Valerie Harding v. LDH - Aging and Adult Services

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT

2025 CA 0040
VALERIE HARDING
VERSUS

LDH-AGING AND ADULT SERVICES

JUN 2 4 2025

Judgment Rendered:

* OK KOK

ON APPEAL FROM THE
STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

i p DOCKET NUMBER $-18960
6 HONORABLE DAVID L. DUPLANTIER, CHAIRMAN:
Sp D. SCOTT HUGHES, VICE-CHAIRMAN:
J. STEWART GENTRY, JO ANN NIXON, CANDES C. CARTER,
i, p CRAIG A. NETTERVILLE & CODI PLAISANCE

BYRON P. DECOTEAU, JR., DIRECTOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CIVIL SERVICE

* OK OK KK
Danatus H. King Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
New Orleans, Louisiana Valerie Harding
Charles E. Watkins, Jr. Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
New Orleans, Louisiana LDH-Aging and Adult Services
Sherri Gregoire Attorney for
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Department of State Civil Service

BEFORE: PENZATO, STROMBERG, AND FIELDS, JJ.

FIELDS, J.

Valerie Harding, a former employee of the Louisiana Department of Health,
Office of Aging and Adult Services (“‘OAAS”), appeals a decision of the Louisiana
State Civil Service Commission (“the Commission”) that denied her appeal of the
OAAS’s termination of her employment. For reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 22, 2024, Ms. Harding, a “Program Manager 2 DHH” employed by
OAAS, who had a probationary appointment, was hand delivered a letter, signed by
Melinda Richard, Appointing Authority, notifying her that her employment with
OAAS was terminated effective that same day.! According to Ms. Harding’s appeal,
Ms. Harding had been employed with the State for more than 33 years, and in March
of 2023, she was promoted and received probationary appointment as a Program
Manager 2 DHH with OAAS. Ms. Harding alleged that before her promotion, she
achieved permanent civil service status as an Adult Protective Specialist Supervisor
and throughout her tenure, she consistently received positive performance
evaluations.

On June 20, 2024, Ms. Harding, through counsel, filed an appeal of her
termination with the Commission. In the appeal, Ms. Harding alleged that her
termination was discriminatory and based on personal animosity and other non-merit
factors.’

On July 10, 2024, the Commission referee issued a notice of possible defect

to Ms. Harding. In the notice, the referee noted Ms. Harding was a probationary

' According to Ms. Harding, before her termination, she was offered three choices: retirement,
resignation, or a position as a “APS Specialist in Region I/Job Appointment.” Ms. Harding
indicated that the APS Specialist position was not classified, was four steps below her current
position, and a substantial reduction in pay.

* Ms. Harding also appealed her termination on the ground that she filed a request pursuant to the
Family Medical Leave Act. However, on appeal to this court, Ms. Harding does not challenge her
termination based on any claim concerning the Family Medical Leave Act.

employee and “[p]robationary separations [were] only appealable if the employee
alleges that the action or decision violated the Civil Service Article or a Civil Service
Rule or discriminated against the employee because of political or religious beliefs,
race, or sex.” The referee indicated that “[d]iscrimination claims must be pled in
accordance with Civil Service Rule 13.11(d).” The referee found Ms. Harding’s
appeal lacked “specific facts, alleged in detail, to support the assertion that the action
or decision violated the Civil Service Article or a Civil Service Rule.” The referee
gave Ms. Harding 15 days to either explain in writing why the appeal should not be
summarily dismissed because of the defect or amend the appeal in a manner that
complied with Rule 13.11(d) to cure the defect(s) noticed.

On July 18, 2024, Ms. Harding filed an amended appeal that set forth
allegations similar to the allegations set out in the original appeal. On July 30, 2024,
the Commission, Chief Referee/Appeals Administrator’ issued her decision. The
Chief Referee found that Ms. Harding failed to show her termination as a
probationary employee violated the Civil Service Article or a Civil Service Rule
because Ms. Harding failed to “name others who [were] similarly situated that were
treated differently due to a specific non-merit factor, and one over which the
Commission [had] jurisdiction; namely race, gender, religion or political affiliation.
Nor [had Ms. Harding] identified how her actions were the same as others or related
that conduct to a specific type of discrimination.” The Chief Referee noted that
“{mJjere allegations of prejudice, discrimination/retaliation, manifestations of
personal animosity, being devalued or the victim of bias [were] insufficient.”

On August 5, 2024, Ms. Harding filed a request for review of the Chief
Referee’s decision with the Commission. In the request for review, Ms. Harding

asserted the referee’s decision was wrong in finding that Ms. Harding’s appeal and

> The Chief Referee and the commission referee are two different individuals and are referred to
as such.

amended appeal did not satisfy the requirements of Civil Service Rule 13.11; that
Ms. Harding failed to name others who were similarly situated, but treated
differently because of a specific non-merit factor of which the Commission had
jurisdiction; and Ms. Harding failed to identify how her actions were the same as
others or related that conduct to a specific type of discrimination.

On September 4, 2024, the Commission issued its decision, denying Ms.
Harding’s request for review of the Chief referee’s decision, rendering the Chief
referee’s decision final. This decision is the subject of the instant appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Ms. Harding sets forth three interrelated assignments of error:

1. The Commission erred in finding Ms. Harding had no right to appeal
to the Commission.

2. The Commission erred in summarily dismissing Ms. Harding’s
[alppeal.

3. The Commission erred in finding Ms. Harding’s [a]ppeal failed to
satisfy the requirements of [Civil Service Rule] 13.11, particularly
sections (d) 2, 3, 4, and 5.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Decisions of Civil Service Commission Referees are subject to the same
standard of review as decisions of the Commission itself, which are subject to the
same standard of review as a decision of a district court. Accordingly, factual
determinations of the Commission or referee should not be reversed or modified
unless clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. However, as to the Civil Service
Commission or Referee’s interpretation of laws and regulations, we perform our
traditional plenary functions and apply the error of law standard. Harris v.
Department of Public Safety & Corrections - Dixon Correctional Institute,
2022-1188 (La. App. Ist Cir. 6/2/23), 370 So.3d 43, 48. The issue before us is a
procedural one involving a determination of the sufficiency of an allegation rather

than a factual finding. The deferential standard of review afforded to factual findings

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are, therefore, inapplicable to our review of the referee’s decision for legal error.
Marcantel v. Department of Transportation and Development, 590 So.2d 1253,
1256 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Ms. Harding asserts that it is “unquestionable” that her appeal
states she was discriminated against for political reasons; therefore, she argues that
her appeal stated a valid cause of action for relief. Ms. Harding further asserts that
as she stated a valid cause of action pursuant to Civil Service Rule 13.10(b), the
Commission erred in summarily dismissing her appeal. Lastly, Ms. Harding asserts
that she satisfied the requirements of Civil Service Rule 13.11(d) 2, 3, 4, and 5.

The State Civil Service Commission is vested with “exclusive power and
authority to hear and decide all removal and disciplinary cases” and to appoint
referees to hear and decide removal disciplinary cases. La. Const. art. X, § 12(A).
The referees’ decision “is subject to review by the commission on any question of
law or fact[.]” La. Const. art. X, § 12(A). The commission’s final decision “shall
be subject to review on any question of law or fact upon appeal to the [C]ourt of
[A]ppeal wherein the commission is located[.]” La. Const. art. X, § 12(A). The
commission’s jurisdiction to hear appeals is limited to two categories of claims:
discrimination claims under Article X, § 8(B) of the Louisiana Constitution, and
removal or disciplinary claims under Article X, §§ 8(A) and 12(A) of the Louisiana
Constitution. Dogans v. Department of Revenue, 2013-1196 (La. App. Ist Cir.
2/18/14), 142 So.3d 20, 24. “[A] state classified employee who has been
discriminated against in any employment action or decision because of his political
or religious beliefs, sex or race” has a right to appeal to the Commission. Civil
Service Rule 13.10(b). An appeal to the Commission may be summarily dismissed

on the ground “[t]hat the appellant has no legal right to appeal.” Civil Service Rule

13.14(a)(2).

In summarily dismissing Ms. Harding’s appeal, the referee determined that
Ms. Harding insufficiently alleged discrimination according to Civil Service Rules,
and therefore, had no legal right to appeal. Civil Service Rule 13.11 sets out what
must be included in a notice of appeal. It provides, in pertinent part:

A notice of appeal must:

(d) Contain a clear and concise statement of the actions complained
against and a clear and concise statement of the basis of the appeal.
Where discrimination is alleged to be a basis for appeal, specific facts
supporting the conclusion of discrimination must be alleged in detail.
The specific facts required will vary depending on the nature of the
appeal; however, the facts must be alleged in sufficient detail to enable
the agency to prepare a defense. A conclusion of discrimination is not
sufficient. The types of facts which must be included are:

bee

. the date, time and place the discriminatory action took place;

2. the name of the person or agency alleged to have taken the
discriminatory action;

3. adescription of how appellant’s action, conduct or performance was
the same as that of other persons who were treated differently;

4. the names of other persons treated differently and the dates the
different treatment occurred;

5. a description of events, including the dates and circumstances
thereof, which led appellant to believe that the adverse decision was
based on his religious or political beliefs, sex, race, or any other non-
merit factor.
Where a violation of the Article or a Rule is alleged to be a basis for
appeal, specific facts supporting the conclusion that a violation has
occurred must be alleged in sufficient detail to enable the agency to
prepare a defense.
Although permanent status employees in the classified civil service have the
right to appeal disciplinary actions to the Civil Service Commission, an employee
who has not obtained permanent status (i.e., a probationary status employee), is not

entitled to review of an appointing authority’s action by the Civil Service

Commission unless there is an allegation of discrimination. Kling v. Louisiana

Department of Revenue, 2018-1480 (La. App. Ist Cir. 7/18/19), 281 So.3d 696,
708, writs denied, 2019-01434, 01441 (La. 11/5/19), 281 So.3d 671.

In Ms. Harding’s appeal of her termination, dated June 20, 2024, Ms. Harding
described several incidents in which she alleged that her supervisor, Shannon
Ioannou’s, actions constituted discriminatory actions. Ms. Harding alleged that on
January 29, 2024, she participated in a conference with Ms. Ioannou about her “PES‘
Mid-Year Review FY24.” Ms. Harding indicated that the meeting lasted one hour
and forty-five minutes because of Ms. Ioannou’s inability to provide “solid answers”
to Ms. Harding’s questions about the “PES.” Ms. Harding described this incident as
the beginning of Ms. Ioannou’s discriminatory refusal to address Ms. Harding’s
managerial needs. Ms. Harding insisted that the managers of the other sections
received positive attention from Ms. Ioannou.

Ms. Harding also alleged that on February 2, 2024, during a weekly meeting
with Ms. Ioannou, Ms. Ioannou began the meeting with the statement, “I don’t have

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anything to discuss today.” Ms. Harding insisted that Ms. Ioannou’s silence left her
“without guidance in her role as a manager.” She considered Ms. Ioannou’s refusal
to provide guidance to be discriminatory because she alleged that Ms. Ioannou
provided continuous guidance to the Intake/Facility Manager, Shelly Hebert (“Ms.
Herbert’).

Ms. Harding described another incident that occurred on February 6, 2024.
Ms. Harding alleged that after her “PES Mid-Year” review, during her weekly
meetings with Ms. Ioannou, Ms. Ioannou began the meetings with the statement that
“she had nothing to discuss/no agenda” despite the fact that Ms. Harding’s mid-year

review completed by Ms. Ioannou and Sharon Jackson (“Ms. Jackson”), Program

Director, Adult Protective Services, indicated Ms. Harding had many things to

* It is not apparent from the record what PES means.

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improve on. Ms. Harding alleged that for every weekly meeting after February 6,
2024, Ms. Ioannou failed to discuss performance issues and failed to provide
guidance on Ms. Harding’s decisions/actions as manager. Ms. Harding insisted this
was another example of “discrimination/retaliation, manifestation of personal
animosity.”

Ms. Harding further alleged that on February 20, 2024, she called Ms. Jackson
to discuss work-related concerns, and Ms. Ioannou was also present. Ms. Harding
stated that she was instructed that it was her job not to allow staff concerns to come
to Ms. Jackson’s level. Ms. Harding indicated that on February 26, 2024, she
scheduled a meeting with Ms. Ioannou to request permission to contact an outside
agency for an upcoming meeting, and Ms. Ioannou provided no additional guidance
but approved of Ms. Harding’s prepared statement. Ms. Harding asserted that “[t]his
deprived [her] of training relating to communicating with others.” Ms. Harding
alleged that on that same day, Ms. Jackson called her into an impromptu meeting in
which Ms. Ioannou and Ms. Hebert were also present. Ms. Harding also alleged that
Ms. Jackson allowed Ms. Ioannou and Ms. Herbert to “bully” her and “call out
discrepancies with the staff in Region 9.” According to Ms. Harding, she was “not
allowed to verbalize her thoughts.” Ms. Harding stated, “[t]his was retaliation for
the staff in Region 9 requesting to speak with Ms. Jackson.” Ms. Harding alleged
that she was advised that “her job was to prevent anyone from coming to Ms.’
Jackson’s level.” Ms. Harding asserted, “[t]his behavior had never occurred with
any other managers.”

Ms. Harding further alleged that on March 11, 2024, she was discriminated
against by being placed on forced annual leave because of her car troubles. She
asserted that other managers were given the option to work remotely. Ms. Harding
stated that she was available to telework on the 11" through 13". Ms. Harding
identified other managers who were allowed to work remotely.

8

Ms. Harding claimed that on March 14, 2024, Ms. Hebert was willing to pass
on information to a reporter about a “newly assigned open investigation without
understanding the ramifications of this breach of information and violation of agency
policy.” Ms. Harding complained that Ms. Ioannou, in Ms. Hebert’s defense,
accused Ms. Harding of being incompetent in her role as a manager. Ms. Harding
considered Ms. Ioannou’s action to be “an act of discriminatory personal animosity
that belittled Ms. Harding’s ability to manage her section of the agency.”

According to Ms. Harding, on April 1, 2024, “the OAAS Newsletter showed
various collaborations amongst Ms. Jackson, Ms. [Ioannou], and Ms. Hebert in
which Ms. Harding was not invited to participate.” Ms. Harding asserted that she
was denied the right to advocate for her staff of 19 in meetings previously scheduled
by Ms. Jackson and Ms. Ioannou. Ms. Harding alleged that on May 6, 2024, “the
OAAS’s Newsletter showed various trainings attended by Ms. Ioannou that would
have [been] helpful to individuals on her staff”’ Ms. Harding insisted,
“{cjollaboration was allowed amongst Ms. Hebert, upper management, Ms. Ioannou,

3°

and Ms. Jackson.” Ms. Harding alleged that she was not invited to attend those
trainings.

In Ms. Harding’s amended appeal, she alleged claims similar to those alleged
in her original appeal. Ms. Harding alleged that on April 29, 2024, Ms. Jackson
came over to her “cubicle to discuss Ms. Harding’s response to an email sent earlier
and going into more detail regarding Ms. Harding’s identified ‘Safety Concerns[.]”
According to Ms. Harding, Ms. Jackson’s response to Ms. Harding’s list was a
display of micro-aggression, which again cast doubt on Ms. Harding’s managerial
skills. Ms. Harding alleged that Ms. Jackson repeated a statement used by Ms.
Jackson on various occasions that Ms. Harding “need[ed] to evolve as a manager.”
Ms. Harding described that statement as being “prejudicial and biased.” Ms.

Harding stated that Ms. Ioannou did not provide guidance, which made Ms. Harding

9

feel “more excluded than included as part of the management team, and favoritism
was placed more on both the needs of the Intake and Facility Investigation Sections
of the agency.” Ms. Harding stated that she managed the non-licensed investigation
section.

Ms. Harding indicated that after the discussion had on April 29, 2024, with
Ms. Jackson, Ms. Harding received additional training scheduled for May 10 and
May 15, 2024. Ms. Harding further indicated that she was unaware that her
impending separation from OAAS was scheduled for May 22, 2024. Ms. Harding
stated that “pretending to provide the needed trainings identified for Ms. Harding’s
management needs” was discriminatory in nature, as the truth was being hidden.
Ms. Harding alleged, “[o]ther managers were not treated in that manner.” Ms.
Harding stated, “[a]ny representation regarding the needs of the section managed by
Ms. Harding was taken in a prejudicial and biased manner as, they prefer to focus
on the needs of the Intake and Facility Investigation Section of the agency.” Ms.
Harding complained about not being able to present on a topic that affected the
section she managed at a meeting hosted by OAAS Secretary, Melinda Richard. Ms.
Harding alleged that other managers were permitted to discuss issues being
addressed in their sections, naming Ms. Hebert and Tanna Guidry as two of those
managers.

Ms. Harding further alleged that during a manger’s meeting on May 21, 2024,
Ms. Jackson treated her unfairly and devalued issues relative to Ms. Harding’s
section in the presence of other managers. According to Ms. Harding, Ms. Jackson
questioned Ms. Harding’s progress on a project by asking “why is it taking so long?”
Ms. Harding described Ms. Jackson’s response as “aggressive, devaluing, biased and
unprofessional as all appointments to complete the task were unknowingly canceled

by Ms. Harding’s supervisor, Ms. Ioannou.”

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In the instant case, Ms. Harding as a probationary employee could be
separated by the appointing authority at any time. See Civil Service Rule 9.1(e).
Therefore, Ms. Harding’s appeal of her termination was limited to allegations of
discrimination or a violation of the Civil Service Rules. Ms. Harding asserts she was
discriminated against because of her political belief that staff employees were
entitled to protection from physical harm and that those employees had a right to
submit their grievances to Ms. Jackson. Ms. Harding further asserts because she
continued to advocate on behalf of the staffs rights, a political battle ensued.

Ms. Harding failed to sufficiently allege that her views concerning the staff
employees’ protection from physical harm qualifies as a political belief, and her
mere conclusion that they constitute a political belief does not give rise to an
actionable claim of political discrimination. Therefore, Ms. Harding has not alleged
specific facts that would adequately satisfy the requirements for a claim of
discrimination based on political beliefs. Ms. Harding likewise failed to identify
others who were similarly situated that were treated differently because of their
political beliefs. Accordingly, Ms. Harding’s conclusions that her separation was
politically motivated are not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Civil Service
Rule 13.11(d). We therefore conclude, as did the referee, that Ms. Harding did not
satisfy the requirements of Civil Service Rule 13.11(d). We find no merit in the
assignments of error.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the referee, summarily
dismissing Valerie Harding’s appeal, which was adopted by the Louisiana State
Civil Service Commission. All costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant, Valerie
Harding.

AFFIRMED.

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