judgment was not proper because material issues of

fact remained. In support of her opposition, Ms. Wessinger submitted a copy of the

10

same rental agreement offered by the White Castle defendants; the affidavits of Ms.

Wessinger and Catelynn; the depositions of Mayor Morris, Chief Brown, Ms. Lewis,

Officer Jones, and Monica Hamilton Lee ( the Town clerk); and the unverified

responses by the White Castle defendants to various discovery requests by Ms.

Wessinger.

Pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 966( D)(2), "[ t]he court shall consider only

those documents filed or referenced in support of or in opposition to the motion for

summary judgment but shall not consider any document that is excluded pursuant to

a timely filed objection." We note that no objections were made by the White Castle

defendants regarding any of the documents attached to Ms. Wessinger's opposition.

However, Ms. Wessinger submitted responses to requests for production of

documents, which items are not listed as proper summary judgment evidence under

Article 966( A)(4), and answers to interrogatories, which were not answered under

oath as is required by La. Code Civ. P. art. 1458. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 966,

Comments -2015, comment ( c) (" Article 1458 requires that interrogatories be

answered under oath, and only answers that are made under oath may be filed in

support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.") After reviewing

the evidence submitted by Ms. Wessinger, we find that the responses to requests for

production of documents and the answers to interrogatories are not proper summary

judgment evidence. These documents are unsworn and unverified and have no

evidentiary value. See Lucas v. Maison Insurance Co., 2021- 1401 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

12/ 22/ 22), 358 So. 3d 76, 89.

According to both Ms. Wessinger and Catelynn, there was no security or

police presence at any time during the party at the Community Center. They both

indicated that the only police officer they saw that night was the one who arrived in

a police vehicle after midnight, once the altercation was over. Contrary to these

statements, Ms. Lewis recalled there being police on the scene as the altercation was

11

ongoing. When asked if there were police there when the fight started, Ms. Lewis

stated, " Yeah, the police was there." She described police cars sitting outside the

second exit of the Community Center. When asked how many police cars were

there, the following colloquy occurred:

A. If I'm not mistaken, I think it was two. And I think one of them
has orange writing on it because that's Plaquemine and I think it was
one of the White -- White Castle police cars. And I'm going to tell you
how I know the police was there. Because when I walked out of the
gym to go to fight with Linda, the police car was there. That's why I
went to the side where she was at.

Q. Okay. So, when you walked out the gym, you saw two police
cars, one of them was orange and one of them was a --

A. When I said orange, I think they had orange writing on it because
there was two. You know how the police cars sit, the lights -- the sirens
are not on, but they just have this blue light just sitting still, just a light
just sitting, you know, that ... acknowledges that ... the police car is
there? You know what I mean? The sirens are not on, the lights are
not blinking, it's just a blue light that they have on.

Q. Okay. So, you said that, if you can remember, there were two
police cars --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- one had orange writing on it --

A. Orange writing on it, yeah, and --

Q. -- and a blue light?

A. The orange writing is -- that's an Iberville car. That's a
Plaquemine car.

Q. Okay. And what about --

A. And then, there was another one right across from it, I think it
was. I think that was a White Castle police car. Don't quote me on that,
but I tell you this, there was a police car there because just like I said,
when Linda walked out that door and I walked out behind her, I didn't
tell her nothing in front of that building because I saw the police right
there. That's why it happened kind of like on the side.

Q. So, to clarify, and I want to make sure that I'm absolutely clear
on this, you saw no one in a police uniform on the inside of the building;
is that correct?

A. I never said that and you never asked me that.

12

Q. Okay. So, I'm asking. You never saw a police officer in uniform
inside the building the night of the party, did you?

A. I didn't say I did and I didn't say I didn't. I don't remember if I
saw police in there.

Ms. Lewis continued, noting that while she was at the Community Center, her

main concern was the animosity that had been brewing between her and Ms.

Wessinger, stating, " my main focus, when I got there and I saw Linda, she said when

ass and that's what I wanted her to do.
she seen me she was going to whip my f------

So, that's why when I saw her went [ sic] out the door, that's why I ran behind her."

Ms. Lewis' description of the altercation was very similar to that of Ms. Wessinger.

However, when she was asked about who " was trying to break up the fight," Ms.

Lewis indicated that she saw a uniformed, black male police officer standing behind

her. She further added, "[ T]here was so many people out there. Even the police was

standing behind when I did look. They had a police there." Ms. Lewis expressed

her concern for being arrested and taken to jail, adding that she did not stay around

to find out the officer's name.

According to Officer Jones' deposition testimony, he was on routine patrol the

night of the incident when he was called to the scene by dispatch.' He did not have

his lights or siren activated when he arrived. Officer Jones was unaware of who was

working security that night at the Community Center and did not speak to another

officer or see any other officer dressed in uniform that night. He never went into the

Community Center that night as part of his investigation. Officer Jones recalled

seeing several people outside, which he knew was not allowed, and attempted to

clear the area.

As Officer Jones was trying to get everyone back inside the Community

Center, he heard yelling coming from behind him. He approached a white vehicle

4 At the time of trial, Officer Jones had been promoted to First Sergeant.

13

and observed a young black female sitting in the front seat trying to get out of the

vehicle. Officer Jones was then approached by Ms. Wessinger, who told him that

she wanted Ms. Lewis arrested because Ms. Lewis had broken Ms. Wessinger's

wrist. He advised Ms. Wessinger that he would need a statement from her in order

to complete his report so that Ms. Wessinger could file charges against Ms. Lewis if

she desired. He also told Ms. Wessinger, " if one person gets arrested, then the other

person will get arrested, too .... It takes two to fight." When Officer Jones returned

to the station after the incident, Mayor Morris told him that " this has been going on

been brewing for months" and that Mayor Morris had been advised that Ms.

Wessinger and Catelynn had jumped Ms. Lewis.

When asked if he had ever worked security details at the Community Center,

Officer Jones indicated he had. Officer Jones testified further about the process of

working such details as follows:

Q. Well, okay, it may be confusing. How would you get on a team?
Would you volunteer? Did somebody call you up and say you're on the
team, or how did you get on it?

A. Usually ... whoever rents the [ C] ommunity [ C] enter, they' ll tell
how many officers they need. The [ T] own clerk would then contact the
secretary of the chief, and then if you're off that day, he' d ask you, you
know, hey ... do you want this detail. If not, then you don't have to
take it.

Q. Okay. So, when it was offered to you, it was [ a] voluntary thing,
want to make some extra money, [ if] you're available?

A. Correct.

Q. Assuming you served on a detail, how did you get paid?

A. It depends. Sometimes we get paid cash. Sometimes they'd
leave the money order with the [ T]own clerk, and she' d bring it over to
the police department. And then, she' d have our names on an envelope.

At the time of her deposition, Monica Hamilton Lee had worked for the Town

for 33 years, spending the last 12 years as Town clerk. Ms. Lee indicated that she

searched her paper files in an attempt to locate the original rental agreement that Ms.
14

Smith signed for the rental of the Community Center. However, she was unable to

find the document. Nonetheless, Ms. Lee was familiar with the rental agreement

submitted into evidence by the parties, noting that the only thing that really changed

with the agreement over the years was the price for security. Ms. Lee testified that

in 2019, the security fee was $ 120. 00 for four hours, whereas at the time of her

deposition in 2024, the fee was $ 160. 00 for four hours. She verified the receipts that

she completed concerning Ms. Smith's rental of the Community Center, adding that

in addition to the $ 120. 00 security fee, the rental fee was $ 350. 00. When asked if

Ms. Smith was issued a refund for either the security fee or the rental of the

Community Center, Ms. Lee responded, " None at all."

Ms. Lee explained that she did not know who was assigned to work security

on the night in question. She indicated she did not know who assigned the security

detail, adding " It just goes through the White Castle Police Department." Ms. Lee

stated she had no knowledge of who actually insured the police officers were paid

for the security details. She further described her involvement in that process as

follows, "[ I collect] the money, drop it off [at the police department] and it's out of

my hand[ s]." Ms. Lee indicated that security fees are always paid with money orders

and that the " Pay to" line is left blank. Once the money order is routed to the officer

who worked the detail, the officer can then fill in the money order to receive

payment.

In a more detailed discussion about the terms of the rental agreement, the

following exchange took place between Ms. Lee and counsel for Ms. Wessinger:

Q. The sixth ... bullet point down, under " Adult functions: At least
one White Castle police officer appointed by the Chief of Police is
required to provide security for events," adult functions.

Is that provision not enforced against the chief of police?

A. I don't know.

15

Q. You, it says pretty clearly that he' s the one that appoints the
police officer, correct?

A. That's what it says in the contract. But I don't know.

Q. You don't know if he follows it?

A. I don't know.

Q. Actually, there's also a signature line for Mario Brown, Chief of
Police where the officer, there' s a blank for the officer. I don't know if
that's where the name of an officer's filled in or the title of an officer's
filled in. Do you know?

A. They barely -- he barely does that. We don't even fill this part
here out.

Q. No, I'm not saying you fill it out, but you maintain this document
after it is filled out, right?

A. Yes, but we don't -- I really don't get him to fill that out. I don't
get him to fill that out.

Q. Are you -- you're the custodian of this document and you're the
intake person for anybody who wants to rent the [ C] ommunity [C] enter.
Are you not familiar with what the police chief does with this document
once it goes to his office?

A. It doesn't go to his office. It just stays in my office.

Q. It stays in your office. Well ... when does Mario sign as the chief
of police?

A. He doesn't sign it. I just -- like I say, I bring the money out over
there to them and let them know they needed an officer and they get the
officer. I mean, that' s it.

Q. Does Mario Brown sign this document --

A. No, he doesn't.

Q. -- on page 7? Yes or no?

A. No, he doesn't.

16

Q. Okay. Does the name of an officer who's going to be a special
duty officer, is it on that form or not?

A. No, sir.

Q. No. Does the mayor sign the rental agreement?

A. No, sir.

Q. Does an alderman sign the rental agreement?

A. No, sir.

Q. Who signs? Just the person renting?

A. The lessee renting it. Just sometimes we don't -- they don't really
come into the office. Sometimes they sign, sometimes they don't.

In his deposition testimony, Chief Brown indicated that he has nothing to do

with the rental of the Community Center. Rather, Chief Brown stated the contracts

are handled by the Town clerk or the mayor. When shown the place on the rental

agreement where he should have signed as Chief of Police and asked if he is the one

who assigns the security, Chief Brown testified as follows:

Q. But that form has a place for you to sign as Chief of Police. Are
you the one who assigns the security detail work?

A.] No, that's personal with those officers ... that's something the
rental paid, it's not a contract with me or whatever. But I rarely have
signed these .... That was between whoever, the officer or whoever
takes it, and ... the [ renter].
Now, I'm not sure where they are officers
or whatever they were working a security, but I don't have, I don't say
you, you, you, you.

Q. Well, if you get a ... call from the [ T] own clerk or the mayor
saying we need ... security for an event, that is your responsibility to
put the security together, correct? ... Well ... who does that? Does
the mayor assign the policeman?

A. No ... it's not assigned ... if that takes a detail ... which we call
it a detail ... that's them and their contract between them and the renter,
as I told you before.

17

Q. [ 4]n this page seven where it has a place for you to sign the
document, it says approval of Chief of Police, adult functions only. Mr.
Brown ... didn't you generally sign [ for] each special event?

A. No, sir.

Q. You didn't sign them?

A. No, sir.

Chief Brown was emphatic that he never assigned officers to details, adding, " I can't

make them." He explained that the details are " an off duty thing" and that he would

ask if any of the officers were interested in working the detail. Chief Brown stated

that his officers were required to have their badge on as identification when working

a detail and that depending on the type of event, the officer may wear a uniform.

When asked about the night in question and whether he knew if there was anyone

on security detail, Chief Brown noted he did not attend the party and does not keep

a list of the officers who volunteer for details.

Summary Judgment in favor of the Town and Mayor Morris

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town and Mayor

Morris and dismissed, with prejudice, all of Ms. Wessinger's claims against them.

In oral reasons for judgment, the trial court concluded that because the acts of Ms.

Lewis and Mr. Foster were intentional, criminal, and unforeseeable, the White Castle

defendants did not owe Ms. Wessinger a duty. Concerning the trial court's dismissal

of Ms. Wessinger' s claims against the Town and Mayor Morris, we agree that

summary judgment was appropriate as against these parties. However, we affirm

this portion of the trial court's April 10, 2024 judgment, not for the reasons given by

the trial court, but because we find that the Town and Mayor Morris satisfied the

duty owed to Ms. Wessinger.

The law recognizes that a property owner has a general duty relative to the

safety of persons on his premises to exercise reasonable care and not to expose such

persons to unreasonable risks of injury or harm. Mundy v. Department of Health

18

Human Resources, 620 So. 2d 811, 813 ( La. 1993). As previously noted, the

rental agreements required the lessee pay a fee to obtain security for any adult

function, i.e., "[ a] t least one ( 1) White Castle Police Officer, appointed by the Chief

of Police." Moreover, the undisputed evidence bears out that in this case, Ms. Smith

paid a rental fee of $350.00 and a security fee of $120. 00. Because the contract

terms required security for the event, the Town and Mayor Morris had no further

duty to Ms. Wessinger.

Whether there was negligence in how the security was carried out is not a

burden to be borne by the Town and Mayor Morris. Rather, this burden falls to the

provider of said security, Chief Brown. The Town and Mayor Morris assumed no

responsibility with regard to how the security would be carried out. Moreover, there

can be no finding of liability on their part if the security that Ms. Smith obtained and

paid for through the White Castle Police Department was not present at the party as

was required by the agreement. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the

Town and Mayor Morris is appropriate, and we affirm the dismissal of Ms.

Wessinger's claims as against the Town and Mayor Morris.

Summary Judgment in favor of Chief gown

As previously noted, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of

Chief Brown finding that Chief Brown owed no duty to Ms. Wessinger under the

facts and circumstances of this case because of the unforeseeable intentional and

criminal acts of Ms. Lewis and Mr. Foster. On appeal, Ms. Wessinger argues that

summary judgment was granted in error and that the question is whether the White

Castle Police Department breached its duty to perform the security services in a non -

5 Although Ms. Wessinger argues on appeal that the failure of the White Castle defendants to
produce a signed copy of the original agreement entered into by Ms. Smith and the Town creates
a genuine issue ofmaterial fact, we find no merit to this argument. As previously noted, the parties
have admitted to the authenticity of the rental agreement that was submitted into evidence in this
case.

19

negligent manner. She further argues that summary judgment was not appropriate

as there are genuine issues of material fact remaining as to whether security was

even present on the night in question. We find merit to Ms. Wessinger's arguments

regarding the summary judgment granted in favor of Chief Brown.

Pursuant to Louisiana statutory law and jurisprudence, a police officer is a

person who has been authorized and empowered by a governmental entity to perform

duties that relate to the governmental function of maintaining peace and order. See

Herrera v. First Nat. Ins. Co. of America, 2015- 1097 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 3/ 16), 194

So. 3d 807, 815, writ denied, 2016- 1278 ( La. 10/ 28/ 16), 208 So. 3d 885. The

peacekeeping aspect of a police officer's duties includes routine patrolling,

investigating, and answering of emergency calls. Along with the duty to maintain

peace and order, a police officer has a duty to prevent crime, enforce the law, and

protect the citizenry. Herrera, 194 So.3d at 815; see also La. R.S. 40: 2402( 3)( a).

Thus, a police officer has a duty to the public that arises from a social contract

that confers upon him the authority to enforce the laws of the city and state within

his jurisdiction and subject to the order of his superior officers. Dyer v. City of New

Orleans, 96- 2802 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 8/ 20/97), 700 So.2d 866, 869, writ denied, 97-

2347 ( La. 11/ 26/ 97), 703 So. 2d 650. Law enforcement officers have a duty to act

reasonably to investigate possible violations of the law and to protect citizens who

may be harmed by a violation. Hardy v. Bowie, 98- 2821 ( La. 9/ 8/ 99), 744 So. 2d

606, 614, abrogated on other grounds by Gregor v. Argenot Great Cent. Ins. Co.,

2002- 1138 ( La. 5/ 20/ 03), 851 So. 2d 959. This authority must at all times be

exercised in a reasonable fashion, and the officer must act as a reasonably prudent

man under the circumstances; thus, police officers are held to choosing a course of

action that is reasonable under the circumstances. Id.; see also Syrie v. Schilhab,

96- 1027 ( La. 5/ 20/ 97), 693 So. 2d 1173, 1177. Generally, this same duty applies to

off-duty police officers working a private detail if they are primarily performing the

FIE

duties of a police officer or are within the scope of their employment because they

are actively engaged in police work or performing some action furthering the police

function. See Blair v. Tynes, 621 So. 2d 591, 595- 596 ( La. 1993); Cheatham v.

Lee, 277 So.2d 513, 516 ( La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 279 So. 2d 696 ( La. 1973).

We note, once again, that the rental agreement required one security guard,

appointed by Chief Brown, to provide security for Ms. Smith' s event at the

Community Center. Although Mayor Morris remembered seeing a police officer

walk in, and then walk right back out" of the Community Center on the night of the

party, no other witness testified to seeing any police presence inside the Community

Center that night. Furthermore, when Officer Jones arrived on the scene, he did not

see or speak to any other uniformed police officer about the incident. We note that

Ms. Lewis did testify that the police were there when the fight started and that she

purposefully avoided two police vehicles parked outside of the Community Center

as she was following Ms. Wessinger out ofthe building. However, it is unclear from

Ms. Lewis' testimony if she is actually referring to an officer being present when the

altercation began or if it was simply the police cars that she was trying to evade as
she was exiting the Community Center. Moreover, Ms. Lewis' reference to a

uniformed, black male police officer standing behind her as the altercation was

taking place is not dispositive of the issue of whether security was present. The

record is devoid of any information concerning the investigating officer other than
his name, leaving open the possibility that the officer Ms. Lewis saw at that point of

the night was, in fact, Officer Jones, the officer who was dispatched to investigate
the incident.

Based on our de novo review of the record before us and the applicable

jurisprudence, summary judgment in favor of Chief Brown was inappropriate. We

find that Chief Brown owed a duty to Ms. Wessinger to provide security per the
contract that was reasonable under the circumstances. Genuine issues of material

21

fact remain as to whether a White Castle officer was in fact present during the party

and whether, if present, the officer performed his duty to provide security in a

reasonable manner. We reverse that portion of the judgment dismissing Ms.

Wessinger's claims against Chief Brown and remand for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm that portion of the trial court' s

April 10, 2024 judgment that granted summary judgment in favor of John Morris, in

his official capacity as Mayor of the Town of White Castle, and the Town of White

Castle and dismissed Linda Wessinger's claims against Mayor Morris and the Town

of White Castle. We reverse that portion of the trial court' s April 10, 2024 judgment

that granted summary judgment in favor of Mario Brown, in his official capacity as

the duly elected Chief of Police of White Castle, and dismissed Linda Wessinger's

claim against Chief Brown. We remand the matter for further proceedings. All costs

associated with this appeal are assessed against appellee, Chief Brown.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

22

STATE OF LOUISIANA

FIRST CIRCUIT

A I I

LINDA WESSINGER

VERSUS

JOHN MORRIS IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF TOWN AND
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OF WHITE CASTLE AND THE TOWN OF WHITE
CASTLE, LOUISIANA, AND MARIO BROWN IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE TOWN OF WHITE CASTLE AND SHARMEL
LEWIS AND KADARIUS FOSTER

cClendon, C.J., dissenting in part.

I agree with the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mayor Morris

and the Town of White Castle. However, I disagree with the majority's decision to reverse

that part of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Chief Brown.

The duty to protect patrons from criminal acts only arises under limited

circumstances, when the criminal act in question is reasonably foreseeable. Posecai v.

Wal- Mart Stores, Inc., 99- 1222 ( La. 11/ 30/ 99), 752 So. 2d 762, 766; Brown v.

England, L. P., 2024-0264 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 26/ 24), 405 So. 3d 766, 771. It is only when

the proprietor has knowledge of, or can be imputed with knowledge of, the third party's
intended conduct that the duty to protect is invoked. Brown, 405 So. 3d at 771.

In this matter, Ms. Wessinger offered no evidence as to foreseeability, and, in fact,

submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the deposition testimony
of Ms. Lewis, wherein Ms. Lewis stated that she walked out of the side door of the gym

to fight Ms. Wessinger to avoid the police car in front of the building. Ms. Wessinger also

testified in her own deposition that she had no idea that Ms. Lewis was thinking of
confronting her at the party.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part.